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Abstract 
The study investigates the role of International Basel Capital Regulation in taming the 
financial capital via improving risk management in banking. The study examines if capital 
adequacy ratios of commercial banks calculated under Basel Capital Accord reflect credit 
risk, market risk, operational risk, liquidity risk, and economic impact in Pakistan. The 
study employed dual methodology utilising both primary and secondary data. A Likert-
scale questionnaire was administered in addition to deploying panel data approach. 
The empirical outcome of the study states that economic predictors: GDP growth and 
Industrial Production growth do not significantly impact the Capital requirements of the 
commercial banks of Pakistan. In addition, the study also found market risk had no impact 
on Capital Adequacy Ratio of the commercial banks of Pakistan despite being major risk 
determinant of Basel Capital regulation methodology. The results of the study also show 
Non-performing loans had no impact on the capital requirements of the commercial banks 
of Pakistan. The results of the study evidenced that capital requirements of the commercial 
banks did not reflect impact of the economic activity in Pakistan. The empirical results also 
show that Credit risk and operational risk along with the size of bank and bank profitability 
show significant impact on capital requirements of the commercial banks of Pakistan. 
Credit risk being the only bank risk variable showing significant negative relationship with 
the capital adequacy ratio of the commercial banks of Pakistan.  
The study reveals that commercial banks of Pakistan are solvent and operate with adequate 
capital that is above the target set by the regulatory authorities to meet an episode of 
financial crises. However, the results also suggest that capital requirements of the 
commercial banks of Pakistan did not reflect impact of economic activity. Furthermore, 
results also evidenced that capital requirements of the commercial banks of Pakistan did 
not factor in full scale banking risks as market risk had no impact on capital requirements 
of the commercial banks of Pakistan.  
 
Keywords: Capital requirements, Basel Capital Accord, Pakistan, NPL, Credit Risk, 
Market Risk, Operational Risk. 
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Part 1: Financial Capital beyond bounds: Assessing the role of 
Bank risks and Basel Capitals in Pakistan 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The rise in globalization and in particular financialization1 where sharper rise in trade 
amongst financial intermediaries across borders has made economies inseparable, 
international banks systemically2 important and economic collapse of contagion nature 
highly probable (Aglietta 2016). Amidst such foray of economic activity, Financial Capital, 
the lifeblood of business managed to advance at a tremendous pace through the veins of 
the world economy, from one jurisdiction to another creating corporate giants in its path. 
Rise in borderless financial intermediation allowed variety of financial institutions3 get 
involved in the act of creating financial capital through development of complex financial 
derivatives to cater for all tastes, thus giving rise to financial capitalism beyond bounds. 
Financial institutions therefore, due to adoption of heightened speculative approach in their 
operations justly took the blame and brunt during the financial crisis of 2007-8. The study 
aims to investigate the role and limitations of banking regulations in improving the risk 
management in banking in light of global financial crisis. The study furthermore proposes 
to test the efficiency of bank capital regulations empirically and investigate that capital 
requirements of the banking institutions reflect banking risks and bank vulnerability to 
economic shocks. 
                                                 
1 Financialization, defined as growing influence of financial intermediaries in contemporary economic and 
political outlook. See Pike, A., & Pollard, J. (2010) for detailed synopsis of impact and role of financialization 
leading up to the global financial crises. Notes on the roots of financialization and contending theories is 
discussed in critical manner by Fouskas and Gokay (2012); Magdoff and Sweezy (1987); Arrighi and Moore 
(2001); Lapavitsas (2013); Aglietta (2000).    
2 Systemically importance banks (SIB) have been identified and studied intensively on backdrop of financial 
crises across literature to assess interconnectivity of SIBs and impact on global economic function see 
Drehmann and Tarashev (2013); Tabak et al (2013) 
3For instance Commercial banks, Investment Banks and Insurance companies 
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1.1.1 Financial Capitalism 
Episodes of economic crises starting as early as 18th, 19th and 20th centuries were rooted in 
financial capitalism (Rockoff 2010; Lapavitsas 2013). The role of banking in instigating 
financial crises peaked debate since 1772 collapse of Ayr bank, the case of British credit 
crises that originated in London. The economic slump caused by the financial crisis of 
1772, was similar to a number of crises fresh in memories including crash of 1929 (Black 
Tuesday) and global financial crisis of 2007-8. Aforementioned crises, and more cited in 
literature frequently marked the end of periods of credit boom. For instance, economic 
crises of 1772 followed Great Britain’s industrial expansion since mid1760’s, an era of 
growth attributed to availability of cheaper capital to merchants, facilitated through banks. 
The growth was down to easy availability of credit, therefore once availability of credit 
stopped the crises erupted (Sheridan 1960). The importance of debate on the role of money 
and banking was recognized as early as Adam Smith, although a blanket proponent of 
laissez-faire, however, reading into the financial crises of 1772 agreed with requiring a 
government regulation of some sort on regulating banking, later on endorsed by Friedman 
following his assessment of the crash of 19294. Not only that, through the history of modern 
financial crises intellects continued attempts to understand and explain the geneses of 
economic growth and decay emerged with pioneering theories of free market5; money 
supply6; and capital accumulation7.  
 
Financial literature8 debates in abundance Marx’s explanation that the rise of financial 
capitalism unavoidably charms economic downtrend. Therefore financial crises will 
always act as an innate predator of growth that feeds on over-accumulated capital during 
an era of global economic progress, in other words any form of regulation is pretty much 
                                                 
4See Rockoff (2010). Parallel journeys: Adam Smith and Milton Friedman on the regulation of 
banking. Rutgers University Department of Economics Working Papers, (201004). 
5 Adam Smith (1723-1790): The wealth of nations [1776]. 
6 David Hume (1711-1776)     
7 Karl Marx (1818-1823) 
8See Fouskas and Dimoulas (2013)  
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helpless in taming the growth of Finance and subsequent financial crises (Lapavitsas, 
2008). For instance argument posited by John Kay9 that 97 percent of the loan extended by 
the banks in England funded loan portfolios of banks and that evidenced activities related 
to financial derivatives involving financial innovation for the purpose of profit making only 
with no contribution to real economic growth, and that mystifies the entire convention of 
financial intermediation facilitated by the banking sector in potential economic 
development, tormenting the role of banking regulations. Nevertheless, banking 
regulations exist, the practice of following a crises with a set of regulations has gone on for 
ages and perhaps a new regulation will occur following sighting of next episode of crises. 
For instance, Zingales (2015) argues that more government regulation does not improve 
stability of financial district due to the fact that formation of regulatory bodies followed 
episodes of crises10, and further lists in fines paid by the Banking institutions11 of their 
alleged exploitation of gaps in regulations despite presence of strict regulatory 
consequences. 
 
1.1.2 Role of Banking: Globalization, Financialization and Global 
Financial Crises 
Banking institutions no doubt form an integral part of economic and political engineering 
due to systemic nature of their operations, for instance banks’ inherent ability to facilitate 
credit creation and providing liquidity, once in a state of crises can threaten the stability of 
entire financial system (Santos 2001). The banking institutions, during the decades 
preceding the global financial crises seemed to have made the most of financial growth 
opportunities, engaged themselves in open market trading as traders, gatherer of fees and 
                                                 
9 Kay, J. (2015). Other People's Money: Masters of the Universe Or Servants of the People? Profile Books. 
10 for instance: Federal Reserve in 1913 to address the liquidity panic of 1907; Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) created in 1933 after the bank runs instances of 1930s, Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in 1934 to address stock market crash of 1929; Office of Thrift Supervision (OTT) in 
response to saving-and-loan crises of 1980s; Public Company Accounting Oversight Boards (PCAOB) after 
Enron scandal, and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) after the global financial crises 
11 Notable Banks in the list include Barclays, Royal Bank of Scotland, HSBC, Bank of America, BNP Paribas 
and Credit Suisse 
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commissions and as mediators in investing savers money (Fouskas and Dimoulas 2013). 
Susan Strange in her book ‘Casino Capitalism12’ published in 1986 stresses the need for 
regulating banks due to innovation in financial market instruments, growth in size of 
financial markets, commercial banks offering investment banking, and a shift to self-
regulations by banks. Banking institutions, given the rise in Casino Capitalism developed 
extraordinary reach, capturing individual, Corporations and Governments alike, deployed 
resources in conducting lending, handling savings and financial instruments, thus 
transformed into giant organizations the world cannot do without13. For example, despite 
international corporations’ measly attempts to distancing themselves from banks, still 
failed to escape the web of financial innovation casted by the banks because only 
commercial option open for raising larger sums of cash apart from banks for corporations 
would be the financial markets. Where banks again dominate in facilitating financial 
instruments as intermediaries, or underwriters and/or traders (Lapavitsas 2008).  
 
Thus, systemic importance of globally active banks as significantly influential on financial 
markets crucially highlighted during instant spread of the global financial crises originated 
by the credit crunch, consequently brings the role of central banks and regulatory 
framework developers in limelight as most burdened, emphasizing that the role of Bank 
Capital Regulations and Supervision in predicting financial health of the entire banking 
segment carries immense importance14. The empirical literature witnesses a number of 
heated debates on the subject of understanding underlying characteristics of risk 
management in banks, in particular under Bank Capital regulations and supervision in 
dictating bank profitability and its impact on soundness of the whole financial system. For 
instance, stricter bank capital regulations have positive impact on the bank performance 
through improved risk management (Chortareas et al 2012; Lee and Hsieh 2013). On the 
                                                 
12 The term ‘Casino Capitalism’ took its criticism later on and argued to be misleading in the title as players 
on financial markets can influence the price of securities they lay on, unlike a casino where the amount of 
stake on one number does not influence the outcome see Ribnikar (2011). 
13 Lapavitsas, C. (2013) The financialization of capitalism: ‘Profiting without producing’, City, 17:6, 792-
805 
14 Credit crunch is defined as credit squeeze faced by lending institutions including SIB’s. Collapse of SIB’s 
due to credit default was at the heart of the global economic meltdown during 2007-8.  
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contrary, financial literature sights plentiful research in conclusion that tighter control on 
bank capital has negative relationship with banks profitability (Barth et al 2010). In 
essence, debate in financial literature attempting to gauge economic impact of banks only 
reveals the impact of banking regulations and supervision based on empirical measures of 
samples selected for the studies so far, and there still remain territories where appropriation 
of the Basel Capital Accord post crises lacks empirical research, for example emerging 
economies (Frait and TomsÍk 2014). It justifies to contribute to the existing financial 
literature and further research activity in jurisdictions where the literature remains 
inadequate in understanding underlying characteristics of risk management of systemically 
important banks under the rules of internationally active Basel Bank Capital Regulations 
and Supervision.  
 
1.1.3 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
The modern banking regulation within the broader economic framework does exist, origins 
of which can easily be traced back to post financial crises of 1929-33, an era of Keynesian 
economics on rise arguing use of monetary and fiscal policies to offset economic 
downturns. Furthermore, post-World War II activities in this direction included 
international collaborations on economic and financial stability15, the introduction of 
Bretton woods system (1944-1971) of fixed exchange rates, formation of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. International Monetary Fund credibly tasked 
to facilitate global trade with global monetary cooperation towards economic growth and 
find monetary solutions for member countries experiencing balance of payment issues. 
World Bank on the other hand was chartered to loan money to the world of developing 
countries for reconstruction and development projects. Bretton Woods arrangement in 
wake of the World War II promised improved economic outlook at the time. Nevertheless, 
effectiveness of such measures remain questionable as following the zenith of the Bretton 
woods system, pillars of fixed exchange rate arrangements started to fumble (Nixon 
                                                 
15 Keynes (1883-1946) argued policy intervention necessary in striking balance between savings and 
investments as a way of curtailing financial crises see Keynes (1930) 
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shock)16 most notable episode being pound sterling crises of 196417. Against the backdrop 
of cracks appearing in the Bretton woods system, during 1960s well before the actual 
termination of the Bretton Woods, International Monetary Fund had already initiated 
informal consultations amongst financial regulatory bodies of major Western countries (G-
10 countries)18 focusing on liquidity related issues, for instance the General Arrangement 
of Borrowing (GAB) and Special Drawing Rights (SDR) (Rueff and Hirsch 1965). 
Following collapse of the Bretton woods system of fixed exchange rates, 1970s embarked 
upon a global floating exchange rate regime in an era of globalization19 rendering banks 
exposed to excessive exchange rate risk. For instance exchange rate risk based insolvencies 
that occurred in Herstatt Bank (Germany), the American Franklin National Bank (United 
States) and Israeli-British Bank (United Kingdom) simultaneously in 1974, were deemed 
interrelated but non-systemic (Norton 2010). In response to aforementioned events Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), a subcommittee informally formed by the 
Central Bank Governors of the G-10 countries, was tasked to develop an international bank 
supervisory standard focusing on institutional liquidity, addressing cross-border 
supervision and capital adequacy requirements of banks. 
 
1.1.4 Capital Adequacy: Basel Capital Accords 
Regulators at Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) viewed bank capital as 
significant indicator of the financial stability of the bank and a cushion against unexpected 
                                                 
16 President of United States Richard Nixon shook the world on 15 August 1971 closing the gold window 
imposing 10% surcharge on imported goods to prevent run on US gold reserves following negative BOP see 
Irwin (2013). The Nixon shock after forty years: the import surcharge revisited. World Trade Review, 12(01), 
pp.29-56. 
17 See Mundell (1971). Monetary theory; and Triffin, R. (1978). Gold and the Dollar Crisis: Yesterday and 
Tomorrow. International Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University for detailed 
critique on mechanism and collapse of Bretton woods 
18 G-10 refers to group of 10 countries established in 1962 member countries: United States, United Kingdom, 
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, and Sweden. Switzerland joined in 1964 
19 After Bretton Woods, financial capitalism gripped the world where banks peaked lending irrelevant of the 
purpose of why money is required that promoted consumption of money as opposed to investment, got 
involved in speculative profit making operations i.e. shadow banking, trading in stocks and bonds, the list 
can be exhaustive See Fouskas and Dimoulas (2013).  
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losses based on first consultative document called ‘Basel I Capital Accord’ released in 
1988. Basel I won the backing of Governors of the central banks of the G-10 countries and 
opened the gate for further industry consultations under the BCBS umbrella to achieve a 
prudential risk management framework across board banking institutions to mitigate 
systemic default probabilities. Basel Capital Accords20 recommend approaches to 
calculating capital adequacy ratios (CAR)21 for international banks in determining 
minimum capital requirements and managing important banking risks.  
 
Basel II in particular, the second in the string of Basel Capital consultations, proved hugely 
popular and received recognition of banking regulations pundits globally. Basel II, 
developed in 2004 prior to global financial crisis, improved on Basel 1 proposals to make 
bank capital more sensitive to risk by adopting either external credit ratings issued by 
external rating agencies or more advanced internal credit ratings based on the bank’s own 
developed risk models. Furthermore, Basel II promised more risk sensitive paradigm with 
increased number of risk categories, proposition of a mix of statistical models and expert 
opinion to help track a bank’s exposure to insolvency risk over a period. Basel II in essence, 
promoted enhanced market transparency with added focus on capital regulation and 
supervision in order to achieve set objective of improved risk management in banking. On 
the contrary, the investment bill for the banks to upgrade to Basel II was significant yet the 
incentive for these banks to make such investments in the new data management 
technologies was even greater, for instance reduction in the amount of regulatory capital22 
required and an increased return on equity. Despite improvements over Basel I, Basel II, 
the globally hailed spearhead international bank capital regulation framework misjudged 
the scale of interdependence amongst cross-border banking institutions and therefore, 
during the global financial crises it became clear that Basel II lacked that all important 
macro approach in risk management amongst banking institutions. Basel II, post global 
                                                 
20 Basel I released 1988, followed by amended releases in 1991 and 1995. Basel II consultation began in 1999 
and Basel II released in 2004, Most recent current format: Basel III; implementation initiated 2012 
21 CAR is ratio of Bank’s tier1 and tier 2 capital (off and on-balance sheet) to risk weighted assets, discussed 
in more detail in chapter 2 of the thesis. 
22 Regulatory capital is defined as the amount of bank capital required by regulatory authorities 
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financial crises paved the way in for serious consultations amongst industry operatives and 
BCBS, resulting in more prudent Basel III23 that improves on Basel II with inclusion of 
liquidity foresights and enhanced capital buffers. The journey of Basel Capital Accords 
continues in form of consultations, perhaps beyond Basel III, but is Banking Regulations 
on right track in taming the financial capital?  
The global financial crises, unveiled plenty of complex global financial structure 
interrogations within the field of risk management in banking under Basel Capital 
Regulations, for instance their role in over accumulation of debt24 and in particular 
securitization defined as transformation of non-liquid assets on balance sheets of banks 
into tradable securities to revive liquidity25. Development in complex financial structures 
of banking institutions such as securitization, starved Basel Capital regulations in timely 
signalling risk of default and as to how the bank’s portfolio of assets might vary in value 
when exposed to unexpected risk for instance global economic crises. Basel II Capital 
Regulations failed to tame such speculative arbitrage by the banks at any stage of 
securitization process. In addition, Basel II like Basel I, continued to be inflexible on 4 and 
8 percent minimum ratios of capital to risk-weighted assets, and therefore explicitly failed 
to accomplish its objective of providing buffer through capital during global financial 
crises. Standardized approach under Basel II relied on ratings provided by External ratings 
agencies. External credit rating agencies on the other hand, due to revenue based incentives 
relaxed ratings requirements causing potential ratings inflation. During the global financial 
crises, credibility of these ratings was seriously dented by frequent and large downgrades. 
In addition, credit ratings by the external credit rating agencies did not aid in setting capital 
requirements as they seemed only useful in establishing loss reserves for particular assets26. 
                                                 
23 Basel III requires banks to add extra 2.5% capital conversations buffer, liquidity control ratios see Caruana, 
J. (2010). Systemic risk: how to deal with it. Basel: Bank for International Settlements. 
24 See Minsky (1992) “The financial instability hypothesis”  for detailed discussion of the accumulation of 
debt and borrowers defined as Hedge, Speculative and Ponzi borrowers  
25 See Pagano, M., & Volpin, P. (2012). Securitization, transparency, and liquidity. Review of Financial 
Studies, 25(8), 2417-2453 
26 Behavior of bank loan-loss reserves see Treacy, W. F., & Carey, M. (2000). Credit risk rating systems at 
large US banks. Journal of Banking & Finance, 24(1), 167-201. 
 9 
 
Internal Rating Based27 approaches also failed to show resilience to the crises as Basel II 
held accountable for allowing big banks to develop their own models for assessing risk and 
determining the amount of regulatory capital, which conveniently led to banks being 
overoptimistic about their risk exposures. Massive losses reported by some of the world’s 
largest banks of developed economies compliant with Basel II framework28 quickly rolled 
over to causing a global financial distress. Despite the launch of Basel III on cards for the 
banks within advanced economies, the banks in the developing countries are trailing well 
behind the Basel III mark, and at best remain limited to Basel II standardized approaches. 
The role of capital regulations and supervision: Basel II Capital Accord in preventing the 
collapse of banking institutions during the global financial turmoil of 2007-08 is considered 
of great significance and well debated in literature. The research aims to take its place in 
contributing to taking a closer look the role and limitation of Basel Capital Regulation with 
an emerging economy perspective.  
 
1.2 Aim and Objectives of the study 
The study endeavours to determine if capital adequacy ratios calculated under Basel 
Capital Accord reflect credit risk, market risk, operational risk, liquidity risk, and risk of 
procyclicality in commercial banking structure of Pakistan. In broader context the study 
aims to contribute to understanding the role of banking regulations and supervisory in 
prudential risk management towards solvency of the commercial banks of Pakistan. 
 
1.2.1 Discussion of the Research Question 
Can banking regulation improve risk management practices in banking institutions and 
plays a significant role in putting a check on risky credit extension by the banks? The rise 
of banking institutions in an environment of extended credit lending activity and risks 
associated with spread of financial capital came to surface in a grand manner during the 
                                                 
27 Internal ratings based see Gordy, M. B. (2003). A risk-factor model foundation for ratings-based bank 
capital rules. Journal of financial intermediation, 12(3), 199-232. 
28 See Wellink, N. (2008). The importance of banking supervision in financial stability. BIS website, Basilea.; 
Benink, H., & Kaufman, G. (2008). Turmoil reveals the inadequacy of Basel II. Financial times, 28. 
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period of Global financial crisis of 2007-8 questions the question above. In discussion of 
role and limitations of banking regulations, Basel Capital Accord for instance, financial 
literature captures a number of empirical efforts extended in understanding the role of bank 
regulation through analysing capital adequacy ratio and correlated factors by testing a 
number of combinations of banks specific variables and economic indicators through 
econometric modelling in particular, using panel data methodologies. Amongst these 
efforts a number of key issues capturing role and limitations of Basel Capital Accord in 
developing countries also have come to surface by researchers and industry operatives in 
varied contextual paradigms, making pertinent literature knowledge rich. Risk 
management in banking and the role of banking regulation has featured in a number of 
previous researches. Losses suffered by the commercial banks due to loan defaults 
significantly impact the performance of the commercial banks highlighting importance for 
enhanced risk management in commercial banks. This is because loan defaults could 
severely affect the liquidity positions of commercial banks in addition to adversely 
impacting profitability and cause bank failures. There is empirical evidence of variation in 
losses suffered by different banks operating in same market with similarly diversified loan 
portfolios. Based on data gathered from nearly 2500 banks, Keeton and Morris (1987) 
concluded such variation in loss suffered by the banks due to loan defaults could be 
attributed to varied credit risk management approaches by the commercial banks directly 
related to the level of risk taking by that individual bank. Level of risk taking is discussed 
to be an important factor in managements’ failure of judgement in predicting bank 
vulnerability to economic shocks (Keeton and Morris 1987). The determinants of credit 
risk have been researched in a variety of jurisdictions with a mix of economic and bank 
specific factors tested for significance. For instance, empirical evidence based on panel 
data study for the period between 1985-1997 from Spain suggested both macroeconomic 
and bank specific variables for instance GDP growth, bank size and capital ratios constitute 
important determinants that explain variation in credit risk (Salas and Saurina 2002). In 
addition, an annual panel data between the periods from 1986 to 2000 was used to analyse 
relationship between economic activity and capital adequacy in Spanish commercial and 
saving banks. The results of the study supported a negative significant relationship between 
capital buffers and GDP growth rates (Ayuso et al 2002). The literature furthermore, 
suggests that rise in nonperforming loans in Sub-Saharan Africa during economic and 
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banking crises was due adverse economic climate. Macroeconomic volatility promote 
higher cost of capital and lower interest margins causing banks to write off loans and incur 
financial losses. There existed strong association between macroeconomic and 
microeconomic indicators and nonperforming loans in Sub-Saharan Africa. Empirical 
evidence of 1990s of Sub-Saharan Africa using panel data set suggested that undiversified 
loan portfolios of African economies explicitly remained exposed to external shock and 
therefore declining nonperforming loans would be associated with positive economic 
growth (Fofack 2005). Panel data modelling using both macroeconomic indicators and 
bank specific variables was employed to examine sensitivity of nonperforming loans to 
economic activity in Guyana. Economic indicators and bank variable were tested for 
significance and the results remained consistent with existing evidence in literature. 
Findings of the study showed positive relationship between nonperforming loans and real 
effective exchange rate, GDP growth inversely related to nonperforming loans however, 
there was no significant relationship detected between bank size and level of 
nonperforming loans it reports (Khemraj and Pasha 2009). Polat and Al-Khalaf (2014) 
conducted panel data study of capital requirements of listed banks in Saudi Arabia Stock 
Exchange covering the period from 2002 to 2012. The results of the study showed loan to 
assets ratio has negative significant impact on capital requirements however, leverage and 
size of banks have positive relationship with capital requirements of sampled banks in 
Saudi Arabia. Econometric analysis of 10 Mauritian banks using panel data for 12 year 
period between 2000 and 2012 showed that exchange rate, lagged loans and the size of 
banking institutions have positive impact on nonperforming loans (Poloodo et al 2015). 
Buyuksalcarci and Abdioglu (2011) analyzed relationship of bank specific variables and 
Capital adequacy ratio of Turkish banks for the period 2006- 2010 and indicated that loans, 
profitability and leverage have a negative significant impact on capital adequacy ratio, loan 
loss reserve and return on assets positively related with capital adequacy ratio in Turkish 
banks.  Chiuri et al (2001) found that imposing of Basel regulation capital requirements 
exert a negative impact on credit supply of banks, in particular less capitalized banks 
causing aggregate slowdown amongst emerging countries. In Pakistan, analysis of Islamic 
Banks reveal capital adequacy ratio exert a negative impact on financing behavior (Ayub 
and Javeed 2016) However, the results of the empirical analysis of listed commercial banks 
of Pakistan investigating impact of risk based capital requirements on the bank risk taking 
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behavior suggest that introduction of strict capital based regulation reduced asset portfolio 
risk of commercial banks of Pakistan (Ashraf et al 2016).  
Key questions considered by the researches above revolve around assessment of the role 
played by international bank capital regulations in making commercial banks resilient. In 
doing so the existing studies considered it vital to test that the capital adequacy ratios 
calculated under International Basel Capital Regulation reflect the important banking risks. 
The research takes its motivation from aforementioned studies and identifies a gap in 
testing the relationship of banking regulation in improving risk management practices in 
commercial banks of Pakistan. Furthermore it would be important to note that the 
commercial bank sensitivity to economic activity in Pakistan can be predicted through 
monitoring capital adequacy ratios. These and more, financial regulatory issues remained 
focal point of the research and the research views that such issues must be discussed by the 
researchers and banking professionals in emerging and developing economies parallel to 
the developed countries for instance Pakistan. Global financial crisis of 2008 sheds light 
on importance of investigating riskiness of banking assets in attempts to curtail expansion 
of credit extension, or in other words onslaught of financial capital beyond the bounds of 
control, putting at risk the solvency of systemically important commercial banks.  
 
Table 1. Panel Data Studies 
Authors Year Data 
Group 
Period 
of 
study 
Variables Methodology Result 
Keeton 
and 
Morris 
1987 US 1979-
1985 
Bank size, 
ROE, Credit 
concentration 
Panel Data – 
OLS 
Risk inverse to 
NPL 
Salas 
and 
Saurina 
2002 Spain 1985-
1997 
CAR, Size, 
Ownership,  
Panel Data – 
GMM 
CAR inverse to 
NPL 
Polodoo 
et al 
2015 Mauritius 2000-
2012 
Size, GDP 
growth rate 
Panel Data – 
GMM 
Post crises BSV 
significant 
Fofack  2005 Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
1990s Size, GDP, 
CAR 
Panel Data Macroeconomic 
factors impact 
NPL 
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Khemraj 
and 
Pasha 
2009 Guyana 1994-
2004 
GDP growth, 
NPL, Bank 
size 
Panel Data- 
PLS 
GDP growth 
inversely related 
to NPLs 
Polat 
and Al-
Khalaf 
2014 Saudi 
Arabia 
2008-
2012 
NPL, Size, 
CAR, ROA 
Panel Data – 
EGLS 
ROA positive 
CAR 
Cai and 
Huang 
2014 China 2008-
2010 
NPL, Size, 
CAR, GDP 
Panel Data – 
EGLS 
NPL negative 
impact CAR 
 
 
Motivated by the cause of mitigating factors instigating insolvencies in the banks during 
episodes of economic crisis, the study aims to investigate the role and limitations of Basel 
Capital Accord in commercial banks of Pakistan and record comments on performance of 
International Basel Capital Regulation in curbing financial crises in emerging and 
developing economies. In light of the discussion above, the study remains in line with 
existing efforts in fields of bank regulations and supervision (Table 1). This research aims 
to contribute to devising and testing a unique model to measure the economic impact on 
minimum capital requirements of commercial banks in Pakistan through combination of 
bank specific variables and economic indicators in a panel data setting. In addition panel 
data analysis, the research proposes questionnaire-based methodology that is novel and 
rarely used previously in studies of Basel Capital banking regulations and risk management 
in Pakistan. 
 
1.2.2 Objectives of the study 
The study aims to put to test the claims that Capital Adequacy Ratio acts as significant 
predictor of the financial stability of the banking sector. The study aims to test further if 
Basel Capital regulation plays an active role in effective risk management in commercial 
banks of Pakistan towards taming the spread of the financial capital:  
 
 Analyse role and limitation of Basel Capital Regulations in taming the financial 
capital in Pakistan. 
 Conduct empirical research to investigate Basel Capital Regulation reflect banking 
risks for prudential bank regulation and supervision in Pakistan. 
 Assess the economic impact of capital adequacy of commercial banks of Pakistan. 
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1.3 Rationale of research 
Amongst the broader economic framework of the journey from industrial capitalism to 
financial capitalism as basis for justifying economic crises29, the research simply aims to 
take place amongst focused empirical studies extending efforts in understanding the 
influence of Basel Capital bank regulations and supervision on risk management of the 
commercial banks within the context of developing countries. Can Bank Capital 
Regulations tame the financial capital? Banking regulations and supervision guidelines 
contained in Basel Capital Accords demonstrated sound theoretical base and route to 
benefit for the banks within developed countries showing eventual benefiting of the 
economy30. Following compliance, success stories and extended limelight in developed 
economies prior to the global financial crises, Basel Capital Accord attracted obvious 
attention from the developing countries. Basel Capital Accords, the on-going consultations 
have been partially integrated globally including a number of emerging economies where 
global market turbulence had raised major concerns to strengthen overall risk management 
framework of their banking institutions. Yet, because of a less sophisticated or restricted 
bank credit setup in developing countries with market operations in volatile political and 
economic conditions, it only proved challenging for banks in developing countries to 
implicate exact same methodology used in highly resourceful globally active banks. Note 
despite presence of advanced Basel II Capital Regulations, Banks in Europe and United 
States failed to cast away the clouds of financial loss and hit hard by the Global Financial 
                                                 
29 See Fouskas, V. K., & Gokay, B. (2012). Fall of the Us Empire: Global Fault-lines and the Shifting 
Imperial Order. Pluto Press Lapavitsas, C. (2009). Financialised capitalism: Crisis and financial 
expropriation. Historical Materialism, 17(2), 114-148. 
30 See analysis of varied empirical literature from 2001 to 2013 through comparison of main findings of the 
studies include proactive portfolio management, forward thinking, improved operational efficiency by Kaur, 
M., & Kapoor, S. (2015). Adoption of Basel norms: a review of empirical evidences. Journal of Financial 
Regulation and Compliance, 23(3), 271-284. 
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Crises of 2008. Thus, in comparison with developed countries of Europe and United States, 
commercial banks in developing countries stumble in their efforts to integrate advanced 
approaches under Basel II Capital Regulations in their commercial banking structures. 
Perhaps contrary to the developed world with comparatively better structured bank 
supervisory setup and research focused culture, the process of bank supervision in many 
developing countries remains inadequate, lacks domestic research lead consultation 
amongst banking industry technicians and therefore had failed to keep up with the rapid 
pace of exacerbated financial system fragility making them prone to crises. 
 
1.3.1 Need for Capital Adequacy: Developing Banking in Developing 
Countries 
Similar to developed countries, some of the major turning points in the emerging markets 
credit cycle during the past few decades have been associated with a string of crises31. 
Massive macroeconomic disruption, sharp fluctuations in interest rates, substantial 
currency depreciation and dramatic deflation of domestic demand followed episodes of 
crises. It can be argued that the Tequila Crises of 1994-95 and Asian crises of 1997 had 
given such concerns some urgency and the need for promoting research culture in emerging 
economies gained momentum. Tequila crises caused by Mexican peso devaluation against 
US dollar, had dramatic consequences domestically and caused major upheaval 
internationally. The demand for credit fell because of recession and prompted greater 
reluctance of borrowers to become indebted. Simultaneously the supply of bank credit 
declined, banks became more risk averse and a major stiffening of supervisory oversight 
reinforced the effect in many countries. Asian crisis similarly caused havoc in East Asia 
triggered by bankruptcy of Thailand during 1997 until IMF intervened to curtail the 
contagion nature of the Asian crises. Thailand witnessed almost four decades of continued 
economic growth before struck by economic downturn of 1997 caused by currency crises. 
                                                 
31 See Goldstein, M., & Turner, P. (1996). Banking crises in emerging economies: origins and policy options. 
In BIS Economic Paper 46. Bank for International Settlements, Monetary and Economic Department, Basle. 
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Thailand baht suffered significant devaluation as consequence and further sparked a 
banking crisis translated into Southeast Asian economic crisis (Wade 1998).32   
 
The importance of more work on capital regulations and banking supervision within 
emerging economies had gained recognition amongst regulators at the Bank of 
International Settlements (BIS)33. Notably, Bank of International Settlements meeting in 
February 1995 started the ball rolling where consultations focused on the challenges faced 
by financial regulatory authorities of developing countries begun as they introduced 
financial reforms, liberalizing their banking system towards global financial integration 
and becoming ever more systemically important (Turner 2006). Developing countries lack 
resources coupled with limited creditworthiness to borrow in international financial 
markets, makes it challenging for developing countries to cope with any global financial 
calamity. In addition, due to developing countries constantly increasing level of financial 
integration with the rest of the world, changes in the developed world’s financial 
architecture following global financial crises have direct consequences for the developing 
countries. There exist a need for capital regulatory framework incorporating developing 
countries circumstances. Basel Capital Regulation despite its positive aspects, struggled to 
tame the financial capital in developed world, therefore the validity of Basel Capital 
Accord in an emerging economy setup remains dubious. It perhaps justifies international 
Bank Capital Regulation consultations to explicitly incorporate circumstances the 
developing world operates in. The research therefore, aims to test the Basel Capital Accord 
effectiveness with an emerging economy set up and extend research in fields of banking 
regulations and supervision on financial stability of the banking structures in developing 
countries.   
 
                                                 
32Literature sights discussions in detail the implications of capital changing hands freely without a regulatory 
framework See Wade, R. (1998). The Asian debt-and-development crisis of 1997-? Causes and 
consequences. World development, 26(8), 1535-1553 for a detailed critique 
33 Bank of International Settlements established in 1930 in Basel, Switzerland to promote monetary and 
financial stability through cooperation amongst the central banks see Toniolo, G., & Clement, P. 
(2005). Central bank cooperation at the Bank for International Settlements, 1930-1973. Cambridge 
University Press. 
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1.3.2 Islamic Republic of Pakistan   
Pakistan34 gained independence from British rule in 1947 as an Islamic Republic, the 
second largest developing economy in South Asia with her economic climate easily 
comparable with the most developing economies of the world. Independence was 
theoretically aimed at converting Pakistan into a welfare state for the Muslims of the 
subcontinent. However, the focus switched towards state building instead of stimulating 
common people welfare. Primary needs of the people for example health, education and 
shelter suffered in hands of incompetent power and rising corruption, in addition security 
situation also deteriorated. Pakistan inherited weak industrial and agricultural structures as 
India occupied more developed regions at the time of partition35. Despite that, economic 
activity witnessed high rates of investment growth achieved during 1950s with the 
industrial development initiatives in Pakistan with the cooperation of the World Bank 
pioneering development finance institutions in Pakistan for instance Pakistan Industrial 
Credit and Investment Corporation (PICIC) and Pakistan Industrial Finance Corporation 
(PIFCO) later on replaced by Industrial Development Bank (IDB) in 196136. The banking 
sector of Pakistan grew during economic growth for instance in 1969 exports of Pakistan 
alone were higher than Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand (Rammal 2008). 
During 1970s Pakistan politically switched towards a socialist economy from prevailing 
liberal capitalist approach under her first democratically elected government evidenced by 
the intervention of government through initiating nationalization37 of banks, insurance, 
educational institutions and industries. This discouraged private investment in Pakistan 
causing increase in public expenditure and widened budget deficit followed by reduced 
subsidies and indirect taxes. Late 1979s witnessed toppling of elective democracy in 
                                                 
34Pakistan, out of a total of 9 nuclear capable countries (United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, 
China, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel) only Muslim country in the world to develop Nuclear reactors 
started in 1972, completed successful underground nuclear tests: code name ‘Chagai-I’ in 1998.  
35 Papanek, G. F. (1967). Pakistan's development, social goals and private incentives. Harvard University 
Press. 
36 GDP growth rates of 5% on average during early to mid1950s see Isran, M. A., & Isran, S. (2013). 
Introduction of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in Pakistan: Transition towards Market 
Economy. Journal of Business Strategies, 7(2), 73. 
37 Transfer from private to state ownership. 
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Pakistan with another military rule with capitalist approaches for instance privatization38 
and western aid39 that helped GDP growth to increase to 6.6% during 1980s from 5% 
during 1970s. In addition, in 1989 Pakistan signed a $2.1 billion, structural reform program 
with IMF (Isran and Isran 2013). 
Pakistan during the past couple of decades witnessed average Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) growth rate above the high income countries since 2005 see Figure 1. Note that 
Pakistan remained resilient through the period of global financial crises as opposed to the 
rest of the comparable upper middle and lower middle income economies. Pakistan shares 
her borders and trades with China, and in particular India despite some political and 
geographical friction. Both India and China are G-2040 member countries and the region 
has accelerated economic development during past few decades with China and India 
leading the way. China and Pakistan in particular, boast close economic and political ties. 
Pakistan and China recently announced China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). CPEC 
project proposes China’s investment circa $46 billion in Pakistan in a variety of energy and 
infrastructure projects including network of roads and railways in Pakistan. The CPEC 
draws in systemically important Chinese banking institutions including Exim Bank of 
China, China Development Bank and Industrial Commercial Bank of China making 
Pakistan systemically important.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: World Development Indicators 
                                                 
38 Industrialized units nationalized during 1970 were returned to original owners during 1980s. 
39 In particular from US, total of $3.2 billion after Soviet interference in Afghanistan in 1979 increased 
remittances from $0.5 to $3.2 billion in 1980s see Rammal (2008). 
40 G20 refer to Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile (joined later in 2010), Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia (joined later in 2010), Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel (joined 
later in 2010), Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Latvia (joined later in 2016), Mexico, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, United States 
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1.4 Research problem 
In Pakistan similar to many developing economies, prior to the structural reforms regime 
announced by the government, banks were strictly instructed on the allocation of credit to 
specific sectors, in particular to finance the General Government and a plethora of 
administrative interests were set for various purposes. Fees were also regulated in detail. 
Prudential regulation, particularly capitalization and provisioning requirements, were 
weak. Pakistan had nationalized its domestic banks in the mid1970s. Since then, state-
owned credit and saving institutions have held a dominant role in the financial sector. In 
Pakistan, the presence of institutional instruments, including the National Saving Scheme 
remain significantly influential on gross domestic savings. In this environment, banks had 
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little incentive and negligible means to assemble additional savings, reduce operating costs, 
or make lending decisions based on creditworthiness. Aforementioned discussion shed 
light that government of Pakistan aimed to make structural remedy to the financial 
infrastructure starting from banks, in a bid to making the financial industry more 
competitive and transparent. The suggested reforms included re-privatizing formerly 
nationalized banks, liberalizing interest rates and credit ceilings, strengthening the central 
bank’s supervisory capacity and imposing standardized accounting and auditing systems, 
scheduled to be initiated under broader macroeconomic structural adjustment program 
during late 1980s (Ul-Haque 1997). Pakistan, as discussed above starting in 1988, very 
substantially de-regulated the allocation of credit, interest rate; liberalized entry into the 
financial sector; privatized major state-owned banks; introduced modern prudential 
regulation and supervision. Pakistani authorities also pursued to liberalize exchange 
controls, and permitting the opening of foreign currency deposits (Haque and Kardar 
1995).  
 
On the basis of keeping in view the global response with regards to banking regulation and 
supervision towards Basel Capital Accord and to bring bank regulatory and supervisory 
standards to international bench mark of Basel compliance, the State Bank of Pakistan 
decided to adopt Basel Capital Accord in Pakistan. Based on Basel 1 guidelines from the 
end of 1997, banks were required to maintain an 8% minimum risk-weighted assets41 to 
capital ratio42, and disclosure of loan classification (Hardy and Patti 2005). Basel II 
implementation, believed to further strengthen existing risk management framework of the 
commercial banking sector of Pakistan. However Basel II, costly to implement, complex 
to understand and prescriptive in its numerous recommendations, favored active risk 
management and in preparation for its adoption, commercial banks in Pakistan would need 
to improve their core risk management models tremendously43. In particular, costs of 
compliance with the Internal Ratings Based approaches are significant, ranging from 
                                                 
41 Risk weighted assets refer to assets after risk weightings applied under Basel Capital Regulations. 
42 Refers to Capital under Basel II: Tier 1 (core capital) and Tier 2 (supplementary capital) 
43 Lastra, R. M. (2004). Risk-based capital requirements and their impact upon the banking industry: Basel 
II and CAD III. Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 12(3), 225-239. 
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investments in data collection and IT systems to training and recruiting specialist staff 
(Bischofberger and Rybach 2003). Regardless of challenges in integrating Basel II, State 
Bank of Pakistan initiated Basel II implementation in 2006 (SBP 2005). Following the 
State Bank of Pakistan directive, the standardized approach under Basel II Capital Accord 
has become business as usual since 2007 and the commercial banks of Pakistan are 
reporting their capital adequacy accordingly44. Compliance in Pakistan, with a developing 
economy set up presents unique opportunity to test the suitability of Basel Capital Accord, 
a regulatory tool originally meant for developed economies. 
 
1.4.1 Need for Banking regulations and Supervision in Pakistan 
In Pakistan GDP growth rate in the past decades averaged 4.3% since 1990s, in comparison 
with GDP growth rate of 6% prior to commencement of structural reforms45, evidencing 
that a weak financial system in developing countries tend to undermine the effectiveness 
of monetary policy where financial development can be deciding factor for economic 
growth at macro-level, promoting increase in national income and wealth that permits 
people to make more deposits and encourage monetary sophistication. For instance 
amongst the discussions on role of financial integration, Krugman (1993) argues that 
international financial integration is unimportant and there is lack of evidence that capital 
flows46 impact growth positively within developing economies. This was argued by 
Keynesian economists47 concluding that regulatory intervention is unavoidable seeing into  
post-World War II era termed as “Golden age of Capitalism”, when economic focus of the 
governments included introduction of regulations and publication of economic indicators 
on the backdrop of growth rates of 1950s and 1960s amongst industrialized nations. 
                                                 
44 State Bank of Pakistan Circular No.1, 2008 
45 See McCartney, M. (2015). The Missing Economic Magic: The Failure of Trade Liberalization and 
Exchange Rate Devaluation in Pakistan, 1980-2012. The Lahore Journal of Economics, 20, 59. 
46 Capital flows include capital investments, portfolio investments (debt and equity), FDI (including start-
ups), from Industrial countries to less developed countries (LDCs). 
47 See Marglin, S. A. (1990). Lessons of the golden age: an overview. The Golden Age of Capitalism, Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1-38. 
 22 
 
Nevertheless, advanced financial intermediation enables firms to raise and manage large 
amounts of funds more effectively, resulting in comparatively rapid economic 
development (Levine, 2002). A number of empirical studies surfaced utilizing a 
combination of economic and financial indicators attempting to evidence the link between 
financial system and economic activity. For instance some empirical evidence suggest, 
during 1970s and 1980s positive causal relationship between financial development 
measured by liquid assets of the financial system as share of GDP caused reduction in 
moderate poverty, however same relationship could not be achieved during 1980s to 1990s 
sample when financial development measured through proxy of credit extended by the 
financial institutions48. Amongst debaters, Asghar and Hussain (2014) use panel data and 
evidence strong relationship between financial development and economic growth 
amongst developing countries. Rashti et al (2014)49 discusses that capital markets had a 
positive impact on economic growth of developing countries during 1990-2010, using 
GMM methodologies in light of global financial crises. Al Samman and Azmeh (2016)50 
differentiating between financial liberalization and financial development, showed that 
financial development had positive impact on economic growth in a sample of 47 countries. 
Banking sector development is argued to be particularly important for developing 
economies since a bank-based system has a greater impact on growth at the early stage than 
a market-oriented financial system (Fase & Abma, 2003; Tadesse, 2002). However, in the 
context of developing economies, financial liberalization needs to be initiated carefully 
through extensive research and consultations, as a too rapid and uniform liberalization 
strategy of the banking industry may not bring optimal outcomes. Empirical evidence 
suggests that countries which hurried liberalizing their banking systems are significantly 
more likely to face a financial crisis see Demirguc‐Kunt, et al (2013). Thus, need for 
continued contribution in knowledge of banking regulations and supervision in emerging 
economies is justified. Islamic Republic of Pakistan likewise comparable developing 
                                                 
48 Perez-Moreno, S. (2011). Financial development and poverty in developing countries: a causal analysis. 
Empirical Economics, 41(1), 57-80  
49 Financial development measured by banking system credit to GDP, ratio of services provided by the banks 
to private sector to GDP 
50 See Al Samman, and Azmeh, C. (2016) for discussion on effect of financial liberalization 
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countries, to prosper economically, must strengthen her financial system and work towards 
eliminating deep rooted issues including poverty51, terrorism52 and political unrest53 in the 
country. Furthermore, Pakistan since independence, faced a number of events of 
misfortunes including three of the history’s biggest refugee crises54, three major wars with 
neighboring India55, and a number of natural calamities56. Nevertheless, Pakistan 
seemingly took daring steps towards financial system stabilization at least, in shape of 
comprehensive and far-reaching restructuring policy. There is little empirical evidence that 
identifies the underlying characteristics of the capital regulations and risk management in 
Pakistani banking sector (Akhtar 2006). Earlier, Hardy and Patti (2003) found that the 
revenue performance of all banks, particularly privatized banks, improved significantly 
after as compared to before banking reforms in Pakistan. Mushtaq et al (2015) finds that 
credit risk was negatively associated to the profitability of banks in Pakistan under capital 
adequacy paradigm. Numerous issues regarding risk management and capital adequacy in 
                                                 
51 See Karim and Iraqi (2015), a detailed discussion on the issue of poverty alleviation and role of public 
policy in Pakistan 
52 Pakistan reputed as to be home of the world’s most notorious terrorist groups including Al-Qaeda. Pakistan 
remains in league of countries hit the hardest by terrorism with over 5,500 fatalities between 2007-2009 see 
Nasir, M., & Shahbaz, M. (2015).   
53 Three eras of military rule by way of military coups: General Iskander Mirza 13 years (1958 – 1971); 
General Zia-ul-Haq 11years (1977-1988) and General Pervez Musharaf 9 years (1999-2008); spanning over 
33 years out of a total of 69 year history of Pakistan.     
54 1947 the independence of Pakistan led an estimated 14 million people to move: Hindus to India and 
Muslims to Pakistan; 1971 civil unrest of Pakistan led to creation of divided Pakistan (formerly West 
Pakistan) and Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan), the event witnessed around 10 million refugees most of 
whom later settled in now Bangladesh; 1980 Pakistan initially took estimated 3.3 million Afghan refugees 
resulting from Soviet war, 1.5 million of whom later moved to Iran leaving Pakistan with over 2 million 
Afghan refugees.  
55 All wars stem from the territory conflict of ‘Kashmir’ with neighbouring India. War of 1947; War of 1965; 
War of 1971. Followed by a number of border skirmishes and stand offs including Kargil 1999 and Siachen 
2003. 
56 Earthquakes and floods discussed in detail see Houze et al (2011) Anomalous atmospheric events leading 
to the summer 2010 floods in Pakistan. Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 92(3), p.291; 
Warraich et al (2011). Floods in Pakistan: a public health crisis. Bulletin of the World Health 
Organization, 89(3), pp.236-237. 
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Pakistan banking have been debated in literature57. However, research on Basel compliance 
in Pakistan remains brief and literature fails to spot studies explicitly focus to quantify the 
steps taken by Pakistani government to prevent banking crises including Basel Capital 
convergence.  
 
1.4.2 Basel Capital Regulations Compliance in Pakistan 
The study, in broader context proposes to the investigate role of Basel capital regulation in 
calculating and monitoring capital adequacy ratios towards better risk management in 
commercial banks of Pakistan. Basel implementation appeared well regarded amongst 
financial industry operatives of Pakistan as an effective tool for improved international 
financial stability, nevertheless compliance limitations in Pakistan revolve around lack of 
technical expertise (Masood and Fry 2012). There is no study to date analyzing explicitly 
the implementation of Basel II in Pakistan in context of testing the role of Basel Capital 
framework in enhancing resilience of commercial banks of Pakistan. This represents an 
opportunity to extend research in operational complexity in integrating Basel II in Pakistan. 
Basel Capital Regulation was developed in the developed world with the developed world 
in mind, therefore it would be interesting to note how Basel Capital Regulation benefits 
Pakistan in improving loan quality and taming financial capital. Basel Capital Regulation 
Study aims to answer the question, is Basel Capital Regulation appropriate for Pakistan 
with a developing economy perspective. The study aims to accomplish this in Pakistan 
through gathering empirical evidence and test if important banking risks as well as 
procyclicality are reflected in capital adequacy ratios of the commercial banks of Pakistan. 
 
Commercial banks of Pakistan even though operating in a developing economy, were 
compliant with Basel II Capital Accord standardized approach during the period of global 
financial crisis and signaled early recovery as opposed to the banks of developed world 
                                                 
57 Afzal and Mirza (2012) found no relationship between risk diversification and nonperforming loans in 
Pakistan; Shar et al (2010) found that performance of Pakistani banking industry improved with increase in 
capital base; Ahmed and Malik (2015) used questionnaires to extract determinants of loan performances in 
Pakistan and found credit terms have significant impact on loan performance 
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who failed to sustain the crises58. This may simply be attributed to the complexity of 
operations in International versus Pakistani commercial banks, nevertheless offers a unique 
opportunity to extend research in role played by Basel Capital Accord in the resilience of 
commercial banking sector of Pakistan. The research therefore, concentrates on developing 
economies perspective, and remains aligned with contributing to existing literature on 
effectiveness of banking regulations and supervision see Barth et al (2010).  
 
 
 
1.5 Methodology 
1.5.1 Conceptual Framework 
Research fundamentally benefits when simplified by defining concepts and by succeeding 
in creating an efficient conceptual framework. Consistency must be achieved in the 
structure of the project from the onset to remain aligned with the cause. In addition to 
providing guidance in the framing of the research question, there opens an opportunity to 
trial the research conceptual framework against the research findings (Fisher 2007). Thus, 
conceptual framework effectively work towards theories that explain the patterns contained 
within the research theme and broadly help depict the relationship between such concepts. 
It is considered suitable to discuss important approaches widely campaigned in literature. 
Grounded approach was carefully considered as the starting point, that theory or the 
concept should emerge out of the material analysed rather than pre imposing a framework. 
Due to an implicit characteristic of the theory developed under grounded approach (i.e. to 
be emerged out of the research material) this approach in practice may exceed time 
constraints. In addition, grounded approach like all other, not only depends upon accuracy 
of the research material gathered, but also requires researcher to negotiate effective coding 
and comparison of the research material. Nevertheless, every time grounded approach is 
adopted masterfully the researches resulted in useful theories developed (Glaser and 
Strauss 1967).  On the contrary, a ‘Structured approach’ based on a preliminary theory, 
concept or hypothesis is applied at the commencement of the study, the applied framework 
                                                 
58See chapter 6 secondary data analysis of the study 
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then directs the data collection themes and ultimately steers the research through that 
initially set path. The study follows a structured approach based on the framework 
developed at the beginning.  
The conceptual framework adopted by the study while acknowledging importance of risk 
management in banking assesses the role of international banking regulations under Basel 
Capital Accords. The conceptual framework of the study further recognizes prominence of 
possible economic implications of internationally active global banks’ capital adequacy 
variations. Economic fluctuations inflicting variations in banks’ capital base thence may 
simply be termed as Procyclicality. Traditionally important financial risks faced by the big 
banks have been identified and calculated under Pillar 1 of the Basel Capital Accord to 
keep at bay any possibilities of a systemic financial turmoil. The theory may be further 
defined simply as that banks in times of economic stability and boom enjoyed relaxed 
regulations allowing banks to take riskier more profitable positions. However, following 
an economic shock stringent regulatory requirements may be imposed on banks resulting 
in possible halt on banks’ growth that eventually translates back in the economy 
exacerbating procyclicality. Aforementioned, episodes of global financial crises demand 
testing the durability and the impact of at the time implemented risk management practices 
and question effectiveness of bank regulations in taming financial capital. The conceptual 
framework remains the foundation of the study proposing daringly to test Basel Capital 
Regulations claims of financial sector durability through Capital Adequacy Ratio in 
commercial banking sector of Pakistan. In order to test if Basel Capital Regulation remains 
truly reflective of most important banking risks in Pakistan and other combinational 
economic and environmental factors including most importantly, presence of 
Procyclicality of banks’ capital requirements, the conceptual framework of the study 
thenceforth supports to categorizing important banking risks and economic forces tackled 
by the commercial banks in Pakistan. Best suited strategy to testing the concept further, 
would be to evaluating the combinational impact of aforementioned bank specific 
variables, economic indicators and important bank risks on minimum capital requirements 
of the commercial banks of Pakistan. Following Figure 2 displays within the economic 
climate, currently applied Capital Adequacy Ratio constituents with liquidity moving in. 
The diagram also lists additional factors under the clouds of economic unpredictability 
 27 
 
around the International Banking Regulations, all to be tested for their impact on capital 
requirements of the commercial banks in Pakistan in order to determine the 
creditworthiness of commercial banking sector of Pakistan. 
 
 
Figure 2: Conceptual Framework 
 
 
1.5.2 Research Methodology 
The research project proposes to adopt dual methodology based on collection of both 
secondary and primary data.  Questionnaire based methodology is applied to gather views 
of key risk managers of the commercial banks of Pakistan on the topic. In banking, the 
views of the key risk managers of the sampled institutions have effectively been obtained 
through structured questionnaires in order to analyze political risk and determinants of non-
performing loans (Masood and Bruno 2008; Wahlström 2009; Masood and Stewart 2008, 
Al-Tamimi and Al-Mazrooei 2007).  
The questionnaire circulated by the study contained a demographical profiling questions 
section along with questions enquiring Basel II implementation, Active Risk Management 
(ARM) under Basel Capital Accord and the impact of procyclicality on the capital 
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requirements of the sampled Commercial Banks. The respondents of the study included 
senior level risk managers of the commercial banks of Pakistan responsible for supervising, 
the implementation; and day to day running of the business in accordance with Basel 
Capital Adequacy framework. This information extracted from the questionnaires 
exploring Basel Capital Regulations in commercial banks of Pakistan is expected to be 
reality rich, based on respondents’ decision making authority and weighing key factors see 
Saunders and Allen (2002).  In addition to descriptive statistical analysis, cross-tabulations 
and hypothesis testing applied to analyze collected primary data, where chi-squared test 
considered most appropriate that is applied frequently see Masood and Sergi (2008). The 
study managed to gather 104 completed observations within population sample size of 
twenty five commercial banks of Pakistan.  
 
For the purpose of secondary data analysis the entire Commercial Banking of Pakistan is 
considered as population, reduced to 25 banks due to data availability and consistency. 
Therefore the data compiled in a panel setting encompassed time from 2007 to 2014 across 
25 banks. Data has also been acquired through World Bank and IMF data bases, audited 
accounts/ annual reports of commercial banks of Pakistan as well as mandatory reports 
submitted to State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), the principal regulator. Data is also obtained 
from Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP), Federal Bureau of 
Statistics (FBU), Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (PBS) and accredited international financial 
and banking journals.  
The study adopts Panel Data methodology taking motivation from earlier studies59 in fields 
of banking regulations and economic activity. The study deploys panel dataset and fixed 
effects modelling by developing unique mix of fitting economic indicators and banks 
specific variables justified for the cause60. Panel Data offers greater identification and 
measurement of effects because of its inherent analysis ability of variables across entities 
and over time. Panel data methodology best serves as balanced however it deals with 
                                                 
59 See Salas and Saurina (2002); Rajan and Dhal (2003); Fofack (2005); Khemraj and Pasha (2009); Boudriga 
et al (2009); Mogboyin et al (2012); Polat and Al-Khalaf (2014); Cai (2014); Polodoo et al (2015); and 
Apergis et al (2016);  
60 See section 3 for more detailed discussion on methodology 
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missing information far more effectively than mere time series or cross sectional 
methodologies (Hsiao and Shen 2003). Panel data are suggested to be heterogeneous and 
allow that crucial control for individual heterogeneity, not inherent in time series or cross 
section data designs (Beck and Katz 1995). In contrast where multicollinearity remains 
strongest contender in afflicting time series and cross section studies with biased results is 
dealt with, adequately within panel datasets (Moulton 1987; Batlagi and Levin 1992). 
Other advantages of panel data over time series or cross section include superior study of 
adjustment dynamics enabling to construct complicated behavioral modelling i.e. fewer 
restrictions applied in panel on distributed lags than time series ((Deaton 1995; Koop and 
Steel 2001; Hsiao and Shen 2003); appropriately deals with issues of heteroscedasticity 
(Kaufman 2013); and reduced biased resulting from including similar variables in 
comparison with time series dataset (Klevmarken 1989). Panel data methodologies widely 
applied in studies of bank specific variables (BSV’s) and economic factors (EV’s) and 
suggest significant association between BSV’s and EV’s61. Following econometric model 
developed and tested by the study. 
 
CARit = βo + β1CRRit + β2MRRit + β3ORRit + β4ROAit + β5ROEit + β6NPLRit + β7LGTAit + 
β8GDPGRt + β9IIPGRt + uit  
 
βo is constant and  β(1,2,3 …) represent coefficients of predictor variables and uit is error term.  
CARit represent Capital Adequacy Ratio of bank i in year t; CRRit represent Credit risk 
weighted assets to total assets of bank i in year t; MRRit represent Market risk weighted 
assets to total assets of bank i in year t; ORRit represent Operational risk weighted assets 
to total assets of bank i in year t; ROAit represent Return of Assets of bank i in year t; ROEit 
represent Return on Equity of bank i in year t; NPLRit represent Ratio of non-performing 
loan to total loans of bank i in year t; LGTAit represent Natural logarithm of total assets of 
bank i in year t; GDPGRt represent GDP growth rates in year t; and IIPGRt represent 
Industrial production index of Pakistan growth rates in year t. 
                                                 
61 See Keeton and Morris (1987); Salas and Saurina (2002); Jiang et al (2013); Zhang et al (2015). Panel data 
OLS and GMM methods applied to study economic indicators and bank specific variable in US, Spain, 
Europe, China and Taiwan 
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1.6 Contribution 
Literature so far regarding Basel Capital regulation implementation and risk management 
in commercial banks of Pakistan is scarce (Masood and Fry 2012). Thus, the literature 
remains adolescent in analysing role and limitations of Basel Capital regulation in Pakistan 
as basis for taming financial capital, for instance there is no study to date capturing the role 
of Basel Capital regulation in taming the financial capital in Pakistan. This research 
therefore identified an opportunity to investigating the role and limitation of Basel Capital 
regulation in Pakistan. Thus, this study contributes to pioneer research in Pakistan in 
directions of 1. Role of Basel Capital regulation in taming the financial capital; 2. Capital 
required by the banks of Pakistan reflective of the risks they face and 3. Assessing economic 
impact on capital requirements of commercial banks in Pakistan.  
 
The research, to gauge the risk faced by the banks developed unique model for commercial 
banks of Pakistan, introducing use of risk weighted assets to total assets as proxy to capture 
the captured riskiness of bank assets by the commercial banks of Pakistan in addition to 
bank specific variables and economic indicators to conclude if capital requirements of 
commercial banks of Pakistan reflect risk. Therefore this particular study could prove a 
mile stone. The model adopted by the study has not previously been tested in Pakistan and 
therefore the concept embarks upon new grounds of research in Basel Capital Bank 
regulation in Pakistan. In addition, comprehensive empirical analysis of implementation of 
Basel Capital regulation in commercial banks of Pakistan is unique. Furthermore, the 
questionnaire-based methodology is novel and rarely used previously in studies of Basel 
Capital banking regulations in Pakistan. Therefore this research has the potential to become 
the cornerstone of further academic research, contributing towards investigating role and 
limitation of Basel capital regulation in Pakistan in context of comparable emerging 
economies that are in-phase banking regulatory reforms. 
 
In order to answer the research question and to meet its objectives, an in-depth qualitative 
study that focuses on a sample selected purposively was undertook. This provided the 
researcher with an information-rich case study in which the research question could be 
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explored (Saunders, Lewis, Thornhill 2000). Senior bank managers’ lending attributes 
have been analysed using questionnaire-based methodology (Masood 2010). Questionnaire 
based methodology has been used to analyse the efficiency of financial managers as well 
as borrowers (Masood et al 2009). In addition, questionnaire methodology has also been 
used with loan officers in relation to their commercial lending (Royal and Altauser 2002). 
Therefore the risk managers who are actually responsible for the Basel Capital regulation 
compliance in commercial banks constitute the sample of the study62.  
 
The research thus aims to contribute to identifying if bank capital is reflective of bank risks 
towards taming the financial capital. The study aims to achieve this by developing a model 
with unique proxies to capture the riskiness of banking assets and carry out questionnaire 
for deeper insights on the topic. Findings of the empirical research will contribute towards 
identifying role and limitation of International Basel Capital regulation in Pakistan with 
developing economies perspective and potentially point out further research directions in 
taming financial capital through International Banking Regulations and prudential risk 
management in Banks.  
 
 
 
1.7 Layout of the thesis 
The research thesis constitutes three parts. Part 1 constitutes introduction and review of 
relevant literature and the “Banking Sector of Pakistan”, Part 2 contains research 
methodology, empirical findings and discussion. Part 3 summarizes the research findings, 
conclusion and recommendations. 
 
Part 1: Financial Capital beyond bounds: Assessing Bank risks and Basel Capitals in 
Pakistan 
Part 1 of the thesis contains chapters 1, 2 and 3 as detailed below:  
                                                 
62 See Neuman and Roskos (1997) for significance of research question focusing on a sample where the 
respondents are selected because they are particularly informative. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter 1 contains the introduction to the study. The chapter encompasses rationale of 
research, statement of research problem, conceptual framework, contribution to existing 
literature, aim and objectives of the study accompanying brief introduction to 
methodology. 
Chapter 2: Basel Capital Regulation 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature debating the evolution and role of banking regulations, 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the journey of Basel Capital regulation from 
the very first Basel Capital Accord Basel I to the most recent Basel III. The chapter then 
takes a critical viewpoint of the role and limitations of the Basel Capital regulation in 
taming the financial capital as witnessed in global financial crises. The chapter continues 
on to discussing Basel Capital regulation, its technical charter (the computation of risk 
under three pillar approach) and the implementation progress across the globe. The chapter 
also includes discussion on the role of Basel Capital regulations in exacerbating 
procyclicality and suitability for emerging market economies.  
Chapter 3: Banking Sector of Pakistan 
Chapter 3 contains the introduction to Banking sector of Pakistan systematically discussing 
evolution of banking regulations in Pakistan, the principal regulatory authority ‘The State Bank of 
Pakistan’ and its regulatory achievements. The chapter also incorporates brief introduction to the 
evolution of dual banking system in Pakistan where both traditional interest-based banks operate 
parallel to Islamic banks offering no interest; and profit and loss sharing services. The chapter 
furthermore highlights the Basel Capital regulations compliance in Pakistan, the regulatory take on 
importance of Basel Capital compliance in Pakistan and the role and limitations of Basel Capital 
regulations in Pakistan.  
 
Part 2: Research Methodology, Empirical findings and Discussion 
Part 2 encompasses a detailed methodology in chapter 4, followed by empirical findings 
and discussion in chapters 5 and 6.  
Chapter 4: Methodology 
Chapter 4 details the research methods, data collection and analysis approaches, data 
presentation, software for the analysis, limitations and ethical considerations of the 
research. 
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Chapter 5: Primary Data Analysis 
Chapter 5 discusses the findings of the primary data analysis 
Chapter 6: Secondary Data Analysis 
Chapter 6 discusses in detail the finding of the secondary data analysis.  
 
Part 3: Conclusion 
Part 3 sums up the thesis with concluding protocol in chapter 7. 
Chapter 7: Findings, conclusion and recommendations 
Chapter 7 contains summary of findings, conclusion, recommendations, limitations of the 
research and future research directions.  
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Chapter 2: Basel Capital Regulation 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter is divided into eight subsections: First takes critical view point of the evolution 
and importance of the banking regulations; second is critical evaluation of Basel Capital 
Accord’s technical charter as basis to critically analyse its role and limitations; third takes 
a look at the implementation challenges across the globe and transition progress, in 
particular impact on capital requirements of the banks, concluding with critique of Basel II 
capital regulation; fourth discusses the economic impact (procyclicality)63 of the variation 
in capital requirements of the under Basel Capital regulation guidelines; fifth section 
discusses the limitations of Basel Capital regulation surfaced during global financial crises; 
sixth discusses the Basel Capital regulatory modifications in response to the global 
financial crises: Basel III. Seventh section of the chapter discuss the suitability and 
transition hurdles of the Basel capital regulation in emerging economies followed by 
conclusion. 
 
2.1.1 International Banking Regulation and Supervisory 
The evolution of banking regulations and supervision of the developed economies is 
highlighted following or during periods of crises64. In times it is evident that solvency ratios 
alone do not act as comprehensive early warning signs. It has been argued that each episode 
of banking crisis followed its own unique circumstances however, deregulation and asset 
price boom remain noted similarities (Basanko and Kanatas 1996; Barth et al 2013a). 
Developed economies of United States and Europe faced devastating banking crises in past, 
owing to financialization of capitalism (Lapavitsas, 2013). Whenever erupted bankruptcy 
was suspected to be a risk of a systemic nature, central banks historically intervened as 
                                                 
63 See Barajas et al (2004)  
64 For example: US regulatory authorities to cope with 1907’s liquidity panic banking failures caused 
introduction of US Federal Reserve (established 1913) as the lender of last resort (LOLR); The crash of Dow 
Jones 1929 inflicting the famous Glass-Steagall Act, the introduction and termination of Bretton Woods 
system and Herstatt crises in 1970s, instigated creation of IMF and World Bank depict the actions of 
regulators at the time see Kroszner and Rajan (1994). 
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saviors confirming the fact that these banking empires are considered too large to be 
allowed to fail (Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga 2013).    
Nevertheless along with US, the financial scene of the rest of the world records bank 
failures leaving overwhelming impact, even most stable economies of world tumbled, 
questioning the effectiveness of the role of regulators see Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). 
Evidently, average yearly world inflation during late 70s and early 80s rose significantly 
higher than world economic growth (Trumbore 2002). The need for synchronization of 
international regulations kept ever growing. Regulatory authorities across the globe at the 
end of 1970s took steps to liberalize their banking sectors to allow financial institutions to 
reorganize and face the threats of volatile economic environment. In particular actions of 
American regulatory authorities, for instance introduction and promotion of domestic and 
global capital markets in attempts to reinstate American economic authority following 
collapse of Bretton Woods.65  
Deregulation of financial sector, gave birth to a number of crises see Lindgren et al (1996). 
In Europe banking regulators issued directive establishing that the supervision of banks 
operating in several countries to be transformed from the host country to the home country. 
Analysis of crises dating from 14th century through to global financial crises showed 
evidence that such transformation was difficult to achieve. A number of countries struggle 
to transform from developing economies into developed economies. In addition neither 
regulators nor banks’ top Managers of host countries occupied skills to see off any planned 
transformation process successfully66. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) discuss some core 
features of crises through quantitative evidence that crises frequently stem from interest 
rate shock, and commodity price crashes frequently accompanied by banking crises. 
It has been recognized for some time now that the banking system comprises a set of 
vulnerable processes, in particular capital calculation and treatment remains complex 
                                                 
65 See Panitch, L., & Gindin, S. (2009). Global capitalism and American empire. Socialist register, 40(40) 
for detailed synopsis of ‘Volcker Shock’ of 1979 and acceleration in capital accumulation; momentum in 
neo-liberal policies towards globalization discussed in detail see Gowan, P. (1999). The global gamble: 
Washington's Faustian bid for world dominance. Verso. 
66 Reinhart, C.M., & Rogoff, K.S. (2008). This time is different: A panoramic view of eight centuries of 
financial crises (No. w13882). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
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affair67. The most frequently discussed weaknesses have been non-existent covenants, 
liberal payments terms, inadequate financial analysis, insufficient collateral support, 
elevated leverage ratio, and repayments dependent on highly optimistic cash flows 
(Moshirian and Wu 2009). Regardless the cause, financial fragility can provoke a loss of 
confidence and prevent banks from offering important product and service liquidity within 
banks and thus become prime cause for a potential bank run. At a time when banking 
system is vulnerable, the lack of confidence associated with one bank can heavily impact 
other banks sequentially see Kroszner, Laeven and Klingebiel (2007). Banks dealing with 
such situation are only left with the option to absorb their losses through capital. On 
instances where bank capital, or retained earnings of the commercial bank are not enough 
to absorb the losses then governments may need to intervene with taxpayers’ money 
causing the government to sacrifice their popularity amongst the taxpayers. Note, once the 
entire financial system collapses, there is no mechanism for money transmission. Rochet 
(2004) discusses that the issue of micro prudential regulation shifts to macro prudential 
regulation if banks in one or more countries are collectively exposed to the same risks 
imposing large costs on the economies. Hoggarth, Reis, and Saporta (2002); Claessens, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Moshirian (2009) further investigate the reasons and impact of the 
crises. Hoggarth, Reis, and Saporta (2002) concluded that the costs of banking crises 
resolution are greater in emerging economies. Developing countries experienced greater 
macroeconomic volatility, and greater volatility of external flows fearing greater 
susceptibility to external shocks. Not to mention that institutions in developing economies 
are weak, bankers and bureaucrats may exploit an unfair advantage of gathering private 
benefits at public cost within an environment where technical expertise is scarce (Foot 
2006). Banks with their potential to impact world economy on such huge scale therefore 
should rightly be subject to stringent regulations and supervisory rules. Bank failures in 
developing countries had threatened the financial health of banks in other countries as well 
raising apprehension about cross-border contagion risk (Tonzer 2015). Regulators have 
been firmly convinced of the need for better coordination in regulation across the globe.  
 
                                                 
67 See Cihak, M., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Peria, M. S. M., & Mohseni-Cheraghlou, A. (2013) found that crises 
countries had complex but less strict definition of capital, however exhibited lower actual capital ratios 
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2.1.2 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
A forerunner to the Basel committee was the standing committee to the group of ten (G-10 
countries)68 central banks, which was established in 1971 due to growing regulatory 
concerns69 including the emergence of the Eurocurrency markets. Its secretariat was agreed 
to be provided by the Bank of International Settlement (BIS), and each member 
government sent representatives. The impetus to create such a committee to focus on 
capital adequacy came from the progressive globalization of financial markets and an 
ongoing process of financial derivatives innovation (Huang et al. 2008). The Basel 
committee act as a forum for discussion on the handling of specific supervisory problems, 
coordinates the sharing of supervisory responsibilities among national authorities in respect 
of banks foreign establishments, and seeks to enhance standards of supervision among its 
member countries. “International convergence of capital measurement and capital 
standards” issued by the G-10 central bankers’ working group was a brief set of simple 
rules intended to ensure financial stability and level playing field among international 
banks (BCBS 1988). During 90s in Europe, the Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD)70 took 
the limelight for incorporating market risk. CAD was based on proposals to equip banks 
and non-banks with adequate capital to cope with unexpected credit default. In 1996 the 
European Commission released an updated Capital Adequacy Directive “CAD II” 
proposing advance VAR71 model, followed by CAD III to incorporate proposed Basel 
Capital Regulation into European legislation (Strug 2008; Holton 2008). Standardized 
approach and Internal Models Approach whereby banks are allowed to use their own VAR 
models was covered comprehensively by the Basel Committee (BCBS 2001a). Basel 
Committee continued consultation with the sector and published a string of working papers. 
Final version published, then widely known as Basel II (BCBS 2006a) replaced the 1988 
framework. The set of recommendations contained in Basel II expected to reach as many 
                                                 
68 G-10 refers to group of 10 countries established in 1962 member countries: United States, United Kingdom, 
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, and Sweden. Switzerland joined in 1964  
69 Suspected termination of then prevailing Bretton Wood fixed exchange rate paradigm 
70 European initiative of 1993, to establish uniform capital requirements for both banks and non-banks  
71 VAR short for value at risk, developed to encompass a firm exposures to market risk see Linsmeier, T.J. 
and Pearson, N.D. (2000). Value at risk. Financial Analysts Journal, 56(2), pp.47-67. 
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as 100 countries and translated into laws in Europe, North America and Japan as was in 
case of Basel 1988 (Balthazar 2006). Furthermore Basel II, just like its predecessor aimed 
to maintain quality and stability of the international banking system along with creation of 
level playing field for international banks. But also adds as most important goal, the 
promotion of adoption of stricter rules regarding risk management framework of banking 
(BCBS 2006b). The Basel committee in a bid to significantly organize dealing with 
international bank supervisory issues operates with a list of sub-expert committees see 
(Appendix 1). 
 
2.1.3 Basel I: The Basel Capital Accord 
The first consultative Basel Capital Regulation document published by BCBS was called 
Basel I (BCBS 1988). The objective was to strengthen not only the soundness and stability 
of the international banking system but also, to diminish existing sources of competitive 
advantage72 enjoyed large international banks. The Accord focused primarily on credit risk 
and consisted of recommendations for minimum capital requirements of the bank, fully 
backed by the central bankers of G1073 countries initially proposed for implementation in 
G-10. To describe briefly, the initial Basel accords suggested both on-balance sheet and 
off-balance sheet item should be assigned a weight based on their estimated risk (BCBS 
1998). Basel effectively aimed to differentiate assets by function of their assumed risk and 
incorporated off balance sheet items that grew significantly. It was designed for banks to 
hold minimum capital level of 8 percent of those risk weighted assets with provisions for 
national regulators to implement stricter conditions if deemed necessary. The capital thus 
categorized as Tier 1 and Tier 2. Tier 1 capital included paid up capital and disclosed 
reserves and Tier 2 capital included undisclosed reserves, general provisions, subordinated 
debt (max. 50% of Tier 1), asset valuation reserves and other unsecured fully paid up 
                                                 
72 Competitive advantage (inequality) in banking refers to lower reserve required by large banks as compared 
to small banks. Large banks with advanced risk management structure manage to convince the regulator of 
their better ability to diverse risk. As a result of lower reserve requirements the large banks have more money 
available to do business and therefore enjoy a competitive edge over smaller banks.    
73 G-10 refers to group of 10 countries established in 1962 member countries: United States, United Kingdom, 
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, and Sweden. Switzerland joined in 1964 
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instruments. Goodwill because of its subjective valuation nature was deducted from Tier 
1. Un-consolidated investment in subsidiaries was also proposed to be deducted from the 
total capital base (Balthazar 2006). Once the capital was defined, the risk weight of assets 
was divided into categories ranging from 0 to 100 percent depending upon their assumed 
risk level. Off balance sheet items were divided in two broad categories and a number of 
Credit Conversion Factors (CCFs) were applied to transform these off-balance items into 
their on-balance sheet equivalents (BCBS 2000a). Collaterals and guarantees were only 
considered if issued by OECD74 central government or cash.  
 
2.1.4 Limitations of Basel Capital Accord 
A number of economic factors contribute to dictate proceedings in each era of crises75 
including fixed versus flexible exchange rates, financial capitalism, speculation and 
liquidity, fiscal and monetary policies, regulation and competition, therefore it is unfair to 
establish credit risk as the only cause for the bank failures (Lindgren et al. 1996, Rochet 
2004, Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Moshirian 2009, Lapavitsas 2013). Nevertheless it 
has been highlighted that Basel I by default, one size fits all approach, was relaxed during 
the times of boom, but in times of recessions it got strict (Dewatripoint and Tirole 1994). 
The research suggested that where increase in capital requirements resulted in decrease in 
quality of banks assets and amplified the business cycle fluctuations, it also most 
importantly for banks increased the value of their future profits (Boot and Greenbaum 
1993, Blum and Hellwig 1995, Besanko and Kanatas 1996, Blum 1999, John 2000).  
Despite number of draw backs and criticism, Basel Accord laid down foundations for the 
greater focus and a better understanding of the risks associated with the banking activities. 
Designed primarily for the international banks of the G10 countries, it effectively is now 
                                                 
74 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile (joined later in 2010), Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia 
(joined later in 2010), Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel (joined later in 
2010), Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Latvia (joined later in 2016), Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, United States 
75See Summers, L. H. (2000). “International financial crises: causes, prevention, and cures”. The American 
Economic Review, 90(2), 1-16. 
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basis for more than 100 countries and has often been imposed at the national level. This 
may not achieve in exact a uniform playing field due to different circumstances prevailing 
in each compliance jurisdiction nonetheless, majority of international banks are facing 
similar set of uniform rules regarding capital requirements and risk management. It is also 
an improvement on previously utilized equity ratios. Although Basel Accord achieving a 
safer banking practice environment remains dubious (Jackson, 1999) indeed it has played 
its part and pushed banks with minimum capital requirements under 8 percent to reconsider 
their risk management strategies.  
 
2.2 Basel II Capital Regulation: The Three Pillars 
The Basel II Capital Accord introduced three pillar approach in a bid to enhance banks’ 
risk management capabilities. Capital allocation under Basel II Capital regulation were 
dubbed more risk sensitive, progressive and comprehensive. Nevertheless, its 
implementation remained difficult, in particular in countries where risk management in 
banks was newly born. The three pillars of Basel II capital regulation are 1. Minimum 
capital requirement, 2. Supervisory review of capital adequacy, and 3. Public disclosure. 
Pillar 1, initially dealt with two major types of risk in the definition of risk weighted assets: 
Credit and Market risk, Operational risk was introduced in calculations later. Credit Risk 
consists of Standardised Approach, Foundation IRB Approach and Advanced IRB 
Approach. Market risk captured through VAR methodologies and operational risk 
computed using Basic Indicator Approach, Standardised Approach and Advanced 
Measurement Approached (AMA). Pillar 2, Supervisory Review process and Pillar 3, 
Market Discipline documented in the Basel II capital regulation were drafted to aid Pillar 
1 in calculating remaining risks not covered under Pillar 1 and keeping a comprehensive 
check on the riskiness of banks’ asset portfolio.  
Judgements of risk and capital adequacy must be based on more than an assessment of 
whether a bank complies with minimum capital requirements, furthermore, it provide 
banks with some insight into supervisory expectations for specific securitisation exposures. 
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In empirical banking literature despite an enormous number of existing studies, there is 
still no general consensus about the function and role of the banking sector76.  
 
Basel I Capital Accord only focused on credit risk and one size fits all approach that made 
no discrimination between a well Risk managed bank and one that is not. In response to 
the criticism of the 1988 Basel Capital regulation a number of changes were made, 
culminating in the 2001 proposals. The original plan was for the proposal to be discussed 
among banker and the member of the Basel committee agreed on by January 2002, and 
adopted by 2004. However, comments from banks, together with the committee’s three 
impact studies77, prompted BCBS to make substantial changes to the original document. 
In June 2004, final proposal was published in full by the Bank of International Settlements 
on behalf of Basel Committee called Basel II Capital regulation introducing a three pillar 
approach discussed below (BCBS 2004d). In transition towards Basel II initial plan was to 
introduce standardized approach to the G-10 member countries by the end of 2006 and then 
“advanced” approaches would take effect from the end of 2007 (BCBS 2004d). During the 
first year of implementation, banks and national regulators were expected to run parallel 
computations, calculating capital charges based on Basel 1 and II. Following the 
implementation in G-10 it will be interesting to find, how emerging economies react to 
implementing Basel II especially in conditions carrying economic recession. Basel II is 
structured in three pillars, a comprehensive step up from Basel II, lacked guidelines for 
calculating the exact minimum capital requirements threshold as a warning sign for the 
regulators (Decamps et al. 2004; Gordon 2004). However, following continued 
consultation and effective dialogue with the sector, the comprehensive version78  contained 
updated guidelines on implementation of the three pillars discussed below.  
 
                                                 
76 Berger, A., Leusner, J., & Mingo, J. (1997). The efficiency of bank branches. Journal of Monetary 
Economics 40, pp. 141–162 
77 Impact studies refer to three quantitative impact studies done by the BCBS before Basel II, QIS III being 
the last one initiated in 2003 across 43 countries to gauge impact of Basel II on minimum capital requirements 
before final version of Basel II in 2004. 
78 (BCBS 2006a) 
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2.2.1 Pillar 1 Minimum Capital Requirements: A Technical Charter 
Pillar 1 of the comprehensive version of Basel II contains the comprehensive guidelines on 
assessment as well as computations of Credit, Operational and Market risk discussed 
individually (BCBS 2006a). The risk management approaches under Basel II have been 
designed for banks to achieve lower minimum capital requirements when moving from 
adopting simpler approaches towards adopting more complex approaches (BCBS 2009a). 
Importance of Capital can be defined simply as the only buffer available to Banks against 
unexpected losses and to maintain their operations in an effective manner. According to 
Basel Capital Regulation, minimum capital requirements of the bank must be calculated 
individually for each of its asset portfolio. This should act as an incentive for the banks to 
conduct secure lending. For instance secure loans would enable banks to keep their 
minimum required capital at its lowest against that asset, freeing up excess funds to conduct 
more business and so forth. This incentive urged banks to raise their risk management 
standards and comply with Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach under Basel Capital 
Regulation. Under the IRB approach, banks can develop their own risk assessment model 
and demonstrate to regulatory authorities that their assets carry low risk (Blum and Hellwig 
1995; Blum 1999; Lastra 2004; Caruana and Narain 2008; and Marrison 2009). Such 
progress and innovations in quantification techniques have allowed large banks to make 
precise estimates of their internal economic capital requirements. Such expertise developed 
by the banks did not necessarily proved useful as banks got involved in riskier activities in 
order to align their economic capital79 with the regulatory capital80 requirements for 
instance Capital arbitrage. In fact, practice of Capital arbitrage (substituting high-risk for 
low-risk assets) theoretically should help banks correcting capital requirements 
constructively (John 2000). Instead it became a speculative practice into growth of 
financial capital and increased profits. The desire for increased return on equity urged 
banks to consider transacting their assets in counterparty arrangements for reduction in 
total risk of the original lender and get involved in trading markets. Markets hosting the 
hedging of such credit assets initially considered inefficient and illiquid. However 
continued growth in credit-derivative and guarantees is somehow spectacular and points 
                                                 
79 Capital requirements according to banks own estimates 
80 Capital requirements according to regulatory body banks must comply with 
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out to the improvement achieved in credit market’s liquidity and efficiency (Altman 2002). 
Commercial and investment banking due to their fundamental difference in operations are 
exposed to different risks and intense competition encouraged banks to pursue in both 
operations. To top that, financialization of the industry played its part in deregulation and 
pushed banks to invest in even riskier markets e.g. investment banking. The extent of 
growth in investment banking and hedge funds at an abnormal pace should have sparked 
concerns amongst regulators. For instance during mid90s US housing market witnessed 
extensive growth accompanied by high injection of cash inflow into US economy from 
other economies (BCBS 2004a). The regulators cut interest rates in regular intervals and 
credit became easy to obtain encouraging exceptional growth in lending activity therefore 
greatly increasing Mortgage-backed securities (MBS)81. In this particularly obvious era of 
volatile exchange and interest rates this time market risk emerged as a definitive force in 
causing bank failures (Moshirian and Wu 2009). 
Growing importance of all forms of risk management driven by the rise in volatility within 
many principal financial markets have led banks to become developers, users and above 
all providers of risk management instruments. In fact risk management has witnessed an 
era of evolution, from a mere limit setting risk valuation technique to extremely complex 
performance measures encouraging risk based pricing, portfolio management and 
economic capital allocation. Basel II arguably developed extremely sophisticated 
breakdown of capital standards for the management of Market, Operational and Credit risk 
techniques starting from the basic standardized approach towards more complex ones such 
as securitization, use of credit derivatives or guarantees and credit insurance products 
(Altman 2002).  
  
2.2.1.1 Credit Risk 
Basel II capital regulation propose credit risk to be calculated broadly using two 
approaches: standardized approach for all banks and internal ratings based approaches for 
                                                 
81 Pagano, M., & Volpin, P. (2012). Securitization, transparency, and liquidity. Review of Financial Studies, 
25(8), 2417-2453. 
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banks qualifying to develop their own internal risk management models discussed in more 
detail following. 
 
2.2.1.1.1 Credit Risk – Standardized Approach: The Standardized Approach is somewhat 
similar to the 1988 capital accord, indeed there is sufficient up grading of the risk weights 
by integrating their estimated risk levels through use of external ratings. Banks lacking 
sophisticated models against the bench mark requirement by the Basel Capital Accord for 
assessing risk would be required to adopt the standardized approach under Basel II (BCBS 
2004c). The major modification in Risk-weighted assets (RWA) involves the use of a wider 
band of risk weightings, ranging from 0% for very low risk to 150% for high risk loans 
even if lending bank has a claim through a short term issue bearing an external risk rating 
(BCBS 2000a). Loans due for over 90 days are risk weighted and do not fall below 50 
percent under any given provision. The credit risk weights for loans to countries, banks, 
corporate and securitized assets vary according to the banks (BCBS 2003a). There is no 
distinction between OECD and other sovereigns where a sovereign risk weighting will be 
determined by external rating agencies or a qualified export credit agency (BCBS 2000a). 
External Credit Assessment Institutions (ECAIs) have been recognized only if they meet 
the standard criteria of transparency and credibility. Released ratings are then converted 
into risk weights. If more than one ratings available, banks should retain lower of the top 
two (BCBS 2005). Public sector entities that are non-central government can be weighted 
by regulators as banks or as sovereign. Multilateral Development Banks and Securities 
firms are also risk weighted as banks unless they fall under certain category to advantage 
from 0 percent Risk Weighted Assets. Banks are weighted under two options. Under option 
1 risk weight is higher than that of given to claims on the country of origin. Under option 
2 risk weight is a function of the bank rating (Balthazar 2006). In Retail, the claims allowed 
are strictly based on individual person or business entity. In case of Residential property 
and Commercial property credit must be fully secured and the borrower must be the one to 
occupy or to rent the property. Recommended risk weight for retail as well as property is 
not less than 100 percent unless specific exception is recognized by regulator. For any other 
Assets 100 percent risk weights recommended (BCBS 2009a). There is no modification to 
recommended use of Credit Conversion Factors (CCFs) to convert off-balance sheet into 
their equivalent credit exposures as in 1988 framework (BCBS 1988). Nevertheless, the 
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probability of default of counterparty and increased deterioration of quality of borrowers 
resulted in increased regulatory capital requirements consistently. This in turn forced 
sophisticated financial institutions to develop Credit Risk Mitigation arrangements 
(Altman 2002; James and Allegra 2009). Credit Risk Mitigation (CRM) mainly to help 
banks manage credit risk by effectively managing collateral dramatically evolved over the 
years. To integrate use of CRM into RWA computations under Basel II Standardized 
approach, covered exposures receive the risk-weight of the collateral with a minimum of 
20% otherwise risk-weight can be treated as unsecured by reducing exposure by the value 
of the collateral. Current value of exposures and collateral is subject to change following 
market fluctuations or, in case of default of counterparty the change in the current value 
from the time bank decides to liquidate collateral till the point position is closed (BCBS 
2004d). Exchange rate has to be taken into account in case of collateral and exposure in 
different currencies (BCBS 2004b). Banks develop their own or adopt supervisory 
procedures in order to adjust the value of collateral in case of sensitive to market 
parameters. Reference values are available under a ten day holding period (the time 
between decision to sell the collateral and the effective time of the recovery) in 
Standardized and IRBF approaches. Banks may alter regulatory guidelines to adjust the 
value of the collateral taking into account transaction holding period due to the fact that 
various types of collaterals on different markets can have different liquidation period. 
Banks that are allowed to renovate supervisory guidelines or use their own developed 
processes in order to adjust the values of collateral, banks must comply with requirements 
set by the regulators. Regulators may allow exemption from adjusting the value of 
collateral only in the cases where exposures and collaterals are in cash or same currency 
with maximum liquidation period of four days where the market participants can be 
sovereigns, central banks and banks (BCBS 2004d). Legal requirements must be 
considered at all times as well as banks’ ability to execute the collateral, and arrange funds 
on request in time see James and Allegra (2009). Although CRM is significantly useful for 
reducing credit risk but at times is guilty of increasing operational, liquidity and legal risks 
(Wang 2008). 
 
2.2.1.1.2. Credit Risk-IRB approaches 
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In IRB approaches (Foundation and Advanced) capital requirements are calculated by the 
function of risk parameters (Table 2) derived from advanced credit risk models estimated 
by the banks (BCBS 2004c).  
Table 2. Risk Parameters 
Probability of default 
(PD) 
The probability of counterparty failing to meet the requirements of the 
financial arrangement. 
Loss given default 
(LGD) 
Expected loss on an exposure in case the counterparty defaults. 
Exposure at default 
(EAD) 
The expected value of exposure at the time when counterparty 
defaults. 
Maturity (M) Average maturity of the exposure 
Source: Bank of International Settlements www.bis.org 
 
For exposures including Corporate, sovereigns and banks, in IRB-Foundation the 
regulator’s data consists of LGD, EAD and M where the banks only have to estimate the 
PD (BCBS 2001a). In IRB-Advanced banks internally have to estimate all risk parameters 
(see Table 2) conventionally based on historical data for most exposure types (BCBS 
2001e). Maturity in majority cases is computed internally by the Banks as a function of 
cash flows and time of the cash flows in years (Balthazar 2006). CI (Confidence Interval) 
and ρ (Asset Correlation) are provided by the regulators in all cases (BCBS 2004d). 
Exposures are essentially classified into six categories for risk weightings (Table 3). 
Table 3. Exposure Categories 
Corporate This includes both large corporate and small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs). In addition it covers comprehensively Specialized Lending (SL) 
exposures through Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs). For risk weighting Banks 
are inclined to use standardized approach to band SL exposure to classify their 
operations. Only ratings classified as strong would be greater than BB+. 
Sovereign Exposures treated as sovereign risk-weighted according to Standardized 
approach i.e. sovereigns, assimilated Public Sector Entities (PSEs) and 
Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) at zero percent. 
Bank Exposure to banks and sovereigns that are not zero percent in Standardized 
approach. The risk weighting is same as corporate. 
Retail Exposures loans given to SMEs amounting less than 1 million EUR along with 
their counterparties that are managed as retail exposures. Exposure on 
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individuals and residential mortgages are without size limit. The risk weighting is 
the same as corporate. 
Equity Exposure that execute claim on borrowers assets in case of default where there 
may be no other debt to clear. In simple form of proceedings they receive 
between 300 to 400 percent risk weightings but in PD/LGD situations risk 
weighting is calculated same as corporate. Internal approach carries risk 
weighting as a percentage of 99 percent of VAR estimated quarterly. 
Purchased 
Variables 
Retail or corporate exposures not directly raised but purchased by banks. Banks 
apply respective risk weighting function. 
Box 2.2.2 - Exposure Categories (BCBS 2004d) 
 
In IRBF, in addition to collateral determined in standard approach, Commercial and 
residential real estate, receivable as well as other physical collateral can be recognized and 
used to offset a part of the exposure before calculations of RWA. Guarantees and credit 
derivatives are treated almost as same as standard approach where PD of the guarantor is 
swapped with PD of the exposure if it is lower (BCBS 2004c).  
In IRBA approach, banks calculate (%) and apply internal collateral adjustment processes 
and set minimum collateral acceptance indicator (%) for receivables; commercial and 
residential estate; and other physical collateral. If the value of covered exposure is less than 
internally calculated minimum collateral indicator, it is not recognized. In case the value 
of covered exposure is more, it is recognized. Final LGD for that part of exposure is 
calculated by dividing the value of collateral by the collateral (Internally adjusted) of the 
exposure (BCBS 2001d). Under IRBA, a bank (with minimum past seven year data on 
average recovery value of collateral) can recognize a range of collateral and deduct from 
exposure to identify capital requirements (BCBS 2004d). Evidently by validating their 
internal credit rating system banks start benefiting straight away (Ozdemir 2009). Only 
after complying with this complex and strict criteria set out by the regulatory authorities, 
the institution is considered eligible to switch to IRB approaches. Research suggests that 
only larger more sophisticated banks show the strength and technical knowhow to 
implementing IRB approaches and as a result extend even further their competitive 
advantage over the banks using Standardized approach (Lastra 2004). QIS3 published by 
Basel II discovered that there is a large variance in capital across different banks and 
evidenced that Banks enjoyed hefty cut down in capital when moving towards adopting 
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IRB approaches (Tschemernjak 2004). In doing so, there is possibility that banks 
underestimate their expertise in encountering problems, in particular rules concerning 
commercial lending. Under IRB approaches risk weightings can drop significantly offering 
banks an incentive to advance further into retail activities e.g. mortgage lending etc. There 
is evidence that even banks complying with Basel II did not have sufficient capital to buffer 
against unexpected losses arisen from mortgage related assets and feared sudden pressure 
to deleverage, that reinforces the role of capital regulators to read into the risk information 
provided by the banks paying close attention to rectifying any gaps in required capital 
(Demirguc-Kunt, Caprio and Kane 2008; Alder 2009).   
 
2.2.1.1.3. Credit Risk – Securitization: 
Banks, in order to reduce their capital requirement transfer their non-liquid assets (debts) 
to an independent jurisdiction called “Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)” and then extend 
subordinated loans, called ‘shadow banking’ (Adrian and Ashcraft 2016). SPV operates 
independently by issuing securities that are backed by the debts bought by the SPV from 
the bank commonly referred to as Asset Backed Securities (ABS). ABS issued by SPV are 
normally structured in various degrees of seniority to generate cash flows. Most senior 
loans are settled first. Most junior loans called “equity tranche” are usually kept by the 
bank. Equity tranche enables bank to keep the main part of the risk on its balance sheet and 
absorb the first losses, therefore enabling ABS extremely attractive to the investors (Gordy 
and Jones 2003). On the other hand securitizing good quality loans and leaving themselves 
low quality loans can prove damaging to the bank’s own risk profile82. The structures where 
underlying loans are not physically transferred out of balance sheet of the originating bank 
but only credit risk is covered through the use of credit derivatives is commonly termed as 
synthetic securitization (BCBS 2002). Securitization structures are significantly complex, 
different in different cases with even more complex techniques to evaluate risk associated. 
Basel II therefore had an impossible task to come up with simple set of rules to determine 
capital requirements. Originating banks raise, directly or indirectly securitized exposures, 
                                                 
82 Pagano, M. and Volpin, P., 2012. Securitization, transparency, and liquidity. Review of Financial 
Studies, 25(8), pp.2417-2453 argues that there is conflict between growing complex financial instruments 
and liquidity on secondary markets giving rise to low level transparency. 
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place securities in the market and provide credit enhancement. Originating banks therefore 
subject to meeting the requirement qualify to exclude the securitized exposures from their 
calculation of RWA. Liquid assets have to be completely transferred out to SPV. Banks 
must follow standardized approach where assets are not transferred physically but hedged 
through the use of credit derivatives (Acharya et al 2013). Also if originating bank agrees 
to buy the securitized exposures back in any case, they must also calculate their RWA 
considering underlying exposures as part of their balance sheet. Investing banks can be 
introduced to bear the risk of a securitization exposure (BCBS 2002).  
For banks that operate their credit risk under standardized approach for the securitization 
framework must comply with external rating based. RWA ranges from 20% for AAA 
rating to 350% for BB- (Standardized Approach). For off balance sheet item Credit 
Conversion Factors (CCFs) are used.  Banks that originate the securitized exposure and 
receive external rating below BBB- should minus them from their capital base (BCBS 
2002). The banks under IRB approaches use Rating Based Approach (RBA), the Internal 
Assessment Approach (IAA) and the Supervisory Formula (SF). RBA is applied in case 
securitized tranche has internal or external ratings but IAA used when there are no available 
ratings but only for exposures extended to Asset Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) 
activity. SF is used in case there are no available ratings (Balthazar 2006).      
Many operations achieve capital arbitrage through securitization under Basel II which can 
be classed as significant improvement over BCBS Consultative paper 1 following 
continued consultation with the sector. For example Supervisory Formula helps 
incorporate the underlying pool granularity, credit quality, asset correlation and tranche 
depth. (BCBS 2001c; BCBS 2002) Rating Based Approaches helps in confirming that 
AAA corporate bond does not automatically mean that the securitized exposure is AAA. It 
has been established that the securitized tranche with a good rating carries less risk than 
corporate bond associated with it and, a low rated securitized tranche is far riskier than the 
corporate bond with same rating (Acharya et al 2013). The rating approaches under Basel 
II assume main risk drivers and incorporate that in the risk weightings. By regular 
interaction with the industry it has been brought to light that although situation has 
improved significantly over the years there still are number of market participants still 
invest in securitization without sufficient risk management expertise. Basel II although 
claims to be updated and granular with regards to mitigating securitization incentives by 
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reduction in capital charge on mortgages held on the balance sheet up to 35% and by 
imposing a capital charge on short-term lines of credit. In effect loss in confidence in 
securitization had comprehensive role play in triggering current financial (Pagano and 
Volpin 2012).   
 
2.2.1.2 Operational Risk      
The losses generated from different forms of operations (e.g. losses from valuation risk 
through in house fraud, legal and documentation risk etc) shed light on the importance of 
effective management of operational risk (Foot 2002; Lastra 2004; Sheen 2005; Flores et 
al. 2006; Moosa 2008). It was established early on that operational risk capital charges that 
are meant for banks may not be suitable for average insurance services directive (ISD) 
(Foot 2002). According to QIS2 of the breakdown of economic capital by risk type, 
operational risk constituted comprehensively significant 16%. To effectively cope with risk 
of losses resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems, or 
external events, Basel II continued consultation and as a result bank may adopt one of three 
approaches to measure operational risk (BCBS 2004d).   
2.2.1.2.1 Basic Indicator Approach (BIA):  
Operational risk is considered directly proportional to the size of the bank. The size of bank 
activity is calculated by the gross income of bank net of interest income, excluding profit 
from the sale of securities in the banking book and extraordinary items. Based on a single 
indicator for overall risk exposure, the capital requirement is calculated as 15% of average 
(positive) annual gross income over the previous 3 years (BCBS 2001b). 
2.2.1.2.2 Standardized Approach (SA):  
Under this approach banks are required to have an adequate Operational Risk Management 
with active involvement of the Board of Directors and that is subject to regular review by 
external supervisors.  Banks must also ensure regular reporting of operational risk 
exposures and material losses. Banks allocate sufficient resources in Operational Risk 
Management in each business line and in the audit department. Once banks identify income 
from eight business lines, the capital charge for each business line is gross income 
multiplied by a fixed percentage. (Retail Banking, Retail Brokerage and Asset 
Management 12%; Commercial Banking and Agency Services 15%; Payments and 
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Settlements, Trading and Sales, and Corporate Finance 18%) The total capital to be set 
aside is the sum of these capital charges. Negative capital charges for a given business line 
can be utilized to offset capital charges from other business lines in that year (BCBS 
2004d). 
2.2.1.2.3 Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA):  
Banks with advanced supervisory standards can use their own models to assess exposure 
to operational risk and calculate the amount of capital charge to be set aside. The banks can 
use internal (5 Years minimum) or external data to develop an internal assessment model, 
as well as scenario analysis. Banks must have reliable procedures to access their stored 
historical operational losses data and allocate them to the correct business lines. These 
internally developed models do not bear any acute specific criteria imposed by the 
regulators, but they must be adequate enough to differentiate losses due to operational risk 
over a year and capture events with least probability to occur. As risk mitigation, banks are 
allowed to have insurance cover against operational risk, and use it to reduce the 
operational risk capital charge by up to 20%. However, to use this benefit, banks must 
comply with certain conditions. The insurance must be for at least a year where insurer has 
an A rating by external agencies in terms of its ability to meet claims (BCBS 2001b).  
The topic is elusive and need for availability of detailed operational risk standards for 
consultation is felt to encounter key operational risk issues facing a number of firms. There 
have been proposals of measuring banks’ operational risk through cost variance, 
implementing enterprise risk/reward units and governing units through quantitative 
measures, nevertheless argued to be complex although banks acquired technology and 
varied data (Mainelli 2002). Basel II remains unable to define in clarity a specific criteria 
for the BIA or SA, nevertheless banks using this approach have been encouraged to use the 
Basel II guidelines (Sheen 2005). There have been questions as to what exactly constitutes 
AMA and there have been different explanations by different authors.83 The argument has 
been, that the problems related to operational risk e.g. settlement failures, poor accounting, 
and lapse in internal controls should be dealt with effective corporate governance, internal 
controls systems, audit, compliance and insurance rather than assigning to equity capital. 
Basel II offers the matters to be dealt with by imposing a capital charge against operational 
                                                 
83 See Moosa (2008) for detailed synopsis. 
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risk. That can represent up to 15% of the total minimum regulatory charge (BIA and SA), 
however under AMA any charge for operational risk is left on discretion of the banks 
supervisors see Lastra (2004). Therefore, BIA and SA did not achieve much appreciation 
because the guess is based upon a fixed percentage of gross income. AMA fundamentally 
received more considerations and urge banks to pay close attention to their operational 
risks. A very few banks84, only with extremely sophisticated internal models have dared to 
invest in developing AMA in order to remove incentives for regulatory arbitrage (Moosa 
2008). Following the evidence of advantages gained by adopting AMA, even for 
implementation of AMA, there are no specific guidelines in Basel II. Therefore Banks are 
encouraged to develop internally, an appropriate operational risk management system 
which is independent within the organization and supervised by competent regulators with 
active involvement of the board and senior level management (Flores et al. 2006). 
Furthermore, Basel II urges that bank operational risk must be capable of foreseeing or 
detecting the losses and assigning them to the corresponding business lines (BCBS 2006a). 
Moosa (2008) presents an in depth analysis of the literature with regards to the sectors 
approach on AMA claiming it to be complex to capture but notably beneficial for the banks 
who possess sophisticated internal risk management system. This is because AMA clearly 
produces lower capital charge than BIA and SA. Aligning regulatory capital85 with 
economic capital86 has become one of the prime concerns for banks and internal models 
are considered relevant and conducive in achieving so. The empirical study conducted on 
Spanish banking discovered that systems currently installed even in sophisticated entities 
are not all compatible with proposition of AMA see Flores et al. (2006). Manning and 
Gurney (2005) comprehensively looked at Lloyd’s insurance market claiming operational 
risk extremely hard to measure and thus makes it hard to manage. Difference in size, scale 
and complexity of activities undertaken by organizations without presence of appropriately 
specified qualitative and quantitative requirements has made providing a sane set of 
requirements for operational risk management will be a daunting task (Shevchenko and 
Peters 2013).  
                                                 
84 For instance Barclays, Citi, HSBC report parts of their operational risk under AMA  
85 Mandatory bank capital to be held by the banks according to the financial regulatory calculation  
86 Bank capital that is necessary to keep bank from going insolvent according to banks own estimation 
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2.2.1.3 Market Risk 
Commercial banks have illiquid portfolios that are exposed to systemic risk and Investment 
banks have highly liquid assets87. This historically implied that bank regulations to be 
different for both types of entities. Increased competition and internationalization have 
urged banks to become active in both directions, so called casino capitalism.88 The growth 
in derivative activities required developing market risk measurement models for internal 
risk management purposes for calculating regulatory capital.89 Market risk not only relates 
to financial derivatives; stocks and bonds it also takes into consideration interest rate risk 
and exchange rate risk (Casson 1996). VaR (Value at risk) was considerably popular 
amongst the banks as well as regulators despite other risk measurement techniques known. 
However, it was established that widely used standard deviation and VaR did not always 
reflected risk preferences accurately see Krause (2002). The financial crisis imposed losses 
resulting from market risk and became prime cause of the buildup of leverage occurred in 
the trading book (Moshirian and Wu 2009). This was attributed to the fact that the current 
capital framework for market risk, based on the 1996 Amendment to the Capital Accord to 
incorporate market risks, does not capture some key risks. It became clearly evident that 
on the bases of accuracy of VaR and market risk measurement models under Basel II 
guidelines, banks really showed their appetite excessive risk raking see Michael (2009). In 
response, the Basel Committee updated the existing value-at-risk based trading book 
framework with an approach that takes into account default risk as well as migration risk, 
for un-securitized credit products. Also incremental risk capital charge has been 
introduced, for securitized products with an exception for essential correlation trading 
activities (BCBS 2009b). The banks may be allowed to calculate comprehensive risk 
capital charge subject to strict qualitative minimum requirements. There is introduction of 
                                                 
87 Commercial banks typically offer deposits and loans services and Investment banks trade in equities, raise 
capital for large corporations, underwriting and brokerage services  
88See Strange, S. (1997). Casino Capitalism [1986]. Manchester & New York: Man. 
89See McKenzie (2011); and Sinn (2010) for detailed discussion.  
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a stressed value-at-risk requirement taking into account a one-year observation period 
relating to significant losses, which must be calculated in addition to the value-at-risk based 
on the most recent one-year observation period (BCBS 2009b). Losses in most banks’ 
trading books during the recent financial crisis have been significantly higher than the 
minimum capital requirements calculated under the Pillar 1 market risk rules (BCBS 
2009b). This additional stressed value-at-risk requirement is tasked to help reduce the 
procyclicality90 of the minimum capital requirements for market risk as well as decrease in 
the incentive for regulatory arbitrage between the banking and trading books (BCBS 
2009a).  
2.2.2 Pillar 2: The Supervisory Review Process 
The Supervisory Process under Basel II requires, in general banks to develop their own 
transparent internal measurement systems to assess capital adequacy. The detailed Internal 
Capital Adequacy Assessment Process within banks containing principles for pillar 2 have 
been published in order to aid regulators correctly manage interest rate risk, credit risk, 
operational risk and securitization (BCBS 2004d). Despite the concept receiving 
recognition in the sector there still remain a number of concerns. The Supervisory Review 
Process (SRP) is accused of adding fatigue to existing work load on the banks. Compliance 
to pillar 1 alone can be complex where inclusion of pillar 2 can promote unleveled playing 
field in favor of larger banks with comparatively superior structures having internal capital 
set below minimum requirements as well as differential implementation across borders 
(Caruana 2003; Lastra 2004). Principally risks external to the banks and risks not covered 
under pillar 1 are dealt with under the Supervisory Review Process (BCBS 2004d). Risks 
involved are: credit risk, market risk, operational risk, liquidity risk, reputation risk, 
strategic risk and interest rate risk in the banking book, and that can be different and 
extremely complex in case of international banks. If the risk profile is not reflected 
adequately in the capital the supervisors can urge the bank to increase their minimum 
capital (Garside and Bech 2003). Supervisors also confirm that banks using credit risk 
Internal Ratings Based approaches and operational risk Advanced Measurement 
Approaches submit and conform to their minimum requirements (BCBS 2004d). The banks 
                                                 
90 Procyclicality is defined as the fluctuation of financial variables in response to economic cycle  
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must bear clear policies regarding risk factor integrated in the business plan, and establish 
reporting system for senior management to estimate the risk. Supervisors granularly review 
the banks internal capital adequacy assessment strategies and assess banks’ ability to 
monitor their own competence in compliance with regulatory capital ratios (Garside and 
Bech 2003; Cartwright and Sarraf 2005). The responsiveness of senior management to the 
notification of changes in risk portfolio of the bank is also considered by the supervisors 
minutely. Banks moreover need to demonstrate they have capacity to operate above 
minimum required capital and can use mitigation and/or acquire additional capital in order 
to facilitate changes to their risk profile. Supervisors must conduct reviews on regular basis 
primarily to sense and alarm in early stages, such cases where banks might allow capital to 
fall below the minimum level (Decamps et al. 2004). Banks therefore, need to have brisk 
succession plan to address such situations. The Supervisory Review Process (SRP) 
currently considers only banks’ internal models which may be developed individually by 
the bank in response to its peculiar circumstances (Samanta and Chakraborty 2016). There 
has been discussion of developing supervisory risk assessment models that could be used 
to benchmarking. Allowing national discretion also indicates regulators struggling to agree 
on a common model for complex situations while dealing with large institutions on an 
international scale. But even if they did this could mean going back a step leading to 
standardized risk models that can cause a systematic risk (Hassan and Tamer 2016; 
Brownbridge 2015). Nonetheless SRP is revolutionary effort for the regulators to realizing 
in principle that capital charge may not reflect the true quality of the banks’ assets portfolio 
(Lastra 2004). There is sufficient indication of the importance of the effective execution of 
SRP case-by-case approach and the application of both discretion and judgment according 
the circumstances of the institution and the markets in which it operates see Roldan (2006). 
There have been financial crises with such preventing procedures in place, indeed raises 
the important questions of regulator’s ability to oversee those internal proceedings and 
ensuring sufficiently consistent application across banks and countries (Alder 2009).  
2.2.3 Pillar 3: Market Discipline 
The foundation objective of the Pillar 3 is to effectively complement the minimum capital 
requirements (Pillar 1) and supervisory review process (Pillar 2) by development of 
disclosure requirements to allow market participants to assess key information (BCBS 
2006a). These disclosures are required to be consistent with how senior management and 
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board of directors assess and manage the risk profile of the bank (BCBS 2004d). Supervisor 
may request information in regulatory reports or further still require banks to publish 
reports for public access. The nature of exact measures used may depend upon the legal 
powers of the supervisor as well as criticality of the disclosure deficiency. The foundation 
intention behind the market discipline is to promote safe and sound banking environment 
not to impose additional capital requirements. The motive here as well, disclosure 
requirements under Pillar 3 are not in conflict with general accounting standards. The 
disclosures will not be required to be audited unless required by accounting standard 
authorities or securities regulators. Generally Pillar 3 would require banks to have approved 
a formal disclosure policy that addresses the approaches bank undertakes in order to assess 
its risk profile (BCBS 2006a). Banks on the other hand already disseminate a lot of 
information for use by shareholders. However, it has been argued that limited risk 
disclosure occurs and the firms are not completely transparent at all times (Linsley and 
Shrive 2005). Pillar 3 works actively to ensure that important market participants such as 
equity or debt holders actively monitor the banks position in comparison with its risk 
profile, and be able to react in an effective manner. Allowing access to key information on 
the capital adequacy of the institution would help banks senior management as well as 
external analysts like credit rating agencies and insurance companies, anticipate potential 
financial health hazards and respond in a timely manner. The argument nevertheless, 
attracted a number of discussion in the literature (Nier and Baumann 2006). Furthermore, 
under active discussion is the issue of how much freedom should be granted to the 
regulators with regards to access to part of the disclosure that is not available to public. 
Non-disclosure of certain bits and pieces does not automatically mean additional capital 
requirement but disclosures concerning pillars 1 and 2 are considered extremely important 
(Hwang and Min 2013; Kishan and Opiela 2015). Pillar 3 allows regulators in designing 
the framework peculiar to market requirement and that can vary vastly between countries 
depending upon accounting rules adopted by those jurisdictions. Europe is historical cost91 
oriented where United States and other international standards are mainly market value92 
                                                 
91Historical cost measure used in accounting whereby asset reflects its original cost on the balance sheet 
Elliott, B., & Elliott, J. (2007). Financial accounting and reporting. Pearson Education. 
92 Based on market value of the assets 
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based (BCBS 2000b). Of course RWA based upon market value approach would generate 
significant volatility in response to market fluctuations resulting in increased risk of pro-
cyclicality (Gordy and Howells 2006). On the contrary, directors can be reluctant to 
disclose full risk information because it can be potentially used by competitors or augment 
the concern about their ability to predict future outcomes of uncertain events. Subsequently 
the analyses conducted by the Basel Committee indicate that banks are not attempting full 
risk disclosures93. Nevertheless instances such as WorldCom, Xerox and Enron stress the 
need for further consultation by Basel committee to promote in true manner the benefits of 
the Pillar 3 in the banking sector and address any irregularities in accounting procedures 
(Jo and Kim 2008).  
 
2.3 Basel II: Implementation 
 
2.3.1 Introduction 
This section discusses the complex nature and the limitations of the Basel II accord in order 
to quantify the impact of the Basel II capital adequacy framework on capital amongst the 
compliant jurisdictions. This section furthermore looks into the scale of international 
transition and implementation progress across the globe. The implementation status 
mirrored the asymmetric development between core and periphery banking structures. This 
section is divided into the four subsections. First discusses the concept and complexity of 
the Basel II accord; second discusses the transition and implementation progress of Basel 
II; third discusses the impact of Basel II on capital in Basel II compliant countries; fourth 
section discusses the limitations of the Basel II accord. 
 
2.3.2 Basel II: Concept and complexity 
                                                 
93 M. Linsley, P., & J. Shrives, P. (2005). Transparency and the disclosure of risk information in the banking 
sector. Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 13(3), 205-214 for debate about requirement of 
excess disclosure required by Basel Capital Regulation 
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Basel II in theory, if effectively implemented would encourage and promote use of more 
and more internal data, risk management practices and models (Mariathasan & Merrouche 
2014). Mariathasan & Merrouche (2014) argued that riskiness of assets declined upon IRB 
approval in a cross-sectional study of analysis of 115 banks from OECD countries94. 
However, the complexity of Basel II implementation has been recognized and discussed. 
Practically Basel II implementation required cultural shift; recreation of all major 
processes, systems, data management; masterminding the new risk management theory and 
practice; calculation of new capital requirements, the list can go on. There is no definitive 
optimal organizational structure because each bank is threatened by compliance risk, has 
its unique circumstances and operates with respect to legal and regulatory environment see 
Edward and Wolfe (2004). Development of PD and LGD models is considered most crucial 
with regards to implementation. Further still, to fertilize effective Basel II implementation 
banks must demonstrate complete readiness i.e. capability to instantly identify, investigate 
and report to the senior management any non-compliance. However, after overcoming 
complex compliance function the process is theoretically followed by achieving complete 
control on each IRB process, adopting appropriate back testing, benchmarking and cross 
checking processes for each parameter of all portfolios (Mariathasan and Merrouche 2014). 
In addition, banks must show their capacity to use internal ratings system for not only 
assessment of PD estimate but also, integrate all relevant parameters to derive estimated 
LGD to each credit facility. The authenticity of the rating systems must be validated, 
initially by internal validation arrangements followed by designated external consultation 
(BCBS 2005). The banks are also required to set thresholds for the comparison of the actual 
versus predicted results and must bear transparent policies to address any breach to the set 
standards. Quantification of fundamental risk parameters carries incontrovertible 
importance in implementation of Basel II (BCBS 2004c). The quantification process can 
be data collection, a score function to estimate the data’s relevance to the risk parameters, 
match the reference dataset with banks current portfolio and finally, rate the borrower with 
                                                 
94 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherland, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, United States 
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developed score function (BCBS 2004d). At each stage, adjustments may apply in loss rate 
to account for referred dataset specifications. Of course the quantification process is also 
subject to Basel II guidelines and authorized independent validation (BCBS 2005).  
Developing the model to assign risk weights to asset portfolio is the most important and 
key foundation activity, that’s one thing, successfully integrating it operationally in 
procedures within an existing risk management framework can be real challenge see 
Shevchenko & Peters (2013).   Banks have to comply with the regulations and therefore 
have to invest heavily to raise their IT (Information Technology) capabilities to achieve 
required standards of quality and transparency, undertake significant adaptations in their 
current data management system in order to facilitate reconciliation of information between 
the bank’s finance and risk management functions (Garcia 2004; Moosa 2008). All 
parameters used to calculate the rating must be recorded to validate that the rating 
guidelines have been adhered to and necessary future comparisons between estimated and 
actual can be facilitated (Mariathasan and Merrouche 2014). A central database able to 
collect all information including financial information as well as qualitative evaluations, 
detailed recoveries, default events and so forth from all lines of business is inevitable 
(Garcia 2004). The information then contained in the central database can be used to 
calculate capital ratios to support risk management and produce other internal and external 
reports. Not only that, all retrievable record contained in the central database can be utilized 
to complete relevant back-testing. Indeed, banks are required to authentically document the 
data management process and ensure data integrity (Demirgüç-Kunt et al 2013). The fact, 
that internal data will often be limited has also been highlighted in requiring banks to 
undertake benchmarking that is, to carry out comparison with external ratings and/or other 
external models (Ozdemir 2009).  
The existing evidence suggests that Practitioners as well Researchers have always been 
convinced of bank capital as key to sound performance of any banking institution (Kaur 
and Kapoor 2015). The concept that close monitoring and efficient management of capital 
of the banking institutions following Basel II guidelines, perhaps will consolidate the 
argument that banks with sufficient capital can lower cost of borrowing to enhance 
efficiency and become more profitable. This would improve their creditworthiness 
amongst the borrowers towards achieving financial stability. For instance there is evidence 
that bank capital supervision improved risk management in banking resulting in positive 
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bank performance (Huang et al 2008, Chortareas et al 2012). Overall focus of Basel II no 
doubt remained on credit risk because of it being most frequent and common reason for 
bank failure. Nevertheless, the importance of operational risk and market risk was 
significant enough and could not be ignored as they played a significant role in generating 
financial crises (BCBS 2009b). The calculation of “economic capital”95 proved to be 
extremely challenging. It has been argued that a specific quantification procedure may not 
suffice to capture all forms of risk and that if the risks can be quantified at all, it will reduce 
the capital requirements (Blum 1999). Further limitations of the concept of quantification 
of risk under numerical models suffered steep challenges and held responsible to be cause 
of the inflated financial growth, casino capitalism and resulted in global financial crises 
where banks simply miscalculated the impact of the credit default initiating financial and 
banking crises (Lapavitsas 2009; Fouskas and Gokay 2012). Practically, economic capital 
frameworks only possible to be implemented under Basel advanced  IRB approaches have 
been accused of being fragmented because even despite availability and implementation of 
such sophisticated risk measurement methods there still existed notable short falls in 
calculating economic capital from integrated risk point of view (Kaur and Kapoor 2015). 
One reason detected in literature can be that the institutions have been allowed to 
implement methods they believe to be accurate in reflecting their risk portfolio making it 
impossible to compare any two institutions from an outsider’s (Regulator) perspective 
(Reeves et al 2004). The complexity in concept as well as in practice has made it even more 
challenging for institutions in achieving the vastly argued objective of aligning economic 
capital with regulatory capital96  (McKenzie 2011). Not to forget, the objective of aligning 
regulatory capital with economic capital received its fair share of criticism due to fact that 
both terms serve different objectives. For instance, regulatory capital is assessed by 
regulatory authorities in order to anticipate banks’ ability to survive or better still, prevent 
in future any catastrophic events e.g. “credit crunch”, whereas economic capital is required 
in running day to day business of the bank efficiently and is calculated by the risk managers 
                                                 
95 Capital required for bank to stay solvent according to bank’s own calculation determined on the basis of 
quantification of risk 
96 Regulatory capital estimated by the regulator and compulsory for the bank to hold, where economic capital 
refers to banks own estimate of capital to be held for solvency  
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following peculiar business environment (Moosa 2008). Anyhow, Basel II established a 
framework for capital regulations focusing on regulatory capital defined as divided into 
Tier 1 and Tier 2 bank capital97 (BCBS 2004d). There is evidence that Basel II efficiently 
addressed a significant hurdle of how to define regulatory capital consistent across the 
board. G-10 countries while implementing the new capital adequacy framework had 
perceived different definitions of the regulatory capital see Herring (2007). Nevertheless, 
Basel II dubbed capable of being implemented by 2004 in over 100 countries across the 
world did not happen. The initial expectations of Basel Committee for smooth dialogue 
and transition to Basel II failed, implementation did not take place in one smooth transition 
but was deferred on more than one occasions (e.g. US) as consultations progressed during 
implementation process by large international banks and then identified potential problems 
(Gordon 2004). Despite that, it was argued that Basel II implementation should be 
recognized as an opportunity due to the fact that possibilities of successful integration 
would be much higher at the time of implementation see Roldan (2006). The complexity 
of implementing proposal i.e. alignment of regulatory and economic capital; calibration of 
capital requirements to expected and unexpected losses was recognized at a number of 
levels, furthermore numerous other issues surfaced with time regarding Basel II 
convergence (McKenzie 2011; Shevchenko and Peters 2013; Kaur and Kapoor 2015).  
The issue of “Home-host implementation” on a worldwide basis took the initial lime light 
with growing concerns that by doing so will increase the levels of complexity (Caruana 
2003). There was evidence that larger and multinational banks already got used to 
operating dual reporting systems in order to comply with different regulations at home and 
host country level but nevertheless, the critical argument developed was that introduction 
of dual reporting systems will definitely generate a huge scope of confusion (Hudson 
2004). However, according to the guidelines published by Basel II (BCBS 2007), 
home/host supervisors should retain their traditional responsibilities in regulating 
multinational banking institutions. This, in theory provided an opportunity to open up even 
more sophisticated level of cooperation between the home-host country supervisors and 
                                                 
97 Tier 1 bank capital refers to core capital includes common stock and retained earnings, Tier 2 capital 
usually less than tier 1 capital on books, refers to complimentary or secondary capital includes revaluation 
reserves, undisclosed reserves. 
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ensure all host supervisors are able to supervise the local operations of foreign banks 
effectively. Despite the fact that increased complexity, such advancements should 
conceptually strengthen the regulation of both domestic and internationally active banks 
(Caruana 2003). There appeared a number of issues with home host kerfuffle see Persaud, 
A. (2010); D'Hulster, K. (2012). Nevertheless, with introduction of Credit, Market and 
Operational risk calculations in risk management framework, many internationally active 
banks took the initiative and undertook heavily expensive exercise to restructure their 
internal control and capital allocation in response to Basel II (Cornford 2003, Garcia 2004). 
The heated debate was what if benefits of Basel II implementation failed to outweigh the 
costs. Barfield (2004) analyzed in detail the impact that balance sheets of European Union 
banks could suffer with the go ahead to Basel II implementation and narrated incremental 
costs to be significant. Regulators feared sophisticated banks using securitization as a 
means of exploiting rules see Hudson (2004). However, well before such fears came to 
surface, Basel II had managed to develop hugely rejuvenated interest from all market 
participants in order to refine credit risk techniques. Not only to encounter known issues 
but to strive for even finer and more reliable techniques to translate credit ratings into 
expected losses (Altman 2002). Basel II (Pillar 1) attempts to control capital arbitrage by 
adjusting risk weights in order to reflect economic risks as accurately as possible (BCBS 
2006a; Herring 2007). Nevertheless, Basel II was accepted significantly to be a tremendous 
improvement in calculating minimum capital requirements, would change completely the 
ways banks perceived the role of regulator in supervising banks risk management practice 
and the extent of information to be published by banks (Garside and Bech 2003; Caruana 
2003; Garcia 2004; Wilson 2004).  Nevertheless, with unfolding of events of financial 
crises of 2007-2008, Basel II not only failed to eradicate Capital Arbitrage98, but issues of 
                                                 
98 Banks like to hold less capital to do business with most of the money available. Capital arbitrage or 
regulatory capital arbitrage is practice of avoiding excess capital adequacy requirements for instance 
securitization i.e. sell safe assets and keep high premium assets and transfer default risk e.g. credit default 
swaps (CDS) see Reeves et al. (2004); Mitchell, M., & Pulvino, T. (2012); Acharya et al (2013) 
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Procyclicality99, Systemic risk100 and extremely financialized capitalism also surfaced 
(Lapavitsas 2013). 
 
2.3.3 Basel II: International Transition and Implementation Progress 
Basel II by no means was a legal text therefore Europe, US and other adopting regulatory 
authorities used national discretion in developing their own national rules to 
implementation of Basel II. Capital regulation in Canada revolved around minimum risk-
based capital ratios and an inverse leverage101 (maximum assets-to-capital multiple). 
According to Basel Accord, internationally active banks needed to maintain tier 1 capital 
at minimum of 4% and total capital at minimum of 8% of the risk weighted assets. 
However, during 1997 implementation Canada imposed minimum targets in excess of the 
Basel II minimum requirements (7% minimum of tier 1 and 10% minimum of total capital). 
All large domestic Canadian banks are strictly compliant since the introduction of these 
targets (Ratnovski and Huang 2009). That in theory discouraged banking institutions in 
Canada to get involved in excessive risk taking.  In Australia, Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority (APRA) geared up for implementation of Basel II in January 2008. 
There already existed Probability and Impact Rating System (PAIRS) and Supervisory 
Oversight and Response System (SOARS), these frameworks were successfully designed 
under APRA for the purpose of early problem identification and intervention where 
necessary (APRA 2007). APRA, in Australia required all Authorized Deposit taking 
Institutes (ADI) to develop and maintain extensive Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment 
Process (ICAAP). An ADI have been obligated to ensure that ICAAP is comprehensively 
documented, proportional to its operations and consistent with the prudential requirements. 
ICAAP is also subject to rigorous review from the APRA where the frequency of the 
                                                 
99Prcyclicality in context of impact of economic fluctuations on the banks’ capital adequacy requirements 
see Gordy and Howell (2006) 
100 See risk of contagion nature due to collapse of systemically important banks Caruana (2010), Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga (2013) 
101 Inverse leverage ratio is calculated by dividing institutions totals risk weighted assets by total tier 1 and 
tier 2 capitals. Maximum multiple is set a 20 (leverage of 5%).The Office of the Superintendent of Financial 
Institutions (OFSI) hold the discretion to increase or decrease the maximum multiple on frequent individual 
assessment basis see Ratnovski and Huang (2009) 
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review depends upon the size and the business mix of the ADI (APRA 2007). In Europe 
Basel II was converted in CRD (Capital requirements directive) and planned in for 
implementation. Phased in standardized approach under Basel II capital framework 
implemented in EU (European Union) from January 2007 and IRBA approaches from 
January 2008, in United States Basel II implementation initiated in 2008 (Appendix 2). 
Apprehension about risk-sensitive capital would intensify pro-cyclicality, was the reason 
behind US decision to initially delay implementation of Basel II (Roldan 2006).   
 
US agencies got engaged in careful consultations because the result of the QIS 4102 showed 
variances across the portfolios and institutions (OCC 2006). Later the same year US 
agencies agreed a bifurcated approach (Basel IA) to implementing Basel I in order to 
address competitive disadvantage issues between large and small institutions in United 
States. In June 2006 Basel committee issued the results of the fifth global quantitative 
impact study (BCBS 2006e) containing estimated change in the minimum required capital 
under Basel II along with European Union referred to EU Capital Directive as the final 
ruling with regards to implementing Basel II (Appendix 2). Final and full implementation 
was expected to be achieved by the year 2010 (2012 in case of US (Appendix 3). Large 
internationally active banks with foreign exposure in excess of $10 billion and/or total 
assets greater than $250 billion termed as ‘core banks’ would initially be required to 
implement advanced approaches under Basel II. Under US regulation103 all banks met a 
“well-capitalized approach”, which required banks in the US to hold more regulatory 
capital than Basel approach (Herring 2007). Bifurcated approach was also taken up under 
the view that it would minimize political obstacles in Basel II implementation in US. Not 
to forget, core banks in US already implemented decent risk management systems. This 
implied that in ‘core banks’104 of US there already existed sophisticated risk management 
                                                 
102 Qualitative impact study 4 2004-2005 conducted by BCBS, to see preparedness of Basel II amongst G-10 
member countries  
103 USA regulations classify four categories (well-capitalized, adequately capitalized, under-capitalized, 
significantly under-capitalized see GAO (2007) 
104Large internationally active banks were termed core banks with foreign exposure in excess of $10 billion 
and/or total assets greater than $250 billion. In US a total of 11 core banks operational with 42% of industry 
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infrastructure making it easy for them to facilitate implementation of advanced approaches 
under Basel II at comparatively less effort and costs. Furthermore the core banks in US 
upon implementation of advanced approach would also benefit with: a) relaxed leverage 
ratio facilitated by Federal Reserve Board (FED) upon gaining confidence in the new credit 
risk management process and b) reduction in regulatory capital because of AIRB by default 
significantly lowered risk weights for retail exposures (Herring 2007).  
 
Additional operational risk charge introduced in order to minimize the impact of reduction 
under advance approaches of Basel II and to prevent a complete tilt of competitive 
advantage in favor of core banks. Although according to bifurcated approach in US non-
core105 banks were offered exemption from additional capital regulation and associated 
costs to achieve level playing field. However, it was argued in abundance that the 
bifurcated approach would fail to realize level playing field due to the clear advantage of 
lower risk weights in SME lending, Credit card lending and the largest asset market of all, 
residential loan market (Hannan and Pillof 2004; Berger 2004; and Lang et al. 2005). 
Despite that, some core banks106 labelled advanced approaches under Basel II as 
deadweight costs and this would place them in international competitive disadvantage. 
This, due to introduction of increased complexity would result in increased costs for 
implementation and increased compliance issues (Herring 2007). 
In order to stay dated with the efforts of the jurisdictions across the globe with regards to 
Basel II implementation Financial Stability Institute (FSI) conducted its first survey in the 
year 2004 and the practice continued to see the jurisdictions compliance status107. In 
conducting the survey Jurisdictions, excluding BCBS member countries, were divided into 
six groups globally (Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Latin America, the Middle East and 
Europe see BIS (2008). According to the findings of the survey, a total of 105 countries 
including BCBS member countries had already implemented or currently implementing 
                                                 
assets in comparison with 8,732 other banks with remaining 58%. See the list of 11 US core banks. Appendix 
3. 
105 Banks with foreign exposure less than $10 billion and/or total assets not exceeding $250 billion  
106 For instance Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, Wachovia and WAMU 
107 For instance 2008 survey was sent out to 130 countries with an overall response rate of 78%    
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Basel II. The results also showed that 57 countries by the end 2008 would have 
implemented Basel II as compared to 31 by the year end 2007. The survey further revealed 
the number of jurisdictions intending to implement Basel II and the number of Basel II 
compliant jurisdictions could increase up to as many as 105 countries by the end of year 
2015 (see Table 4 below).  
Table 4. Overview of Basel II Capital Regulation implementation 
 2007 2008 2009-2015** 
Africa 
America* 
Asia* 
Caribbean 
Europe* 
Middle East 
- 
- 
2 
- 
27 
2 
2 
3 
10 
- 
34 
8 
12 
14 
18 
8 
44 
9 
Total 31 57 105 
Overview of Basel II Implementation (Source: Bank of International Settlements, www.bis.org) 
 * Including BCBS member countries 
** includes countries with exact timeframe for full implementation not 
available 
 
The results of the 2008 survey portray, in comparison with the previous surveys, that 56 
jurisdictions will be offering advanced approaches for both credit risk and operational risk 
under the Pillar 1 of the Basel II capital accord by the year end 2015  (BIS 2008 chart 7). 
The fact that 77 jurisdictions will be implementing both Pillar 2 and Pillar 3 of the Basel II 
capital accord by the year end 2015 was a positive development (BIS 2008 chart 8 and 9). 
Although the figures seem encouraging for the overall study and represent an invaluable 
insight into the world of Basel II implementation. In Africa survey returned 57% response 
rate and revealed that implementation (Pillar 1) of Standardized approach has slowed right 
down during year 2009. In addition the number of countries intending to adopt the IRB 
approaches had also decreased against the previous reading of the year 2006 (BIS 2008). 
However, standardized approach remained to be used most widely and the number of 
countries intending to implement standardized approach stayed the same for the year 2015 
(BIS 2008). The Basic indicator approach was intended to be adopted by 67%, significantly 
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higher portion (in comparison with Standardized approach at 50% and Advanced 
Measurement Approach at 33%) of the participation in order to calculate capital 
requirements for the operational risk by the year 2015. Pillars 2 and 3 seemed to have 
deferred by several participating jurisdictions in Africa since 2006 (BIS 2008). Asia had 
better rate of response at 82%, and all expected to implement Standardized approach (Pillar 
1) by the end of year 2009. In addition, 65% of the respondents intend to adopt both 
Foundation and Advanced Rating Based approaches by 2015. All jurisdictions intend to 
upgrade from Basic Indicator approach to Standardized approach to calculating the 
minimum capital requirements under operational risk by the year 2015, however only 35% 
of respondents expressed their intentions with regards to using Advanced Measurement 
Approaches (BIS 2008). Like in African jurisdictions, several participants deferred 
implementation plans recorded in the previous survey with regards to Pillar 2 and Pillar 3. 
The survey in Caribbean saw a response rate similar to Asia at 82%. For Credit risk (Pillar 
1) number of jurisdictions intending to offer all three approaches by the year 2015 saw rise, 
likewise for operational risk the participants planning to adopt all three approaches by the 
year 2015 rose. With regards to implementing Supervisory Review Process and Market 
Discipline (Pillars 2 and 3) by the 2015, the number of jurisdictions went up as compared 
to the previous studies (BIS 2008). Latin America produced another encouraging, 82% 
survey response rate. Out of 14 surveyed 12 jurisdictions confirmed to implementing Basel 
II. For credit risk (Pillar 1) 92% showed intent to adopt standardized approach. 
Furthermore, 50% and 42% survey respondents expect to offer Foundation and Advanced 
rating based approaches respectively. Jurisdictions offering Basic Indicator and 
Standardized approaches for calculating capital required under operational risk were 75% 
and 50% respectively, however in comparison to the last study some countries deferred 
their implementation plans with regards to adopting Advance Measurement Approach 
under operational risk (BIS 2008). Pillar 2 and Pillar 3 implementation seemed promising 
in future (92% respondents expect to be compliant with the Pillars 2 and 3 by 2015), 
however, currently some jurisdictions deferred implementation of Supervisory review 
process and Market Discipline (BIS 2008). Middle East returned 90% response rate with 
all respondents intending to implement Basel II, in fact all jurisdictions surveyed had 
implemented Standardized approach (Credit risk) and eight out of nine jurisdictions 
surveyed implemented Basic Indicator Approach and Standardized Approach (Operational 
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Risk) by 2008. In addition, 78% countries planned to adopt foundation internal rating based 
by 2015. However, 44% of the countries were to implement AIRB (Credit risk) and AMA 
(Operational risk) by 2015. The survey also revealed that 89% of the jurisdictions surveyed 
in Middle East implemented Pillars 2 and Pillar 3 of Basel II by 2008 (BIS 2008). In Europe 
(non-BCBS member countries), the response rate was 83%. Overall 34 out of 35 countries 
responding to the survey planned to implement all three approaches under Credit Risk as 
well as Operational Risk by 2008. Furthermore, 76% and 74% of the surveyed jurisdictions 
(non-BCBS member countries) would have implemented Pillar 2 and 3 respectively by 
2008, and expecting to improve to 91% for  Pillars (2 & 3) by 2015 (BIS 2008). Despite 
strides towards all round Basel II implementation, global financial crises carved its way 
through the defenses of capital adequacy structures of the core banks108 of the US and 
Europe. The advance risk management under Basel II Capital Regulation fell short to 
capture the full exposure to risks associated with complex asset structures of the 
commercial banks and more integrated banks got hit harder by the global financial crises 
giving birth to the question, can Basel Capital Regulation tame the financialized capitalism 
(Lapavitsas 2013).                   
 
2.3.4 Basel II: The Impact on Bank’s Capital Adequacy  
Basel Committee focused on industry consultation in order to quantify the impact of Basel 
II implementation on minimum capital requirements and published updated versions of the 
Basel II capital accord regularly. Arguably a huge progress has been made since Basel I 
capital accord prompted developing a risk sensitive capital framework (Roldan 2006; 
Caruana ad Narain 2008). One major highlighting inclusion in the Basel I (BCBS 1988) at 
the time was treatment of off-balance sheet exposures and their conversion into equivalent 
on balance sheet exposures. The idea based upon risk differentiation through a simple risk 
weighting mechanism took off like a storm but quicker came down to earth, the short 
comings of Basel I ‘one size fits all approach’. Basel II attempted to address the shortfall 
with a number of distinct improvements for instance introduction of more risk categories, 
insertion of Operational and market risk calculations; introduction of the three pillar 
                                                 
108 Core banks defined as Large internationally active banks with foreign exposure in excess of $10 billion 
and/or total assets greater than $250 billion 
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approach to the framework (BCBS 2004d; BCBS 2009a). In order to continuously 
introduce improvements to then existing set of Basel II in 2004 guidelines, Basel 
committee working groups continue consultations on a huge scale to gauge the impact of 
the Basel II implementation. Quantitative Impact Studies (QIS) played a crucial part and 
served the objective of allowing BCBS to capture the impact of Basel II guidelines on 
minimum capital requirements (BCBS 2006a). In conducting the Quantitative Impact 
Studies the Banks were divided in two groups. Group 1, comprise of large Banks with Tier 
1 capital in excess of €3 billion and Group 2 include specialized banks with less than €3 
billion Tier 1 capital (BCBS 2003b). The scale of QIS 3 was huge and attracted enormous 
attention in line with Basel committee expectations109. The launch of third Quantitative 
Impact Study (QIS 3) offered banks more time to collect and compile data and aimed to 
achieve participation of as many as over 200 banks across 40 countries in order to assess 
the likely effects of the revised capital framework. On a best-efforts basis, National 
supervisors and banks in participating countries constructed positive dialogue over the 
course of the QIS 3 to positively influence the results of the study and effectively capture 
the impact of the proposed latest changes on the minimum capital requirements (BCBS 
2003b). 
Table 5. Change in capital requirements of Banks 
    GROUP 1     GROUP 2   
Portfolio 
% of 
current 
capital 
% change in 
capital 
requirement Contribution 
% of 
current 
capital 
% change in 
capital 
requirement Contribution 
Corporate 32% -9% -2% 20% -27% -4% 
Sovereign 1% 47% 2% 1% 51% 0% 
Bank 5% 45% 2% 8% -5% -1% 
Retail:(total) 20% -47% -9% 36% -54% -21% 
   Mortgage 11% -56% -6% 19% -55% -16% 
   Non-mortgage 7% -34% -3% 11% -27% -5% 
   Revolving 2% -3% 0% 6% -33% 0% 
                                                 
109 Total of 188 banks in 13 G 10 countries and 177 banks from 30 other countries including all EU member 
countries 
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SME(total) 18% -14% -2% 21% -17% -4% 
Equity 2% 115% 2% 2% 81% 2% 
Trading Book 8% 5% 0% 3% 4% 0% 
Securitised 
Assets 2% 103% 0% 3% 62% -1% 
Other Portfolios     1%     3% 
General provision     -2%     -3% 
Overall credit risk   -8% -8%   -29% -29% 
Operational Risk     10%     7% 
Overall change   3% 3%   -22% -22% 
Source: Bank of International Settlements www.bis.org QIS 3 Overview of Global results. p.23  
 
In general capital requirements under IRB both foundation and advanced, were lesser in 
comparison to Standardized approach and more reflective of risk. On aggregate Group 2 
banks implementing IRB approaches saw more benefit due to their specialized nature 
(Retail and SME exposures). Although banks with comparatively stronger retail portfolios 
saw greater reduction in minimum capital requirements, QIS 3 also recorded significant 
level of diversity within individual banks for positions with similar risks (BCBS 2003b). 
The results showed internationally active banks would reduce capital requirements upon 
implementing AIRB approach (BCBS 2003b), because of decrease in credit risk for 
corporate, retail and SME exposures. On the contrary, larger internationally active banks 
suffered increase in capital due to increase in other exposures, mainly Banks and 
operational risk (see Table 5). The nature of impact posed by increase in capital for Bank 
exposure and operational carried particular importance due to its potential impact on inter-
bank loan activity in context of widely differing national market environments of the 
participating countries (BCBS 2003b). Barfield (2004) conducted an in depth analysis of 
impact of Basel II on the capital in participating countries and highlighted the impact of 
operational risk against overall capital (Figure 3).  
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Figure 3: Expected change in Capital requirement per country – credit and operational 
risk 
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Nevertheless, QIS 3 highlighted the limitations faced by banks in many countries in 
presenting data on all three approaches under pillar 1 in a format that is necessary to analyze 
impact of the new capital accord. Banks in many countries failed in recognizing all 
categories of collateral that reduced minimum capital requirement successfully. Also, 
although as noted earlier QIS 3 offered more time to collate data, banks still notified 
considerable levels of difficulty with regards to gathering data in the format required by 
the committee for setting PDs, LGDs and EADs110 resulting into further variations.  In such 
conditions then, it was considered fair to argue that implementation of Basel II would 
enable banks to identify more collateral and increase possibility of borrowers to be rated 
effectively in addition, banks systems would also develop constructively. Basel committee 
working groups took necessary actions, integrated the results and inflicted changes in 
standardized approach to lower risk weights allocated to residential mortgages and made 
available alternative treatment for operational risk. Furthermore, IRB approaches also 
suffered some fine tuning resulting in updates introduced in the Basel II proposals (Hall 
                                                 
110 Probability of Default (PD); Loss given default (LGD); and Exposure at Default (EAD)  
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2006). QIS 3 in particular became a cornerstone in development of Basel II accord111, 
followed by more tailored and specific Quantitative Impact Studies112 in an attempt to even 
more precisely identify potential impacts of Basel II implementation. QIS 4 was structured 
in a way to be implemented in several countries and results presented in form of change in 
minimum capital requirements. There have been discussions constructing comparison 
between QIS 3 and QIS 4 highlighting some key points i.e. the economic conditions were 
comparatively benign at the time of QIS 4; the data management systems of institutions in 
participating countries, in a bid to eventually be compliant with Basel II framework, had 
improved significantly over the period therefore arguably Data collected during QIS 4 and 
5 was considered more reliable and of higher quality in comparison with previous QIS. 
Furthermore, none of the previous occasions tested banks to assess the minimum capital 
requirements using advanced approaches.  QIS 4 attracted significant response where US 
in particular, in collaboration with Basel committee working groups tailored a specific US 
version of QIS 4. QIS 4113  in US recorded significant decrease in all portfolio categories 
and also pointed out similar loan products in different institutions required different risk-
based capital requirements. During QIS 4 Minimum required risk-based capital (MRC) and 
Effective minimum required risk-based capital (EMRC) were used as common measures 
(MRC is the threshold hold required to be maintained by institutions and consisted of total 
regulatory capital plus eligible  reserves whereas EMRC is adjusted MRC where eligible 
reserve are deducted in order to calculate effective total regulatory capital). In application, 
MRC was used to analyze changes when moving from existing approach to the Basel II 
framework for individual exposures supporting the argument that in principle reserves did 
not impact independent portfolios significantly e.g. Banks mortgage portfolio. However, 
on the contrary effects of reserves can be significant when analyzing the impact of the 
change for the Bank as a whole, EMRC was used. The aggregated results for QIS 4 showed 
the changes in the MRC (Appendix 4). The results showed MRC decreases down to 12.5% 
                                                 
111 see detail of QIS 3 results and discussion BCBS 2003b; Barfield 2004 and Hall 2006 
112 QIS 4 in 2004; QIS 5 in 2005; where QIS 6 initiated in 2010 after the crises 
113 QIS 4 estimated reductions I minimum total risk based capital requirements of 15.5 percent (mean) and 
26.3 percent (median), in addition reductions in minimum tier 1 risk based capital requirements of 26.3 
(mean) and 31 percent (median) were also noted in comparison with Basel I 
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and EMRC 15.5% lower under Basel II capital framework in comparison with current US 
regulations based upon data collected from 26 participating institutions. The change has 
also been present portfolio wise (Appendix 5). The largest reductions occurred for 
mortgage exposures making an impact on the aggregate MRC. In fact most portfolios for 
over half of the participating institutions showed decrease in minimum risk-based capital 
requirement in double digits. Nevertheless the results of QIS 4 showed that every 
participating institution was allocated equal weight without consideration of the size of the 
exposures. There were few more important readings into the results of the QIS 4. There 
was no existing operational risk charge therefore no percentage variances could be 
recorded for operational risk. With majority of institutions, a fraction of operational risk 
charge would be associated with various portfolios. However, operational risk noted as a 
separate line amongst all portfolios, attempts to capture all risk based requirement 
associated with operational risk. The results in US further influence the approach 
undertaken by US regulatory authorities in delaying Basel II implementation. Nevertheless, 
QIS 4 in US encouragingly, hinted at greater sensitivity of the advanced approaches under 
Basel II (A-IRB, AMA)114 to economic conditions. QIS 4 was somewhat limited (only 
Germany, US and South Africa participated) however, QIS 5 targeted the impact Basel II 
implementation globally to evaluate changes in minimum capital requirements as industry 
progressed further towards Basel II implementation. QIS 4 and QIS 5 combined was 
enormous effort and collated responses from 32 countries. The data received contained 
participation of 382 banks from BCBS member countries, non- BCBS member countries 
and other non-BCBS member countries115. Data was collected on the bases of national 
implementation of Basel II capital framework, however that included adaptation of the 
Standardized approach by some jurisdiction to oblige their peculiar circumstance. Example 
of such cases were mostly other non- BCBS countries.  
                                                 
114 A-IRB (Advanced Internal Ratings Based: Credit Risk); AMA (Advance Measurement Approaches: 
Operational Risk) 
115 BCBS member countries are Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. Non- BCBS member 
countries are Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Malta, Norway, 
Poland, and Portugal. Other Non-BCBS countries include Australia, Bahrain, Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, 
Peru and Singapore. 
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Table 6. Basel II Capital regulation credit risk compliance 
         
    Group 1       
Group 
2     
  Total SA FIRB AIRB Total SA FIRB AIRB 
BCBS 82 30 43 62 146 130 108 12 
Non BCBS 8 7 6 2 86 85 9 2 
Other non-
BCBS 6 3 6 4 54 50 5 2 
Total 96 40 55 68 286 265 122 16 
Source: Bank of International Settlements www.bis.org 
Upon responding to their consequent supervisory authorities, a number of banks managed 
to provide data for all three approaches (Standardized Approach (SA), Foundation Internal 
Rating Based (FIRB) and Advance Internal Rating Based (AIRB)) towards credit risk 
under Basel II guidelines (see Table 6). However, majority of the data could only be 
produced by Group 1 banks of the G 10 consolidating their technical supremacy over 
competition. This also confirmed the fact that the data management systems had improved 
comprehensively within banks over the period.  
 
Table 7. Basel Capital compliance intentions: Provisional  
 
        
    
Group 
1     Group 2   
  SA FIRB AIRB SA FIRB AIRB 
BCBS 0 23 59 33 102 11 
Non-BCBS 2 4 2 78 7 1 
Other non- BCBS 0 2 4 49 3 2 
Total 2 29 65 160 112 14 
Source: Bank of International Settlements www.bis.org 
 
Approximately 68% of the Group 1 banks intended to adopt AIRB from all participating 
countries however, G 10 Group 1 banks again dominated the participation. 56% of Group 
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2 banks in all participating countries were interested in adopting Standardized approaches 
under Basel II (see Table 7) proving their intentions to stay in touch with competition with 
regards to adopting better more sophisticated credit risk management techniques.  
 
 
 
Table 8. Basel II operational risk compliance approaches: BCBC member countries 
    
 
Approaches Group 1 Group 2  
Basic indicator approach 2 81  
Standardized approach 32 65  
Advanced Measurement Approach 22 0  
Total 56 146  
Source: Bank of International Settlements www.bis.org 
 
The data received with regards to using all three approaches under operational risk showed 
that AMA (Advance Measurement Approaches) proved challenging for Group 2 banks of 
G-10 member countries. Whereas, 40% of Group 1 banks produced data on AMA 
highlighting the fact that Group 1 banks have invested in abundance to improve their data 
management structures capturing operational risk (Table 8).  
QIS 5 definitely pointed out that more and more Group 1 banks of BCBS member countries 
were implementing advanced credit and operational risk techniques as compare to Group 
2 banks in particular in non-BCBS and other non-BCBS countries. Although from QIS 5, 
it became evident that there was progress made in terms of data survey quality however, 
need for further improvements were also discussed (BCBS 2006e).  
 
Table 9. Group wise Basel II capital regulations credit risk compliance  
 Standardized 
Approach 
% 
FIRB  
Approach 
% 
AIRB 
Approach 
% 
Most likely 
Approach 
% 
BCBS Group 1 1.7 -1.3 -7.1 -6.8 
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BCBS Group 2 -1.3 -12.3 -26.7 -11.3 
Non- BCBS Group 1 -0.9 -3.2 -8.3 -7.7 
Non- BCBS Group 2 -3.0 -16.6 -26.6 -15.4 
Other Non- BCBS 
Group 1 
1.8 -16.2 -29.0 -20.7 
Other Non- BCBS 
Group 2 
38.2 11.4 -1.0 19.5 
Source: Bank of International Settlements www.bis.org 
 
Overall change in the minimum capital requirements showed that with progression towards 
more advanced Basel II capital framework approaches, capital charge decreased for all 
groups with exceptions of Group 1 banks in BCBS member countries under Standardized 
approach and Group 2 banks in other non-BCBS member countries using Standardized and 
FIRB approaches. However, the results above showed that all banks implementing AIRB 
would increase minimum capital requirements upon converting into most likely approach 
whereas Group 1 banks under Standardized and FIRB approaches would gain benefit with 
significant decrease in required minimum capital upon adopting the most likely approach 
(Table 9). There remained exceptions of Group 2 banks in all BCBS, non-BCBS and other 
non-BCBS member countries who saw increased minimum capital requirement upon 
making switch to most likely approach (BCBS 2006e). Nevertheless, in contrast with 
previous impact studies QIS 4/QIS 5 showed overall decrease in minimum capital 
requirement for majority of the banking institutions in participating countries attributed to 
favorable macroeconomic conditions that impacted rather heavily on mortgage portfolios 
of the banks in participating countries (BCBS 2006e). Other variances were attributed to 
difference in portfolio characteristics and variable estimation methodologies116.   
In addition to analysis of the findings country wise, QIS 5 effectively discussed the impact 
of the each of the tested approaches of Basel II on portfolio basis. Under standardized 
approach results presented largely a similar pattern for both Group 1 and Group 2 banks in 
all participated countries. The retail portfolio proved the strongest contributor towards the 
decrease in overall change in MRC (see Table 10 below). The retail portfolio for the study 
was further divided in to three main categories: Mortgage, Revolving and Other (Other 
                                                 
116 see BCBS (2006e) for comprehensive discussion estimation methodologies of QIS 5 
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subdivided into SME Retail; and Equity). According to the published results Mortgages 
was the biggest contributor towards decrease in overall capital requirements amongst all 
categories of the retail portfolio (Appendix 5). This was due to the fact that mortgages took 
the property as collateral and considered less risky. There was an extraordinarily large 
percentage change in the sovereign portfolio for other non-BCBS countries (G2 in 
particular) reflected in overall MRC as positive (Appendix 6). This was because exposures 
that currently carried 0% risk weight would result in an infinite percentage increase upon 
applying any risk weights under standardized approach, even if in absolute terms recorded 
change MRC is much less (BCBS 2006e). 
 
Table 10. Standardized Approach: Overall change in MRC 
Standardized Approach 
 Group 1 Group 2 
BCBS 1.7 -1.3 
Non- BCBS -0.9 -3.0 
Other Non-BCBS 1.8 38.2 
Source: Bank of International Settlements www.bis.org 
 
Under IRB approaches the negative change in overall MRC is larger in comparison to 
Standardized approach (see Table 11). However, the pattern stayed almost unchanged 
largely. In all participating countries retail exposure was the major contributor towards 
overall decrease in MRC117.  
 
Table 11. IRB Approach: Overall change in MRC 
IRB Approaches 
 Group 1 Group 2 
                                                 
117 BCBS member countries are Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. Non- BCBS member 
countries are Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Malta, Norway, 
Poland, and Portugal. Other Non-BCBS countries include Australia, Bahrain, Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, 
Peru and Singapore. 
 78 
 
BCBS -4.5 -14.1 
Non- BCBS -7.5 -18.0 
Other Non-BCBS -20.7 -5.4 
Source: Bank of International Settlements www.bis.org 
 
The PD and/LGD data was limited than expected because most banks applied treatment 
for immaterial exposures under national discretion of Basel II implementation in each 
jurisdiction (BCBS 2006e). The complexity of the securitized assets118 was highlighted 
however, compared to previous studies significant progress was noted. Therefore only 
average results were shown and evidence of results on a single-jurisdiction basis could be 
significantly diverse (see Table 12). The QIS 5 also most importantly, brought to light the 
fact that IRB approaches encouraged Internal Assessment Approach (IAA), that when used 
in conjunction with Group 1 banks ‘Liquidity Positions’ stood on 0% risk weight (Maturity 
< 1 Year). That was accused of being risk-insensitive and became an important driver of 
increase in capital charges for the future treatment of liquidity facilities representing 
significant portions of the banks portfolios in particular Group 1 banks (BCBS 2006e).  
 
Table 12. Overall change in MRC for securitization portfolio (%age) 
Group 1    Group 2 
 Standardized 
Approach 
IRB 
Approaches 
Standardized 
Approach 
IRB 
Approaches 
BCBS 7.7 0.5 10.2 -17.3 
Non- BCBS 21.2 7.9 -3.9 -14.6 
Source: Bank of International Settlements www.bis.org 
  
In calculating operational risk charges (average) for the minimum capital requirement only 
the approach used by the banks in actual. The contribution of operational risk was restricted 
because banks were in different stages of system development (see Table 13). Furthermore, 
significant dispersion was recorded depending upon the risk profiles e.g. banks when 
                                                 
118  See Acharya, V.V., Schnabl, P. and Suarez, G., (2013). Securitization without risk transfer. Journal of 
Financial economics, 107(3), pp.515-536 for detailed synopsis of technical charter of securitization.  
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providing financial services encounter higher operational risk as compared to providing 
loans when credit risk takes the importance (BCBS 2006e).   
 
Table 13. Contribution of operational risk to MRC: All participating countries  
 Approach Group 1 Group 2 
BCBS Basic Indicator 
Approach 
6.3 8.3 
 Standardized Approach 5.7 7.6 
 Advance Measurement 
Approach 
7.2 - 
Non- BCBS Basic Indicator 
Approach 
- 8.9 
 Standardized Approach 5.5 7.9 
 Advance Measurement 
Approach 
5.9 5.4 
Other non- BCBS Basic Indicator 
Approach 
- 13.5 
 Standardized Approach 4.0 5.2 
 Advance Measurement 
Approach 
4.7 - 
Source: Bank of International Settlements www.bis.org 
 
Finally in a bid to capture impact of the trading book on capital requirements and treatment 
of double default, Basel committee gathered data but information received was scarce on 
both of the said topics therefore overall change in MRC was almost unaffected due to small 
sample size.  
 
2.3.5 Critique of the Basel II capital accord 
Basel Capital Accord (BCBS 1988) had limitations that attracted discussions in detail 
across the literature even before consultations that led to Basel II. Basel II capital 
regulations consultative document developed into an extremely complex set of capital 
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standards guidelines.119 Earlier discussions mainly targeted Basel I’s approach of ‘one size 
fits all’120. Nevertheless, once arrived, Basel II showcased its own set of limitations, to start 
off with, Basel II instantly fell prey to varied status of compliance jeopardizing one of the 
main objective of Basel Capital regulations that was to achieve level playing field see 
D'Hulster, K. (2012) for home-host issues. The aforementioned discussion of the impact 
studies show achieving level playing field a daunting task because of varied level of 
sophistication in the banking structures of the core and periphery economies. In addition, 
many cited disadvantages of Basel II in the literature include cost of implementation; 
accountability in international administrative law; competitive inequalities i.e. between the 
banks that need to implement and the ones that do not; varied standards of compliance 
imposed by the regulators across different jurisdictions; operational risk charges labeled as 
burden costs; and most important of all its tendency to increase systematic risk, shadow 
banking  and financialized capitalism (Barfield 2004; Barr and Miller 2006; Das 2007; and 
Dimirguc-Kunt et al 2008, 2013; Lpavitsas 2013; Hassan and Tamer 2016; Adrian and 
Ashcraft 2016). There is no doubt that Basel Committee injected tireless efforts in 
continually driving Basel II guidelines towards ultimate sophistication. Benefits of Basel 
II over Basel 1 even at the time of implementations remained incomplete in absence of a 
comprehensive cost benefit analysis of alternative approaches (Hall 2006). Basel II could 
be a world more risk sensitive than Basel I however, aforementioned serious limitations 
plague Basel II capital framework. The Basel Committee, considered one of the most 
influential trans-governmental regulatory network exercised across the globe, has been 
constantly engaged in a never ending process of reviewing Basel II guidelines towards 
overcoming identified flaws and preventing transnational externalities generated by global 
banking activities and regulation. One outcome of such externalities resulted in credit 
crunch and bank failures that traveled swiftly from one country to another (Fouskas and 
Gokay 2012). Basel II’s ultimate objective is to achieve convergence in bank capital 
                                                 
119 See Danielsson et al 2001; Gordy 2003; BCBS 2006a for an early note on Basel II limitations. 
120 Basel I (1988) approach promoted ‘one size fit all’ meaning that all corporate loans were placed into the 
8 percent capital bucket without giving any considerations to the fact that internal capital allocations for 
individual loans vary considerably within the institution depending on the estimated riskiness of the position 
in question see Dewatripoint and Tirole (1994) for detailed Basel I critique. 
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standards and coordination of bank supervision among the major industrialized countries 
whose banking environment dominates the global remained dubious rather seemed to 
aggravate financial capitalism and causing systemic risk see (Aglietta 2016; Pike and 
Pollard 2010; Demirguc‐Kunt et al 2013). However, Basel II from the onset faced criticism 
as an agreement achieved by the wealthiest countries’ central bankers therefore developed 
a reputation of ‘trans-governmental agent network’. Despite that Basel convergence 
extended beyond the member countries for instance, over 100 countries voluntarily adopted 
the Basel II capital accord (BCBS 2003b; OCC 2006; and BCBS 2006e). Developing 
countries faced pressure from developed economies, to adopt the Basel II capital standards 
regardless of their ability to incorporate Basel II rules in their national supervisory 
structures, simply to keep up at pace with international developments. Nevertheless, the 
interaction initiated by Basel II amongst international, transnational and domestic 
administration was for the purpose of generating norms of behavior and structures of 
practice that enhance accountability and legitimacy in the global administrative 
environment. International regulation aimed to foster domestic norms of accountability and 
legitimacy, in particular with in developing economies where inside elite are blamed to 
block reforms and prevent transparent domestic regulatory environment from prevailing 
and (Bar and Miller 2006).  
 
As noted earlier, majority of the banks confirmed implementing standardized approach. 
Standardized approach under Basel II credit risk was an improvement over its predecessor 
Basel I due to introduction of wider categories of assets that promised to deliver improved 
risk sensitivity of capital charges. Standardized approach to calculating credit risk requires 
Basel II Capital Regulation compliant banks to consider credit ratings released by external 
Credit ratings agencies121. However, this is subject to (a) if there is rating available through 
external credit ratings agencies and (b) do the ratings obtained by external rating agencies 
reflect actual risk and have been publically disclosed. Thus, standardized approach faced 
limitation including non-availability of ratings, which may be the case for the majority of 
institutions in the developing world (Foot 2006). Furthermore, ironically non rated firms 
                                                 
121 Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s to name the most frequently consulted. 
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are charged at lower rate than firms rated BB- or lower. Such scenario can promote 
practices where lower rated firms may decide go without ratings completely to be classed 
in lower capital charges category. In addition there has been evidence that ratings supplied 
by the ratings agencies lack consistency (across the agencies as well as across issuer 
category) therefore making it dubious to implement consistent application of ratings across 
the board and prevent firms ‘cherry picking’ desired ratings. Moreover, external credit 
ratings give only an extent of the riskiness of the institutions based upon their accounting 
information. In compiling the information for the allocation of credit weights market 
information is considered invaluable, however external credit rating agencies tend to rule 
out market fluctuations (Mariathasan & Merrouche 2014).  
 
Basel II accord relies on four risk components to deal with the credit risk: 
 
 EL = PD x LGD x EAD x f(M)122    (BCBS 2006a) 
 
However, it has been argued that where some complications related to the formula, some 
important causes of concerns are contained in the input assumptions too. All four risk 
components (PD, LGD, EAD and M) in order to determine the EL may be randomly-
determined and obtained from distributions containing correlations. Correlation 
assumptions are crucial because substantial difference to the computed risk measures can 
be observed for the institution as whole. Depending upon chosen granularity (aggregation 
level) at the time of composition of the individual business units, an imperfect aggregation 
of risk may occur (Das 2007). Aggregation problems may also arise when different 
business unit compositions can press to adopt different measurements of marginal risk 
contributions and calculations of additional capital required; or upon addition or deletion 
of positions to existing portfolios; or when bank has multiple exposures to the same 
obligator (Gordy 2003). Nevertheless, in case the correlation between asset classes depend 
on granularity chosen can act as an unfair incentive for banks to then may adopt lower level 
of granularity for the their portfolios to keep less capital than actually required. There is 
                                                 
122 EL (Expected Loss); PD (Probability of Default); LGD (Loss given default); EAD (Exposure at default); 
M (maturity) 
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evidence that with reduction of level of granularity the risk measures fall but the overall 
risk remains unchanged. However, if the granularity is decreased continually there arrives 
a point where risk measure start to rise again see Das (2007). Furthermore, it remain unclear 
amongst the regulators that what granularity level the Asset Value Correlations123 (AVC) 
should be set and how to test the accuracy of set correlations (AVC), especially at the time 
when assets are highly heterogeneous. There have been suggestions that assets classes 
should be defined more narrowly in order to mitigate such correlation issues, or better still 
to provide an underlying factor structure onto which all assets may be projected. In 
addition, the fact that credit loss distributions are sensitive to the changes in correlation 
assumptions should be considered whilst setting the credit correlation parameters under the 
Basel II framework. Basel II assumes single form of correlations impact credit risk 
however, does not take into account separately default probability correlations across 
issuers; correlations between PD and LGD; correlations of default in relation with PD; and 
correlations between credit risk and exposures (Das 2007).   
 
For IRB approaches risk weights are based on banks own estimates of PD, LGD and EAD. 
According to Basel II a borrower should be treated as default if it is at least 90 days past 
due on coupon or principle payment for the wholesale exposures and 120 days for the retail 
exposure (BCBS 2006a). Default probabilities and LGD vary with business cycle and are 
considered wholly state dependent. Basel II suggests that LGD and EAD estimates to take 
into account partially depending on government monetary and fiscal policy decisions. Thus 
the computations of IRB approaches to calculating LGD and EAD rely upon economic 
circumstances and therefore government stance on monetary policy must be accounted for. 
In contrast, PD is defined as 1 year long term average default probability alien to prevailing 
economic climate (Jarrow 2007). Thus, making the PD, LGD and EAD calculations 
simultaneously complex under the IRB and A-IRB approaches. Note in case all three 
determinants124 failing to take into account prevailing government strategies would result 
in bank capital requirements not reflective of the risk. This implies that same capital would 
                                                 
123 Asset value correlation refers to measuring the relationship between two or more asset values and their 
potential interdependency. 
124 PD; LGD; and EAD 
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prevail in both conditions, i.e. when projected economic environment is in crises and when 
not. Nonetheless, theoretically the required capital should be less during economic boom 
and vice versa in order to effectively manage and monitor risk of bank failures over the 
business cycle. On the contrary, although state dependent capital rules sit perfectly with 
changing business cycle and changing risk preferences in the economy, it may exacerbate 
business cycle. For instance in times of economic crises, credit is scarce to obtain making 
it difficult for banks to arrange necessary additional equity and may result in banks starting 
to charge higher interest rates. In order to tackle such scenarios, governments possess 
monetary tools in order to maintain control and there is evidence that the interest rate levels 
during economic crises often lowered.  
 
Market risk can result from market shocks and therefore there is a threat for systematic 
failure spread. As noted earlier, due to their tendency to generate instantly contagious bank 
failures market risk must be under regulation. The nature of operational risk is 
idiosyncratic125. Although fundamentally operational risk does not carry threat of spread 
to other institutions nonetheless, evidence suggests that there is obvious risk of making loss 
influenced by other institutions suffering loss that operate in same or different market 
environment (Systemic risk). Capital adequacy regulations aim to highlight such 
spreadable bank failures risks not currently assigned to any risk category explicitly and 
proposed guidelines for such risks that can be labeled vague or unidentified so far (Kupiec 
2007; and Jarrow 2007). The limitations of unclear modelling for risks that banks may be 
exposed to clearly evidenced in the global financial crises (Demirguc‐Kunt et al 2013). A 
number of reasons support such claims through the onslaught of financial crises for 
instance limited existence of the databases that are equipped enough to support operational 
risk methodologies; and as noted earlier certain type of losses by default are unpredictable 
therefore the quantification of such losses is impossible (Flores et al. 2006; and Moosa 
2008; Kaur and Kapoor 2015; Kishen and Opiela 2015). Moreover, operational risk 
overlook Reputational risk and Strategic risk (risk of losses due to failure to implement 
                                                 
125 That is losses incurred due to operational risk directly impact individual bank’s stake holders e.g. 
management, equity and bond holders see Danielsson et al (2001), Shevchenko and Peters (2013) gives an 
account of loss distribution approaches for operational risk under Basel II capital regulation 
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strategic policy). In addition, the risks also arise from the conflict between the ownership 
and management of a firm resulting from either fraudulent activity or mismanagement is 
only captured implicitly under the advanced approaches. The inclusion of Operational risk 
guidelines is significant upgrade but not sufficient (Jarrow 2007).   
 
Basel II in particular encouraged institutions to adopt advanced approaches to cultivate 
capital requirements under credit risk that rely on the internal risk models developed by the 
banks. Basel II proponent pride these internal rating models due to mathematical 
complexity and accuracy, later on debated in abundance regarding their effectiveness 
(Mariathasan & Merrouche 2014). In theory, these complex models should enable banks 
to assess their portfolios effectively to calculate capital charges that reflect sensitivity to 
risk. This is a sound theory until, when times of economic distress impose condition on one 
institution to sell its riskier assets which in turn obligate other institutions to sell same 
assets decreasing the value of those assets in the market inflicting fragility to the banking 
system as a whole. Such implications are completely external for the banks therefore not 
considered by the individual banks while developing internal models. In additions, existing 
VaR126 models fail to incorporate external events that potentially can be fuel for crises 
(BCBS 2004a; Dimirguc-Kunt et al 2008). Thus, the inefficiency of these measures during 
the financial crises, furthermore there exist no particular regulatory guidelines for 
individual banks to forecast such external issues in order to avoid financial destabilization. 
Financial crises conveniently inflict structural damages to the data management streams 
and thus there arise serious questions about the validity of the data preceding the beginning 
of the crises to be used for the future estimation of risk.  
 
Regulators encourage advanced approaches of the Basel II and enhanced use of VaR 
models. Regulatory capital is considered the key to surviving in the events of a systematic 
nature. According to the advanced approaches VaR is to be assessed at 99.9% risk level 
assumption over a year period. According to this technique, banks are required to maintain 
capital for an event that occurs on average every 100 days in a year (Kupiec 2007; Jarrow 
2007; and Petrov and Pmazanov 2009). However, there is no proof that systematic failures 
                                                 
126 Value at risk models used widely by the banks to assess the sensitivity to market shock, calculated daily 
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occur on average every 100 days therefore suggesting a mismatch between regulatory 
assumptions and frequency of systematic risk occurrence. In addition, forecasts have been 
based on the estimation horizon set at one year, however it has been argued that forecast 
precision increase if longer horizon period are applied see Danielsson et al (2001). 
However, this time horizon may not correspond with the actual maturity of loan, for 
example for a three-year high risk loan, considering one year horizon would result in more 
than two thirds of the potential credit risk not in picture at all (Petrov and Pnmazanov 
2009). In theory, diversified loan portfolio should require less capital than a single asset 
concentration. Despite that, in calculation VaR of a diversified portfolio can be higher for 
diversified loan portfolio (Jarrow 2007). The ASRF (Asymptotic single risk factor) model 
relying on results of Merton (1974) and Vasicek (2002) is implemented under Basel II to 
hold portfolio invariance (Petrov and Pomazanov 2009). Not to mention the limitations of 
ASRF model as incapable of factoring more than one risk factor see Jarrow (2006). 
Nevertheless, applying ASRF would imply that even diversified portfolio will have same 
required capital as concentrated portfolio. Guidelines to dealing with regards to handling 
concentration risk are covered separately under pillar 2 (BCBS 2006a). Moreover, upon 
applying the ASRF model, it assumes the actual correlation between assets (within an asset 
class) is by means of simple function of the asset’s PD for non-defaulted wholesale 
exposures. In addition, the losses are assumed to be normally distributed implying that 
asset returns are normally distributed. These assumptions generate rough approximation 
(Jarrow 2007). The Basel II formula requires an adjustment for the maturity of the asset in 
question. This is because the actual formula does not automatically takes into account the 
market value of the assets. The book value does not give fair picture due to the loss in value 
particularly if the issues are downgraded over 1 year horizon. In order to incorporate market 
value fluctuations in the model the assets maturity needs to be adjusted. Asset’s value 
downgrade depends upon the firms overall health. An asset’s collateral or seniority may 
dictate a firm’s probabilities of default as a whole, causing the particular asset’s value to 
downgrade eventually. However, this is completely independent of any particular assets 
maturity. In essence, firm as a whole carries the fundamental importance not the maturity 
of any particular asset within the firm’s portfolio (Jarrow 2007). Kupiec (2007) discusses 
that a major concern with regards to rough approximation generated by use of VaR model 
is how to gauge magnitude of the approximation error. The extent of the approximation 
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error127 showed that AIRB significantly under estimated the capital required by the 
alternative rule, therefore concluding that Basel II generates poor approximation to the 
ideal capital rule under the advanced approaches. 
 
The regulatory model used128 to allocate capital according to the probability of default 
(PD), loss given default (LGD), maturity (M) and expected exposure at default (EAD) for 
the Credit in question. It is based on assumption, that banks portfolio is fully diversified 
and capital buffer is required only against the probable loss associated with a single non 
diversifiable source of risk (Gordy and Jones 2003). Basel II approaches are calibrated and 
in effect, for large internationally active banks AIRB approach produces lowest capital 
requirements acting as an incentive for upgrading from standardized and FIRB approaches. 
The costs of upgrading to AIRB approaches is presumed to offset with capital savings and 
improved efficiency associated with efficient measurement of credit risk. However, 
according to the results of QIS 5, estimates of minimum capital required under the AIRB 
approach varied significantly across the banks raising concerns with regards to the 
calibration of AIRB and guidelines for calculating PD, EAD and LGD inputs. This 
questions the rigor of prudential standards set under the Basel II capital framework and 
identifies limitations regarding implications of its calibration principles and input 
specifications. Moreover, the calibration comparison showed that AIRB approach 
substantially undercapitalized credit risk as oppose to FIRB when credit risk is 
overcapitalized (Kupiec 2007). The definitions that qualify for EAD and LGD can result 
in AIRB prudential standards that in effect are weaker than its predecessor Basel capital 
accord (BCBS 1988). In addition, in different jurisdictions evidence of varied 
interpretations lead to significant variation in estimates of minimum capital required by the 
banks (OCC 2006; and BCBS 2006e). There have been apparent limitations in achieving a 
                                                 
127 The extent of approximation error is computed using alternative rule based on VaR in hypothetical Black-
Scholes-Merton economy where the banks’ asset portfolio consists of collection of risky zero coupon bonds 
following correlated geometric Brownian motions 
128 Model called Guassian Asymptotic Single Risk Factor of credit risk assuming that default risk is generated 
by Guassian uncertainty and includes a single common source of risk and independent risk factors see 
Vasicek 2003; and Kupiec 2007 for detailed argument. 
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clear interpretation standard set for all banks implementing AIRB approaches across 
jurisdictions129 in order to deter any sources of ambiguity in the Basel II rules that can be 
damaging for the level playing field. Due to the fact that internationally active banks can 
achieve capital standards (under Basel II-AIRB) that enhance their implicit public safety 
net, non AIRB banks may consider this incentive to shift their banking assets towards 
AIRB banks to increase the value of their implicit safety net subsidies. As a result, an 
imbalance may be introduced in the level playing field. There is strong mention of the fact 
that the capital advantages gained by the internationally active banks upon implementing 
much encouraged advanced risk management technologies may undermine Basel II 
objectives of creating a level playing and the financial stability of the international banking 
(Kupiec 2007).        
 
Improvement of internal risk measurement and management technologies of institutions in 
relation with the depth and sophistication of financial markets, supervisory authorities must 
continually find ways to incorporate market advances into their prudential policies (Barr 
and Millar 2006). Capital standards under Basel II recognize hedging, diversification and 
difference in risk management techniques e.g. portfolio management (for trading activities 
only). In addition, Basel II with introduction of advanced approaches attempts to raise 
awareness for Regulators to keep up to date with increasing sophistication with which 
banks are responding to the new regulatory framework (Moosa 2008; and Demirguc-Kunt 
et al 2008). The capital adequacy requirements primarily act as a closure threshold only 
and assume that in presence of regulatory forbearance, the market discipline can be utilized 
to reduce the closure threshold. Strong mention of the fact that direct market discipline can 
only be effective if regulatory authorities can avoid political influence and that indirect 
market discipline should be treated as void due to erratic market justifications during crises. 
Basel II proposals would prove insufficient in the absence of guaranteed independent 
supervisory review (Danielsson et al 2001; and Decamps et al. 2004). Capital requirements 
increase for banks that hold risky assets and decrease significantly for banks that hold safer 
portfolios (Caruana and Narain 2008; James and Allegra 2009). This theory dictates 
regulatory authorities’ attempts to make capital requirements as risk-based as possible. 
                                                 
129 BCBS and Non-BCBS member countries 
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Basel II was accused of playing an important role in creating incentives for banks to move 
risky assets to unregulated parts of the holding company in order to negotiate the minimum 
capital restrictions imposed by the authorities. In other words, banking institutions have 
been provided with an authentic excuse to undertake capital arbitrage and restructure their 
risk position in order to be classified in a category that attracts lower capital charges. 
Securitization as noted earlier, a significant technique used by large internationally active 
Banks in order to transfer risk to investors. However, regulatory capital arbitrage is not all 
bad news. This is because in absence of such arbitrage, a regulatory capital requirement 
that is inappropriately high for the economic risk of a particular activity could prevent the 
bank from offering important services at a competitive rate (Demirguc-Kunt et al 2008). 
The lack of acceptable rate of return on capital in such situation can force bank to quit that 
relatively low-risk business. The reason why major banks have become quite efficient at 
engaging in regulatory capital arbitrage, through securitization and other devices is that 
capital arbitrage may appropriately lower the effective capital requirements against some 
safe activities that banks would otherwise be forced to drop due to the influence of the 
supervisors. Supervisory authorities showed clear intentions not to interfere with internal 
decision making by the banks with regards to such resource allocation. However, such 
resource allocation comes with its price and implications. In addition, situations with 
inconsistencies between internally required economic capital and the regulatory capital 
standard fuel more issues. Due to the fact that regulatory capital ratios possibly mask the 
true level of insolvency probability it becomes dubious if banks arbitrage away 
inappropriately high capital requirements on their safest assets by removing these assets 
from the balance sheet via securitization. Such scenario raises concerns with the sufficiency 
of regulatory capital requirements on the assets remaining on the book (James and Allegra 
2009).  
 
2.3.6 Conclusion  
The recent past witnessed creation of complex and difficult to assess risk portfolios in the 
name of financial innovation; inadequate underwriting practices; bespoke securitization 
and ‘Internal Ratings Based’ (IRBF and IRBA) approaches; questionable predictions by 
the credit rating agencies and excessive reliance on credit rating agencies; inaccurate 
judgment of liquidity, concentration and off balance sheet exposures; arguably the most 
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turbulent phase for the financial markets across the globe (Demirguc-Kunt et al 2008; 
James and Allegra 2009, Anderson 2010; and Moosa 2010). Despite introducing robust 
risk valuation methodologies, improved transparency and disclosure practices, amid 
identified critical limitations Basel II attracted significant criticism. Procyclical nature of 
Basel II (discussed in detail in the following section) remained at heart of the debate 
(Kashyap and Stein 2004; and Goodhart et al. 2006b). The fears of tilted playing field 
remain intact due to Basel II’s continued heavy reliance of external rating agencies and 
allowing sophisticated institutions the use of internal models for risk assessments. 
Furthermore, the recent financial distress unveiled Basel II restriction with regards to 
liquidity. Nevertheless, Basel Committee respond contains serious developments of 
proposals to strengthen liquidity risk management. In addition, Basel III developed in 
response to the recent market movements aims to address frequently discussed 
shortcomings of Basel II (Blundell-Wignall 2010; and BCBS 2010b)       
 
2.4 Procyclicality under Basel II 
 
2.4.1 Introduction 
This section takes the look at the most important issue of procyclicality of the financial 
system. Procyclicality in context of Basel Capital Regulation can simply be defined as 
impact of economic activity on capital requirements of the bank for instance earnings loss 
due to default can impair bank capital and raise risk based capital requirements.  
 
2.4.2 Procyclicality of the Financial Sector 
Relaxations of various controls on loan and deposit interest rates, credit allocations, and 
cross border flow of funds have allowed bank credit supply and deposit demand to respond 
positively to variations in economic activity. Literature advocates the fact that Basel II 
enhances the procyclical effects of banking regulation see Borio (2003); Estralla (2004); 
Quagliariello (2008); Khoury (2009); and Caruana (2010). There have been a number of 
attempts via development of various models in order to determine how bank capital charges 
would change in response to business cycle fluctuations see Kashyap and Stein (2004); 
 91 
 
Goodhart et al (2006a); and Gordy and Howell (2006). Nevertheless, increased activity in 
variety of structured credit product practices continued and seemed to amplify business 
fluctuations promoting financial instability (CGFS 2009). In market practices, use of VAR 
and other market-sensitive risk management measures did not capture through the cycle 
volatility. It has been argued that traditional risk management measures often eased in 
times of boom due to rise in asset prices associated with low volatility. Therefore, excessive 
risk taking and leverage was promoted until the peak was obtained and then process 
reversed. The nature of banking operations by default, have been discussed to be 
procyclical130, i.e. banks in general tend to shrink their lending in recession and expand 
during the boom boosting the amplitude of the business cycle (Kashyap and Stein 2004). 
In other words, recessions are severer and booms tend to become exceptionally 
inflationary. In times of economic distress, important risk parameters may be stressed 
enough to inflict a decrease in solvency ratio, which may force the banks into extremely 
careful lending behavior. In times of such lending behavior by the banks it becomes hard 
to obtain credit at a number of institutional and/or individual levels, and therefore may lead 
to a credit crunch (Andersen 2010). The role of capital regulations in linking capital with 
risk is extremely crucial. The journey of prudential capital requirements continued from 
being invariant to the economic circumstance to current capital regulations that 
significantly depend upon risk assessment of a particular set of borrowers under prevailing 
economic environment. This implies capital based regulations exacerbate procyclicality 
(Moosa 2010). Basel II capital framework however, due to its stringent risk sensitive 
capital requirement restrictions, believed to have played a vital role in enhancing the 
procyclicality of the banking system, one more reason contributing towards causing the 
global financial crises. This is because capital requirements for banks increased when 
estimates of default risk were high encouraging banks to lend abnormally in excess during 
economic stability and choke business during economic rescission. Hence the reason, most 
recent credit crunch exacerbated recession and imposed delayed recovery of the real estate 
                                                 
130 Jackson (1999) argued that there was no obvious evidence suggesting Basel II exacerbated procyclicality. 
Nevertheless, in addition to capital rules, plenty factors concerning Basel regulation explored that may 
exacerbate the swings in the economic cycle increasing volatility, dubbed as procyclical (Lastra 2004; and 
Balthazar 2006). 
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as well as the financial sector (Moosa 2010; McKenzie 2011; Demirgüç-Kunt et al 2013 ). 
Introduction of fixed capital requirements raised concerns that it aggravated procyclicality. 
Initially with some scattered evidence of impact (on small business and mortgages sectors) 
due to the pressure banks faced to maintain minimum capital. Nevertheless, procyclicality 
exacerbated when set of borrowers suffer downgrading in the ratings during the recession 
causing capital requirement to increase for the banks doing business with that particular 
borrower (Demirgüç-Kunt et al 2013).  
 
2.4.3 Procyclicality under Basel II 
Procyclicality under Basel II and the extent of economic swing responding to the capital 
requirements pendulum depends upon the dynamic features of banks’ IRB systems and 
their probability of default estimation techniques (Caruana 2005). The capital requirements 
under IRB approaches too are inclined to increase as an economy falls into recession and 
vice versa, makes the task for regulators to maintain macroeconomic stability extremely 
complex and challenging. In contrast, in times of crises, theoretically a countercyclical 
measure to help moderate the economic swings would be to make available funds by the 
financial institutions for the purpose of extending credit, and that may be achieved by 
creating incentives to over lend (Kashyap and Stein 2004; Caruana 2005; Benford and Nier 
2007; Repullo and Suarez 2008; Repullo et al. 2009; Brunnermeier et al. 2009; Pederzoli 
et al 2009; McKenzie 2011; Demirgüç-Kunt et al 2013) Arguably Basel II, despite 
suggested to have positive macroeconomic implications fueled procyclicality. This is 
because of its compulsion for the banks to hold excess capital during the times of financial 
crises as means of safety buffer against default probabilities. In times of economic 
instability, to cater for potential fluctuations in the capital the widespread concerns have 
been the ways banks can meet increased capital requirements i.e. either through arranging 
excess capital or through adjusting their lending activity (Kashyap and Stein 2004). If there 
is a check put on banks’ lending activity then, in order to meet excess in required minimum 
capital requirement alternate means must be applied to cover any given shortfall e.g. 
instead of limiting lending activity cuts may be applied on dividends131. This may restrict 
                                                 
131 Cuts in dividends may not be sufficient enough to be able to do the trick see Benford and Nier (2007) 
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the overall effect on the corporate and retail sectors. In order to avoid unnecessary increase 
in regulatory capital in hard times the Basel committee however under Pillar 2 of the 
current accord, suggests banks to conduct calculations in order to identify how much 
capital would be sufficient during times of crises and make provisions (Cihak et al 2013; 
Mariathasan and Merrouche 2014). Under Basel II, minimum capital requirements for large 
banks were set according to their internal assessment of the risk of their portfolios. 
Literature also points out to another issue, if banks’ internal assessment procedure could 
have be carried out in times of boom then there is great possibility that it may be under the 
assumption that prevailing economic condition will continue. However, such assumption 
may prove to be too optimistic132.  In times of boom the subjective probability of crises 
may become very low and banks allow their capital position to relax and start extending 
credit on softer terms and to broader range of borrowers. Not only that, the pricing of credit 
may also be relaxed as well as incentives offered to staff that reflect importance of short 
term profit making. Such approaches carry neglect of the impact they might impose long 
term and in particular, during economic downturns. Once an economic shock transpires, 
subjective probabilities are reversed and the whole financial system my face risk of crises 
(Carey et al 2012).  
In addition, Basel II in broader context, with its micro-economic model structure133 fails to 
take into account a global outlook on banks and markets for promoting achievable financial 
stability across the globe. The risk parameters134 under Basel II are computed at one point 
in time rather than through the cycle (Kashyap and Stein 2004). If output is to be smoothed 
during the period, the results may be less procyclical capital ratio. However, pursuing too 
far in such direction would weaken the connection between capital and risk, where the 
whole idea of modern prudential regulation is that capital should reflect the banking risks 
(Brunnermeier et al. 2009). In addition, the risk that has been accumulated during healthier 
economic circumstances actually materializes during economic downturns. In principle, 
                                                 
132 In reality underestimating the long term riskiness of the exposures could exacerbate procyclicality 
(Danielsson et al. 2001). 
133 Only takes into account the domestic economic outlook at best, fails to incorporate international economic 
development in particular in an era of heightened financialized capitalism see Lapavitsas (2013) 
134 PD (Probability of Default); LGD (Loss given default); EAD (Exposure at default); M (maturity) 
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the capital base should reflect this however, it has clearly been overlooked. Risk weightings 
based on ‘past-incorporating’ data tends to underestimate the tail risk and there are none 
known authentic ‘future-estimates’ toolkit (Brunnermeier et al. 2009). Most commonly 
discussed measures deal with the losses incurred during normal business cycle; they may 
be completely irrelevant in times of systemic crises. There is no guarantee that risk-
adjusted capital proposals alone can tame the extremely and potentially fragile evolution 
of the financial system in unpredictable directions. Heavy reliance of Basel II,135 on rating 
agencies and internal models to determine regulatory capital requirements attracted 
unprecedented discussion in literature in particular, during most recent financial turmoil 
(Moosa 2010). For instance, Basel II by offering credit rating agencies supervisory 
recognition not only rest faith in them, it most certainly allowed credit rating agencies to 
influence banks decision making more than Basel II itself (Catarneu-Rabell et al 2005). 
Basel II capital regulations unintentionally may have allowed the rating agencies play 
almost a deciding role in budding of the most recent subprime crises (Dedu and Nechif 
2010; and Moosa 2010). The AAA ratings for securities backed by subprime loan became 
easy to obtain and therefore reliance on the rating agencies to dictate riskiness of assets 
appears ironic post crises. Furthermore, as a buffer to market fluctuations, contractual 
provisions seemed to be used as extra cushion to the creditors in case of unexpected market 
value deterioration (Goodhart et al 2006a; Gordy and Howell 2006; and Panagopoulos and 
Vlamis 2009). The buffer could be extra collateral or may be additional control rights over 
borrows’ decision making. Most rating agencies issued such buffer incorporated debts 
highest ratings136. However, where such buffer systems effectively protected against 
idiosyncratic crises, it certainly exacerbated procyclicalty in particular when shocks of 
systematic nature occurred. As a consequence, excessive debt financing may have been 
allowed by the market participants (Gai et al. 2007; and Moosa 2010). Excessive reliance 
                                                 
135 Regulators relied on external rating agencies instead of supposedly administering the implementation of 
Basel II. European Savings Banks Group, British Bankers Association, and European Banking Federation 
agreed that rating agencies failed to deliver transparent ratings methodologies. 
136 Assessment criterion have been based upon models that assumed that future asset price volatility could be 
estimated with the historical data: In some instances irrelevant or inadequate historical data on some asset 
classes may further obstruct risk assessment and induce excessive leverage. 
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on credit agencies for determination of riskiness of assets have been proved to be 
misleading. Due to the fact that credit rating agencies followed market trend rather than 
forecasting them and failed to remain consistent with regards to issuing estimates of the 
risk of assets, giving birth to concerns whether rating agencies meet required Basel II 
criteria of credibility and transparency (Moosa 2010).  In addition, the link between asset 
valuation and leverage has been proved to be extremely crucial towards exacerbating 
procyclicality. The decline in asset prices impose an adverse impact on availability of 
credit, not to forget, that credit availability feeds back into investment and consumption 
and therefore fed back into economic growth. This may be procyclical due to the fact that 
the value of collateral depends upon the point in time during the business cycle. In addition 
as a result of negative shock to economy, the bank’s capital decreases and may induce 
excessive leverage (CGFS 2009). Furthermore, due to extremely unfavorable conditions 
for raising capital during times of economic crises, banks tend to raise capital through sale 
of the assets. Disposing off of assets feeds back into asset prices causing them to fall even 
more, thus confirming an initial stage of shock. The impact becomes massive if the shock 
hits several banks simultaneously and especially when banks are trying to maintain 
required leverage level137. Inevitable liquidations at a huge scale have proved to result in 
triggering a vicious circle and systematic crises may become imminent. Most countries 
have adopted intelligent leverage ceiling, however leverage still poses active threats to 
speeding up the procyclicality138.  
Banks have been advised to hold excess capital than the minimum requirements under 
Pillar 2 and 3 of Basel II capital framework. In principle, this would enable banks during 
the times of economic distress to avoid liquidation and continue healthy lending activity. 
Effective risk management under Basel II, as in formation of better control structures, 
improved corporate governance and intelligent investment in IT infrastructures as well as 
human capital has been emphasized in abundance as counteractive measure against the 
procyclicality under Basel II (Moosa 2010). Under the Basel II regulatory framework, 
                                                 
137  An entity is considered to be leveraged when it operates under conditions where exposures to risky assets 
exceed its equity capital. 
138 See Adain and Shin (2008) for detailed discussion regarding relationship of increase and decrease of asset 
prices and leverage in different countries. 
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calculation of capital ratios on the basis of risk adjusted assets exacerbates procyclicality. 
In order to introduce countercyclical capital buffer, the literature suggests that capital ratios 
may be calculated from total unadjusted assets. This would mean that required capital to 
be function of the change in assets, not just the risk-weightings (Moosa 2010). Basel II is 
more about compliance with regulatory requirements rather than a mere risk management 
tool. Risk management practices (with or without Basel II) exist primarily to enhance 
overall profitability of the institution, poise them better within competitors and usually 
have been tailored in line with institutions’ peculiar requirements.  
Despite frequently identified limitations of IRB approaches that exacerbate procyclicality, 
IRB capital ratio still easily qualified as the pioneer of the modern portfolio risk 
management standards. Internal Rating Based approaches (as discussed earlier that IRB 
techniques are formulated under asymptotic approximations to the risk factor models and 
are now widely used across internationally active banks) offer an extremely sophisticated 
measure of capital adequacy. Compulsion to comply with strict regulatory standards 
contains vital benefits of enhanced comparability of creditworthiness between banks and 
across time. The steep procyclicality under the IRB approaches may be curtailed via 
adaptation of through-the-cycle rating methodologies to diminish the impact of the 
business cycle fluctuations on borrower ratings139. In addition to using through-the-cycle 
methodologies literature also advocates the fact that procyclicality can be diminished either 
by flattening the capital function in order to reduce the sensitivity of capital charges to 
changes in PD, or the regulators may exercise their discretion to impose a smoothing rule 
directly on to the output of the IRB capital function. Under the first two pillars, any of the 
above mentioned methods could be considered to sufficiently address the issue of 
procyclicality under Basel II. However under pillar III, the said approaches may develop 
certain conflict implications, e.g. flattening of the IRB capital function can cause distortion 
to relative capital charges across the borrowers. Adopting through-the-cycle ratings 
method would severely increase inability of the market participants to conclude changes in 
                                                 
139 In order to reduce the sensitivity of borrowers PD to macroeconomic conditions using through-the-cycle 
system means each rating grade may be calculated as a long term historical average. This would enable to 
calculate regulatory capital requirement with diminished impact of macroeconomic conditions see Gordy and 
Howel (2006) for more detailed discussion) 
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portfolio risk from changes in a bank’s capital ratio and seriously damage the transparency 
as well as comparability of IRB capital requirement across time. Gordy and Howell (2006), 
applied auto regressive filter (AR) and tested the behavior of smoothing rules that are 
applied directly to the output of an unmodified IRB capital function by assuming that bank 
rating system are point-in-time, expressed as a percentage of portfolio book value: 
 
Ĉit = Ĉi,t-1 + α(Cit – Ĉi,t-1)       (1) 
 
Basel I operated by setting α = 0, whereas Basel II rests α =1. According to Gordy and 
Howell (2006), the value of α is set in the middle would offer a compromise between Basel 
I and Basel II in determining sensitivity to the business cycle. By setting α (parameter that 
controls the degree of smoothing) at 0.25 in their simulation, Gordy and Howell (2006) 
showed the suspicion is the shocks to Cit are absorbed in to the minimum regulatory capital 
over several years rather than all at once. 
An advanced counter-cyclical indexing rule would apply by introducing time-varying 
multiplier to the IRB formula i.e. Ĉit = αtCit. The multiplier αt would be reduced by 
regulators during a recession to offset the effect of higher borrowers’ PDs capital 
requirements. During an expansion, αt would be raised, and similarly offset the effect of 
falling PDs, where αt is a time-varying multiplier released publicly by the national 
regulator in each period and applies uniformly to every bank in the regulator’s jurisdiction 
and specified as follows:  
 
αt =exp (a. (ω1 X*t-1+ ω2 X* t-2+ …. + ωk X*t-k) – a2/2)   (2) 
 
Both AR and CC rules have been considered effective in smoothing capital volatility 
without requiring excessive operational requirements from banks. However, there exists 
significant difference in implementation requirements of the rules. Auto regression (AR) 
rule has clearly been dubbed decentralized. It smoothes the capital requirement 
independently for each bank using its own time-series filter of IRB capital requirements 
and allows bank to operate in local markets with business cycle distinct from the overall 
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national market. However, it has been critically argued that AR rule assumes that the banks 
conduct operations with stationary lending strategy. This would mean that banks may take 
the incentive to revamp their credit risk portfolio rapidly whereas required capital 
requirements following AR rule would only increase slowly and play catch up at all times 
(Gordy and Howell 2006). The role of regulator remains as a passive observer of the 
smoothing. In contrast, counter-cyclical (CC) indexing rule is set by the regulator in each 
period for all banks by applying a time varying multiplier to the IRB formula (i.e. >1 during 
boom and vice versa), thus confirming some level of regulator participation and control.  
The CC rule is robust to changing business mix at the individual bank level. This is 
advantageous with in markets where large flow of assets can be shifted between regulated 
banks and unregulated institutions. Regulator needs to possess some degree of control in 
order to keep business cycle synchronized across the major financial markets and check 
any involvement in capital arbitrage.  It has been critically argued that in presence of 
reliable and transparent data on the operations of credit markets in question, CC rule should 
be favored. Regardless of the methodology followed, dampening output by flattening the 
capital formula generates some caution points. In case flattening is modest and uniform 
across the loan types would achieve modest dampening of procyclicality. On the other hand 
heavy dampening may be achieved by comprehensive flattening of the IRB capital formula, 
in such situation practice of capital arbitrage may increase. This is because where heavy 
dampening may comprehensively address procyclicality, it may result in severe distortion 
of the relative capital charges across loans at every point in business cycle. Thus, changes 
in the banks’ capital requirements would not be correlated in its economic capital and there 
would be no means to conclude regulatory capital from economic capital. In such scenario, 
Pillar 3 would not be valid in order to aid market participants monitor bank over time 
(Gordy and Howell 2006).  
 
Chapter 3: Basel Capital Regulation: Response to global 
financial crises 
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3.1 Introduction 
Early 1980s witnessed US regulators instructed that federal banking agencies required a 
certain level of leverage ratio on primary capital. The US International Lending and 
Supervisory Act (ILSA) unified capital requirements for the various bank types at 5.5 % 
of the total assets and also unified definition of the capital. At the time there emerged 
number of developing countries where banks had exposures equaling more than twice their 
capital and reserves. Mexico declared that it was unable to pay its debt of 80 billion USD 
followed by number of countries restructuring their debt totaling 239 billion USD. That 
was not it, there seemed to be a queue of crises that haunted the world. Rumasa Crises 
floored Spanish financial sector leaving a number of commercial banks and financial 
institutions bankrupt. At the same time Oil crises hit Continental Illinois commercial bank 
in USA when they announced their non-performing loans rose to 2.3 billion USD causing 
a threat of a bank run. A number of large US banks had to gang up together and offer a 
rescue bid of 5.3 billion USD. Regulators at the time instructed banks to write off their bad 
debts in progression and clear their balance sheets over a number of years to avoid 
numerous bankruptcies. On occasions the root cause of the crises was pronounced as 
decline in economic activity, unskilled management and lack of regulations. Shortly after 
1986 followed with collapse of US S&Ls (Savings & Loan), US Federal insurer of S&Ls 
went bankrupt leaving 441 S&Ls insolvent and approximately 566 billion USD in question. 
Regulators were left with no choice but to interfere to avoid bank run by offering state 
guarantee for the depositors and bought the troubled S&Ls to sell them back to the banking 
groups. Only next year, 1987 brought the black Monday, the crash of stock exchange. The 
Dow Jones index lost 22.6 percent in one day. Other notable losses on the day were incurred 
by CAC40 in Paris and Nikkei in Tokyo losing 9.5 percent and 14.7 percent respectively. 
It highlighted the growing need for international convergence in banking regulation. The 
G10 countries created a committee of representatives from central banks and regulatory 
authorities at a meeting at the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) in Basel, 
Switzerland. Only to encourage internationally, a fair and level playing field and ensure 
giant international banking groups were not avoiding supervision through creation of 
holding companies. The reference paper issued, a few years later claimed the bases for 
national regulation in more than 100 countries. 
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Continuing a bird’s eye view of the historical events, Norway witnessed growth in lending 
during early 1980s but the banks were hit by the spread of oil crises. The deposits insurance 
system was used to inject capital into troubled banks but in 1991 three largest Norwegian 
banks announced loan losses and significant increase funding cost. The deposit insurance 
system could not cope with the burden and the government had to intervene to avoid 
collapse of the whole financial system. In Sweden regulators allowed deregulation and high 
growth in lending activity resulted. The asset price bubble due to high volume of mortgage 
loans was inevitable. The bubble burst as real estate prices in Stockholm collapse by 35 
percent in 1991 and first to suffer were NBFIs (Nonbanking financial institutions), 
eventually inflicting burden on the banking sector. Two of the biggest six banks in Sweden 
required state support to avoid bankruptcy. Switzerland also witnessed crises of same sort 
caused by increased lending activity in the real estate. United Kingdom saw demise of its 
oldest merchant bank, Barings, caused by market and operational risk. Although the bank 
was significant business this was not considered causing a systematic risk and taxpayers 
money was not used on this occasion to cover the losses.  
On the other side of globe Bank of Japan increased interest rates five times during 1990 to 
curtail inflation to no avail140. The stock market began to react and lost 50 percent in a year 
as well as real estate market started to slow down. Some small banks showed signs of high 
concern but regulators were optimistic about the recovery. Their optimism proved false 
and severe bankruptcies hit large Japanese banks later. Collapse of Sanyo Securities, 
Yamaichi Securities and Long-Term Credit Bank (LTCB) of Japan are to name a few. The 
government of Japan guaranteed deposits to avoid bank run followed by Financial 
Reconstruction Law in 1998. Exchange rates were changed only infrequently, and only 
with the permission of World Bank and IMF. These included the vast expansion of 
international trading and inflationary pressures in the major economies. The shift flexible 
foreign exchange rates introduced daily or intraday volatility exchange rates, the financial 
markets began to offer currency traders special tools for insuring against these new risks. 
The development of interest rate volatility and derivative instruments followed a similar 
path from the early 1970’s. The end result of bank activity in these new derivative markets 
                                                 
140 Asian Crises see Wade, R. (1998). The Asian debt-and-development crisis of 1997-?: Causes and 
consequences. World development, 26(8), 1535-1553. 
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was that banks naturally became even more exposed to volatile derivative instruments and 
these exposures had to be carefully risk managed.  
The regulators did not spot the threat and fragility of the financial system, instead allowed 
over leverage to occur resulting in failure of top 5 US investment banks141. The failure of 
these investment banks have been argued to have played a key role in bursting of the US 
housing and credit bubble that peaked in 2005-06.  
 
3.2 Basel Capital Accord and the Global Financial Crisis 
Based on the adverse market advancements and extensive industry consultation Basel II 
had vowed to upgrade weaknesses in Basel I. As discussed earlier such weaknesses, in past 
had encouraged financial institutions to seek out opportunities for ‘arbitrage’ along with 
inadequate risk management and weak disclosure practices and that, participated 
significantly to the recent crises (Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2008; Caruana and Narain 2008; 
and Moosa 2010). Basel II undoubtedly an improved form of Basel I, stricter and aims to 
reduce spurious incentives to securitization by significant reduction in the capital charge 
for mortgages held on the balance sheet and introducing capital charge on new lines of 
credit. Nevertheless, recent financial crisis seriously questions effectiveness of the Basel II 
accord. Basel II agreed to be implemented during 2004, is still believed to be in integration 
process in a number of jurisdictions in particular advanced approaches. In addition, it 
boosted far more complex statistical methodologies accompanied by extremely complex 
IT models to be incorporated than under Basel I, and moreover Basel II required heavy 
investments in order to develop such models and expertise. The complexity under the new 
Basel II does not guarantee accuracy by any means. In fact it promotes less understanding 
of the underlying concept for all market participants and increases compliance burden in 
cost as well as implementation. Even upon overcoming such huge hurdles Basel II has 
significantly been doubted by a variety of market participants with regards to its ability to 
improve on setting the arbitrary target ratios over its predecessor. The highlighting points 
have been that there is no change in the definitions and rules for Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, 
                                                 
141 Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley 
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and minimum ratios of capital to risk-weighted assets still hover around 4 and 8 percent 
with no comprehensive ruling as to why either of those ratios should be applied (Demirguc-
Kunt et al. 2008).  
Basel II’s heavy reliance on external credit rating agencies and determination of regulatory 
capital based upon internally developed models was exposed at a global level in recent 
events. The rise in financial capitalism seemed to be untamable with mere risk management 
in banking.142 Literature argues that even with a complete transition towards Basel II was 
achieved prior to 2007-8, it would still have been insufficient in dealing with the onslaught 
of the global financial crises. This could be because Basel II by default is a capital based 
regulation and implementation has been more of a compliance practice by the banks as 
opposed to actual risk management. The current crises highlighted liquidity and leverage 
to be more serious issues than capital adequacy (Caruana and Narain 2008). The current 
financial crises also highlighted that Basel II was not equipped appropriately to addresses 
key regulatory issues. Despite that upon complete implementation of Basel II capital 
accord, a paradigm for domestic regulation is considered to be certainty. There have been 
substantial shortfalls in efforts as well as predicted benefits in harmonizing capital rules 
and best supervisory practices internationally (Moosa 2010). Such arguments give clear 
indication that global financial crises added to severe concerns over the core concept of the 
Basel II capital accord along with its existing heavily debated operational limitations and 
complexity143  The Basel II accord attempts to tackle the issue with either Standardized 
approach or Internal Rating Based (IRB Foundation and Advanced) approaches. 
Standardized approach is more or less the same as its predecessor with an improved wider 
range of risk buckets and fundamentally requires use of assessments computed by external 
rating organizations. Inexplicably, unrated firms carry a risk weight of 100% in comparison 
with low rated firms that carry 150%. In presence of such rating bands and revenue-based 
                                                 
142 See Lapavitsas (2008; 2009; 2013) and Fouskas and Gokay (2012); Fouskas and Dimoulas (2013) on 
financial capitalism; Adrian and Ashcraft (2016) on role and rise of shadow banking; and Strange (1997) 
Press  
143 See progressive debate in this regards in Bruggink and Buck 2002; Caruana 2003; Hudson 2004; Garcia 
2004; Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2008; Teitelbaum 2008; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009: Moosa 2010; Repullo and 
Suarez (2013); Araghi et al (2014); Samanta and Chakarborty (2016) 
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incentives for credit rating agencies, the quality of information provided by them is 
questionable. In evidence, during times of financial disturbance there have been frequent 
large downgrades seriously affecting highly rated and thus seriously harmed the credibility 
of ratings (Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2008). Bank Capital requirements must consider the buffer 
against unexpected losses. Credit ratings do not, and are computed with accounting for 
expected losses. Credit ratings do not contain information about volatility of a particular 
asset or a portfolio therefore they may only be useful in predicting the loss reserves. 
Therefore the target capital set aside as a buffer must incorporate measures of the volatility 
of an institutions’ volatility of earnings dictated by unexpected events (Moosa 2010). 
Furthermore, once questions have been raised about the reliability and transparency of the 
ratings institutions faced reputation risk and a withdrawal of existing business upon 
maturing of the liabilities increased the liquidity risk (Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2008). Basel 
II remained unsuccessful in addressing such issues even with a wider more sophisticated 
range of credit risk categorization.  
 
The treatment of 5 year data span, and 99.9 percent confidence threshold under the new 
Basel II accord proved limited and insufficient in order to catch a full business cycle. 
Furthermore, during the time of crises unexpected events evolved (US housing bubble) and 
new types of market participants were introduced at regular intervals and therefore models 
estimated from the period with no such advancements proved void. Upon satisfying the 
eligibility obligations, internal rating based approaches can be applied. In case of advanced 
ratings based approach institutions can rely comprehensively on their own estimates of PD, 
LGD, EAD and M144, and that have been heavily criticized by researchers as well as other 
market participants. This is because it definitely provides grounds for complex financial 
models and dataset be manipulated in order to achieve desired capital requirements (Dowd 
et al. 2008). More sophisticated IRB approaches of the new Basel Capital Accord (Basel 
II) came under severe criticism during the global financial crises. This is because even most 
sophisticated models employed by largest and well equipped institutions proved inadequate 
to track risk. Few of the frequently sighted limitations of the internal models have been 
their inability to capture risk of tail events, or predict future; and focus on measures rather 
                                                 
144 PD (Probability of Default); LGD (Loss given default); EAD (Exposure at default); M (maturity) 
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than effective management of risk (Danielson et al. 2001; Majnoni and Powel 2005; Kupiec 
2007; and Jarrow 2007). These models have also been accused of completely disregarding 
the rise of casino capitalism, and other heterodox145 economist views (Aglietta 2016; Kay 
2015; Fouskas and Dimoulas 2013; Sinn 2010; Lapavitsas 2008). The models inaccurately 
captured types of risks in complex securitization environment and large losses were the 
result. These models take their foundation from value-at-risk (VAR) and faced severe 
criticism from researchers and practitioner alike during the recent financial disturbance. 
These highly sophisticated models, on basis of their high capability and accuracy level 
have been argued to promote false belief amongst risk managers of the financial institutions 
that upon implementing these models they are ready for the risk promoting complacency. 
The current financial crises highlighted the incapability of such models. For example VAR 
forecast that events of extreme economic shock occur only extremely rarely. However, in 
reality the history of banking contains significant evidence that such shocks that are severe 
in nature have been a lot more frequent than the models predict. In case of Goldman Sachs, 
at the beginning of the recent financial crises it was reported that Goldman Sachs recorded 
25-standard deviation fluctuations, which according to the model should only occur once 
every hundred years (Dowd et al 2008). During the recent financial crises, such examples 
clearly demonstrated the limitations of the internal models with regards to estimating 
exposure to risk and brought to surface, difficulties associated with accounting for losses 
occurred due to high severity of unexpected economic shocks. In addition Banks, while 
developing their internal models, also proved to be unfairly over optimistic with regards to 
their risk exposures in order to achieve the incentive of lower regulatory capital 
requirements and increased returns on equity (Moosa 2008).  
 
Basel II has assigned no particular protocol to be followed to aid regulators in monitoring 
and controlling insolvency risk. Regulators failed to demonstrate skill in order to 
adequately check and validate internal risk models (Wihlborg 2005). There exists serious 
requirement for Basel II to develop protocols for identifying a troubled bank and require it 
                                                 
145 Wolfson, M. H., & Epstein, G. A. (Eds.). (2013). The Handbook of the political economy of financial 
crises. Oxford University Press; furthermore see McKenzie, R. A. (2011). Casino capitalism with derivatives: 
Fragility and instability in contemporary finance. Review of Radical Political Economics,43(2), 198-215. 
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to recapitalize before it becomes inevitable for the government to intervene with taxpayers’ 
money. Nevertheless, not only the existing role of regulator has been criticized in 
abundance but also regulators’ authority, skill and political motivation have been 
questioned. In addition, national regulators enjoy greater discretion powers under Basel II 
and therefore there have been evidence of varied minimum capital requirements across the 
globe in response to their peculiar circumstances. In US the Basel II implementation is only 
mandatory for the larges institutions whereas in EU Basel II is required to be implemented 
in all banks. In particular, complete implementation of Basel II in a number of developing 
countries is dubious. Due to this reason Basel II cannot be uniformly implemented across 
the globe there have been widely discussed possibilities of increased regulatory capital 
arbitrage. As a consequence it prevents transparent and credible capital control questioning 
the role of Basel II standards as truly global. In addition, modern sophisticated institutions 
in response to volatility of and correlation between returns of range of asset categories take 
risks that cannot comprehensively be captured under one static rule. Therefore static rules 
give way to developing extremely complex mathematical models budding fears of 
regulatory arbitrage, reduced supervisory control, reduced transparency and so forth. 
Recent financial crises unveiled weaknesses of static models developed under Basel II. 
Therefore points out a serious need for supervisors to carefully respond to volatile market 
advances in evolving prudential regulation with extensive focus to market signals in 
development of appropriate stress testing.  
Recent financial crises seriously questioned the concept that capital adequate institutions, 
if hit by huge losses would remain solvent (Chiu et al 2009). Nevertheless, after being 
struck with huge loss, financial institutions are likely to suffer invaluable loss of reputation 
regardless of whether the losses can be covered monetarily immediately or not. Even if the 
losses are immediately coverable, the capital may be with priority required to satisfy the 
creditors and therefore generates a need to raise capital in addition anyway in order to 
continue operations. This is where institutions may require bailout. In fact, there is strong 
argument that introduction of regulatory capital requirements have caused institutions to 
involve in excessive risk taking146. The role of Basel II has been argued to be 
                                                 
146 For example securitization or some form of capital arbitrage, dubbed as shadow banking see Adrian and 
Ashcroft (2016) 
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discriminatory. The financial turmoil confirmed that all sorts of financial institutions147 
became involved in over optimistic risk taking, suffered losses and needed bailouts. Yet 
Basel II addresses issues concerning commercial banks. In fact, main victim of the credit 
crises included investment banks (Zuberbuhler 2008). In addition, Basel II completely 
disregards business and reputation risk148. Financial institutions that took positions on 
Collateral Debt Obligations (CDOs) in the wake of American International Group’s (AIG) 
credit default swaps to provide sufficient protection became highlighted casualties of the 
business risk (error of judgment).  
  
Leverage and liquidity played dominant role in intensifying credit and market risk during 
recent events of financial turbulence and that has not been comprehensively addressed 
under the new Basel II accord. Banks involved in practicing sale of highly liquid assets and 
critically relied on borrowed liquidity instead of building adequate reserves of liquid. 
Declared with adequate capital, Northern Rock and Bear Sterns are most frequently 
highlighted casualties of liquidity and leverage during the recent financial crises. Liquidity 
seriously hampered Rock’s business and resulted in a run on deposits, the first in United 
Kingdom for 140 years (Demirguc-Kunt et al 2008). Liquidity has been discussed to be 
fundamentally different from insolvency. Capital regulations under Basel II primarily 
meant for banks to hold capital to address insolvency. In the wake of the current financial 
crises, the development of complex tradable instruments increased the interdependence 
between banks and market enhancing financial institutions’ exposure to the liquidity risk. 
Practices of transferring illiquid assets took place rather frequently and Special Purpose 
Vehicles (SPVs) were created to off-load risks in a cost efficient manner. The liquidity risk 
associated in such practice was dangerously underestimated by decent market participants 
(Bankers and Regulators alike). Furthermore, vulnerable developments on the liquidity 
aspects of the banks usually promoted an environment of credit markets (for example ABS 
                                                 
147 Ranging from large internationally active banks to small relatively less sophisticated institutions including 
investment banks hedge funds commercial banks insurance companies in both developed and developing 
countries are exposed to all kinds of risks credit, market, operational, reputation, business, legal 
148 Northern Rock significantly suffered reputation risk evident during the global financial. Reputation risk 
have not been given recognition under much criticized Basel II (Moosa 2010). 
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and CDOs) where institutions increased leverage significantly. Bear Stern ended up 
leveraged 32-1 at the time it collapsed in a bid to sustain amplified impact of the adverse 
market advances. Leveraged entity is one whose exposure to risky assets exceeds its equity 
capital. Leverage feeds on strong desire of firms to maximizing their profit in times of 
lower interest rates and rising asset prices (Moosa 2010). During 2003-2007 overall 
financial system leverage increased and amplified market risk as well as liquidity risk. In 
particular, countries with booming housing market witnessed considerable increase in 
mortgage debt and only partially funded by banks through securitization (CGFS 2009). Use 
of balance sheet leverage as a measure of risk exposure suffered a fair share of criticism in 
the literature149. This is because it fails to capture risk from derivatives, does not adjust for 
the risk of assets and by no means is a measure of liquidity characteristics of the assets held 
on or off balance sheet towards capturing liquidity risk. On cross border level other 
limitations came to surface as well e.g. Balance sheet leverage under GAAP is calculated 
to be different to IFRS.  
Thus, Basel II being capital based regulation, evidenced its limitations explicitly during the 
global financial crises with regards to capturing liquidity risk and leverage. In light of 
global financial crises, Basel Committee considered raise in capital standards to address 
issues of asset valuation and liquidity150. Global financial crises motivated a debate that 
earlier implementation of the new Basel II capital accord may have prevented or reduced 
the severity the recent financial crises.151 On the other hand it has widely been accepted 
that Basel II models proved flawed and actually failed to signal an arrival of a financial 
crises let alone curtail the recent global financial turmoil. As discussed liquidity, leverage, 
business and reputation risks aggravated the financial crises beyond any capital focused 
regulation and Basel II did not deal with any of them significantly (Griffin 2008). 
Furthermore, the crises affected non-bank financial institutions as well (e.g. AIG), which 
Basel II did not cover. Global financial crises reflected upon inadequacy of the Basel II 
                                                 
149 Balance sheet leverage is determined by the ratio of total assets on the balance sheet to the equity, off 
balance sheet assets may be considered in order to further fine tune balance sheet leverage. 
150 Blundell-Wignell, A., Atkinson, P. (2010) Thinking beyond Basel III: Necessary solutions for capital and 
liquidity. OECD journal: Financial Market Trends 2010(1), 1-23 
151 See Wellink, N (2008) Basel II might have prevented credit crunch, available at www.bobsguide.com 
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capital adequacy accord or any capital based regulations. Frequently notable issues were 
that Basel II clearly lacked provisions to deal with liquidity and leverage; could not put 
check on improper use of internal ratings based models; showed over dependency on 
external credit rating agencies; contained complex models making it difficult to implement; 
and failed to promote uniform playing field152.  
 
 
3.3 Basel III: Regulatory response to the global financial crises 
 
3.3.1 Modified Basel II: Basel III 
Basel Capital Accord (BCBS 1988), started the ball rolling within banking regulations with 
new standards at the time that were easily negotiable by the banks but visibly, contained 
exploitable loop holes. Banks found ways to escape capital charges153 under Basel Capital 
Accord and got involved in riskier more profitable businesses. Basel II (BCBS 2006a) an 
update version of the original Basel Capital Accord attempted to address such issues and 
focused on setting common standards agreed amongst the big economies in order to 
identify a capital that is adequate for a bank during periods of economic distress, in a bid 
to make global financial system more resilient. Regulators under Basel II Capital Accord 
urged banks to engage in sophisticated assessment of their risk and adjust their capital 
requirements accordingly. It has been observed that banks instead, would engage in all 
sorts of arbitrary practices in order to reduce their capital charges. During the global 
financial crises Basel II emerged as an inconsistent arrangement. The approaches 
advocated by Basel II (Standardized and Advanced) in order to determine adequate capital 
could not protect banks from the onslaught of the global financial crises. The global 
financial crises identified crucial weaknesses in the practices of the financial world i.e. 
development of extraordinarily complex risk exposures in wake of financial innovation 
                                                 
152 Praet, P. & Nguyen, G. (2008) “Overview of recent policy initiatives in response to the crises,” Journal of 
financial stability, 4 (d), 368-375 
153 For instance securitization as discussed by Acharya et al (2013). Securitization without risk 
transfer. Journal of Financial economics, 107(3), 515-536. 
 109 
 
that were not completely understood or assessed by all relevant market participants; 
debatable underwriting standards gave way to fraudulent practices in subprime sector; 
questionable ratings provided by external credit rating agencies; and poor use of internal 
models for risk management that generated liquidity and concentration risk. Once the 
financial crises struck, it deepened because of increased risk aversion, falling assets prices 
and intensified leveraging. Basel II promoted better valuation techniques than Basel I; 
incorporated improved market transparence standards and perhaps managed to address 
rather than taming speculative securitization to a certain extent. However, as the global 
financial crises unfolded it became apparent that Basel II implementation would have 
stopped or even spotted the subprime crises in the bud. Over excessive activity in granting 
subprime loans in US as well as UK also points out to the fact that regulator needed to 
exercise higher level local knowledge in order to put a check on potentially hazardous 
practices within their respective jurisdictions. In the US Government-backed mortgage 
lenders Fannie Mae (Federal National Mortgage Association), Freddie Mae (Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation) and Ginnie Mae (Government National Mortgage 
Association) began to make mortgage loans on easier terms and instead of waiting for the 
life time repayments sold the mortgages on to commercial financial institutions. This 
enabled them to arrange more cash and they increased the lending activity globally without 
due caution154. Northern Rock in the UK grew at a rapid pace undertaking activity of same 
sort. The growth was clearly abnormal in comparison with normal deposit taking institution 
and once peak was reached resulted in severe global consequences. Nevertheless, allowing 
same situation to alleviate in different jurisdictions confirms the sensitivity of the matter 
and the fact that there is no substitute to local knowledge of bank practices and economic 
conditions. Moreover, Royal Bank of Scotland and HBOS required £12 billion and £4 
billion respectively to cover the losses announced in wake of the financial crises. This 
represents the fact that the amount of regulatory capital held before the financial crises, 
was based upon either overly optimistic or completely wrong computations. In case of 
Northern Rock, because of the good quality of its mortgage loan portfolio, the risk 
associated with the mortgage book was calculated to be 15% using their own internal rating 
                                                 
154 See Financial Stability and transparency. House of Commons Treasury Committee, 6th Report, March 
2008. Paragraphs 169-178. 
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based approach (under Basel II) as compare to a standard 50%.155 Such practices acted as 
curtain raiser with regards to limitations of Basel II and highlight the need for reforming 
the current Basel II regulation.  
Financial deregulation, financial capitalism, shadow banking and casino capitalism 
enjoyed the center stage of the discussion in determining the cause of the financial crises156. 
Theoretically, relaxing controls on interest rates, charter power and portfolio structures 
should aid banks cultivate economic resilience. Therefore financial deregulation does not 
in any way propagate opportunities to shift private risk exposures on to a safety net. 
However, innovation in financial modeling had led to development of complex and 
nontransparent forms of risk transferring.  Existence of inadequate or unskilled monitoring 
of leverage and asset price fluctuations allowed breakdown in innovative financial 
modeling157. In midst of the global financial crises blanket guarantees, open ended liquidity 
support offers and regulatory moderation often raised the overall fiscal cost for crises 
resolution and prolonged the tenure of the financial crises (Demirguc-kunt et al 2008). 
Global financial crises in addition, detected certain similarities to the crises witnessed 
through the history of banking, e.g. as early as crises of 1772 that marked the end of credit 
boom, crises of 1929 marked the end of speculative boom of 1920s, and many more can 
be cultivated into the discussion158. Global financial crises also had its roots in limitations 
in the way financial institutions and regulators interact. Market participants managed to 
ignore serious developments in important indicators of systematic risk e.g. asset price 
inflation, rising leverage, large sustained current account deficits and slowing of economic 
growth until it was too late and a systemic crises was eminent. Global financial crises that 
emerged in 2007, was not the first instance when financial institutions took advantage of 
the regulatory shortfalls and engaged in reckless risk taking that fueled an abnormal 
increase in leverage and boom in asset prices for considerable period of time, consequently 
                                                 
155 See Green Paper, The run on the rock. House of Commons Treasury Committee, January 2008. Page 25 
156 Acharya et al (2013); Wolfson and Epstein (2013); Lapavitsas (2013); Aglietta (2016);  
157 Statistical models have been argued to have limitations in capturing risk see Borio, C., Drehmann, M., & 
Tsatsaronis, K. (2014). Stress-testing macro stress testing: does it live up to expectations? Journal of 
Financial Stability, 12, 3-15.   
158 Lapavitsas, C. (2012). Crisis in the Eurozone. Verso Books. 
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once the peak was achieved resulted in an economic shock (Demirguc-kunt et at 2008). 
The role of international regulator was brought under acute scrutiny after the global 
financial crises stating that regulation had clearly been guilty of allowing market 
participants to involve in such practices within the financial environment whereby selfish 
approach of market participants amplified intolerable systematic risk (Mcllroy 2008). The 
global financial crises more than ever before, highlighted that the banks in particular due 
to their systemic nature need to be regulated to dispose of the threat of systemic risk in 
future. Global financial crises furthermore, confirmed that there is nothing mythical about 
systematic risk. Systematic risks truly and surely exists and pose serious threat to the 
international economic climate. The regulatory authorities post global financial crises, 
similar to previous comparable episodes seemed to have made peace with their limitation 
to capture full scale complexity of the financial structures developed pre global financial 
crises and reverted back to consultations strategy. As a reflection, in order to develop 
effective policies to mitigating the system wide risk and its procyclical implications, 
industry wide consultations advocated capital and liquidity buffers to be higher across the 
board; market discipline; control over the structure of the financial industry; improved 
market infrastructure; taxation and above all significantly improved supervision (Caruana 
2010). One straight forward advantage of improving transparency and holding access 
capital during the times of boom is that banks would not need to refer to asset liquidation 
in order to acquire required capital during the times of economic recession (Mcllroy 2008). 
However, translating general industry insights into practical financial regulatory policies 
is a challenge in itself and although, these financial policies may construct a major portion 
of the solution it may not entirely capture the complexity of the systematic events. In 
addition, implementation of the regulation across board banking institutions with same 
rigor proved the biggest challenge of all (Caruana 2010). Nevertheless, noticeable 
acceleration in response to market participants and in line with industry and Financial 
Stability Forum recommendations, Basel committee aimed to introduce the modification 
of the capital treatment of structured credit risk transfer instruments (CRT); improved 
management guidelines for liquidity; further improve Pillar 2 principles concerning stress 
testing practices, management of off-balance sheet exposures; and revamp market 
discipline by stricter disclosure obligations of complex securitizations and valuation 
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practices. In addition, BCBS published a string of consultative papers since the global 
financial crises in a build towards ‘Basel III’ (BCBS 2010b). 
Limitations of VAR methodologies of the Basel II capital accord in capturing market risk 
were addressed by the Basel Capital regulations for instance in order to boost capital held 
for market risk in the trading book portfolio a multiplayer of 3 to VAR for the treatment of 
specific risk and stressed risk has been introduced. The results of Basel Committee 
consultations regarding trading book showed the impact of aforementioned that average 
capital requirements for banks would rise by 11.5% however the median would only 
increase by 3%.  
 
3.3.2 Review of Basel III proposals 
Development of Basel III aims159 to address shortfalls identified in Basel II in response to 
the global financial crises in particular by encouraging banks to promote practices of 
liability-driven asset management (Allen et al 2012). Important improvements further 
include proposals to roll out Tier 3 capital160 requirements and insertion of going concern 
capital i.e. common shares and retained earnings; targeted debt-equity arrangements that 
are subordinated and may qualify for discretionary dividend under the Tier 1 (BCBS 
2010c). In addition Basel committee proposes that Tier 2 capital to be stricter (for instance 
5 year minimum maturity, no redemption incentives). Equity is treated as most reliable 
means of capital to cover sudden losses and therefore under Basel III all deductions161 that 
are not recognized on the balance sheet have been disallowed in common equity. 
Furthermore, to address the failure to capture the off balance sheet risks and tame the 
procyclicality banks now required to assess their capital requirements for counterparty 
                                                 
159 As of March 2016 all 27 BCBS (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision) member jurisdictions have 
final risk-based capital rules in place. Amongst non-BCBS member countries final risk-based capital rules 
adopted by 63 countries see BIS (2016) “Implementation of Basel standards: A report to G20 Leaders on 
implementation of Basel III regulatory reforms”. August. Available at Bank of International Settlement 
website www.bis.org with complete list of countries, scope and methodology of the survey. 
160 Tier 3 Capital includes greater amount of undisclosed reserves and general loss reserves in comparison 
with tier 2 capital and mainly allocated to support market risk, commodities risk, foreign currency risk 
161 For instance Goodwill (Balance sheet item); bank’s investment in its own shares; minority interest; and 
deferred tax assets that are net of liabilities 
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credit risk using proposed stressed inputs. Capital charges associated with depreciating 
reputation of the counterparty should be included instead of overall default charges. 
Application of increased margining periods should be mandatory for calculating regulatory 
capital of illiquid derivative exposures to the counterparty (BCBS 2010a). Banks will need 
to introduce a 1.25 multiplayer to asset value correlation (AVC) of exposures to regulated 
financial firms. In order to put a check on excess leverage build up, Basel III proposes 
introducing a leverage ratio (BCBS 2010a; and BCBS 2010b). The proposed leverage ratio 
is Tier 1 capital based and supports 100% treatment to all exposures net of provisions but 
does not include netting of off-balance sheet derivative exposures and collateral held. Basel 
III decrees that banks have a 30-day liquidity cover in case sudden economic calamity, for 
instance value of assets and cash flows to be considered similar to when in major economic 
shock (BCBS 2010b). To tame the procyclical effects of Basel II identified during the 
recent financial crises Basel III proposes to dampen the cyclicality through enhanced use 
of Pillar 2, for instance banks should focus on long-term calibration of the PD within their 
of risk modals. In particular, Basel III aims to support expected loss based principles rather 
than incurred loss based. Basel III also intends to introduce deductions from bank capital 
any shortfall in such provisions to address the issues of under provisioning (Repullo and 
Suarez 2008; Repullo et al 2009; and BCBS 2010b). In addition, Basel III proposes banks 
to hold buffers well above regulatory capital to address any economic downturns 
comprehensively. This should primarily be achieved with significant cutbacks in 
discretionary dividend and staff bonus. Basel III promotes principles of a buffer system 
that works in a countercyclical pattern, to be used in macro prudential setting to restrain 
excessive risk taking.  
The proposals of Basel III make some concrete improvements towards Basel II. However 
some fundamental issues still remain unaddressed. Pillar 1 continues to advocate rating 
system that assumes portfolio invariance enhancing possibilities of concentration risk and 
capital arbitrage incentives see Blundal-Wignell and Atkinson (2010). In addition, VAR 
models based on single risk factor undermines the limitation of the model with regards to 
recognizing different forms of risk again requiring unpractical and awkward supervisory 
overriding practices. The introduction of leverage ratio in presence of risk weights 
mechanisms makes the matters tricky. For example if the leverage is set high the required 
capital will fall and give banks an excuse to engage in arbitrage to get rid of excess capital. 
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Such cost savings by the banks are due to distract regulatory authorities in setting 
maximum capital rations rather than minimum. In result institutions, exactly replicate past 
practice with keeping lower risk-weighted assets and shifting riskier ones outside the 
banking system. That may again become recipe for development of shadow banking 
through regulatory capital arbitrage162. Yet again suggesting extreme reliance on 
supervisory authorities to track such practices and nip the evil in the bud. The liquidity 
proposal discussed above had some serious operational limitations for instance if banks 
prove that they are solvent with satisfactory capital adequacy, that would mean the liquidity 
and fund management at the institution is sound and there is no justification for any 
interference by regulator. The role of regulator is promoted under Basel III to ascertain that 
institution can absorb losses and therefore avoid unnecessary liquidity measures that can 
seriously damage market confidence. Blundal-Wignell and Atkinson (2010) argue that 
focus of the supervisors should be to deal with insolvency through resolution regimes when 
it arises.163 Above discussion shed light on the some extremely sensible propositions 
contained in Basel III draft however, on the surface some serious limitations have also been 
explored.  
Basel II implementation was seriously distorted by the recent global financial crises, and 
Basel III published proposals in response to concerns with regards to effective transition. 
In US, for example the implementation of Basel II suffered delays initially however crises 
sparked some urgency in implementing remedial policies. In the US, the initial responses 
introduced improvements to the Pillar 2 of the Basel II in addition to Basel III proposals. 
However, these were the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), Supervisory Capital 
Assessment Program (SCAP) and the release of “the treasury guidelines” (Smith III 2010).  
In Europe amendments to the already in effect CRD with some regional variation are in 
broadly in line with Basel III proposals of suggested changes in trading books and banking 
books. In addition changes proposed in Pillar 2 and 3 have also incorporated in the amended 
                                                 
162 Encouragement for banks to pursue profit making getting involved in speculative arbitrage activities i.e. 
swapping high risk assets with low risk and ending up with needing rescue operations such as quantitative 
easing. 
163For example in case of Northern Rock liquidity problems started to rise after confidence in capital 
adequacy was lost. 
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CRD (Bake et al 2010). Promotion of countercyclical capital buffers under Basel III 
package could dampen the impact of economic fluctuations164. 
      
 
3.4 Emerging and Developing Economies (EMEs)165 
 
3.4.1 Introduction 
The first section discusses the challenges faced by the EMEs with regards to capital 
regulation; the second section looks at the Basel II implementation in EMEs; the third 
section discusses the progress made in EMEs; fourth sections looks at the impact of the 
recent global crises in EMEs; and fifth sections discusses the role and limitations of Basel 
II in EDEs in light of the global financial crises. 
 
3.4.2 Basel II Bank Capital Regulation challenges in Emerging and 
Developing Economies: 
The capability of Basel I and Basel II in warning of the financial turmoil is of significance 
and should be under acute scrutiny. In particular Basel II, a development over Basel I as 
more risk sensitive paradigm was in process of being implemented in most countries lagged 
behind the scheduled transition. Nevertheless, the revised Basel framework (Basel II) 
advocating the ‘three pillar approach’ was clearly not designed with developing countries 
in mind166. Basel II not only increased the number of risk categories in Pillar 1, it also 
proposed a mix of statistical models and expert opinion to help track a bank’s exposure to 
insolvency risk over a period. The new accord developed in 2004 claimed to make capital 
                                                 
164 Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCyB) calculated as the weighted average of the buffers in effect in 
territories to which banks have credit exposure, Basel III makes it compulsory for banks to calculate and 
report CCyB. See empirical evidence in Angelini et al (2015). Basel III: Long‐term Impact on Economic 
Performance and Fluctuations. The Manchester School, 83(2), 217-251. 
165International Monetary Fund. (2007). World economic outlook database.  
166 Griffith-Jones, S., Spratt, S., & Segoviano, M. (2002) “Basel II and Developing Countries”, The Financial 
Regulator, 7(2). 1-14 
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more sensitive to credit risk by adopting either (i) external credit ratings issued by rating 
organisations (the standardised approach) or (ii) the internal ratings based on the bank’s 
own risk models (IRB and AIRB). Banking institutions in emerging market economies did 
not qualify to integrate the advanced ratings based systems under Basel II, therefore at best 
adopted standardized approaches. Nevertheless, external ratings as well as internal credit 
rating techniques did not seem to aid in setting up capital requirements and remained only 
useful in establishing loss reserves for particular asset portfolios. Developing countries due 
to a less structured or restricted bank credit setup in developing markets, and operation in 
volatile political and economic conditions found it very difficult to implement exact same 
risk management techniques of Basel Capital regulation used in large internationally active 
banks167. In fact, importance of more work within emerging economies was realised at the 
first annual meeting of Deputy Governors from the emerging markets that took place at the 
BIS in February 1995 focusing on the challenges faced by central banks as countries moved 
towards a more liberal banking system in the context of wider capital account convertibility 
(Turner 2006). The process of bank supervision in many emerging countries remains 
inadequate, and had failed to keep up with the rapid pace of exacerbated financial system 
fragility therefore the role of bank capital regulations in taming financial capital remains 
significant.  
 
In developing countries, institutional financial agencies tend to continue playing a 
considerable role in their respective financial systems. For instance, the main reason for 
the lack of change in the financial sectors of most Asian developing countries over decades 
appeared to be the oligopolistic structure of their financial markets, the concomitant 
political power to the large banks, and the governments’ desire to manipulate the financial 
system to finance its own expenditures at low interest cost as well as investment in priority 
sectors of the economy (Haggard et al 1993). Measures such as the imposition of foreign 
exchange controls, interest rate ceilings, high reserve requirements and suppression or non-
development of private capital markets can all increase the flow of domestic resources to 
the public sector without higher tax, inflation or interest rates (Fry 1973, Nichols 1974). 
There existed loan rate ceilings as well as deposit rate ceilings in most financially repressed 
                                                 
167 For instance HSBC Holding, Barclays PLC and Citigroup Inc.  
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economies. In developing countries credit allocation is rarely random that is credit is not 
allocated according to expected productivity of the investment products but according to 
transaction costs and perceived risks of defaults. Therefore the average efficiency of 
investment is usually reduced as the loan rate ceiling is lowered to convert investments 
with lower returns profitable. In developing countries, banks have often required to allocate 
minimum percentages of their asset portfolios for loans to priority sectors of the economy 
at subsidized loan rates of interest. Abolishing interest rate ceilings altogether produces the 
optimal result of maximizing investment and raising still further investment’s average 
efficiency resulting in higher rate of economic growth (McKinnon 1973)168. McKinnon 
argued that financial markets play key role in economic development, a contending 
approach to the predecessors with neoclassic approach that the impact of financial system 
on real growth is minimum due to low influence on investments in physical capital (Solow 
1956)169. Furthermore, some evidence suggested that financial development can be 
important factor for economic growth at the macro-level as an increase in national income 
and wealth permits people to make more deposits and encourages monetary sophistication 
(Khan & Senhadji 2000; Andersen & Tarp 2003). Advanced financial intermediation could 
enable firms to raise and manage large amounts of funds more effectively, resulting in rapid 
economic development170. A number of empirical researchers remained convinced that 
banking sector development is particularly important for developing economies since a 
bank-based system has a greater impact on growth at the early stages and market-oriented 
financial system found to perform better in developing economies171. Fase & Abma, (2003) 
defined economic growth complex to capture nevertheless and argued Gross National 
Product as comparatively effective measure of economic growth than per capita indicators. 
                                                 
168 McKinnon, R. (1973). Money and capital in economic development. Washington, DC: The Brookings 
Institution. 
169 Solow, R. M. (1956). A contribution to the theory of economic growth. The quarterly journal of 
economics, 65-94. 
170 See Barth et al (1998)“Financial regulation and performance: cross country evidence” World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper, (2037)  
171 See for example Tadesse, S. (2002). Financial architecture and economic performance: international 
evidence. Journal of financial intermediation, 11(4), 429-454.; Levine, R. (2002) Bank-based or market-
based financial systems: Which is better? Journal of Financial Intermediation 11. 398–428.  
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He argues Per capita economic indicators as week reflection of wealth of nation. In order 
to measure financial development, in addition to the aforementioned economic indicators 
he considered size of banking sector; scale of financial intermediation172. Yet, in the 
context of developing economies, a too rapid and uniform liberalization of the banking 
industry may not bring optimal outcomes. Contending empirical evidence suggest that 
countries having liberalized their banking systems are significantly more likely to face a 
financial crisis (Demirgüç-Kunt et al 1997). This evidence is consistent with economic 
theory related to information asymmetry in a lending market (Hellmann et al., 1996; 
Hellmann et al., 1998a and Hellmann et al., 1998b; Stiglitz & Weiss 1981, Krugman 1993). 
The efficiency of complete and immediate interest rate liberalization as part of stabilization 
package now seem dubious. Bank supervision and some degree of price stability seem 
essential prerequisites for success of financial liberalization. (Delano and Mirakhor 1990). 
In addition, in developing countries, some public financial institutions are expected to have 
different objectives, such as nationwide financial service provision and political credit 
allocation to priority sectors, other than cost minimization. 
 
The aforementioned crises in developing countries, had dramatic consequences 
domestically and caused major upheaval internationally. In most cases they went hand in 
hand with massive macroeconomic disruption: sharp increases in interest rates, substantial 
currency depreciation and dramatic deflation of domestic demand. The demand for credit 
fell because of recession and the greater reluctance of borrowers to become indebted. 
Simultaneously the supply of bank credit declined, banks became more risk averse and a 
major stiffening of supervisory oversight reinforced this effect in many countries. The 
financial unrest on 1990s amongst emerging markets paved the way in finding reasons 
behind crises in developing countries notable discussion revolve around role of 
                                                 
172 Scale of financial intermediation, defined as function of channeling of savings from surplus to deficit 
units, where paradoxically deficit units increasingly constitute business and government sectors. 
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financializaiton173, rise of short term debt instruments174 and international illiquidity175. 
Recent empirical evidence nevertheless, suggests, during 1970s and 1980s positive causal 
relationship between financial developments measured by liquid assets of the financial 
system as share of GDP caused reduction in moderate poverty, however same relationship 
could not be achieved during 1980s to 1990s sample when financial development measured 
through proxy of credit extended by the financial institutions (Perez-Moreno 2011). 
Amongst debaters, Asghar and Hussain (2014) use panel data and evidence strong 
relationship between financial development and economic growth amongst developing 
countries. Rashti et al (2014) discusses that capital markets had a positive impact on 
economic growth of developing countries during 1990-2010, using GMM methodologies 
in light of global financial crises. Al Samman and Azmeh (2016) showed that financial 
development had positive impact on economic growth in a sample of 47 developing 
countries. 
 
 
3.4.3 Basel II: Integration in Emerging and Developing Economies 
Increasing number of developing countries gave clear indication of Basel II adoption, for 
instance as per the results of the survey of Financial Stability Institute (FSI) of Bank of 
International Settlements (BIS) conducted in 2008 revealed that a total of 92 countries 
excluding BCBS member countries have implemented Basel II or are in progress of 
implementing Basel II (BIS 2008). Basel II perceived to have developed a number of 
proposals that may be beneficial in point of view of the developing economies e.g. removal 
of OECD/non-OECD distinction and reduction of excessive incentives towards short term 
                                                 
173 Increasing role of financial institution in building credit portfolio called asset portfolio in banking terms, 
development of complex and profit making financial instruments inclusive of securitization of shadow 
banking, and scale of financial intermediation see Epstein, G. A. (Ed.). (2005). Financialization and the world 
economy. Edward Elgar Publishing. 
174 See Diamond, D. W., & Rajan, R. G. (2001, June). Banks, short-term debt and financial crises: theory, 
policy implications and applications. In Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy (Vol. 54, 
No. 1, pp. 37-71). North-Holland. 
175 See Chang, R., & Velasco, A. (2001). A model of financial crises in emerging markets. Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 489-517. 
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lending under the standardized approach are very encouraging. However, the important 
question is this: can capital regulations under the Basel II contain systemic risk in emerging 
economies where banking institutions are vulnerable due to currency mismatches and 
maturity adjustments? Literature advocates concerns with regards to the way Basel II 
addressed the issue of direct or indirect foreign exchange exposure of banks in emerging 
economies. The role of net foreign exchange exposure sits at the heart of crises in 
developing countries according to the history of crises in emerging economies. There is 
requirement for additional proposal in the Basel II to incorporate risk related to such 
exposures. More questions prevailed over Basel II capabilities to reduce bank credit levels 
to developing countries, possible implications of such could be slow economic growth and 
reduced investments in case of poorer countries.    
Basel II implementation may enhance procyclicality176 of bank lending (from international 
as well as regional banks perspective) leading to possibilities of risks of systematic nature 
in banking sector due to increase in volatility of growth and investment. In addition, it 
would be interesting to note the impact of Basel II implementation on loans extended to 
SME’s or other market participants that may be vital for investment, economic growth and 
improvement in employment. However, due to competitive advantage foreign banks may 
have could seriously promote negative consequences for loans extended to SME’s i.e. only 
handpicked firms may qualify for loan on basis of their reputation. This would lead to 
concentration risk and banking instability. Upper hand of the foreign banks such as use of 
advanced IRB in competition with host banks’ standard approaches, threatens supervisory 
authorities to practice their discretion in order to effectively regulate them. On the contrary, 
compliance with standardized approach under Basel II to meet regulatory capital 
requirements in host country would mean for an international IRB compliant bank to have 
a separate reporting system one for home regulator and host regulator. This potential area 
of conflict between institution and regulators definitely warrant hard work and 
consultations (Majnoni and Powel 2005; and Griffith-Jones and Gottschalk 2006). 
                                                 
176 The concept that financial system is procyclical and exacerbates swings in real economy gained 
momentum during recent decades, due to collapsing of linkage between borrowers and savers due to banks 
collapses see Gordy and Howell (2006); Khoury (2009); Rupello and Suaraz (2008, 2013); Pederzoli et al 
(2010) 
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There is extensive debate in literature that Basel II implementation has direct consequences 
for the domestic provision of credit in developing economies177. Nevertheless, most 
developing countries affected through the capital accords’ effects on international capital 
flows. There are indeed, macroeconomic implications for emerging economies of 
implementing Basel II accord. By and large capital adequacy regulation might fail to 
improve stability of the domestic financial markets. Inefficient regulation creates more 
serious problems to the financial stability than capital adequacy provisions (Barth et al 
2010). The guidelines published by the Basel committee for regulating banking activity 
should have contained proposals to be adopted by any country regardless of 
resourcefulness of its banking infrastructure. Mohanty et al. (2006) argued that following 
core principles proposed by the Basel committee fail to create a regulatory and supervisory 
environment that can effectively host improved banking performance. For instance by 
compliance with Basel II core principles the share of nonperforming loan (NPL) deteriorate 
and inflict decrease in the net interest margin (Bushman and William 2012). Furthermore, 
Basel II implementation impacts adversely on provision of domestic credit by slowing 
down the lending activity. The impact of Basel II on capital flows in emerging economies 
could cause declines in credit activity and increase pricing of loan as a direct response to 
regulatory capital requirements that fed through international lending rates resulting in a 
‘credit crunch’. Direct impact of new risk weights would result in introduction of increased 
capital ratios and dent the long-term non-speculative credit agreements in emerging 
economies.   
Basel II regulators failed to translate Basel Capital regulation principles into implementable 
policies and practical action plans in the member BCBS countries for example integrating 
cross-border banking framework and principles proved a challenge for Basel II within the 
developed world 178.  In applying the Basel Capital Regulations uniformly across the globe 
specifically in emerging countries to promote sound risk management, the main challenge 
                                                 
177 Bayne, N., & Woolcock, S. (2016). The new economic diplomacy. Decision-Making and Negotiation in 
International Economic Relations, Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Limited. 
178 See Demirguc‐Kunt, A., Detragiache, E. and Merrouche, O., (2013). Bank capital: Lessons from the 
financial crisis. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,45(6), pp.1147-1164 
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in emerging markets is that they are at different levels of preparedness in order to cope 
with the far-reaching challenges and potential implications of Basel Capital Regulation. 
Given the different stages of development and levels of market complexity, applying Basel 
II, designed basically to cater developed economies, seemed impossible to integrate in 
developing economies without some significant customization in order to accommodate 
emerging markets conditions. Serious liquidity issues go hand in hand with a higher level 
of market unpredictability in emerging markets, that may not be adequately captured in the 
under the rule of the Basel II framework.  
Despite the significant critique of Basel Capital Regulation, capital regulations still seem 
to be considered the way forward with continued consultation and rollout of Basel III 
Capital regulation. Emerging economies indicated clearly to implement Basel II to bring 
their credit risk management in line with the sophisticated practices of the developed world 
to stand some chance of financial stability (BIS 2008). However, the requirement of 
concise principles for regulators of emerging economies may be imminent in order to 
evaluate technical issues like data integrity as well as broader implications of financial 
stability. Once developing countries confirmed their intentions of implementing Basel II, 
BCBS needed to develop a more efficient and comprehensive legal, accounting, regulatory 
and market infrastructure to facilitate Basel convergence in developing countries. In 
addition, as a critical part of implementation strategy, the training of supervisory staff on 
Basel Regulations (BIS 2008). 
 
3.4.4 Basel II: Progress in Emerging and Developing Economies 
The banking systems in emerging economies have been transformed over the last few 
decades in response to the neoliberal structural reforms in developing world179. 
Globalization thence, encouraged entry of foreign banks in domestic markets of the 
developing countries with competitive advantage impacted the performance of local banks 
in emerging markets. For instance instead of lunging into privatization blindly, China and 
India were among the first of the emerging countries to announce planned corporate 
governance reforms and reduce planned privatization in order to improve performance of 
                                                 
179 Siddiqui, K. (2012). Developing Countries' Experience with Neoliberalism and Globalisation. Research 
in Applied Economics, 4(4), 12. 
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state owned banks. Despite challenging conditions faced by state owned banks to attract 
strategic investor without offering guarantees against hidden losses, in general state owned 
banks of emerging economies have gradually improved their governance and performance. 
In addition to privatization and corporate governance reform, several approaches of 
consolidation were witnessed among the emerging economies. In most parts of Asia where 
the banking systems are highly fragmented, government-driven financial consolidation 
planning came into force. In Russia takeovers and closures of smaller banks by larger banks 
were the case. In Central-Europe mergers and acquisitions were witnessed by the large 
banks of the Europe as a way of consolidation. In theory large banks should be able to 
manage and diversify risk in a comparatively better way. The role of foreign bank leading 
in Mexico and Europe made job of the regulatory authorities difficult in particular, in 
jurisdictions where the foreign bank subsidiaries were systemically crucial. The role of 
foreign banks remained restricted in Asia and rest of the Latin Americas. Introduction of 
bank lending in a sophisticated environment of risk assessment gave rise to some new risks. 
Macroeconomic volatility fell sharply in emerging economies in comparison with 
developed markets. In addition, years in the run up to 2007 crises witnessed growth and 
increased commodity prices. At the heart of the reasons were improved reserves of foreign 
exchange, flexible exchange rates systems and growth of domestic debt markets were 
mentioned. In particular, growth of local currency debt markets reducing costs for banks 
to adjust their risk portfolios in response to economic shock. This however, increased the 
risk of transmitting external shocks from global financial market more quickly. In 
addressing the most important issue of systematic risk, notable progress has been made in 
emerging economies through introduction of policies that are mainly in line with Basel II 
proposals. The policies are on rules on corporate governance to ensure banks are well 
managed; disclosure requirements to help promote healthy market participants to monitor 
important advances e.g. banks’ changing risk exposure; prudential regulations and 
supervisory control process; anticipate and development of clear and concise corrective 
action policies to track emerging uncertainties; deposit insurance and lender of last resort 
(LOLR) arrangements. 
The major revival of bank lending in emerging market economies following an era of 
declining growth required more research in investigating possible factors explaining the 
growth; track trends of lending by the commercial banks and the level of sustainability of 
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these improvements (Mohanty et al. 2006). Bank stability and capabilities of credit supply 
is building block to growth and innovation. Events that contribute to improve banks’ 
lending capacity introduce capital inflows or a laid back monetary policy resulting in 
significant credit supply in the economy causing excessive growth in bank lending and 
asset price bubble, followed by ‘credit crunch’ (Bernanke and Gertler 1995; and Rajan and 
Zingales 1998). In addition, financial deregulation of poorly regulated banks, incapable 
supervisory standards and over optimistic incentive structure have induced economic 
fluctuations in emerging market economies180. Banks in emerging economies, during past 
couple of decades noticeably improved their lending capacity due to increase in deposits; 
foreign borrowing; reductions in net lending to the government and increase in other 
miscellaneous borrowing (Mohanty et al 2006). In addition, commercial banks remained 
the backbone of the credit supply in the emerging economies. Several emerging economies 
(Latin America, Central Europe, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Turkey) witnessed steep rise in 
bank lending to the productive private sector. However, in Asia China, India and Korea 
saw increased lending activity but there remained declining curve in domestic credit 
growth in Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. In addition, strong growth 
noticed in household credit in almost all emerging market economies. In case of developing 
countries the sustainability of the financial system remains questionable i.e. banks face lack 
of data availability on household credit history in a situation where banks have transferred 
a significant portion of their market risk to household. This reflects an environment of 
excess liquidity, strong competition in retail loan market and strong income growth motives 
by the banks, perhaps another interpretation of casino capitalism in developing world.  
   
3.4.5 Global Financial Crises: Impact on Emerging and Developing 
Economies 
The financial crises sparked a concern with regards to the improvements in functioning of 
international financial system. International financial regulatory authorities initiated a 
number of international standards to shape and facilitate market advances. The new Basel 
                                                 
180 Barth, J. R., Caprio Jr, G., & Levine, R. (2013). Bank Regulation and Supervision in 180 Countries from 
1999 to 2011. Journal of Financial Economic Policy, 5(2), 111-219. 
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proposals formed an important element of the financial architecture.  Nevertheless, as in 
case with majority of remedial policies, the policy mechanism lacked inputs from the 
developing markets (Classens et al 2008). There are no doubts about the fact that recent 
financial crises stamped down on the emerging market economies with ruthless force. The 
financial crises caused an extraordinary drop in export demand that corresponded with a 
significant setback in global bank lending and overseas portfolio investment. Most 
developing countries, in wake of sharply increased cost of external financing witnessed 
helplessly deteriorating exchange rates and rapidly falling equity prices (Ahmed and Zlate 
2014). 
Restricted consumer and investor activity in developed world raised the pace of declining 
demand for EME exports, which in turn impacted capital inflows adversely demolishing 
an extended growth era. In a build up towards the recent global financial crises most EMEs 
enjoyed strong exports-based growth associated with rising gross savings resulted in large 
capital inflows. China and India in particular enjoyed exports-GDP ratio of as much high 
as 100% in 2007. Other Asian EMEs and central European countries also witnessed rising 
levels of exports. Moreover, foreign exchange levels accumulated at an abnormal pace and 
emerging economies got involved in complex financial integration with developed 
countries. GDP growth in EMEs jumped to an average of 7.4% per year during the period 
2003-2007 (pre recent global crises) in comparison with 6% for the period 1992-1996 (pre 
Asian crises). Growth in exports and global savings turned EMEs significant global trade 
participants. Nevertheless, the structure of growth proved flawed and significantly varied 
across the EMEs, perhaps contributed to fueling the recent economic distress (BIS 2009). 
Before the onslaught of the recent financial crises majority of EMEs had adopted policies 
to respond to the crises in a resilient manner, with exception of central and eastern 
European countries. Nevertheless, as the crises gained tempo developments in capital 
inflows followed a pattern suggesting loss of confidence in emerging market policies. 
EMEs once had accumulated larger current account and fiscal deficits; and sectors with 
significant foreign exchange exposures suffered from the wiped out capital and restricted 
financing arrangements. The prices began to slip after peaking therefore impact of the 
reversal in capital inflows was severe in most part equity markets. To address their own 
liquidity issue resulting in withdrawal of foreign investments from EMEs for instance $30 
billion were wiped out of Poland, Malaysia, Czech Republic, China and Chinese Taipei 
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towards the end of the year 2007 showing detrimental impact of global financial crises 
towards developing countries (BIS 2009). Global financial crises furthermore caused 
widespread distortions in EMEs financial architecture i.e. sharp decline in equity inflows, 
EMEs currencies loosing value, spreads on international sovereign bonds widened quickly 
and domestic bond yields rose in many EMEs rapidly181. EMEs (South Africa and Central 
European Countries) with larger current account deficit felt the impact of rising costs and 
demolished external finances. In addition at the time slump in oil and commodity prices 
further intensified the impact of global financial crises on developing economies for 
example Argentina, Russia and Venezuela. With sudden decline in exchange rates against 
major international currencies, corporations with heavy international debt obligations the 
recent financial crises acted as curtain raiser in identifying crucial vulnerabilities due to 
off-balance sheet active trading in derivatives markets by EMEs. When local currencies 
depreciated in international trading, generated sustained losses. International debt market, 
frozen primary funds reduced secondary trading of emerging market bonds, even in 
comparatively sophisticated EMEs (Brazil, Malaysia and South Africa). To top that, the 
highly volatile bond markets in many EMEs (Hungary, Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey) 
lost important business due to liquidity issues inflicting risk aversion practices amongst 
foreign investors. Once the crises got a strong foothold EMEs suffered devastating decline 
in cross-border loan to the banking sector by the developed countries (Ahmed and Zlate 
2014). On the contrary, EMEs of smaller financial infrastructure where foreign banks held 
controlling stake seemed to be less affected by reduced foreign investor activity (BIS 
2009). Nevertheless, crises have sparked a worldwide loss of confidence, and investors (in 
particular the ones with excess to foreign market) tend to revert to more liquid foreign 
currency assets during the times of economic recession. Trade finance became another 
casualty of the global financial crises, due international players only renewed about as 
much as 50-60% of their specialist commitments with regards to business credit 
agreements adversely impacting trade volumes and commodity prices. Reduction of trade 
credit had worst effects for Africa and some of Asia due to non-sophisticated financial 
systems and inability of governments to increase supply of funds. Despite reasonably stable 
                                                 
181 See Ahmed, S., & Zlate, A. (2014). Capital flows to emerging market economies: a brave new 
world? Journal of International Money and Finance, 48, 221-248. 
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historically, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)182 during the recent financial crises declined 
significantly. In addition increased profit remittance from some EMEs due to many 
multinational players needed to ensure liquidity. 
To direct the EMEs on to a vigorous global economic recovery route, there is urgency to 
bring about trade expansion. Historically as well as discussed earlier, growth in exports 
played vital role in the recovery of the EMEs. However, due to unpredicted severity of the 
import decline in developed countries the recovery through the exports based growth was 
slow. Imports forecast for US, Europe and Japan remained disappointing post global 
financial crisis. Nevertheless, the recovery of EMEs also depends upon the domestic 
demand fluctuations to offset the impact of reduced foreign exports. Moreover, the 
recovery of EMEs depends on the repair of the capital inflows that played vital supporting 
role in growth of EMEs. On the other hand, the current crises emerged in the financial 
infrastructure of the developed world therefore the focus of the international regulators 
remains primarily to develop policies to strengthen the financial architecture of the 
developed world, the fate of EMEs in hands of developed world remains uncertain183.                 
 
 
3.4.6 Role and Limitations of Basel II in Emerging and Developing 
Economies  
 Financial markets in EMEs experience more volatility in comparison with developed 
countries. Frequently discussed indicators of financial stability have been capital adequacy, 
asset quality, management, efficiency earnings, liquidity and market sensitivity. Basel II 
captures market signals through the use of VAR and rating agencies. Rating agencies claim 
to incorporate implications of business cycle on relative terms rather than absolute in rating 
borrower. Nevertheless, in reflecting the prices and ratings in the market, market 
fluctuation may be reinforced as banks downgrade or upgrade clients on a large scale, 
exacerbating procyclicality. Due to comparatively more volatile environment, this issue 
                                                 
182 See Lall, S., & Narula, R. (Eds.). (2013). Understanding FDI-assisted economic development. Routledge 
on FDI as form of investment in other countries by large multinational businesses. 
183 Barth, J. R., Caprio Jr, G., & Levine, R. (2013). Bank Regulation and Supervision in 180 Countries from 
1999 to 2011. Journal of Financial Economic Policy, 5(2), 111-219. 
 128 
 
becomes prime concern for EMEs because the impact is adversely felt on external 
financing and lead to even more severe business cycles domestically (Classens et al . 2008). 
Banking crises had remarkable adverse externalities that could impose economic costs to 
any society. However, developing economies tend to pay higher price in comparison with 
developed countries e.g. between 1976 and 1996, a total of 59 banking crises were recorded 
amongst the EMEs costing them on average 9% of the GDP. On the contrary, 10 crises 
recording during the same time frame in developed countries costing them an average of 
4% of their GDP (Ahmed 2009). Basel committee, IMF, World Bank and other bearers of 
the banking regulations flag across the globe permitted this far, only limited representation 
of EMEs. Representation of EMEs is far from in line with their contribution in the global 
economic activity, clearly irrespective of their legitimacy and impact on global economic 
environment. The reason that EMEs have had minimal influence on formulation of the new 
amended regulations is not hidden by any measure. In light of recent modifications, there 
have been claims that it may reduce the availability of external credit for a significant 
number of EMEs. Nevertheless, hierarchy and membership list of G20 and Financial 
Stability Forum leaving little doubt that the global financial architecture continues to be 
dominated by the G-20 industrial nations. Therefore, Basel Capital proposals majorly 
influenced by the international banks i.e. the new rules skip important policy issues 
concerning EMEs e.g. an appropriate exchange rate regime for developing countries or 
possible nomination of international lender of last resort see Truman (2006). Nevertheless, 
absence of EMEs appropriate participation led to development of standards too high for 
most EMEs i.e. lack of conventional debt management system increased the risks of 
lending to EMEs confirming the status of high volatility of external funding in most 
developing countries. The new standards aimed to improve cross border financial practices 
through sound macroeconomic policies, better exchange rate rules, and in particular 
improved regulatory and supervisory practices (Classens et al 2008).  
Basel I, relatively simple set of proposal was followed by extremely complex Basel II 
raised significant implications for the EMEs. Implementation of Basel II increased relative 
compliance costs more for smaller and less sophisticated banks in EMEs. Domestic banks 
in EMEs can’t afford to compete with their international counterparts due to lack of 
sophisticated risk management systems. Most exposures in EMEs would attract 100 per 
cent (BB+ to B-) or even worst 150 per cent (below B-) see BCBS (2006a). In addition, 
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some banks and corporation were more creditworthy than that of the sovereign entity 
therefore they should be separately assessed from the sovereign. Yet, this has been not the 
practice under the Basel II. The new risk weightings inflict significant increase in capital 
requirements for the loans to lower rated borrowers, which is typically the case in EME 
causing adverse impact on lending activity to such borrowers. Moreover, the capital 
adequacy requirements for smaller banks are binding in comparison with larger banks with 
their capital adequacy requirements calculated in line with risks associated, reaping the 
benefits of diversified portfolio see Gropp and Heider (2007).      
Less resourceful institutions in EMEs suffer from procyclical lending behavior and are 
somewhat deprived of significant access to financial services. In addition implementation 
of Foundation- IRB approach under Basel II leads to an increase in average capital 
requirements in a number of EMEs. Adopting improved capital adequacy ratio resulted in 
credit crises in Korea (Shin and Chang 2005). Basel II implementation in EMEs evidently 
increased the cost of external. On the contrary, banks in EMEs receive funds from sources 
such as capital markets and non-bank financial institutions that do not fall under capital 
adequacy requirements under the Basel II capital regulations, hence reducing the impact of 
Basel II to some extent (Cihak et al 2013).  
Basel II capital regulation may contribute to general uplifting of the global financial market 
practices and improve risk management through improvement in supervisory practices, for 
EMEs it comes with considerable cost. The impact of Basel II seems clearly twisted in 
favor of developed countries in comparison with EMEs advocating the argument that 
impact of EMEs remains small despite increase participation in global financial system. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The spectacular onslaught of the global financial crises identified need for comprehensive 
principles to address the issues of liquidity and leverage. The way recent financial crises 
unveiled limitations of the Basel II’s reliance on external rating agencies under the 
standardized approach; internal rating based approaches in calculating minimum 
regulatory capital; and boosting procyclicality in the banking sector has raised tremendous 
concerns with regards to the way forward in capital based regulation that is uniform across 
the globe (Repullo and Suarez 2008; Repullo et al. 2009; and Moosa 2010, Cihak et al 
2013, Demirgüç-Kunt et al 2013).  Developing economies faced difficulties in translating 
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complex Basel II methodologies into policies and required major reconstruction of the 
regulatory infrastructures and skilled human resources. Different jurisdictions should be 
allowed to adopt the exchange rate regime that suits their circumstances, as was the case 
after the fall of Bretton Woods System (Moosa 2010). In particular, an attempt to 
incorporate the globally recognized and reputed advanced approaches under Basel II would 
fail and put financial institutions in emerging economies at the risk of huge losses due to 
significant competitive disadvantage see Davies (2005). Classens et al (2008) finds 
evidence that Basel II affected external financing agreements of the EMEs adversely. Basel 
II applies higher capital adequacy requirements for institutions employing Standardized 
approach, typically the case in EMEs where financial institutions tend to be smaller and 
less sophisticated to benefit from advanced approaches under Basel II (Davies 2005; and 
BIS 2008). Higher capital requirements for the banks in EMEs would mean higher cost of 
capital and restricted access to external investment. In addition, procyclicality of the capital 
flows to EMEs increase because international banks apply advanced approaches. Due to 
the fact that developing countries suffer from volatile capital flows, exacerbated 
fluctuations in foreign loan extension practices puts EMEs at even greater risk of crises 
(Majnoni et al. 2004; Majnoni and Powell 2005; Barrell and Gottschalk 2006; and Classens 
et al. 2008).  
 
. 
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Chapter 4: Banking Sector of Pakistan 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter constitutes five subsections. First section essentially introduces the banking 
sector of Pakistan and its economic set up as the stage for the Basel Capital regulation 
compliance; second section discusses in detail the banking regulatory environment and the 
role of principal banking regulator of Pakistan: ‘The State Bank of Pakistan’; third section 
introduces the Islamic Banking in Pakistan; fourth section discusses Basel Capital 
regulation compliance in Pakistan, the role and limitation followed by conclusion. 
The banking system is the only mechanism of transferring funds within the economy i.e. 
all large money transactions take place through banks. Therefore banks undoubtedly have 
the potential to play an important role in economic growth. Over the last couple of decades, 
banking sector of Pakistan184 has undergone a number of reform initiatives (Qayyum and 
Ahmed 2007). Primarily, in order to acquire in broader context macroeconomic stability 
through important financial sector recovery equates to a major objective and set the tone 
of the neo-liberal approach in Pakistan185. Restructuring process in Pakistan initiated in late 
1980s became foundation to convert majorly state owned banks into private ownership and 
strengthen the structure of banking sector. Introduction of market based financial 
environment began to phase in Pakistan by introduction of private investment in the 
banking sector (UL Haque 1997)186. The reform procedure of Pakistan urged restructuring 
of major banks, continued strengthening of the banking system of Pakistan through 
encouraged mergers and acquisitions, introduction and reinforcement of an improved 
                                                 
184 See Appendix 8 
185 Hassan, R., & Shahzad, M.M. (2011) “A macroeconometric framework for monetary policy evaluation: 
A case study of Pakistan” Economic Modelling. 28(1-2). 118-137; Khan, M. (2008). Main features of the 
interest-free banking movement in Pakistan (1980-2006). Managerial Finance, 34(9), 660-674 
186 See Ul Haque 1997 for complete financial drawing of Banking and Non banking institutions in Pakistan 
including Commercial banks; development financial institutions (DFIs); Non-bank financial intermediaries 
(NBFIs), Debt, Equity, Foreign Exchange and Informal financial markets.  
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regulatory regime, and enhanced transparency, corporate governance and credit friendly 
environment. The extent of success remains the key question see McCartney (2015)187. 
Financial market deregulation and liberalization has transformed the banking systems of a 
large number of countries over the last couple of decades, and especially in some 
developing countries. Late 1980s amongst the neo-liberal storms across the globe, Pakistan 
joined IMF and embarked upon structural adjustment program in order to iron out 
macroeconomic imbalances through adopting neo-liberal approaches including cut in 
public expenditure and subsidies, tax increases and encouraging imports. Prior to joining 
the IMF, fiscal position of Pakistan witnessed decline and constituted 8.5% of the GDP 
due to subsidies and tax rebates. In addition government of Pakistan monitored and 
restructured the tax brackets and abolished tax exemptions and brought fiscal budget deficit 
down to 4.6% of GDP in a decade188. The banking sector of Pakistan too, witnessed 
government substantially de-regulated the allocation of credit, interest rate, liberalized 
entry into the sector, privatized major state-owned banks, introduced modern prudential 
regulation and supervision (Khan and Aftab 1994; Khan 1995; Ul Haque 1997; Rizvi 2001 
and Parera et al. 2010). Pakistani authorities in addition, pursued to liberalize exchange 
controls, permitting the opening of foreign currency deposits by both residents and non-
residents (Hardy and Patti 2003; Burki and Niazi 2006; and Qayyum and Ahmed 2007). 
Despite political fragility in Pakistan balances in these accounts grew rapidly, especially in 
the foreign banks showing signs of improvement (Masood et al. 2008). From the end of 
1997, banks were required to maintain an 8% minimum risk-weighted capital ratio, and 
loan classification and provisioning requirements were tightened (Burki and Niazi 2003; 
and Patti and Hardy 2005).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
187 McCartney, M. (2015). The Missing Economic Magic: The Failure of Trade Liberalization and Exchange 
Rate Devaluation in Pakistan, 1980-2012. The Lahore Journal of Economics, 20, 59. 
188 See Anwar, T. (1996). Structural Adjustment and Poverty: The Case of Pakistan. Pakistan Development 
Review, 35(4 Part II), 911-926. 
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4.1.1. Review of Pakistani Banking Sector Performance: 
The commercial banking sector in Pakistan189 progressed significantly over the neo-liberal 
period and with time sufficiently up to the mark in terms of technology, skills and financial 
resources in a bid to act in an efficient role in financial intermediation (Khan 2006; Masood 
and Bruno 2008; and Ahmad et al. 2010). Financial assets grew at a staggering 70 percent 
for the period from 2000 to 2005, recorded at Pak Rupees (Rs) 5.1 trillion and contributed 
to 80 percent of GDP. The growth of banking sector was speedier in comparison with non-
bank sectors and accounted for 71 percent of the financial industry assets (Khan 2006; 
Ansari 2007). Banks assertively increased their lending exposures with a jump in their 
gross advance percent from Rs 1.63 trillion in year 2004 to Rs 2.05 trillion during year 
2005 (SBP 2006a). In addition, consumer financing in the overall credit portfolio stood at 
Rs. 213.8 billion for year 2005, a rise of 75% from Rs 122.4 billion for year 2004. Total 
deposits of all commercial banks stood at financial soundness of the system. As a result of 
increased Net Domestic Assets (NDA) of the banking system M2 in Pakistan estimated at 
Rs. 3.41 trillion in June 30, 2006 as compare to Rs. 2.96 trillion in June 30, 2005, a 
significant 14.54 percent rise, hinting at improved liquidity available with the banks (Khan 
2006). In addition, Net Foreign Assets (NFA) on the sized private banks grew their 
operations robustly due to expansion in geographical borders and improved service quality. 
In year 2005 the banking sector employed 85,469 people (81,759 in 2004) and operated a 
network of 6,858 branches as opposed to 6,584 in 2004 (SBP 2006a). Banking sector profit 
(after tax) amounted at Rs. 63.3 billion in 2005, a significant improvement over Rs. 34.7 
billion in 2004, generating increased return on assets to 1.9 percent, good enough by any 
international standard. Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) improved to 11.3 percent in 2005 
from 10.5 percent in 2004 showing strengthening of the system (Khan 2006). Non-
performing loans dropped significantly, reducing NPLs to loans and, net NPLs to net loans 
ratios to 8 percent and 2.1 percent respectively (Khan 2006; SBP 2006a; Masood et al 
2010). Furthermore, encouraging results recorded in terms of foreign inflows, 
advancement in IT infrastructure, increased ATM transactions and on-line banking. Banks 
focus increased in particular, SMEs and consumer financing in order to improve margins. 
                                                 
189 See Appendix 8 
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Nevertheless, despite improvement in the risk management system in the banking sectors, 
such growth curve exposed banks to higher risk level and need for effective and stringent 
regulatory environment was felt in order to efficiently tame the risk taking appetite of the 
banks in Pakistan. State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) demonstrated its commitment and capacity 
with regards to ensuring consolidation and introduction of effective risk management 
policies (Khan 2006). The risk management system within Pakistani banks improved 
significantly, with introduction of greater disclosure requirements and strengthened 
corporate governance structure in order to promote transparency. In addition, in order to 
acquire enhanced transparency in reporting and streamline the classification and 
provisioning of NPLs the Prudential Regulations underwent significant amendments (Khan 
2006, Ul-Haque 2009, Masood 2010).  
 
4.1.2 Impact of Global Financial Crisis on Pakistani Banking System 
 
Commercial Banks of Pakistan operate in conditions similar to comparing emerging and 
developing countries, for instance political and economic instability resulting in unstable 
domestic macroeconomic policies, weak exchange rate regime, and domestic financial 
structure flaws due to insufficient bank supervision and regulation (Eichengreen and Rose 
1998). Furthermore, presence of information asymmetries makes it even more challenging 
for the commercial banks of Pakistan to perform systemically important banking duties, in 
particular liquidity transformation. Limitations faced by commercial banks in liquidity 
transformation190 could contribute significantly towards initiating banking crisis. Foreign 
direct investment through a foreign bank to domestic bank remains an important factor in 
facilitating liquidity transformation and expediting cross border financial transactions. 
Pakistan, likewise emerging and developing economies benefited with capital inflow prior 
to the global financial crisis of 2007, an era of heightened integration of cross border 
markets with accelerated cross border lending (Figure 4).  
 
                                                 
190 For instance global financial crisis saw loans default causing banks a liquidity crunch where banks found 
challenging to raise funds and eventually seek bail out. 
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Figure 4: Foreign direct investment 
  
 
Empirical literature suggests that important economic indicators, for instance Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), Real growth rate of GDP in commodity producing sector of 
Pakistan, Foreign Exchange Reserves and Per Capita income remain key determinants of 
FDI inflows in Pakistan (Awan et al 2011). Furthermore, empirical literature also suggest 
that in Pakistan increase in foreign direct investment would increase real exports in long 
run (Yousaf et al 2008). Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Pakistan rose at a tremendous 
pace in the years preceding global financial crisis of 2007-8 reaching a $4 billion mark 
(Figure 4). In year 2007 foreign direct investment in Pakistan accounted for a 70% of the 
total foreign investment in Pakistan. In Pakistan Foreign Direct Investment rose for a 
number of reasons, for example availability of low cost labour, with population in excess 
of 150 million boasting a large Consumer goods market, and growing middle class with 
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improved purchasing power. Foreign direct investment figure in Pakistan fell sharply191 
due to the global financial crisis. Global financial crisis sparked loss of confidence in 
financial assets and solvency status of the foreign banks. This further caused international 
as well as domestic commercial banks to restrict lending due to their reliance on external 
capital flows192. Nevertheless, despite the dip in foreign direct investment since 2007 
commercial banks of Pakistan proved robust due financial reforms193 pre crisis had boosted 
financial soundness in commercial banks of Pakistan with less reliance on external funding 
and negligible lending exposure to crisis originating countries. This response is similar to 
the financial sectors of a number of emerging and developing countries undergoing similar 
reform regimes194. In Pakistan therefore, due to ongoing efforts towards improved 
regulations, careful liberalization of banking system to restrict trading book practices and 
securitization exposure, commercial banks remained less exposed to global financialization 
and managed to grow their asset portfolio through the reign of the global financial crisis of 
2007-8 (Nazir et al 2012).  
 
4.2 Banking Regulations in Pakistan 
4.2.1 State Bank of Pakistan (SBP): The Principal Regulator 
The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) continues full command of the Pakistani financial system 
in order to achieve the neo-liberal policy objective of price stability through financial 
durability. The State Bank of Pakistan in addition to its role as the central banker of 
Pakistan takes on the challenging responsibility of the banking sector regulatory authority. 
More importantly the State Bank of Pakistan assigned itself the reforms of the banking 
sector of Pakistan as its prime task in line with the governments prevailing financial 
                                                 
191 See Milesi-Ferretti, G. M., & Tille, C. (2011). The great retrenchment: international capital flows during 
the global financial crisis. Economic Policy, 26(66), 289-346. 
192 See Frank, N., & Hesse, H. (2009). Financial spillovers to emerging markets during the global financial 
crisis (No. 9-104). International Monetary Fund. 
193 Financial reforms regime in Pakistan included. 
194 See Cetorelli, N., & Goldberg, L. S. (2011). Global banks and international shock transmission: Evidence 
from the crisis. IMF Economic Review, 59(1), 41-76                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
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stability assessment regimes. Monetary Policy and Research (MPR), Banking Policy and 
Regulations (BPR), and Banking Supervision (BS) are the dominant functional groups set 
up under the State Bank of Pakistan taking on the challenge of financial stability through 
the current financial stability program. MPR group operates on macroeconomic level in 
order to acquire price consistency. In order to achieve this objective, MPR group assists 
the monetary policy making through conducting in depth surveillance of the monetary 
policy and exchange rate policy management and practices of the entire financial system. 
BPR group reviews the legal and regulatory framework and develops policies in response 
to important recent developments in a bid to ensure banking system stability whereas, BS 
group supervises and regulates the risk exposures on individual banks basis (SBP 2010a).       
 
4.2.2 Importance of Regulation in Pakistan 
The need for aligning banking supervision with those of developed economies regulatory 
authorities around the developing World critically begun to re-evaluate their existing 
financial stability practices and the role of regulatory authorities in achieving that. The 
State Bank of Pakistan strongly advocated international initiatives underway in Macro 
Prudential Framework, Capital adequacy framework, review of provisioning requirements, 
strengthening of risk management systems and models, refinement of stress testing 
techniques (to capture the systemic risk) and, improved disclosure requirements. Pakistan 
duly complies with the ‘Core Principles of Effective Banking Supervision’ and initiatives 
are already underway for addressing any shortfalls in the compliance (BIS 2010). The State 
Bank of Pakistan yet again, in a bid to keep its legal and regulatory framework at par with 
international best practices in response to the recent global financial developments, 
proposed a number of measures to ensure stability in the banking system (Khan and Saqib 
2008; BCBS 2010b; Bake et al. 2010; and SBP 2010b). Once extremely risky nature of 
banking is revealed, a cautious approach must be adopted to regulate and monitor financial 
practices. Higher capital requirements should be in place firmly in order to promote prudent 
and solvent financial institutions, and also to check abnormal growth curves of the small 
financial institutions. The State Bank of Pakistan supports the policy of well capitalized 
banking institutions and the minimum Paid up Capital (free of losses) requirements for 
banks (revised in April 2009) which for locally incorporated banks was set at Rs 6 billion 
by December 31, 2009, required to raise to Rs 10 billion by December 31, 2013. In 
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addition, Banks and Development Financial Institutions (DFIs) were required to operate 
on average Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) of at least 10 percent through out. The State 
Bank of Pakistan remained firm and consistent with regards to CAR policies and therefore 
despite slowdown in economic growth, the solvency ratio of entire banking industry 
remained at a comfortable 14 percent in year 2009 (SBP 2010a).  
 
The financial liberalization program initialized in early 1990s, resulted in increased activity 
of mergers and acquisitions in the financial market (since 2000, more than 40 transactions 
of mergers and acquisitions were recorded) and witnessed improvement and presence of a 
number of banks and their controlling groups in previously restricted areas of leasing, 
insurance, asset management, brokerage and other non-banking financial practices (Malik 
and Humayoun 2010; Ahmad et al. 2009; Akmal and Saleem 2008; Ansari 2007; and Burki 
and Niazi 2006). Encouragement of such practices allowed groups controlling banks access 
to stakes in non-financial/real sector of economy as well as improvised universal banking 
thanks to in particular, leasing and investment banking activities. Such growth of varied 
range of business practices and generation of complex ownership structures added to the 
supervisory burden i.e. increased possibilities of systematic risk. 
 
In addition, The State Bank of Pakistan plays a leading role in the government of Pakistan’s 
relentless pursuit of institutional competitiveness and operational efficiency; 
diversification from the ownership portal, diminish government participation in business 
activities, easing burden on budgetary resources, improving their revenues and making the 
most of the sale proceeds for reduction in national debt and poverty mitigation (SBP 2011). 
The government of Pakistan in 2009 released rejuvenated privatization incentives. 
Ongoing privatization process of House Building Finance Corporation Limited (HBFCL) 
and SME Bank was expected to be completed by 2008. However due to global financial 
crises it was recognized that SME Bank needed restructuring in order to complete its 
privatization. The State Bank of Pakistan in consultation with Ministry of Finance 
initialized restructuring of HBFCL and the SME Bank. On the other hand the government 
of Pakistan cleared its intentions to maintain First Woman Bank Limited (FWBL) as a 
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public entity and buying back the shares of FWBL through the State Bank of Pakistan from 
the private investors195.  
 
Realizing these upcoming challenges in wake of recent corporate developments, the State 
Bank initiated a project for the consolidated supervision of banks196. The State Bank of 
Pakistan proposals released during 2007-08 attracted exhaustive discussions amid different 
market participants including bank, Ministry of Finance (MOF) and Securities & Exchange 
Commission of Pakistan (SECP) and consultants from key regulatory bodies of a number 
of other countries (SBP 2011). Extensive deliberations continue and necessary adjustment 
in order to finalize the consolidated supervision of banks and financial institutions in 
Pakistan are being carried out. The State Bank of Pakistan has also signed Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU) with SECP for sharing of information and regulatory expertise. 
In order to efficiently conduct consolidated supervision of banks, a dedicated joint task 
force has been established jointly under The State Bank of Pakistan and SECP that 
regularly monitors and manages the risks posed by continued complex developments in the 
corporate structures of the banks in Pakistan.  
 
The State Bank of Pakistan started conducting sensitivity based stress testing using 
individual bank’s portfolio since year 2004 and in year 2005 it was made mandatory for all 
banks to conduct sensitivity based stress testing of its financials197. In addition, the State 
Bank of Pakistan introduced Macro-stress testing of Credit risk to assess the resilience of 
the banking system towards credit shocks since June 2008. The macro-stress testing models 
developed and applied to forecast default rates ahead, in particular to capture the business 
cycle fluctuations (SBP 2010a, SBP 2011). 
                                                 
195 The recent mergers and acquisition activities under the supervision of the State Bank of Pakistan include: 
Telenor Pakistan acquiring majority shareholding of Tameer Microfinance Bank Limited; KASB Capital 
Limited and Network Leasing Corporation Limited were merged into KASB Bank Limited; Arif Habib Bank 
Limited and Atlas Bank Limited subject to the condition: the two banks shall be merged into one banking 
company; the acquisition of RBS Pakistan by Faysal bank Limited; and proposed merger of Albaraka Islamic 
Bank (Pakistan operation) and Emirates Global Islamic Bank Limited are under consideration. 
 
196 Core Principles of Effective Banking Supervision (Principle No. 24 – Consolidated Supervision) 
197
 See BSD Circular No. 7 of 2005 available at www.sbp.org.pk 
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The State Bank of Pakistan took bold steps in order to encourage a robust risk management 
framework in the banking sector by introducing deposit protection scheme, Internal 
Controls over Financial Reporting (ICFR) and reinforcing of the loan classifications 
provisioning requirements. Financial liberalization program induced complex ownership 
structures within the banking structure of Pakistan resulting i.e. nearly 80 percent of the 
banking system’s assets now belong to private sector institutions. Moreover, complex 
ownership structures in practice reduced the effect the available protection to depositors 
under the Bank Nationalization Act, 1974. To correct that, the State Bank of Pakistan 
initiated formal explicit deposit protection scheme in 2008 in consultation with prime 
stakeholder and awaits Ministry of Finance formal approval. The proposals should in 
principle, protect a broad range of eligible depositors. This is because the participating 
banks aim to contribute in regular installments towards the fund, reducing any bailout 
reliance on taxpayers in case of bank failure.  
 
In order to cope efficiently with the threats posed by continually changing risk 
environment, the State Bank of Pakistan issued directive to the banks to prepare and submit 
quarterly, half yearly and annual financial statements in line with revised International 
Accounting Standards (IAS-1) with effect from mid2010. Moreover, to enforce the control 
program with regards to financial reporting, banks were required to submit a 
comprehensive progress report on ICFR for the third quarter in 2010 identifying status of 
compliance. Any shortfalls needed to be addressed with remedial policies and deadlines. 
In order to address the deterioration of credit as a response to the recent credit crises, State 
Bank of Pakistan further strengthened the loan classification and provisioning requirements 
by rationalizing the provisioning requirements by making the ‘Forced Sale Value’ (FSV) 
of collateral buffers available to the banks.  
 
The State Bank of Pakistan plays an extremely crucial part in countering money laundering, 
and financing of terrorism. In Pakistan Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Act was only 
approved by parliament in 2010 and acquired law status. The Asia Pacific Group on Money 
Laundering (APGML) conducted evaluation of Pakistan to assess the efficiency of legal 
and regulatory framework in countering money laundering and terrorist financing in the 
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country. The State Bank of Pakistan in line with APG’s recommendations instructed banks 
to not only provide records to law enforcement agencies but obtain more authentic CNIC 
(Computerized National Identity Card) from account holders. The State Bank of Pakistan 
also took initiative in installation and development of monitoring software as well as met 
staff training requirements.  
 
The Prudential Regulations on Corporate Governance are brought in line with international 
principles and best practices i.e. implementation of the ‘Fit and Proper Test’ (FPT) 
requirements. Pakistani banks are required to seek prior authorization from the State Bank 
of Pakistan (under the FPT Criteria) for appointment of key executives for their overseas 
operations. The due diligence procedure for directors, sponsors, and chief executives of the 
Pakistani Banks has been further refined with flexibility regarding payment of 
remuneration to their non-executive directors for attending important meetings to enable 
utilizing  highly skilled professionals in order to gain best strategic input.  
 
The State Bank of Pakistan198 has developed a comprehensive branch licensing policy 
(BLP) to enhance the outreach of banking facilities. Under the BLP banks can 
independently make their branch location decisions within broad parameters. The very 
justification of BLP is to spread branches in rural/underdeveloped areas by making it 
mandatory for all conventional and Islamic banks to open at least 20 percent of their 
planned branches in such areas. The total number of conventional bank branches increased 
from 8729 to 8999 showing a growth of 3.10 percent during the period of 2009-10. In the 
same period total number of Islamic bank branches increased from 528 to 667 showing a 
growth of 26.33 percent. The total number of microfinance bank branches increased from 
268 to 287 showing a growth of 7.09 percent. In addition, the State Bank of Pakistan 
actively promoted branchless banking (BB) to fundamentally reduce the cost of delivery 
of services and increase convenience for customers and expand coverage to new, 
historically underserved regions of the country. Branchless Banking Regulations were 
                                                 
198 State Bank of Pakistan Act, 1956, and the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, provide legal frame work 
for licensing of banks and their branches whereas licenses for Microfinance banks and their branches are 
issued under the Microfinance Institutions Ordinance, 2001 
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issued by the State Bank of Pakistan in 2008, to use technology productively to assist a 
range of market participants including commercial banks, microfinance banks, Islamic 
banks, and mobile phone operators199. 
 
The State Bank of Pakistan continued to enhance its supervisory practices and in order to 
save time and effort the State Bank of Pakistan required submission of ‘Quarterly Data File 
Structure’ (DFS) for Micro Finance Banks (MFBs) in both hard and electronic copies of 
Quarterly Report of Condition under Reporting Chart of Accounts (RCOA) from Sep-09. 
To improvise timely propagation of data to all market participants, State Bank of Pakistan 
reduced the deadline period for submission of quarterly DFS under RCOA with effect from 
December 31, 2009200.  
 
The State Bank of Pakistan conducted detailed analysis of the existing off-site rating 
system of the Microfinance banks (MFBs) in Pakistan (i.e. United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP), Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), Consultative Group to 
Assist the Poor (CGAP), and Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX)), effectively 
upgraded analytical tools through incorporating assessment mechanisms fundamentally 
based on system generated data, new ratios with realistic benchmarks and peer analysis. 
The revised Off-Site Rating Framework suggested uniform and multidimensional data 
presentation, availability of CAMELS (C: Capital Adequacy; A: Asset Quality; M: 
Management; E: Earnings; L: Liquidity and S: sensitivity to market risk) ratings for all 
quarters and improved sharing of data with other stakeholders. 
                                                 
199 SBP allowed Tameer Microfinance Bank ‘Easy Paisa’ and United Bank’s ‘OMN-I’ whereas First 
Microfinance Bank’s model has been conjoined with Pakistan Post. Dubai Islamic Bank has also been 
allowed to start branchless banking at convenient public locations. In addition, innovation and use of alternate 
delivery channels allowed MCB Bank, KASB Bank, and Habib Bank to offer Mobile Phone Banking to their 
existing account holders 
200 All financial institutions are now required to upload their quarterly data through Data Acquisition 
Gateway (DAG) Portal within 18 working days from the end of each calendar quarter instead of 30 days.  
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The State Bank of Pakistan in a serious bid to protect interests of stakeholders in line with 
international best practices set up Banking Inspection (on-site) Department (BID). BID 
(on-site) update inspecting guidelines and carry out on-site visits of the financial 
institutions to assess functionality of their Information Systems (IS), Foreign Exchange 
regime and CAMELS framework. In addition BID (on-site), investigate and resolve 
requested issues and complaints received from important market practitioners. 
 
Despite embarking upon a mass consumer awareness program, growing consumer and 
SME lending have highlighted financial disputes between the banks and borrowers. The 
need for a transparent complaint and dispute resolution mechanism to enhance public 
confidence in banking system was instantly urged. The State Bank of Pakistan set up a 
dedicated Consumer Protection Department (CPD) to address any such grievances against 
banks. For example year 2009-10 witnessed more than 5,000 complaints received with 
regards to ATM/Debit/ Credit Cards, mortgage, Automobile/Personal loan, Customer 
services and other fraud (See Table 14). 
 
Table 14. Regulatory compliance in commercial banks of Pakistan: Complaints 
handling 
Table 3.3: Complaint Handling in numbers 
    
Category Name Complaints 
ATM/debit cards 77 
Auto finance 87 
Credit Card irregularities 291 
Delay in remittances/ collections/clearing 72 
Frauds & forgeries 161 
Mortgage finance 5 
Loans/advance 530 
Misbehaviour/misconduct 247 
Operation of PLS/ deposit account 288 
Pension problems 67 
Personal loan 23 
Service charges 81 
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Staff matters 148 
Miscellaneous 3063 
Total 5140 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan (www.sbp.org.pk) 
 
 
 
4.2.3 Challenges faced by Pakistani Banking Sector 
Despite, above discussed far reaching policy refurbishments and stringent regulation of the 
operations of the banking system, Pakistani banking sector still encounters a number of 
key challenges i.e. much higher administrative costs in comparison with productivity, 
political interference and diminishing state owned banks to promote healthy competition 
(UL Haque 1997; Masood and Bruno 2008; Masood et al. 2008; and Parera et al 2010). In 
addition, a significant number of banks are realistically undercapitalized facing serious 
hurdles in complying with the State Bank of Pakistan requirement of raising capital to Rs 
10 billion. SME’s, agriculture, housing and other important sectors are faced with issues 
e.g. lack of credit availability (Khan 2006). The retail banking model encouraged by the 
State Bank of Pakistan in line with international standards requires significant branch 
networking, not the case in Pakistan. In addition, low credit penetration ratios, insufficient 
liquidity and limited human resources are serious challenges faced by Pakistani banking 
sector. Although banking sector in Pakistan enjoyed continued growth in profitability in 
the recent years due to growth in advances, increasing net interest income and reduced tax 
rates, still banks face challenges to customize their operations to remain competitive. 
Performance of individual banks remains highly depending on its assets portfolio, 
geographical coverage, financial position and credit worthiness of bank guarantors, skills 
of human resources and information technology infrastructures. In fact, expanding business 
activities of the private banks, introduction of foreign global financial institutions, 
revamped regulations (i.e. Basel II implementation), principle upgrade requirement in IT 
and development of new products set a significant impact on banks resources. In such 
environment, large resourceful privatized entities (e.g. HBL, UBL etc) induce fierce 
competition in Pakistan, although medium size banks have held their ground well, smaller 
banks seem to fall prey to acquisition activity (Khan 2006). Nevertheless, in wake of recent 
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phase of financial structure reformation, vibrant competition in Pakistani banking sector is 
striving towards improved service quality and product innovation (Ahmad et al 2010). 
 
4.2.4 Conclusion 
In broader context post 1990s indicators of financial system reflected improvements in 
profits, banks capital base and nonperforming loan performance (Khan 2006; Khan and 
Saqib 2008; and Ahmad et al. 2010). Nevertheless, in presence of inherent weaknesses201 
in Pakistani Banking System faced enhanced threats of liquidity crises in response to 
economic shocks (Griffith-Jones et al 2002; Weder and Wedow 2002; CGFS 2004; and 
Khawaja and Mian 2008; Abbas and Malik 2010).  In addition to the global financial 
distress, Pakistan faced disastrous flood that adversely impacted the performance 
indicators causing nonperforming loans (NPLs) of the banking system to grow in shadow 
of decreasing asset base for third quarter in year 2010202. ‘Strategic Plan 2005-2010’ rolled 
out by the State Bank of Pakistan promised a number of measures and developments (SBP 
2010a). In order to stay par with the situation of the economic distress, transparency and 
disclosure requirements were subject to be brought in line with strict international 
standards.  
 
The State Bank of Pakistan conducted stress testing203 with various scenarios considered, 
and reported on capabilities of the banking system to absorb losses resulting from economic 
disturbance. In addition, all banks were required to raise their minimum capital to Rs 6 
billion by 2009, and be subject to variable Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) based on the 
ratings assigned by the Institutional Risk Assessment framework (IRAF) to each bank 
depending upon its financial condition. On the basis of foregoing and keeping in view the 
global response towards Basel II, State Bank of Pakistan had decided to adopt Basel II in 
                                                 
201 See Ul Haque (1997) for detailed discussion of the limitations of the Pakistani Banking infrastructure; 
Khan, M. (2008). Main features of the interest-free banking movement in Pakistan (1980-2006). Managerial 
Finance, 34(9), 660-674 
202 See State Bank of Pakistan Quarterly Review of the Banking System September 2010 (SBP 2010b) for 
detailed performance overview following floods in Pakistan. 
203 See Appendix 8 
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Pakistan and intended to complete transition by January 2008. The State Bank of Pakistan 
efficiently proposed changes applicable to the current regime of minimum capital 
requirement i.e. to include capital charge for market risk that comprised interest rate, 
equities investment position and foreign exchange risks. Under the State Bank of Pakistan 
proposals the market risk capital requirement needed to be calculated in addition (SBP 
2010a). 
 
In 1991, the State Bank of Pakistan had set up Credit Investigation Bureau (CIB) to gather, 
organize and disseminate critical information with regards to credibility of borrowers to 
help financial institutions with lending decisions and reduction of the occurrence of default. 
During 2003, in a bid to further enhance sophistication in credit risk management systems 
in financial sector State Bank of Pakistan uploaded CIB services online namely ‘e-CIB’. 
The membership on e-CIB increased to 101 member financial institutions with over 5 
million borrowers record on its data bases. All financial institutions in Pakistan are required 
to update their borrowers’ (Rs 0.5 Million or above) data by submitting information to CIB 
monthly. The e-CIB, now evolved into hi tech entity employing state-of-the-art technology, 
facilitated over 1.4 million enquiries during year 2009-2010 alone. Access to e-CIB data 
bases fundamentally aimed to improve accuracy in risk prediction and fraud prevention 
amongst the member banks. In order to improve access to the credit profile of those 
customers, Credit Information Bureau (CIB) witnessed structural upgrades. In addition, the 
minimum limit of Rs. 0.5 million for data reporting was abolished to facilitate accurate 
capture of the risks associated with the consumer and SMEs sectors with recent default 
history (SBP 2010a). 
  
The State Bank published detailed risk management guidelines for identifying, measuring, 
monitoring and managing credit, market, liquidity, country and operational risks. The State 
Bank of Pakistan, recognizing the absolute importance of a properly designed and 
implemented internal control system for an adequate risk management framework, 
published clear principles on internal controls and guidance for implementation and 
monitoring. In addition the responsibilities of Board of Directors for ensuring efficient 
internal control system were also disclosed in clarity. Submission of half-yearly progress 
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reports regarding the status of compliance with the guidelines for the banks was also made 
mandatory (SBP 2010a). 
 
4.3 Islamic Banking in Pakistan 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Last few decades witnessed continued growth in Islamic Banking practices across the globe 
and importance of Islamic banking attracted significant debate in comparison with 
conventional (Sarkar 1999; Iqbal 2001; Baqar 2005; Siddiqui 2008; and Ahmad et al. 
2010). Nevertheless, conventional international players moved in to seize the opportunity 
to serve large Muslim market. Islamic banks strictly follow ‘riba free (interest free) 
banking’ under the ‘Shariah’204, instead contracts developed under Islamic Banking are 
equity based (Siddiqui 2008). Widely known savings and investment products offered by 
Islamic Banks are Murabaha (Sales that already incorporate markup), Bay “bi thaman ajil” 
(Agreements for credit sales), Musharaka (Joint ventures), Modaraba (Profit and loss 
sharing investments on behalf of customers), Salam (Agreement for the sale to be 
completed in future), Ijara (Leasing agreements) and Qard-e-Hasna (interest free loan 
facilitation)205. Like traditional banks Islamic banks face risk. However, in case of Islamic 
banks with their Profit and Loss Sharing (PLS) mode of financing, already existing 
prudential regulations (based on CAMELS) to monitor risk exposure of the financial sector 
as a whole may require essential amendments. In addition, PLS based lending activity by 
Islamic institutions attracts higher capital adequacy ratio and larger liquidity ratio from the 
regulatory authorities i.e. Basel II has set higher minimum capital requirements for Islamic 
banks (Siddiqui 2008). This has essentially urged regulatory authorities with conventional 
as well as Islamic banks in their jurisdiction to set varied capital adequacy requirements 
for Islamic institutions in order to effectively manage risk of the banking sector as a whole. 
In addition, due to ‘no interest law’, Islamic banks fail to take interest benefit for their 
quota of reserves with central bank and lose out on the central bank’s facilitation as the 
                                                 
204 Shariah is based upon Quran, the Hadith and the Sunnah see Sarkar (1999) 
205 See Sarkar (2000); and Siddiqui (2008) for full definition of all Islamic Contracts  
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lender of last resort because central bank pays and charges interest for holding reserves and 
providing liquidity for commercial banks. In order to deal with such issues, the central 
bank needs to set up an Islamic bank deposit service and develop loan instruments on basis 
of profit and loss sharing in order to facilitate (e.g. provide liquidity at a crucial instance) 
the Islamic institutions in its jurisdiction (Siddiqui 2008).    
 
4.3.2 Evolution of Islamic banking in Pakistan206 
In Pakistan, Islamic banking finds its roots in 1977, launch of banking restructure ordered 
by the president of Pakistan. The Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) appointed experts to 
convert the banking structure of Pakistan from interest based traditional banking to interest 
free Islamic banking model, and 1979 non-bank financial institutions of Pakistan for 
instance National Investment Trust (NIT), and National House Building Finance 
Corporation (NHFC) started offering interest free products. The State Bank of Pakistan 
(SBP) and Pakistan Banking Council (PBC) pursued the task of converting the prevailing 
traditional interest based banking system of Pakistan into Islamic way of interest free 
banking since 1980. By mid1980s banks offering PLS207 saw their deposits grow in PLS 
accounts and PLS deposits funded 3.1 percent of the total investment portfolios. 
Nonetheless, mid1980s also witnessed, the State Bank of Pakistan allow banks to invest 
PLS funds in interest-based banking products and that seriously hampered the process of 
Islamization of banking sector of Pakistan. A number of contributing factors caused the 
initiative of converting banking in Pakistan completely towards Islamic banking halted208. 
Nevertheless, it did provide Islamic Banks with opportunity to offering interest free 
products and services in Pakistan along with the traditional interest based banking. Thus, 
in Pakistan there is a dual banking system in place and both interest based and interest free 
banking products are on offer. The Islamic banking in this dual banking environment in 
                                                 
206 Khan, M., & Bhatti, M. I. (2008). Islamic banking and finance: On its way to globalization. Managerial 
Finance, 34(10), 708-725 
207 PLS means interest free and stands for ‘profit and loss sharing’ basis bank account as per Islamic Banking 
principles. 
208 See Ahmad, A., Malik, M. I., Humayoun, A. A. (2010) “Banking developments in Pakistan: A journey 
from conventional to Islamic banking” European Journal of Social Sciences. 17(1). 12-17 
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Pakistan grew at a consistent pace over the last couple of decades (Ahmad et al 2010). The 
total assets of Islamic Banking increased at 31.1 percent since June 2009, with deposits 
grew at staggering 38.5 percent for the same period. In addition, the financing and 
investment portfolios saw a 21.5 percent rise to Rs 235.5 billion. As shown in Table 15, 
continuous increase in size accompanied with the continued high levels of growth rates 
since 2004, clearly justify the increasing acceptability and popularity of Islamic banking in 
Pakistan. Due to equity based nature of the Islamic products, disclosure quality of the 
investment books is excellent, however lack of asymmetric information induce increased 
default probabilities in particular, countries like Pakistan. Pakistan significantly suffers 
documentation challenges for instance only a handful of people registered and pay tax out 
of population of over 180 Million.  Nevertheless, although Islamic banking in Pakistan 
continues to witness growth still far off to become real threat to the throne of traditional 
banks (Siddiqui 2008; Shahid et al 2010; and Ahmad et al 2010). 
 
Table 15. Trends in Islamic Banking in Pakistan 
Table 3.1: Trends in Islamic Banking in Pakistan 
(billion rupees, growth in percent) 
  Deposit Financing & invest 
Total 
assets 
Jun-04 13.2 13.1 18.8 
Jun-05 37.8 37.2 54.0 
Growth 188.0 184.0 187.0 
Jun-06 59.7 57.9 87.6 
Growth 58.0 56.0 62.0 
Jun-07 107.4 89.2 157.9 
Growth 80.0 54.0 80.0 
Jun-08 163.1 163.4 229.6 
Growth 52.0 83.0 45.0 
Jun-09 238.2 193.8 313.0 
Growth 46.0 18.6 36.3 
Jun-10 329.8 235.5 411.1 
Growth 38.5 21.5 31.3 
       
Source: State Bank of Pakistan (www.sbp.org.pk) 
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The share of Islamic Banking in banking industry of Pakistan also rose to more than 6 
percent with deposits reaching as much as 6.4 percent of the total banking system. The 
Islamic banking institutions (IBIs) count in Pakistan stands at 19. Six are classed ‘full-
fledged’ Islamic banks whereas thirteen conventional banks have Islamic banking 
branches. The branch network reached 667 branches. The growth in branches was shared 
evenly by the ‘full-fledged’ Islamic banks and conventional banks having Islamic banking 
branches (see Table 16). The growth momentum despite slowdown in overall economic 
activity during the last couple of years remains in line with forecasts of the Strategic Plan 
for Islamic Banking Industry in Pakistan (Ahmad et al 2010). Witnessing growing number 
of conventional banks setting up Islamic banking branches, State Bank of Pakistan decided 
to release detailed proposal in order to facilitate conventional banks in conversion of their 
existing conventional branches into Islamic banking branches. 
 
Table 16. Islamic Banking branches in Pakistan 
 
Table 3.2: Islamic Banking Players 
in number 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2016* 
Islamic banks (operating) 1 1 2 4 6 6 6 6 
a) Branches of Islamic banks 8 10 32 48 122 223 389 1171 
conventional banks operating Islamic 
banking branches 0 5 9 11 13 12 12 17 
b) Total standalone Islamic banking 
branches of conventional banks 0 10 30 39 61 103 139 821 
Total Islamic banking branches(a+b) 8 20 62 87 183 326 528 1992 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan 
(www.sbp.org.pk) 
*As of 30 June, 2016         
 
4.3.3 Regulation of Islamic Banking in Pakistan 
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Realizing the growth potential and regulatory challenges posed by Islamic banking, State 
Bank of Pakistan initiated a number of proposals in order to further promote Islamic 
banking in Pakistan including adoption of Shariah Standard as a priority. Harmonization 
of Shariah in Islamic Banking Institutions (IBIs) of Pakistan is foundation objective of the 
Islamic Banking Department of the State Bank of Pakistan. ‘Essentials of Islamic modes 
of financing’ and related Model agreements were issued by State Bank of Pakistan in 2005 
as minimum requirements for Shariah compliance. These general guidelines were later on 
made compulsory in 2008. In addition, Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic 
Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) Shariah standards may be used as guidelines only by 
consultations with their Shariah Advisers. AAOIFI standards are under review for adoption 
in Pakistan and are being gradually incorporated amid consultations between IBI’s in 
Pakistan, Shariah Advisor Forum (SAF), different divisions of State Bank of Pakistan and 
State Bank of Pakistan Shariah Division. Discussions have also been aimed at the next 
phase of Islamic banking in Pakistan introducing Shariah Standards on Sharika 
(Musharaka) and Modern Companies, Investment Sukuk, Guarantees, Conversion of a 
Conventional Bank to an Islamic Bank, Salam and Parallel Salam, Istisna’a and Parallel 
Istisna’a (SBP 2010a).  
 
Internationally State Bank of Pakistan is effectively coordinating with Islamic Financial 
Services Board (IFSB hereafter) on various supervisory and regulatory aspects in a bid to 
create a better enabling supervisory and regulatory environment for Islamic finance to 
progress. State Bank of Pakistan effectively joined hands with IFSB to conduct a Study on 
Displaced Commercial Risk and facilitated a survey on Islamic capital markets. In addition, 
State Bank of Pakistan constructively working towards development of Guidance Notes 
for Stress testing of Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs) and liquidity risk management. 
The Guidance Notes in principle aimed at refining the regulatory and risk management 
framework for IFIs, making the Islamic financial system more sound and stable. In addition 
to IFSB, The State Bank of Pakistan reserves a seat on the International Islamic Financial 
Markets (IIFM) Board and actively participates in its strategic decision making209. 
                                                 
209 IIFM is a Bahrain based institution focusing on development of liquidity management solutions and 
standardization of documents for hedging transactions. 
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4.4 Basel II implementation in Pakistan 
4.4.1 Introduction 
As discussed earlier, mounting complexity of operations and product innovations left 
financial institutions vulnerable to a varied list of risks i.e. credit, interest rate, liquidity, 
foreign exchange, strategic, compliance, reputational, country and operational risk. The 
need to tame complexity of risk management has turned ever more urgent following recent 
global financial turmoil. The past couple of decades witnessed financial institutions, 
dominated mainly by the large banking organizations invested significantly in 
strengthening their key internal infrastructures in order to capture risks. In contrast bank 
supervision and regulations continued tirelessly in devising more responsive and 
sophisticated solutions towards risk management. Basel II with the three pillars approach 
effectively converted the conventional regulatory framework into an extremely 
sophisticated regulatory and supervisory mechanism through continued industry 
consultations.  
4.4.2 Roadmap of Basel II Implementation in Pakistan 
In Pakistan, Basel II transition started in June 2006 (SBP 2005). State Bank of Pakistan 
developed the ‘roadmap of Basel II implementation’ for the transition. Following the 
international implementation pattern in Pakistan, initially the standardized approach to 
credit risk and operational risk will be implemented and then proceed to the compliance 
with the internal ratings based (IRB) approach subject to due diligence of the banks with 
international presence. The State Bank of Pakistan set up the ‘The BASEL-II Unit’ in the 
department in 2007 to oversee the implementation of capital accord initiated in 2006 
(Appendix 7). In addition, the Basel II Unit assisted financial institutions prepare for on-
site inspections; released guidelines for capital charge on credit risk under standardized 
approach, market risk charge and other recent advancements in Basel II framework; and 
conducted skills training (SBP 2006a).  
4.4.3 Basel II: Implementation in Pakistan 
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In January 2008 standardized approaches under Basel II capital regulations was made 
mandatory for Pakistani banks, following a parallel run of 18 months back in June 2006 
(SBP 2006b). Implementation of advanced approaches under Basel II remains 
discretionary and implementing institutions are required to submit their updated action 
plans to State Bank of Pakistan. In addition, guidelines on Internal Capital Adequacy 
Assessment Process (ICAAP) were made available in August 2008. Based on scale and 
complexity of their operations, banks were left with the option to adopt best suited capital 
adequacy assessment framework. Nevertheless, regardless of the capital adequacy regime 
adopted, financial institutions in Pakistan have been instructed by the State Bank of 
Pakistan to introduce Internal Credit Risk Rating Systems and submit the ratings of all 
corporate borrowers to the State Bank of Pakistan’s e-CIB portal. In addition, scoring of 
all consumer loans has been made obligatory for all financial institutions since June 2010 
and the scores must be submitted to e-CIB. Bank of International Settlements (BIS) issued 
minimum global standards for improving the resilience of the banking sector to be 
implemented by 2012 in response to recent financial turmoil (BCBS 2010b). The Basel III 
reforms are expected to be implemented in a phased manner and the full Basel III reforms will be 
fully implemented by January 2019 (see Table 17).  
 
Table 17. Phase-In Arrangement Projections: Capital Ratios 
Phase-In Arrangement Projections 
  2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Minimum common equity 
capital ratio 3.5% 4.0% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 
Capital conservation buffer       0.6% 1.3% 1.9% 2.5% 
Minimum common equity 
plus capital  3.5% 4.0% 4.5% 5.1% 5.8% 6.4% 7.0% 
  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Minimum Tier 1 capital 4.5% 5.5% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 
Minimum Total capital 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 
Minimum total capital plus 
conservation 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.6% 9.3% 9.9% 10.5% 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan (www.sbp.org.pk) 
 
 154 
 
4.4.4 Basel II transition: Limitations in Pakistan   
The evidence across the globe suggests that successful implementation of the basic 
standardized approach under Basel II demands accurate, timely available and reliable data. 
Despite rigorous improvements, Pakistan still hosts an inadequate data management 
infrastructure for the purpose. In addition, current practice of international financial 
accounting standards and reporting system lacks the standards expected for standardized 
approach under Basel II. More importantly, reliability in business continuity planning and 
sophistication of the IT resources of complete banking architecture of Pakistan need to 
significantly improve on current status in order to justify and take advantage of Basel II 
implementation. Not to forget, the installation of modern risk assessment mechanism, staff 
training and revamped IT infrastructures under Basel II requires banks to incur huge costs. 
Meeting such phenomenal costs is obvious hurdle for the less resourceful banks in Pakistan 
(Hoggarth et al. 2002; HSBC 2003; and Garcia 2004). Another challenge is that Pakistan, 
amid other developing countries utilizes services of separate regulatory authorities for 
separate market participants i.e. only banks are required to comply with Basel II and other 
financial services provider remain free from such obligations. Such situations create 
incentives for regulatory arbitrage. In Pakistan therefore, it is critical that SECP and the 
State Bank of Pakistan coordinate significantly with regards to formulation and compliance 
of regulatory policies.  In addition, risk assessment practices of banks are seriously affected 
by imperfect market advancements and challenges posed by them, so is the case in 
Pakistan. The risk of price manipulation by key market participants can destroy the true 
value estimation of the securities portfolio and in addition to banking sector portraying a 
responsible character in this regard, Pakistani regulators need to embed skills to read 
marker fluctuations and still are long way away to develop sound policies to encourage 
market discipline (Akhtar 2006). Pakistani regulations require increased monitoring for 
market risks. In addition to market risk, Basel II is significantly accompanied with its much 
debated inherent capabilities of exacerbating procyclicality. Pakistani regulatory 
authorities despite publishing tons of regulatory guidelines somehow missed out on clear 
understanding of its discretionary powers to address Procyclicality under Basel II and there 
seems a lack of coordination between the State Bank of Pakistan and SECP (Akhtar 2006). 
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Increased capital requirements in developing countries contained serious concerns for the 
developed economies due to their status of capital flows to the developed countries 
(Griffith-Jones et al. 2002; CGFS 2004; Classens et al. 2008). Studies show that there will 
be a significant drop in capital flows to developed countries due to higher risks portfolios 
and inadequate rating and risk management systems (Majnoni et al. 2004; Majnoni and 
Powel 2005). This problem is amplified for Pakistan in particular. Banks in Pakistan in a 
bid to grow pursue to extend business coverage to the varied unexplored small businesses 
and relatively deprived segments of the society. Therefore, banks in Pakistan upon 
including such risks in their portfolio will face serious restrictions of increased capital 
under the Basel II capital accord due to inadequate credit scoring mechanisms for small 
business and vulnerable segments of population, further increasing the risks of decreased 
foreign capital flows (Akhtar 2006). Nevertheless, the State Bank of Pakistan encourages 
banks in Pakistan to facilitate small businesses through better and transparent credit 
appraisal mechanisms rather than increasing capital. Such encouragements of flow of credit 
towards underserved particles of the economy induced fears of deviation from fundamental 
implementation of Basel II in Pakistan. The State Bank of Pakistan faces a daunting task 
to develop realistically adoptable solution that not only encourages credit availability to 
SMEs but also prevents any potential deviation from Basel II. The issue concerning cross-
border flows further indicates to the limitations in information-sharing across sectors and 
across borders. The State Bank of Pakistan seeks to ensure accurate information disclosure 
in accordance with the rules defined under Basel II (pillar III) in order to maintain 
confidence level in international market.  
 
4.5 Conclusion  
Banks in Pakistan are pursuing important advancements towards the implementation 
roadmap of Basle II. Nevertheless, the quality and level of such advancements vary i.e. 
comparatively large and resourceful banks in Pakistan with foreign presence and consistent 
growth patterns are progressing soundly. On the contrary, smaller banks clearly lack 
capacity and seek support (Akhtar 2006). Banks in Pakistan in order to introduce more 
competition in the credit rating business are required to make persistent and focused 
capacity building measures i.e. initiate fundamental improvements in the auditing field; 
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acquire properly skilled teams; develop internal risk models and advance risk management 
systems; and enhanced coordination between the financial industry and all regulatory 
authorities.  
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Part 2: Methodology, Empirical Findings and Discussion  
Chapter 5: Research Methodology 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The chapter contains comprehensive discussion towards arriving at the methodology 
including the research design, the methods of data collection; the identification of the 
population, sample size, sampling procedures, methods of data analysis, and the research 
instrument.  
The research design in short, followed a conclusive viewpoint and provided structured 
foundation in order to examine specified hypothesis, requiring defined, formal and 
structured information with a significant sample size to be representative (Saunders et al. 
1997). Qualitative data collection was carefully executed through administration of 
structured questionnaire to key staff of the credit risk management departments of all 
sampled commercial banks in Pakistan. In addition, study deployed panel data approach to 
analyze relationship between bank specific variables including size of bank (LGTA), return 
on assets (ROA) and return on Equity (ROE), Non-performing loans (NPL), Capital 
Adequacy Ratio (CAR); Credit Risk, Market Risk and Operational Risk exposures of the 
sampled commercial banks for the period from 2007 to 2014. Growth rates of the country’s 
GDP and Industrial Production (IIP) were included in the panel data set to establish the 
procyclical relationship. 
 
5.2 Research Methods 
 
5.2.1 Data collection approaches 
5.2.1.1 Primary Data 
The data instigated for the sole purpose of addressing the research problem fundamentally 
constitutes the primary data. Therefore, primary data consequently tailored to match the 
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identified requirements of the study carries immense importance. Regardless of 
exploratory or conclusive research designs, the study identified various approaches 
available to be adopted in collecting primary data. Panel Approach, Observation Approach, 
Documentary Approach, Interviewing, and Questionnaire based approaches were 
considered by the research. In discussing ‘Panel approach’, that is a group of people 
engaged in a focussed but free flowing debate on a specified topic, fundamentally 
contributes to bridge social and cultural gap between researchers and participants. Panel 
approach requires the discussion amongst the participants to be initiated and supervised by 
a trained mediator in an informal environment that does not follow a structure. Before 
conducting discussion, size of group, grouping of participants, time allowed for discussion 
and topic for discussion should be set. In addition, best practices suggest that advance 
planning should involve due consideration to developing protocols in the beginning for 
justified use of information (Malhotra and Birks 2007). The study acknowledged the 
limitations of the panel approach in a restricted time frame bound project and therefore not 
adopted. Swiftly moving on to, ‘Observation approach’, on the other hand can be identified 
as an indirect approach and the purpose of the project is normally kept out of sight of the 
participants to obtain as natural observations as possible. A research diary may be kept in 
an exploratory research process as opposed to an observation schedule in the conclusive 
research due to the fact that the scale of honesty or the pre-coding protocols used may 
require to be considered in full detail. The study takes an implicit nature and ignores 
observation approach for transparency. ‘Documentary approach’ for both exploratory and 
conclusive research designs, advocates statistical testing of the research question and 
applies open or a pre-coded form according to the research design210. The undertaken study 
remains conclusive and therefore pre-coded approach was adopted. Advancing on to 
‘Interview approach’ in an exploratory design are uncomplicated, open and unstructured 
in a bid to encourage an informal debate in a scenario where respondent is allowed a free 
hand to glide the direction of the interview. Interviewer assumes role of a spectator. In 
contrast, pre-coded interviews form a conclusive research design where the script questions 
are controlled by the interviewer. The purpose of the study is normally disclosed and direct 
approach adopted for primary data collection. The study although followed a conclusive 
                                                 
210 Silverman (2016) 
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design, did not adopt interview approach. Questionnaire approach was considered most 
appropriate where questionnaire may be defined as a structured set of questions for 
gathering information from the participants. The study employs the structured 
questionnaire for primary data collection. The questionnaire was designed to be simple 
with clear instructions and the objective of the study was disclosed.  
 
5.2.1.2 Secondary Data 
Secondary data constitutes vital parts of successful research if not the whole project and 
may be acquired much quicker than primary data. Secondary data may have been created 
for reasons other than the main research problem however it still caters for range of uses 
starting from justification of key variables to be measured, formulating appropriate 
research design; developing sampling plan and hypothesis testing through to validating the 
research findings. The study utilises multiple sources to acquire secondary data to compare 
standard statistical procedures. Special attention observed by the study towards 
maintaining the accuracy of the secondary data in line with research objective. The study 
attempts to analyse data that is most recent, appropriate and best fit in context of the study. 
This is because acknowledging the fact that where various studies serve several crucial and 
interesting objectives the secondary data may still hint a time gap between collection and 
publication. The study ensures that credible data sources selected acknowledging the 
importance of dependability as well as provides justification of selected key variables and 
their relationship. 
5.2.2 Research Design  
The study acknowledges the significance of both exploratory as well as conclusive research 
designs. An exploratory research fundamentally adopts unstructured methods help 
establish the obvious link between the various variables in the study. Exploratory research 
is conducted in order to develop an understanding of a fact, where the subject matter cannot 
be fully justified quantitatively or the process of measurement may result in an unjustified 
association amongst a particular set of virtues in consideration. In contrast, conclusive 
research actively advocates structured methods to test specific hypothesis and examine the 
relationships amongst identified variables. Furthermore, conclusive research applies 
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structured approach to extract information that is clearly defined prior to commencing the 
research, and where the representative sample size may be large and justified to facilitate 
quantitative data analysis. 
5.2.2.1 Conclusive Design 
The study aims to offer all research participants the opportunity to critically review 
information contained in this study of risk management of banks in Pakistan, therefore 
research design is considered essential map for conducting successful research. The study 
attempts to accomplish clear objectives to meet research question and maintain a clear 
course throughout the whole of study towards serving the research objective. The study 
attempts justifying and acquiring appropriate data, identifying reliable data collection 
sources and the testing of the hypothesis by developing effective research design (Malhotra 
and Birks 2007; and Saunders et al: 1997). Following, conclusive research design the study 
aims to adopt a dual methodology. Both secondary and primary data would revolve around 
risk management in banking and continued developments in Basel Capital Accords to 
establish procyclicality of banks capital adequacy. Secondary data sources include 
academic journals, working papers, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Pakistan Bureau 
of Statistics (PBS) reports, State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) reports, Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS) publications, Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (BCBS) working 
papers and Annual reports of Commercial Banks of Pakistan. The study also develops 
qualitative/quantitative data analysis making use of coding process, graphical presentations 
and cross tabulation as appropriate. Primary data would be collected through structured 
questionnaires. The study discusses qualitative/quantitative sampling process and 
identifies sample data of senior risk management officials of commercial banks in Pakistan 
 
5.2.3 Research Instrument  
5.2.3.1 Structured Questionnaire 
In literature there is strong mention of the operational complexity of numerical models 
advised to be used for measuring risk under Basel capital accord (Danielson et al 2001; 
Jarrow 2007; Kupiec 2007; and Das 2007). This reinforces the fact that the effectiveness 
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of Basel Capital Accord not only depends upon the accuracy of the numerical models 
developed by the banks but also there exists an issue of how the model itself is applied by 
the bank operatives who in actual are responsible for Basel Capital Accord compliant day 
to day risk management. Hence, it is considered necessary to learn how risk managers 
applied risk management under Basel II and their grasp of its correlated topics (Wahlstrom 
2009). Furthermore, there is strong argument that selected skilled workers are perceived to 
be extremely informative. As above, the study prominently considered various approaches 
available to be adopted in collecting primary data as discussed earlier e.g. Panel Approach, 
Observation Approach, Documentary Approach, Interviewing, and Questionnaire based 
approaches.  
Structured questionnaire applying Rensis Likert211 ranking scales would be deployed by 
the study as main instrument for acquiring primary data and facilitating hypothesis testing. 
Rensis Likert ranking scales would be employed acknowledging the fact that all questions 
revolve around the same topic area and response alternatives purposefully integrated to 
draw out desired information, evade any loss of validity and diminish the impact of any 
excessive practice of ‘neutral’ answer. In addition, to extract as honest information as 
possible the questionnaire will be executed with extreme caution and respondents would 
be assured of the confidentiality. Furthermore, pilot questionnaire conducted in advance 
provided with useful feedback with regards to the conciseness of the questions and to assess 
potential restrictions that may be imposed on respondents by their organizations with 
regards to filling in the questionnaire.  
Structured questionnaire, in addition is preferred due to the fact that the study aims to analyse data 
on a comparatively large scale, not only that questionnaire based methodology is relatively simple 
to administer i.e. coding, analysis, interpretation and the general processing of data. Deploying 
structured questionnaires would allow the researcher to conduct the research proceedings with 
precision and control. Data obtained using structured questionnaires would be potentially consistent 
with risk of variability limited to the response alternatives provided. Therefore questionnaire based 
methodology is expected to facilitate primary data to be narrated in a meaningful and 
understandable milieu (Saunders et al. 1997; and Malhotra and McCourt 2001). In banking, the 
views of the key risk managers of the sampled institutions have effectively been obtained through 
                                                 
211Likert, R. (1932). A technique for the measurement of attitudes. Archives of psychology.  
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structured questionnaires in order to analyse political risk and determinants of non-performing 
loans (Masood and Sergi 2008; Wahlstrom 2009; Masood and Stewart 2009). The questionnaire 
contained two sections where section 1 is demographical profiling and the section 2 evaluate Basel 
II implementation, Active Risk Management (ARM) under Basel Capital Accord and the impact 
of procyclicality on the capital requirements of the sampled Commercial Banks. The respondents, 
senior level risk managers, are responsible for supervising, the implementation; and day to day 
running of the business in accordance with Basel Capital Adequacy framework. This would enable 
the researcher to extract reality rich information from risk managers who are actually responsible 
for complying with Basel Capital Accord in Pakistani Banks based on their decision making 
process and weighing key factors see Saunders and Allen (2002).  In addition to descriptive 
statistical analysis, appropriate hypothesis testing would be applied to analyse collected primary 
data, where chi-squared test considered most appropriate and has been applied frequently see -
Masood and Sergi (2008). However, Mann-Whitney test, medians, K-S test and K-W test can also 
be reported (Malhotra and Birks 2007, Masood and Sergi 2008).  The study would aim to 
accomplish approximately over hundred (100) observations where population sample size of banks 
remains twenty five (25). 
 
5.2.4 Research Population 
5.2.4.1 Commercial Banks of Pakistan 
Considering the importance of the research topic following a conclusive design and 
resources in question including time, budget and so forth, it made sense to deploy sampling 
as conducting the research, the entire census may not be realistic. In order to exterminate 
sampling error, the target population of the study remained professionals with expertise 
and decision making authorities in risk management of commercial banks in Pakistan. A 
relatively large sample was considered due to research topic being vital and relevant to the 
most recent global financial crises. The study acknowledges the complex relationship 
between different categories i.e. the risks calculated under Pillar 1 of the Basel Capital 
Accord, determination of Capital Adequacy ratios and Procyclicality; and recognise the 
significance of cross tabulation. After collecting and compiling, the data is summarized in 
order to facilitate observer to construct a clear purpose of database of the study. The typical 
values in the data and its variations follow e.g. the population, sampling procedures and 
data presentation (Fisher 2007). 
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5.2.5 Sampling Protocol  
Population defined as the entire set of elements considered for the purpose of investigating 
the research problem containing common parameters. In order to acquire information about 
the characteristics of the population, either a census or a sample may be considered. Census 
may be defined as entire collected population and the sample constitutes a subgroup of 
population (Malhotra and Birks 2007). Risk personnel in Commercial Banks of Pakistan 
constitute a fairly large population size however, with small variance in the characteristics 
predicted. The study adopted sampling in order to limit cost of non-sampling errors (Verma 
and Le1996). 
In discussing the sampling approaches Bayesian Approach remained prominent that 
elements added to sample and data drawn followed by calculating sample statistic 
sequentially. Other approaches include sampling with or without replacement elements. 
Nevertheless, the sampling process in research inevitably carries immense importance 
(Rossi et al 2013). The sampling process must intensely identify the target population 
precisely to avoid any vague results. Target population normally includes all elements that 
potentially hold information required to contribute towards conclusion of the research, 
however it may also include elements not fit for the objective. It was assured that 
respondents have been assessed in context of the research requirement to qualify for the 
target population and kept sampling error to minimum. Sample size may be influenced by 
similar studies undertaken however, in deciding sample size precision of the information, 
number of variable and nature of research can play a dictating role. Smaller sample size 
may deem sufficient for an exploratory research than that of a conclusive. The sample size 
must unquestionably be able to cater appropriately chosen data analysis technique. The 
study believed in employing fairly large sample to enable information rich data analysis 
considering completion rate of responses and resources available in conducting the survey. 
The respondents were filtered through the criteria based on their skill level within the 
research topic based on their responsibilities within the sampling frame. The filtering 
process confirmed validity of the sample as well as elements not found in the sampling 
frame were discarded. 
Sampling remains serious business for the research and therefore close attention to 
sampling techniques observed. Furthermore, sampling techniques are either probability or 
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non-probability. In a bid to employ best suitable options the study attempted a detailed 
overview of both. Stratified and Simple Random sampling techniques highlighted in 
Probability sampling. All population elements (without omitting any) transported into 
respective sub-population termed as ‘strata’ (Kjell 2000). For the collection of primary as 
well as secondary data the study partially adopted this technique in separating commercial 
banks from specialised and justified all 36 commercial banks as main population out of 
which sample of 25 banks chosen based on required information availability and data 
symmetry (Appendix 8). The criteria of Simple Random sampling that each element in 
population possess equal opportunity to qualify as a sample has been criticised to boost 
large samples with lower precision rate and higher standard errors (Verma and Le 1996). 
Cluster and Systematic sampling considered similar to simple random sampling also 
considered by study but not used. This is because ‘Cluster sampling’ remains complex and 
multistage procedure where target population divided into cluster and sample selected 
randomly. Systematic sampling may be easier that starts with choosing sample, rest 
samples choice follows an evenly sequential pattern within the sampling frame. In selection 
of non-probability sampling techniques, where expert judgement is favoured over random 
selection’ objective estimate of accuracy of the sample remains questionable. The study 
nevertheless, reviewed Quota, Judgement, Convenience and Snowball sampling to adopt 
most suited. Convenience sampling is done when selecting most convenient or accessible 
respondents from entire sampling unit and therefore struggles to justify representation 
(Silverman 2016). The study did not adopt Convenience sampling at any stage however, 
judgement sampling was considered when sampling personnel from the banks in 
combination of other sampling techniques used by the study. Judgement techniques 
justified practicality in line with objective of the study where elements believed to be in 
possession of specific skill to qualify as representation. Quota sampling also ignored by 
the study, implied developing quotas of population by constructing list of decided control 
characteristics in the target population and then selections made that fit the quota criteria 
based on judgement. Lowest sampling error is facilitated by Snowball sampling (Atkinson 
and Flint 2001). The research employed snowball sampling using the data from State Bank 
of Pakistan and Commercial banks of Pakistan for primary data collection. Snowballing 
started with initial group of respondents confirmed randomly comprising of respondents in 
possession of certain expertise. In the study this was simply achieved by targeting heads of 
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risk management divisions of the sampled commercial banks as well as personnel heading 
regional credit teams reporting to risk management divisions. The group then started the 
process rolling by identifying potential respondents within their organisation belonging to 
the target population occupying same expertise and so on. The structured questionnaires 
were then administered with expectations of a good response rate facilitating a valid 
representation of the target group. In determining sample size, the study adequately allotted 
large sample size as predetermined. Confidence interval approach to sample size 
determination was also considered to construct logical guess of an interval inside which a 
fixed proportion of the sample mean would appear.  
For secondary data analysis the study initially considered whole of the commercial banking 
sector of Pakistan as research population. At this stage sample comprised of all 36 
commercial banks in Pakistan (Appendix 8). After careful research on the availability of 
key variables and units of measurement in the annual reports the sample was reduced to 25 
commercial banks for the period between 2007 and 2014 to achieve complete consistency 
in data. The main collection of secondary data conducted from published annual reports of 
the sampled banks. The sample of 25 commercial banks accounted for more than 92% of 
the banking assets in Pakistan and includes the ‘big five’ and therefore considered adequate 
for primary data collection the study also212.  
5.3 Data Analysis Approaches  
In effectively negotiating with both primary and secondary data, significant handling of 
qualitative as well as quantitative data is the key. This demanded crucial focus observed in 
employing appropriate strategy in line with research sense. Efforts were made in order to 
enable research gradually develop analysis through different phases of the project life. 
Quantitative data already deals in figures and hence the study considered various 
quantitative data analysis methods in detail. The study likewise seriously acknowledges 
the importance of mastering various methods of adjusting qualitative for quantitative data 
analysis. The study carefully considered important procedures for statistically fine tuning 
qualitative into quantitative data including weighting, use of variable re-specification and 
                                                 
212Quarterly performance review of the banking system October to December 2014, available at sbp.org.pk 
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scale transformation (Silverman 2016). Weighting was ruled out because participants were 
already selected due to their knowledge and skill in the field of the study. Weighting is 
usually applied by giving weight to the sample that possesses specific characteristics 
making it more representative of the target population. The study also classed out the need 
for variable re-specification or use of dummy variables due to the structured questionnaire 
that sets out clear variables towards the objectives of the study. The study rules out scale 
transformation as the scales employed by the study did not result lower and upper scale. 
Scale transformation or ‘Standardization’ may be applied in cases where participants’ 
response carries conflict, i.e. use of either upper end or lower end rating scales. 
 
5.3.1 Qualitative Data Analysis 
Data preparation logically considered to begin as soon as first completed questionnaire 
received, that implied all received filled questionnaires inspected for completeness, 
legibility, errors or missing information (Malhotra and Birks 2007). Little or no variance 
in responses or pattern of responses itself may indicate misinterpretation on the respondents 
part. The plan was put in place as follows if the questionnaires are returned with missing 
information then attempts may be made to resend the questionnaire for response. If 
resending questionnaire back is deemed impractical missing values will be allocated. 
However, missing responses would be discarded where key variable values left blank 
(Malhotra and Birks 2007). Missing responses pose serious problem for the research if 
exceed 10 percent of the returned questionnaire. Casewise and Pairwise approaches may 
be at hand to tackle the issue however not with consequences and major of what remains 
sacrificing data. Further treatment of missing responses involves substituting by mean 
response to the variable or by jotting a suitable response derived from the pattern of other 
responses by the same respondent. To exterminate any claims of bias, the later may be done 
so by statistically identifying the relationship with other variable based on the data 
collected (Malhotra and Birks 2007)  
Structured questionnaire employed by the study were coded and calibrated to pool 
comparable concepts collated from respondents taking part in the study. Coding, 
appropriate organization and inputting of the data on computer would facilitate the study 
to utilise participant views effectively into interpretations and draw conclusion. Achieved 
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contribution would be corroborated with comparable work in fields of risk management in 
banking and Basel capital regulations. 
 
5.3.1.1 Hypothesis testing  
The study acknowledges the fact that in tests of associations or differences regardless of 
primary or secondary data, null hypothesis (Ho) is rejected and alternate hypothesis (Ha) is 
accepted. Alternate hypothesis is simply opposite of the null.  Null hypothesis may prove 
one or two-tailed. The study aims to carefully apply correct sequence i.e. assign appropriate 
statistical technique to test the null hypothesis, choose the level of significance, calculate 
the test static, determine the critical value and compare the critical values to arrive at the 
decision. The study remains aware of the risk to encounter ‘Type I error’ when the sample 
results may lead to rejection of the null hypothesis falsely. ‘Type II error’ on the other hand 
is when results wrongly lead to acceptance of null hypothesis. ‘Type I and Type II’ were 
taken into account to identify the sample size and data collection. T-test and z-scores 
computed to determine the probability based on levels of significance.  
 
Null Hypothesis 
Ho: Capital requirements of Commercial Banks in Pakistan reflect banking risks  
Ho: Capital requirements of Commercial Banks in Pakistan reflect economic activity 
 
Alternate Hypothesis 
Ha: Capital requirements of Commercial Banks in Pakistan do not reflect banking risks  
Ha: Capital requirements of Commercial Banks in Pakistan do not reflect economic activity 
 
The hypothesis proposed to be tested based on using chi squared test as a test statistic at a 
confidence level of 95%. The chi-squared test is considered appropriate allowing for just 
over hundred observations where the population sample size of banks remains twenty-five 
(25). Questionnaire designed to extract information regarding the relationship of risk 
variables under Basel Capital Accord; bank capital adequacy ratios; bank profitability and 
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loan performance; and Procyclicality for which a statistical significance of association of 
cross tabulation may be evident. 
 
 
5.3.2 Quantitative Data Analysis 
The statistical analysis techniques may start by simply determining measures of central 
tendency and measures of dispersion. Where basic measures have been widely employed 
by the studies for quantitative data analysis, the study takes much in depth look into varied 
statistical techniques and involved steps. Statistical techniques primarily deal in data 
measured on either an interval or nominal scale identified as metric or non-metric data 
respectively. Univariate techniques cater for analysing variances of single. Multivariate 
techniques focus on relationships when two or more variables analysed simultaneously. 
Samples are treated as independent when drawn randomly from diverse population. The 
data analysis technique applied usually guide how data may be collected as well as the 
number of samples. Literature carefully scrutinised for varied statistical testing i.e. use of 
z-test and t-test to investigate difference in mean sources when dealing with metric data 
where two or more independent samples involved (Malhotra and Birks 2007). Literature 
also witnesses ANOVA or ‘F-statistics’ applied in abundance, in contrast t-test used in 
testing two means whereas F-test in testing several (Fisher 2007). Frequency distribution, 
Medians, Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S tests), Mann-Whitney, Chi-squared test and Kruskal-
Wallis one way analysis of variance (K-W ANOVA) appear significant in dealing with 
non-metric data (Malhotra and Birks 2007). Cross-tabulation, analysis of variance and 
covariance, multiple regression, two group discriminant analysis or conjoint analysis may 
be applied when there is only one dependent variable involved. When dealing with two or 
more dependent variables, multivariate analysis (MVA) and multiple discriminant analysis 
(MDA) may be considered appropriate. In situations where variables may not be classified 
as dependent or independent, factor, cluster and multidimensional scaling considered 
appropriate to test the interdependence (Silverman 2016).  
Correlation, generally used to justify association between two or more variables, calculated 
from standardised measures of covariance. Correlation generates self-explanatory 
outcomes i.e. positive, negative or neutral correlation. Correlation may also vary according 
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to the strength of the relationship. Correlation coefficient (r or R) denotes the strength of 
the relationship and lies between -1 and +1. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) and covariance 
(ANCOVA) usually applied to investigate mean values of the dependent variables. 
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests the means of two or more populations where 
dependent metric variable and independent non-metric variables involved. ANOVA may 
be one-way or n-way depending upon involvement of a single factor or combination of two 
or more factors respectively. ANCOVA looks at combination of metric and non-metric 
variables. Regression analysis also deals in more than one independent variable. In general 
independent variables are interval scaled. Here categorical variables may be dealt with 
introducing dummy variables. The study is aware of the importance of ANCOVA to host 
both its metric and non-metric variables. Study further acknowledges importance of 
comparing proportions and the role played by Chi-squared test in analysing existing 
relationships and proportions of the variables. To confirm the nature of relationship among 
the variables and that collected data are close to the generally expected value, Chi-squared 
test adopts construction of contingency tables to determine the difference between expected 
and observed frequencies divided by expected frequencies. Cross-tabulations travel hand 
in hand with questionnaire based methodologies. Both the chi-squared test and cross-
tabulation techniques were made available to the study. Not to forget, study seriously 
acknowledged Regression as a powerful methodology for examining associated 
relationship between varied dependent and independent variables (Malhotra and Birks 
2007). In research regression: a mathematical equation of relationship of variables may be 
applied either to determine strength of the relationship or predict values of the dependent 
variables or both. Number of observations may be noted including error term normally 
distributed and that means of all normal distributions of Y, given X are on straight line with 
slop b. Further assumptions are the mean of error term is zero and the variances of error 
terms are uncorrelated. Regression takes either bivariate or multivariate form. Bivariate 
regression involves two variables and this is not mere correlation, here determined 
mathematical relationship must verify one dependent and other predictor variable. The 
study already established to investigate multiple variables verified as one dependent and 
more than one independent variable therefore adopt multiple-regression to determine R2. 
R2 is square of multiple-correlation coefficient and determines the strength of association 
between dependent and independent variables. The usual regression journey involves: 
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construct a scatter diagram, determine general model to be tested, estimate parameters and 
standardised regression coefficient; and test for significance of association. In addition, 
checks may be made to determine the strength and significance of the relationship amongst 
variables and prediction accuracy. Residuals examined and model validated. Stepwise 
regression may be applied to deal with large sample size in terms of predictor variables. 
This is achieved by including only those predictor variables that justify the most variation 
in the dependent variable. The procedure also involves adding and removing predictor 
variables from the regression equation. In doing so, presence of correlation between 
variable may restrict important variable to be included or less important variables to be 
deleted. Stepwise regression however, does not aid in determining larger R2. Regression 
may be complicated with the presence of Multicollinearity due to which Partial regression 
coefficient may not be estimated precisely resulting in high standard error reading. 
Multicollinearity is present when two or more predictor variables are highly correlated. 
Dampening multicollinearity would involve varying complexity by using one of the 
variables in presence of highly correlated variables, Ridge regression and latent root 
regression may also be considered (Moulton 1987, Deaton 1995, Wooldridge 2010). 
 
5.3.2.1 Econometric Model 
Extensive review of existing literature resulted in a number of successful studies emerged 
using econometric methodologies in fields of risk management in banking and assumed 
procyclicality of banks minimum capital requirements. Here time series, cross section and 
panel data models analyzed critically for the purpose of understanding patterns and 
forecasting. Time series data characteristics are bred in data from varied disciplines and 
sub disciplines of medical studies, engineering, sociology, meteorology, economics the list 
can go on. Time series defined as set of readings at specified or unspecified time intervals, 
in fields of Economics enjoy a long tradition of limelight amongst professional and 
academics alike. Examples range from analysis of statistics on production, exchange rates, 
interest rates, growth rates of various economic variables and so forth. Time series serves 
varied objectives starting from simply identification of patterns to forecasting and post 
economic event critique. Hypothesis revolve around the theory of cause-effect relationship 
between dependent and independent variable stated in terms of prediction. Time series 
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limitations primary attribute to the fact that observation may incur loss of mutual 
independence due to a single event causing a change in all later data points. In addition 
presence of autocorrelation makes it challenging to interpret true trends or underlying 
mechanisms. Cross section data, defined as varied units selected from population at one 
point in time caries more of descriptive status while providing interest based outcome from 
a random sample of whole population in a snapshot. Changing time frame may vary the 
outcome tremendously making it difficult to justify causal relationship (Wooldridge 2010).  
Panel Data offers greater identification and measurement of effects because of its inherent 
analysis ability of variables across entities and over time. Panel data methodology best 
serves as balanced however it deals with missing information far more effectively than 
mere time series or cross sectional methodologies (Hsiao 2007). Panel data are suggested 
to be heterogeneous and allow that crucial control for individual heterogeneity, not inherent 
in time series or cross section data designs. In contrast where multicollinearity remains 
strongest contender in afflicting time series and cross section studies with biased results is 
dealt with, to some degree integrally within panel datasets (Moulton 1987; Batlagi and 
Levin 1992). Other advantages of panel data over time series or cross section include 
superior study of adjustment dynamics (Deaton 1995); enabling to construct complicated 
behavioral modelling i.e. fewer restrictions applied in panel on distributed lags than time 
series (Koop and Steel 2001; Hsiao 2007); and reduced biased resulting from including 
similar variables in comparison with time series dataset (Klevmarken 1989). The study 
proposes to test the following equation. 
 
CARit = βo + β1CRRit + β2MRRit + β3ORRit + β4ROAit + β5ROEit + β6NPLRit + β7LGTAit + 
β8GDPGRt + β9IIPGRt + uit  
 
βo is constant and  β(1,2,3 …) represent coefficients of predictor variables and uit is error term.  
CARit represent Capital Adequacy Ratio of bank i in year t; CRRit represent Credit risk 
weighted assets to total assets of bank i in year t; MRRit represent Market risk weighted 
assets to total assets of bank i in year t; ORRit represent Operational risk weighted assets 
to total assets of bank i in year t; ROAit represent Return of Assets of bank i in year t; ROEit 
represent Return on Equity of bank i in year t; NPLRit represent Ratio of non-performing 
loan to total loans of bank i in year t; LGTAit represent Natural logarithm of total assets of 
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bank i in year t; GDPGRt represent GDP growth rates in year t; and IIPGRt represent 
Industrial production index of Pakistan growth rates in year t. 
 
5.3.3 Limitations of the data 
Data for the study was collected in Panel data set to utilize properties of both time as well 
as cross section dimensions of the data and thus the study deploys Panel Data estimation 
to the final sample. The sample captured annual data for an eight year period starting from 
2007 to 2014 across 25 commercial banks in Pakistan out of total 36 banks with the 
exception of Kasb bank for 2014 only. Kasb bank suffered losses and failed to maintain 
targeted capital adequacy ratios through the period in question. Due to the concurrent losses 
Kasb bank failed to continue its operations and was taken over by Bank Islami in May 2015 
resulted in no data available for Kasb bank for 2014 only. However, unbalanced panel data 
character remain similar to balanced panel and is consistent (Baltagi and Levin 1992; Hsiao 
2007; Wooldridge 2010). The time period chosen simply because to facilitate data 
symmetry i.e. not enough information disclosure present on risk weighted assets and CAR 
before 2007 in Pakistan213. Basel Capital Regulations methodology applied across the 
board in Pakistan as standard since 2007. All commercial banks in Pakistan followed the 
standardized approach under Basel guideline set by the central bank State Bank of Pakistan. 
5.4 Data Presentation 
Quantitative data analysis forms crucial portion of the study in addition to qualitative data 
that too converted into pseudo quantitative data through codes before analysis. The study 
considered set of 25 commercial banks of Pakistan. The balance sheets of the banks in 
Pakistan are simpler than sophisticated international banks, containing less complex 
products and transactions. Data collected included Credit risk, Market risk, Operational 
risk charges, Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR), Total Assets (LGTA), Non-performing loan 
(NPL) ratio, Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA). In addition, GDP and 
Industrial Production Index of Pakistan (IIP) growth rates over a period of 8 years also 
                                                 
213 Monthly or quarterly data not available for our key variables, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics release annual 
GDP growth rates of Pakistan only. 
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collected to establish the procyclicality of the banking system. It would be interesting to 
present the extent to which regulators influenced the capital adequacy of individual 
institutions according to susceptibility to the economic events. The study would attempt to 
gauge the relationship between all collected economic and bank specific performance and 
risk variables. The study will discuss stylized facts to endeavour that collated data on 
capital adequacy ratios, risk charges, bank performance variables including Size and Non-
performing loans’ behaviour, as well as growth rates of the GDP and Industrial production 
of Pakistan make research sense. Data where deemed appropriate will be tabulated and 
presented in appropriate graphs (Tables, Line graphs, histograms and bar or pie charts). 
The study acknowledges the fact that the style of presentation plays significant role in 
extracting the meaning out of data (Few 2005).  
5.4.1 Software for Data Analysis 
In number of software packages at hand, Microsoft Excel may be suitable for very basic, 
simple and descriptive statistical data analysis. Where the complexity level is higher, 
advanced software packages may be used including Minitab, Statistical Package for the 
social sciences (SPSS), E- views. The study used Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS) for the primary data. The SPSS was found user-friendly in dealing with complex 
analysis with cross tabulations, bivariate and possibly multivariate analysis. SPSS remains 
well regarded software by academic and practitioners alike in dealing with primary data.  
The study adopted Econometric views 9 (E-views) for the secondary data analysis because 
it also was found user-friendly in dealing with panel data and collaborate well with excel 
spread sheets for importing the data and allows number of analytics. 
5.5 Error Rate  
The study will attempt to reduce if not fully escape the error rate by carefully targeting 
questionnaires to practitioners/risk management decision makers in banking sector of 
Pakistan. In order to ensure adequate data and reduced respondent errors the study will 
administer questionnaire to all 25 sampled scheduled commercial. This is to achieve 
significant high response rate and reduction in representation sampling error. 
Questionnaire was brief, to the point and easily answered with only tick mark to record the 
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observation. Secondary data analysis will also go through appropriate diagnostics to 
determine the best fitting model. 
5.6 Limitations 
The research remained limited to Pakistan. Primary data based on collected structured 
questionnaires and secondary data compiled from commercial banks of Pakistan including 
the annual reports and accounts, reports submitted to State Bank of Pakistan, reports from 
Bureau of National Statistics of Pakistan. Limitations of secondary data remain as 
discussed above. 
5.7 Ethical Considerations 
The study ensures to remain focused on the fact that it is being carried out ethically to 
address widely acknowledged limitations in fields of Risk Management in commercial 
banks and the Capital regulations. There are absolutely no intentions, hidden or apparent 
to degrade or harm individuals concerned directly or indirectly. In order to remain ethical 
in line with usual professional researchers practice, the topic was approved to carry out 
research at University of East London following the University’s rules and code of conduct 
for the research. Furthermore, the research project accordingly obtained ethics approval 
from the University of East London Research Ethics Committee in carrying out 
questionnaires. 
The following was observed to address important ethical considerations including right to 
privacy, confidentiality and anonymity, informed consent, transparency and data handling.  
The secondary data was obtained from 25 out of 36 commercial banks and the 
questionnaires were administered within the same set. The questionnaires carried the 
information sheet which clearly addresses important ethical consideration in line with the 
University of East London Research Ethics Committee guidelines. The information sheet 
remained concise, stating the aim and objectives of the research in addition to the 
contribution requested by the participants. No personal information required from 
participants was also clearly evident from the information sheet. Furthermore, the 
information sheet clearly sets out the steps taken to observe confidentiality of data (Data 
Protection Act 1988) as well as ensures the privacy of respondents observed. In addition, 
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information on how the secure data storage and treatment would be achieved was made 
explicitly clear. The participants and institutions were also made aware of the intentions 
for the results to be published for equal benefit of the researches and practitioners. 
Participation in the study remained purely participants' choice therefore each participant 
was made aware through the information sheet what to do if one does not wish to continue 
participation. 
The study ethically attempt making sense of the research material and discuss possible 
interpretations of the research findings considering the fact that there may arise more 
insights relating the research topic area. Therefore the study would continue appreciate 
input from all-round clientele of the study. Not only that, the research findings may 
challenge the existing outlook of the topic triggering the research plan to be altered 
accordingly. The study claims to steer clear of any misuse of research at all costs. This will 
be achieved by reporting findings with utmost morality and completely impartial (Homan 
1991; Richard Winter 1989; Fisher et al 2007).   
 
5.8 Concluding Remarks 
The research work seeks to ultimately address at least a portion of the challenges associated 
with measuring and controlling for economic impact of bank regulation and supervision 
under Basel Capital Accord’s progressive consultations. The research deployed utmost 
effort in obtaining most suitable and appropriate methodologies i.e. data collection and 
analysis, software for use and keeping the research ethical.  
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Chapter 6: Primary Data Analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter tell-tale the results of the questionnaires administered in commercial banks of 
Pakistan. The chapter contains Cross tabulations and the descriptive statistics in addition 
to the results presented in frequency tables to facilitate effective data analysis of the survey. 
The questionnaire contained two broad sections, one: questions included on demographic 
profiling and two: questions exploring role and limitation of risk management practices in 
commercial banks of Pakistan under international bank supervisory guidelines of the Basel 
Capital Regulations. Appropriate coding applied to extract meaningful analysis of the 
factors considered through data collected (see Tables 18 and 19 below).  
 
Table 18. Questionnaire coding protocol 
     
Variables Age_group Qualification Experience Basel_training 
Implementation 
_status 
CODING 5 : 41 years and above 6 : Other/Professional 
5 : Above 21 
years 
5 : 9 or more 
courses 5 : Don't Know 
  4 : 36 - 40 years 5 : PhD   
4 : 15 - 20 
years 4 : 7 - 9 courses 4 : Not compliant 
  3 : 30 - 35 years   4: Mphil 
3 : 11 - 15 
years 3 : 4 - 6 courses 
3 : To some extent 
(calculate credit 
risk only) 
  2 : 26 - 30 years 3 : Masters  2 : 6 - 10 years 2 : 1 - 3 courses 
2 : To large extent 
(calculate credit, 
market and 
operational risk) 
  1 : 20 - 25 years 2 : Bachelors 1 : 0 - 5 years 1 : None 
1 : Fully compliant 
(AIRB) 
    1 : Diploma       
 
Demographic questions (see coding compiled in Table 18) included age, qualification, 
experience and extent of Basel Capital Regulation training attended. In particular, a 
question included in questionnaire regarding respondents’ knowledge of Basel compliance 
in their own banks (see table 1 for coding calibration). It would be interesting to see how 
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respondents’ view Basel compliance in their banks where according to State Bank of 
Pakistan commercial banks in Pakistan comply with Basel Capital Regulation standardized 
approach and apply risk weightings to the assets under Basel Capital Regulation guideline. 
This can be compared in line with evidence from secondary data collected from 
commercial banks of Pakistan and discussed in the next chapter. None of the commercial 
banks in Pakistan achieved the status to qualify for applying Advance Internal Rating 
Based (AIRB) approach, which allows banks to develop their own risk assessment models.  
 
Table 19. Risk Management questions coding protocol 
 
Variable  Question (strength of agreement) Coding   
Credit_on_CR Impact of credit risk on capital requirements    
NPL_on_CR Impact of Non-performing loans on capital requirements    
Market_on_CR Impact of market risk on capital requirements   
Effective_compliance 
Importance of Basel Capital Regulation for effective risk 
management 5 : Strongly agree 
Liquidity_on_CR 
Impact of market risk on capital requirements - strength of 
agreement 4 : Agree 
Profit_on_CR Impact of profitability on capital requirements 3 : Neutral 
Advanced_data_analysis Basel Capital Regulation as most advanced data analysis 2 : Disagree 
Operational_on_CR Impact of operational risk on capital requirements 1 : Strongly disagree 
Economic_on_CR Impact of economic activity on capital requirements   
Size_on_CR Impact of bank size on capital requirements   
Complex_models Basel risk calculation models are very complex   
Regulatory_compliance Basel Capital Regulation as matter of regulatory compliance   
Variable  Question (level of importance) Coding  
Bank_Risks_Credit Most important banking risks: credit risk   
Risk_Mgmt_LBR 
Factors effecting risk management in banks: Local bank 
regulations   
Bank_Regulate_NPL Most important for regulating banks: Non-performing loans   
Bank_Regulate_CR Most important for regulating banks: Non-performing loans 5 : Most Important 
Risk_Mgmt_Econ 
Factors effecting risk management in banks: Economic 
Impact 4 : Important 
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Bank_Risks_Market Most important banking risks: market risk 3 : Neutral 
Bank_Regulate_Profit Most important for regulating banks: Non-performing loans 2 : Un-important 
Bank_Risks_Operational Most important banking risks: operational risk 1 : Most un-important 
Risk_Mgmt_IBR 
Factors effecting risk management in banks: International 
bank regulations   
Risk_Mgmt_Glob Factors effecting risk management in banks: Globalization   
Bank_Risks_Liquidity Most important banking risks: liquidity risk   
Bank_Regulate_Econ Most important for regulating banks: Non-performing loans   
Bank_Regulate_Size Most important for regulating banks: Non-performing loans   
Risk_Mgmt_Political Factors effecting risk management in banks: Political factors   
Bank_Risks_Procyclicality Most important banking risks: procyclicality risk   
 
Questions revolving risk management in commercial banks of Pakistan included and 
remained investigative of respondents’ indicated strength of importance and/or agreement 
with respective assertions. See table 19 for the complete coding protocol.   
 
6.2 Results and Discussion:  
6.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive stats as calculated (Table 20) show minimum, maximum, mean and standard 
deviations. The factors are ranked 1 though to 32 according to the mean values. The highest 
rank is assigned to the value having the largest mean. The table below notes that impact of 
credit risk on capital requirements of the bank sits at the pole and impact of procyclicality 
on capital requirement last. Credit as most important risk to commercial banks of Pakistan 
sits on second spot. The impact of non-performing loans on capital requirement of the 
commercial banks of Pakistan tied with ‘Local bank regulations most important of risk 
management in commercial banks of Pakistan’ in the third place. The descriptive stats 
favor credit risk as most dominating risk determinant of the commercial banks in Pakistan. 
The results in table also show that there is no evidence that procyclicality impact the 
minimum capital requirements of the commercial banks of Pakistan.  
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Table 20. Descriptive Statistics (Primary data) 
      
Factors Rank Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Credit_on_CR 1 3 5 4.33 0.548 
Bank_Risks_Credit 2 1 5 4.25 0.963 
NPL_on_CR 3 1 5 4.16 0.814 
Risk_Mgmt_LBR 4 1 5 4.16 1.133 
Market_on_CR 5 2 5 4.09 0.765 
Effective_compliance 6 1 5 4.04 0.869 
Liquidity_on_CR 7 2 5 4.02 0.788 
Profit_on_CR 8 2 5 4.02 0.859 
Advanced_data_analysis 9 1 5 4 0.776 
Operational_on_CR 10 2 5 3.96 0.869 
Economic_on_CR 11 2 5 3.88 0.878 
Size_on_CR 12 1 5 3.8 1.028 
Bank_Regulate_NPL 13 1 5 3.78 0.955 
Bank_Regulate_CR 14 1 5 3.59 1.432 
Complex_models 15 1 5 3.58 0.962 
Risk_Mgmt_Econ 16 1 5 3.56 1.164 
Regulatory_compliance 17 1 5 3.44 1.283 
Age_group 18 1 5 3.34 1.212 
Bank_Risks_Market 19 1 5 3.34 1.22 
Qualification 20 2 6 3.16 0.765 
Bank_Regulate_Profit 21 1 5 3.08 1.094 
Bank_Risks_Operational 22 1 5 3.06 1.113 
Risk_Mgmt_IBR 23 1 5 2.74 1.358 
Risk_Mgmt_Glob 24 1 5 2.68 0.968 
Experience 25 1 5 2.63 1.098 
Bank_Risks_Liquidity 26 1 5 2.6 1.128 
Bank_Regulate_Econ 27 1 5 2.3 1.407 
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Bank_Regulate_Size 28 1 5 2.26 1.393 
Basel_training 29 1 5 2.2 0.989 
Implementation_status 30 1 4 2.1 0.744 
Risk_Mgmt_Political 31 1 5 1.86 1.226 
Bank_Risks_Procyclicality 32 1 5 1.76 1.326 
      
 
Table 21 below shows the minimum, maximum, mean statistic and standard deviation with 
highest rank to the largest mean value. All variables show large mean values showing that 
all variable considered below have impact on capital requirements of the commercial banks 
of Pakistan. Noted from the table below most important variables impacting the minimum 
capital requirements of commercial banks of Pakistan are credit risk, non-performing loans, 
market risk and liquidity. 
 
Table 21. Descriptive Statistics (Variables-primary data) 
 
     
Factors Rank Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Credit_on_CR 1 3 5 4.33 0.548 
NPL_on_CR 2 1 5 4.16 0.814 
Market_on_CR 3 2 5 4.09 0.765 
Liquidity_on_CR 4 2 5 4.02 0.788 
Profit_on_CR 5 2 5 4.02 0.859 
Operational_on_CR 6 2 5 3.96 0.869 
Economic_on_CR 7 2 5 3.88 0.878 
Size_on_CR 8 1 5 3.8 1.028 
      
Table 22 below notes the results of the reliability analysis of the variables and reports the 
value of Cronbach’s Alpha 0.681 shows that the data is reliable. The reliability values of 
0.5 to 0.6 are considered acceptable (Churchill 1979).  
 
 
Table 22. Reliability Analysis 
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Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items 
.681 8 
 
 
6.2.2 Questionnaire Results and Analysis 
Frequency tables presented results obtained from the questionnaire. The aim of the 
discussion remains assessment of current practice of credit risk management under 
International Basel Capital regulations in determining minimum capital requirements of 
commercial banks of Pakistan and its reflection on the economic activity. 
 
Table 23. Age group 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 20 to 25 Years of age 9 8.7 8.7 8.7 
26 to 30 Years of age 13 12.5 12.5 21.2 
31 to 35 Years of age 40 38.5 38.5 59.6 
36 to 40 Years of age 18 17.3 17.3 76.9 
41 Years and above 24 23.1 23.1 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
The survey result compiled in frequency distribution table 23 regarding the age group 
revealed that 38.5% of the participants belonged to age group between 31 to 35 years 
followed by 23.1% over 41 years of age. Further 17.3% and 12.5% belonged to age groups 
36-40 and 26-30 years respectively. The least proportion of participants (8.7%) was the 
youngest age group that is 20-25 years of age. 
 
Table 24. Qualification 
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 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Bachelor’s Degree 8 7.7 7.7 7.7 
Master’s Degree 81 77.9 77.9 85.6 
MPhil 10 9.6 9.6 95.2 
Other 5 4.8 4.8 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
The survey result in table 24 shows that risk management in Pakistani banks is serious 
business. Risk personnel hold higher education and are research driven with all round 
professional expertise. This is evidenced as largest proportion of participants (77.9%) held 
a Master’s degree. 9.6% participants were MPhil and further 4.8% participants had 
professional qualification proving that career progression as a senior operative in risk 
management at important positions required higher education and research driven 
backgrounds. Majority personnel holding Master’s degree and above proves that they are 
considered better equipped to understand, implement and manage Basel Capital regulations 
for effective risk management. Only 7.7% participants held Bachelor’s degree. 
 
Table 25. Experience as a senior banker 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 0 to 5 Years 11 10.6 10.6 10.6 
6 to 10 Years 46 44.2 44.2 54.8 
11 to 15 Years 26 25.0 25.0 79.8 
16 to 20 Years 12 11.5 11.5 91.3 
Above 21 Years 9 8.7 8.7 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
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Table 25 above shows an interesting mix of experience amongst the participants. The 
balance is tilted in favor of more experienced as the largest proportion (44.2%) was bagged 
by the participants with experience between 6 to 10 years as senior risk manager. The 
second largest stood at 25% of participants with even more experience that is between 11 
to 15 years. A healthy 11.5% participants had experience between 16 to 20 years and 8.7% 
with experience above 21 years. The novice most category stood at 10.6% had experience 
up to 5 years. The results of the survey show that experience is regarded a crucial expertise 
in fields of risk management in Pakistan for career progression and decision making ranks.  
 
Table 26. Number of Basel training courses attended 
 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid None 25 24.0 24.0 24.0 
1 to 3 Courses 48 46.2 46.2 70.2 
4 to 6 Courses 18 17.3 17.3 87.5 
7 to 9 Courses 11 10.6 10.6 98.1 
9 or more 2 1.9 1.9 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
The table 26 shows that the highest percentage of participants (46.2%) attended up to a 
maximum of 3 Basel Capital training courses. This may be considered sufficient exposure 
to introduction of basic mechanics of Basel Capital Accord. Further 17.3% participants 
attended 4 to 6 and 10.6% participants attended 7 to 9 Basel Capital training courses. 1.9% 
participants attended an impressive more than 9 Basel Capital training courses and could 
be considered forming an elite group of respondents with highest level of Basel Capital 
Regulations mechanics and current most recent developments. The evidence from the 
survey results suggest that overall high proportion of participants attended Basel Capital 
training courses but there is room for improvement. There still remain 24% participants 
not attended any Basel Capital regulation training course, yet acquired high positions in 
risk management in commercial banks of Pakistan. This could be attributed to the theory 
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that experience gained by the participants seemed to have got them in their current role as 
senior risk managers. Nevertheless that, and a large proportion of participants only 
hovering between 1 to 3 courses point out to that need for Basel refresher trainings may be 
the way forward in Pakistan. Basel training courses could create opportunity to bring risk 
management personnel in Pakistan commercial banks at par with current most recent 
developments in Basel Capital regulations for improved intuitions of risk management 
practices in banking. 
 
Table 27. Implementing Basel is a matter of “Regulatory Compliance only” for you bank 
 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly disagree 5 4.8 4.8 4.8 
Disagree 33 31.7 31.7 36.5 
Neutral 1 1.0 1.0 37.5 
Agree 41 39.4 39.4 76.9 
Strongly agree 24 23.1 23.1 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
 
Table 27 contains participant responses when asked regarding Basel compliance as 
regulatory compulsion. This was considered important question to establish the role of 
central bank, State Bank of Pakistan as regulatory and supervisory body in making Basel 
compliance as an important regulatory requirements. Participant responses in table 7 
therefore hint on the role of regulator in implementing Basel Capital Accord in Pakistan. 
23.1% participants strongly agreed followed by 39.4% agreed. Higher proportion of overall 
participants agreeing with the assertion conclude that majority seriously viewed Basel 
implementation as a regulatory obligation and took the matters seriously. This show that 
an effective role is played by the principal regulator and supervisor, State Bank of Pakistan 
not only to bring Basel Capital implementation in line with international standards but also 
successfully delivered the message that Basel Capital Regulation implementation remains 
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a serious matter of regulatory obligation in Pakistan. This argument also supported by the 
secondary data collection of the study, whereby actual Capital Adequacy Ratios calculated 
by the commercial banks in line with Basel compliance analyzed from the annual accounts 
of the banks. Thus there exists strong evidence through both primary data collected for the 
study as well as secondary data that commercial banks in Pakistan are compliant with Basel 
Capital regulation and adequately under way “in phase Basel III implementation” since 
2013. On the contrary, 31.7% disagreed and 4.8% strongly disagreed with the statement. 
1.0% of participants neither agreed nor disagreed. The results also point out that there still 
is a significant proportion of respondents (36.5%) overall, disagree with the assertion 
evidence there for reflects an interesting theory that respondents simply do not view Basel 
Capital Regulation compliance as an important regulatory compulsion, and therefore 
disagree with the assertion.  
 
Table 28. Full compliance with Basel is most significant requirement for effective risk 
management in your bank 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly disagree 2 1.9 1.9 1.9 
Disagree 7 6.7 6.7 8.7 
Neutral 4 3.8 3.8 12.5 
Agree 63 60.6 60.6 73.1 
Strongly agree 28 26.9 26.9 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
Table 28 shows the participant responses when asked if Basel compliance was the most 
significant requirement for effective risk management. 26.9% participants strongly agreed 
followed by the largest proportion of participants (60.6%) agreed. 6.7% disagreed and only 
1.9% strongly disagreed. 3.8% of respondents remained neutral. The survey results show 
that large percentage of participants agreed that implementing Basel Capital Regulation as 
most significant requirement for effective risk management in Pakistan is reflective of their 
understanding of the subject and its practical applications. This outcome remains in line 
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with the objective of the research to gauge the role and limitation of Basel Capital 
Regulations in Pakistan. The results displayed in table 8 above constitute unique findings 
of the study with regards to perceived versus achieved actual effectiveness of the Basel 
Capital Regulations in Pakistan in view of important industry operatives. The response 
evidence suggests that large proportion of participants not only agreed with Basel Capital 
implementation in Pakistan but were also convinced that it is an effective risk management 
tool for the commercial banks of Pakistan.  
 
Table 29. To what extent Basel in implemented in your bank 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Fully Compliant (AIRB) 18 17.3 17.3 17.3 
To large extent 64 61.5 61.5 78.8 
To some extent 16 15.4 15.4 94.2 
Not Compliant 6 5.8 5.8 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
 
Survey results compiled in frequency distribution table 29 are with regards Basel 
compliance status. Once established the importance of regulatory compliance as well as 
conceptual significance of risk management under Basel Capital Regulation it was 
considered important to build up on that, and identify the extent of Basel Capital 
Regulatory framework in view of the respondents. 17.3% participants were of the view that 
they are fully compliant i.e. bank achieved status of advanced internal rating based models 
are in effect. This followed by 61.5% participants ticked compliant to large extent. 
Compliant to large extent referred to the status where banks calculate and submit all three 
risk exposures under Basel Capital regulation namely Credit, Market and Operational risks. 
15.4% viewed as they were compliant to some extent i.e. calculate only credit risk under 
Basel Capital regulation. Smallest proportion (5.8%) of participants voted as not compliant. 
The results show that majority risk management personnel (61.5%) were well informed of 
their banks take on risk management practicality in line with international standards and 
 187 
 
overall an overwhelming 94.2% participants confirmed Basel Capital regulation 
compliance in commercial banks of Pakistan. 
 
Table 30. Basel provides most sophisticated and advanced data analysis methodologies 
for risk management in banking 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly disagree 2 1.9 1.9 1.9 
Disagree 4 3.8 3.8 5.8 
Neutral 7 6.7 6.7 12.5 
Agree 70 67.3 67.3 79.8 
Strongly agree 21 20.2 20.2 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
Table 30 compiles participant response to the statement that Basel Capital regulation 
propose most sophisticated and advance risk management methodologies to calculate 
Credit risk, Market risk and Operational risk. 20.2% participant strongly agreed with the 
statement followed by 67.3% agreed. 6.7% participants remained neutral. 1.9% of 
participants strongly disagreed and 3.8% participants disagreed with the assertion. The 
evidence in table 8 of the survey result suggests that risk personnel in Pakistan have been 
in progression of implementation of Basel Capital regulation for some period of time and 
seem now able to pin point positives and negatives between previous data management 
practices and currently imposed most advanced methodologies proposed by Basel Capital 
regulation. Better still, based on majority participants in favor of the assertion justifies the 
decision of Basel compliance by Pakistan to improve risk management in banks.  
 
Table 31. Risk management models developed by Basel for credit, market and 
operational risk are very complex 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly disagree 4 3.8 3.8 3.8 
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Disagree 10 9.6 9.6 13.5 
Neutral 25 24.0 24.0 37.5 
Agree 52 50.0 50.0 87.5 
Strongly agree 13 12.5 12.5 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
Table 31 contains responses to the assertion that risk management models developed by 
Basel Capital regulation for Credit risk, Market risk and Operational risk are very 
complex.12.5% strongly agreed with the statement and 50.0% agreed. 3.8% and 9.6% 
strongly disagreed and disagreed respectively. As 24% of the participants remained neutral, 
it may be concluded that a significant 24% of respondent were not exposed to the 
mathematical derivation or assignment of risk weightings for the Capital Adequacy ratios 
of their banks. The results shed an interesting insight into the complex methodology 
advocated by the Basel Capital Regulation as there is majority proportion agreeing with 
assertion (62.5%), and further suggests that products developed in commercial banks of 
Pakistan continue to be less complex in comparison with their globally active more 
advanced counterparts headquartered in larger and more developed economies of the 
world.  
 
Table 32. Credit risk has a significant impact on Bank capital requirements 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Neutral 4 3.8 3.8 3.8 
Agree 62 59.6 59.6 63.5 
Strongly agree 38 36.5 36.5 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
Credit risk remains one of the most important risk covered under Basel Capital Regulation. 
The participants exposed to day to day operation of managing credit risk, therefore gives 
an important insight to credit risk management in commercial banks of Pakistan. Table 32 
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shows 59.6% agreed and 36.5% participant strongly agreed that Credit risk has significant 
impact on Bank Capital requirements therefore showing an overwhelming 96.1% 
proportion of respondents agreeing that credit risk impact on minimum capital 
requirements of the commercial banks of Pakistan. 3.8% neither agreed nor disagreed. 
Interestingly, none of the participants disagreed with the assertion. The results heavily tilt 
in favor of identifying minimum capital requirements incorporating credit risk under Basel 
Capital Regulation as an important measure for monitoring the financial health of 
commercial banks of Pakistan. The result remains in line with the research objective of 
investigating if capital requirements of commercial banks of Pakistan reflect most 
important banking risks namely credit risk under Basel Capital Regulation priorities. In 
addition, the result is also reflective of the industry operatives agreeing to Basel 
international consultation in Pakistan captures credit risk upholding null hypothesis of the 
study.  
 
Table 33. Market risk has significant impact on Bank Capital requirements 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Disagree 8 7.7 7.7 7.7 
Neutral 2 1.9 1.9 9.6 
Agree 67 64.4 64.4 74.0 
Strongly agree 27 26.0 26.0 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
Table 33 shows that 26% strongly agree with the statement that Market risk has significant 
impact on Bank Capital requirements. A further 64.4% agreed. 7.7% disagreed and 1.9% 
remained neutral. Market risk is covered under pillar 1 of the Basel Capital Regulation and 
directly impacts the Capital Adequacy Ratio. The results largely agree with the assertion 
that market risk have a significant impact on Banks capital requirements. The results accept 
the null hypothesis of the study in agreeing that market risk has significant impact on 
capital requirements.  
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Table 34. Operational risk significant impact on Bank Capital requirements 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Disagree 11 10.6 10.6 10.6 
Neutral 8 7.7 7.7 18.3 
Agree 59 56.7 56.7 75.0 
Strongly agree 26 25.0 25.0 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
Operational risk directly relates to the role and performance of the participants in overall 
risk management of the commercial banks of Pakistan. The results compiled in table 34 
above show that 25% and 56.7% strongly agree and agree respectively to the statement that 
Operational risk has significant impact on Bank Capital requirements. Operational risk too 
is covered comprehensively under pillar 1 of the Basel Capital Regulations showing strong 
evidence of Basel Capital Regulations compliance in commercial banks of Pakistan. 7.7% 
neither agreed nor disagree and 10.6% disagree.  
 
Table 35. Liquidity has significant impact on Bank Capital requirements 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Disagree 7 6.7 6.7 6.7 
Neutral 10 9.6 9.6 16.3 
Agree 61 58.7 58.7 75.0 
Strongly agree 26 25.0 25.0 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
In table 35 results compiled of respondents view of significant impact of liquidity on 
minimum capital requirements of the commercial banks of Pakistan. The results show that 
25% participants strongly agreed and 58.7% agreed with the assertion that liquidity risk 
has significant impact on Bank Capital requirements. Liquidity risk was not covered under 
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initial consultation of Basel Capital Regulations up to Basel II however, now included in 
Basel III. Phase in implementation of Basel III is underway in commercial banks of 
Pakistan. 6.7% of the respondents disagree and 9.6% neither agree nor disagree. None of 
the participants strongly disagreed. 
 
Table 36. NPL have significant effect on Bank Capital requirements 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly disagree 2 1.9 1.9 1.9 
Disagree 4 3.8 3.8 5.8 
Neutral 3 2.9 2.9 8.7 
Agree 61 58.7 58.7 67.3 
Strongly agree 34 32.7 32.7 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
 
Considering Credit risk as most important factor in determining Capital Adequacy Ratio 
under Basel Capital Regulation, non-performing loans go hand in hand with credit risk 
portfolios, it was viewed as an important input by the respondents as they manage and run 
risk portfolios of commercial banks of Pakistan on daily basis. The question was put to the 
participants and response rates to this question recorded in table 36 above show that 32.7% 
strongly agree and 58.7% agree with the assertion that Non-performing loans significantly 
impact Bank Capital requirements. Further 1.9% strongly disagree and 3.8% disagree. A 
small proportion of respondent (2.9%) neither agree nor disagree. 
  
 
Table 37. Bank size significantly impacts Bank Capital requirements  
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly disagree 3 2.9 2.9 2.9 
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Disagree 13 12.5 12.5 15.4 
Neutral 10 9.6 9.6 25.0 
Agree 54 51.9 51.9 76.9 
Strongly agree 24 23.1 23.1 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
Bank size remains an important indicator of the banks health both in times of economic 
recession and boom in view of the participants of the study. Respondents directly in 
position to impact the bank size in terms of assets growth or decline were asked if Bank 
size impacts on the minimum capital requirements of the banks. The results compiled in 
table 37 show that 23.1% strongly agree and 51.9% agree with the assertion that bank size 
has significant impact on Bank Capital requirements. Further analyzing the result revealed 
2.9% strongly disagree and 12.5% disagree. 9.6% of respondent neither agree nor disagree. 
 
Table 38. Bank profitability significantly impacts Bank Capital requirements 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Disagree 10 9.6 9.6 9.6 
Neutral 7 6.7 6.7 16.3 
Agree 58 55.8 55.8 72.1 
Strongly agree 29 27.9 27.9 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
The participants of the study showed with their responses that profitability can be impacted 
with lending profile of the banks and influenced by the risk management preferences of the 
banks. Table 38 shows that 27.9% of the participants strongly agreed with the statement 
that bank profitability has significant impact on Capital requirements of the commercial 
banks of Pakistan followed by the largest proportion of respondents (55.8%) agreeing with 
the same. Further 9.6% strongly disagree and 6.7% neither agree nor disagree. None of the 
respondents strongly disagreed with the statement.  
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Table 39. Economic fluctuations significantly impact Bank Capital requirements 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Disagree 13 12.5 12.5 12.5 
Neutral 8 7.7 7.7 20.2 
Agree 62 59.6 59.6 79.8 
Strongly agree 21 20.2 20.2 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
Economic activity considered impacts the assets of the banks and respondents directly 
managing and altering loan portfolios, therefore equipped with firsthand knowledge of the 
impact of economic activity on the financial considerations of the commercial banks in 
Pakistan. We compile the results in table 39 showing that 20.2% of the participants strongly 
agree and 59.6% agree that economic fluctuations significantly impact Bank Capital 
requirements. Further 12.5% disagree and 7.7% neither agree nor disagree. The results 
show that participants of the study are in good position to judge the impact of economic 
fluctuation while managing day to day risk portfolios of the commercial banks in Pakistan. 
Large proportion of participant response as agreed reflects that risk management in the 
commercial banks of Pakistan is reflective of the influence of the economic environment 
of the country. Therefore, sensitivity of commercial banks to the economic activity is worth 
considering while scrutinizing the financial health of the commercial banks of Pakistan.  
 
Table 40. Please rank important bank risk – Credit risk 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid most un-important 3 2.9 2.9 2.9 
un-important 1 1.0 1.0 3.8 
neutral 17 16.3 16.3 20.2 
important 29 27.9 27.9 48.1 
 194 
 
most important 54 51.9 51.9 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
Participants were also asked to rank most important risks faced by the commercial banks 
of Pakistan. This would help identify the proportion of the respondents considering credit 
risk as most important in comparison with other risks identified in effective risk 
management of the commercial banks of Pakistan. The views of respondents remain largely 
similar to each other as Table 40 shows that when asked to rank important banking risks, 
51.9% and 27.9% ranked Credit risk as most important and important. 16.3% remained 
neutral and 2.9% ranked Credit risk as most unimportant. Lowest 1.0% viewed it as un-
important. An overwhelming majority of risk operatives took part in the research ranked 
credit risk as the most important reflects the fact that extending credit remains the main 
business in commercial banks of Pakistan. The evidence that high capital adequacy ratio 
maintained by commercial banks of Pakistan indicates that more capital buffers installed 
to counter credit risk in Pakistan than market risk of operational risk. Thus there is evidence 
that in applying Capital Adequacy Ratio formula under the Basel Capital Accord, credit 
risk weighted assets form the major portion of the denominator in commercial banks of 
Pakistan. Operational risk weighted assets as well as market risk weighted assets constitute 
comparatively much smaller proportion of the capital adequacy ratio consideration in 
commercial banks of Pakistan. Therefore to conclude, according to the responses compiled 
in table 20a show that credit risk remains the main determinant of the capital adequacy 
ratio in commercial banks of Pakistan.  
 
Table 41. Please rank important bank risk – Market risk 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid most un-important 8 7.7 7.7 7.7 
un-important 19 18.3 18.3 26.0 
neutral 29 27.9 27.9 53.8 
important 26 25.0 25.0 78.8 
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most important 22 21.2 21.2 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
 
The results compiled in table 41 show that 21.2% of the participants view market risk as 
most important followed by 25% of participants ranked market risk as important in 
commercial banks of Pakistan. A rather large proportion of the participants remain neutral 
at 27.9%. Furthermore, 18.3% ranked market risk unimportant and 7.7% ranked market 
risk as most unimportant in commercial banks of Pakistan. The results reflects that 
although majority of respondents ranked market risk as an important risk faced by the 
banks, still 27% of the respondents remained neutral around 25% ranked market risk as 
unimportant overall reflects to the fact that there is not enough awareness of the impact of 
market risk on the commercial banks of Pakistan. This also points out to availability of 
limited research and publications in field of market risk management, practicality of VAR 
and its impact on commercial banks of Pakistan. It would be interesting to find out if 
participants agreed that foreign exchange risk covered under market risk as per Basel 
Capital Accord guidelines is practical in commercial banks of Pakistan. The results 
however, point out that the respondents generally viewed commercial banks of Pakistan 
are less exposed to market risk. 
 
Table 42. Please rank important bank risk – Operational risk 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid most un-important 8 7.7 7.7 7.7 
un-important 28 26.9 26.9 34.6 
neutral 27 26.0 26.0 60.6 
important 32 30.8 30.8 91.3 
most important 9 8.7 8.7 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
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Table 42 shows results when asked to rank operational risk as important banking risks, a 
mere 8.7% of the respondent considered operational risk as most important. Nevertheless 
30.8% participants ranked operational risk as important in commercial banks of Pakistan. 
Together the important category constitutes 39.5% of the respondents overall view. A 
healthy 26% remained undecided reflecting their knowledge of the practice of operational 
risk in commercial banks of Pakistan. On the contrary 26.9% of the respondents were of a 
view that operational risk was unimportant followed by another 7.7% ranking it as most 
unimportant so an overall 34.6% of the participants viewed operational risk as unimportant.  
 
Table 43. Please rank important bank risk – Liquidity  
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid most un-important 16 15.4 15.4 15.4 
un-important 38 36.5 36.5 51.9 
Neutral 31 29.8 29.8 81.7 
Important 10 9.6 9.6 91.3 
most important 9 8.7 8.7 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
 
Table 43 shows results of respondents’ view of liquidity as most important risk faced the 
commercial banks of Pakistan. The result show that 36.5% of the participants were of the 
view liquidity is unimportant followed by the second highest proportion of 29.8% of 
respondents undecided. Only 8.7% ranked liquidity as most important followed by 9.6% 
ranked Liquidity risk as important. 15.4% ranked Liquidity risk as most unimportant. The 
result remains in line with the fact that commercial banks of Pakistan in general operate 
with high capital adequacy ratios. 
 
 
Table 44. Please rank important bank risk – Procyclicality  
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 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid most un-important 69 66.3 66.3 66.3 
un-important 18 17.3 17.3 83.7 
important 7 6.7 6.7 90.4 
most important 10 9.6 9.6 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
The results shown in table 44 points out very interestingly that largest proportion of 
respondents at 66.3% ranked procyclicality as most unimportant. A bleak proportion of 
9.6% and 6.7% ranked Procyclicality risk as most important and important. 17.3% ranked 
unimportant. There were no neutral responses recorded. Overall balance in favor of 
unimportant shows that participants are not convinced that procyclicality causes a threat to 
the financial soundness of the commercial banks of Pakistan.  
 
 
Table 45. Please rank most important for regulating banks – Capital requirements  
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid most un-important 11 10.6 10.6 10.6 
un-important 18 17.3 17.3 27.9 
neutral 16 15.4 15.4 43.3 
important 17 16.3 16.3 59.6 
most important 42 40.4 40.4 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
 
Respondents when asked to rank if capital requirements is most important for regulating 
banks, 40.4% ranked capital requirements as most important for regulating banks followed 
by 16.3% ranking capital requirements as important. Together both categories add up to a 
total of 56.7%. On the contrary 17.3% and 10.6% of participants represented views of 
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unimportant and most unimportant. The result in table 45 remain in line with research 
expectations where majority of respondents remained convinced that capital requirements 
is sound indicator of the financial health of the commercial banks of Pakistan making it 
justifiable to comply with Basel Capital Accord and in line international banking practices.   
 
 
 
 
Table 46. Please rank most important for regulating banks – NPL  
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid most un-important 3 2.9 2.9 2.9 
un-important 9 8.7 8.7 11.5 
neutral 16 15.4 15.4 26.9 
important 56 53.8 53.8 80.8 
most important 20 19.2 19.2 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
Rise in non-performing loans spell out difficult times for banks may it be economic 
recession or boom, although historically rise in non-performing loans is associated with 
economic downturn, therefore it was important to extract views of important participants 
in monitoring non-performing loans as an important measure in regulating banks. Table 46 
presents responses when asked to rank if non-performing loans is most important in 
regulating banks. A very high proportion of respondents ranked non-performing loan as an 
important indicator for regulating commercial banks in Pakistan, with further 19.2% 
ranking it as most important. A small population of respondents (8.7%) ranked unimportant 
further deteriorating to 2.9% ranked as most unimportant. 15.4% remained neutral. 
 
Table 47. Please rank most important for regulating banks – Bank profitability 
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 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid most un-important 9 8.7 8.7 8.7 
un-important 17 16.3 16.3 25.0 
neutral 49 47.1 47.1 72.1 
important 15 14.4 14.4 86.5 
most important 14 13.5 13.5 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
Table 47 showcases results when respondents were asked to rank bank profitability as most 
important in regulating banks, small proportion of participants seemed convinced of 
profitability being an important measure in regulating commercial banks in Pakistan. In 
short, 13.5% and 14.4% ranked Bank profitability as most important and important 
respectively. On the contrary did not witness comprehensive status neither, 16.3% ranked 
unimportant and 8.7% ranked as most unimportant. Interestingly almost half of the 
respondents (47.1%) remained neutral making it significantly clear that majority of 
participants failed to justify profitability as an important measure in regulating in 
commercial banks of Pakistan. The results remain in line with the research expectations as 
majority of respondents viewed profitability did not constitute major indicator for 
regulating commercial banks of Pakistan.  
 
Table 48. Please rank most important for regulating banks – Bank size 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid most un-important 41 39.4 39.4 39.4 
un-important 32 30.8 30.8 70.2 
neutral 6 5.8 5.8 76.0 
important 13 12.5 12.5 88.5 
most important 12 11.5 11.5 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
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Participants views on bank size as an important indicator for regulating banks yield some 
interesting insights arranged in table 48, as a mere 15.4% participants considered bank size 
as most important followed by 2.9% ranked as important. The opposite viewpoint prevailed 
in grand manner, with largest proportion of participants (38.5%) ranked bank size as most 
unimportant followed by the second largest viewpoint (26.9%) in the same category ranked 
bank size as unimportant in regulating commercial banks in Pakistan. 5.8% of the 
respondents remained neutral. The results remain in line with international bank regulation 
approaches and majority of banks operatives classed bank size as unimportant in regulating 
commercial banks in Pakistan.   
 
Table 49. Please rank most important for regulating bank – Sensitivity to economic 
activity 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid most un-important 40 38.5 38.5 38.5 
un-important 28 26.9 26.9 65.4 
neutral 17 16.3 16.3 81.7 
important 3 2.9 2.9 84.6 
most important 16 15.4 15.4 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
Results of an important factor namely sensitivity to economic activity as an important 
indicator regulating commercial banks in Pakistan are locked in table 49 above. The results 
remained interesting as an overwhelming majority at 38.5% recorded their response as 
most unimportant where the 26.9% participants ticked unimportant in the questionnaire. 
15.4% of respondents ranked Economic impact as most important with only 2.9% 
convinced as important. 16.3% remained neutral. The results represent that the respondents 
were not convinced that monitoring sensitivity of commercial banks of Pakistan to 
economic activity is most important in regulating banks. The result showed participants 
response attributed to limited evidence of impact of economic activity on commercial 
banks of Pakistan and limitations in development of a sensitivity index. 
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Table 50. Please rank factors significantly impact effective risk management in banks – 
International Bank Regulation 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid most un-important 22 21.2 21.2 21.2 
un-important 32 30.8 30.8 51.9 
neutral 15 14.4 14.4 66.3 
important 21 20.2 20.2 86.5 
most important 14 13.5 13.5 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
 
Participant responses were gathered when asked to rank if international bank regulation 
impact significantly on effective risk management in commercial banks in Pakistan. The 
responses are shown in table 50 above. 13.5% of the respondents viewed international bank 
regulation and supervision as most important followed by 20.2% participants ranking it as 
important. Opposite concept seemed to take lead in this question where 30.8% of the 
participants ranked unimportant and 21.2% ranked as most unimportant, where 14.4% 
remained neutral. 
 
 
Table 51. Please rank factors significantly impact effective risk management in bank – 
Local Bank Regulation 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid most un-important 5 4.8 4.8 4.8 
un-important 7 6.7 6.7 11.5 
neutral 8 7.7 7.7 19.2 
important 30 28.8 28.8 48.1 
most important 54 51.9 51.9 100.0 
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Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
 
Table 51 above locks in results of the responses when asked to rank local bank regulation 
as most important in effective risk management in commercial banks of Pakistan. A 
whopping 51.9% and 28.8% ranked local regulations as most important and important 
respectively. 6.7% ranked unimportant and 4.8% ranked as most unimportant. 7.7% 
remained neutral. The results clearly point out to the role of central bank of Pakistan namely 
State Bank of Pakistan is significant in impacting the risk management practices in 
commercial banks of Pakistan. The results remain in line with research expectation as 
overwhelming majority of respondents somewhat approve of that fact that bank regulation 
and supervision plays an important role in effective risk management in commercial banks 
of Pakistan. 
 
Table 52. Please rank factors significantly impact effective risk management in banks – 
Globalization  
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid most un-important 4 3.8 3.8 3.8 
un-important 49 47.1 47.1 51.0 
neutral 36 34.6 34.6 85.6 
important 6 5.8 5.8 91.3 
most important 9 8.7 8.7 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
Table 52 shows results when asked to rank if globalization is most important in 
significantly impacting effective risk management in commercial banks of Pakistan. The 
result shows that 8.7% of the participants marked most unimportant and only 5.8% ranked 
globalization as important. On the contrary, 47.1% ranked globalization unimportant and 
3.8% ranked as most unimportant. 34.6% remained neutral. The result shows that the 
 203 
 
participants were of the view that banks in Pakistan somewhat remains not sensitive to 
global climate change. The results constitute an interesting finding as there is evidence of 
restricted global cash flows towards Pakistan during global financial crises of 2007-8.  
 
Table 53. Please rank factors significantly impact effective risk management in banks – 
Economic Factors 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid most un-important 11 10.6 10.6 10.6 
un-important 4 3.8 3.8 14.4 
neutral 25 24.0 24.0 38.5 
important 44 42.3 42.3 80.8 
most important 20 19.2 19.2 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
 
Table 53 shows results when asked to rank economic factors as most important in 
impacting effective risk management in commercial banks of Pakistan. 19.2% of the 
participants shared their view as most important with 42.3% ranked economic factors as 
important and significantly impact effective risk management in commercial banks of 
Pakistan. A further 3.8% ranked unimportant and 10.6% ranked as most unimportant. 
24.0% remained neutral. The results show that majority of participants remained convinced 
that economic factor should be considered in managing risk in commercial banks of 
Pakistan. The result of this question showed that although majority of respondent remained 
unsure or unconvinced of the sensitivity in regulating banks, they remained firmly 
convinced that effective risk management benefits with monitoring economic factors.  
 
Table 54. Please rank factors significantly impact effective risk management in banks – 
Political Factors 
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 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid most un-important 62 59.6 59.6 59.6 
un-important 12 11.5 11.5 71.2 
neutral 20 19.2 19.2 90.4 
important 3 2.9 2.9 93.3 
most important 7 6.7 6.7 100.0 
Total 104 100.0 100.0  
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
 
Upon asking to rank if political factors act as significant aspect in effective risk 
management in banks in Pakistan, vast majority of participants 59.6% marked as most 
unimportant followed by a further 11.5% ticked as unimportant see results compiled in 
table 54.  6.7% and 2.9% ranked political factors as most important and important. 19.2% 
participants remained neutral. According to the results respondents firmly seemed 
convinced of irrelevance of political factors in effective risk management in commercial 
banks of Pakistan.  
 
Ranking question are particularly helpful in extracting respondents’ own views as to what 
they regard as most important based on their skills occupied during work experience in 
field of risk management in commercial banks of Pakistan on top of agree/disagree options. 
This is facilitated through making choices available to respondents to pick the option they 
most deem fit. We analyse further the ranking questions and calibrated the option termed 
as ‘most important’ as highest rank of importance. Here we only discussed the top rank as 
evidence of most important risk faced by the banks, nevertheless it made sense to discuss 
the complete picture portrayed by the respondents. The results locked in tables 40 through 
to 44 based on assertion that what in participants’ opinion is most important risk for the 
commercial banks of Pakistan. The options included Credit risk, Market risk and 
Operational risk as default, currently covered by the Basel Capital Regulation’s Basel II, 
in addition liquidity was also included as an option along with procyclicality. Liquidity is 
now in stage of phase in introduction under Basel Capital Regulation’s Basel III for the 
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purpose of calculating capital adequacy ratios. In addition, Procyclicality, was included to 
test that if participants viewed it as risk to the commercial banks of Pakistan. The results 
depict that Credit risk stood top of ranking as clear winner in most important risk faced by 
the commercial banks of Pakistan category, with over half of the participants viewed it as 
most important. Credit risk was well clear at the top as the second most important risk 
faced by the banks market risk scored only 21% well behind credit risk. The results clearly 
showed that the participants of the study viewed that commercial banks of Pakistan are 
mostly exposed to the credit risk. Here, it would be interesting to note that operational risk 
currently covered under Basel Capital Regulations along with credit risk and market risk 
was considered by 9% of the respondents, just behind procyclicality considered by 10% 
respondents as most important. This was not by much but still hints at the fact that 
procyclicality is not only understood the risk management operative took part in the study 
but also, regarded it just a tad more important than operational risk in commercial banks 
of Pakistan. We continue to march on to analysing our next ranking question regarding the 
participants’ opinion on what is most important in regulating commercial banks in 
Pakistan. The options included bank’s capital requirements, nonperforming loans, 
profitability, size and sensitivity to economic activity. Results are compiled in tables 45 
through to 49 above. The results showed that capital requirements was top ranked with 
40.4 percent participant viewed it as most important in regulating banks. This results 
remain in line with research expectation and objectives of Basel Capital International 
banking regulations and supervision. It was also interesting to note that 19% respondents 
viewed nonperforming loans as most important in regulating banks and 15% respondent 
stamped on bank’s sensitivity to economic activity as most important in regulating banks. 
The results regarding respondent views on most important factors significantly impacting 
effective risk management in commercial banks of Pakistan presented in tables 50 through 
to 54. The options for the choice included international bank regulations, local bank 
regulations, globalization, economic and political factors. The results showed that local 
bank regulation was clear winner in significantly impacting effective risk management in 
commercial banks of Pakistan with 52% respondent marking it as most important. The 
second spot was grabbed by the economic factors with 19% respondents making it the most 
important factor in significantly influencing effective risk management in Pakistan. 
International bank regulations losing to local bank regulations as most important factor for 
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effective risk management indicates that participants adequately regulated by the local 
authority. The participants  therefore viewed that international rules may not deem fit for 
the territory and international procedures needed to be filtered through the local authority 
to create a bespoke fit for the commercial banks in Pakistan. This relishes the importance 
of local bank regulation in implementation of effective risk management protocols in 
commercial banks of Pakistan may it be a local construct or an internationally implemented 
standard.  
6.2.3 Results of Cross tabulations 
 
Table 55. Full Basel Compliance and impact of Globalization 
Full compliance with Basel is most significant requirement for effective risk management in your bank * 
Please rank factors significantly impact effective risk management in banks - Globalization Cross 
tabulation 
 
Please rank factors significantly impact effective risk 
management in banks - Globalization 
Total 
most un-
important 
un-
important neutral important 
most 
important 
Full compliance 
with Basel is most 
significant 
requirement for 
effective risk 
management in 
your bank 
Strongly 
disagree 
Count 
0 2 0 0 0 2 
% of 
Total 
0.0% 1.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.9% 
Disagree Count 
0 4 1 2 0 7 
% of 
Total 
0.0% 3.8% 1.0% 1.9% 0.0% 6.7% 
Neutral Count 
1 3 0 0 0 4 
% of 
Total 
1.0% 2.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.8% 
Agree Count 
2 25 28 2 6 63 
% of 
Total 
1.9% 24.0% 26.9% 1.9% 5.8% 60.6% 
Strongly 
agree 
Count 
1 15 7 2 3 28 
% of 
Total 
1.0% 14.4% 6.7% 1.9% 2.9% 26.9% 
 207 
 
Total Count 
4 49 36 6 9 104 
% of 
Total 
3.8% 47.1% 34.6% 5.8% 8.7% 
100.0
% 
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
 
Table 55 above indicates that globalization remained largely unimportant in significantly 
disturbing effective risk management in commercial banks of Pakistan when analysing side 
by side with the views of participants regarding full Basel Capital Regulation compliance 
and globalization. The results above indicate that only 4 participants classed globalization 
as important, backed by further 9 participant as most important in effective risk 
management out of 91 participants who agreed or strongly agreed with Basel Compliance 
as most significant for effective risk management leaving in the same viewpoint group 50 
participants classing globalization as unimportant followed by a further 3 as most 
unimportant. A large proportion of participants who agreed or strongly agreed that full 
Basel compliance is most important in effective risk management remained neutral when 
asked if globalization significantly impacts effective risk management in commercial 
banks of Pakistan. 
 
 
Table 56. Senior Banker and Training 
Experience as a senior banker * Number of Basel training courses attended Cross tabulation 
 
Number of Basel training courses attended 
Total None 
1 to 3 
Courses 
4 to 6 
Courses 
7 to 9 
Courses 
9 or 
more 
Experience as a 
senior banker 
0 to 5 Years Count 2 9 0 0 0 11 
% of 
Total 
1.9% 8.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 10.6% 
6 to 10 
Years 
Count 19 21 5 0 1 46 
% of 
Total 
18.3% 20.2% 4.8% 0.0% 1.0% 44.2% 
Count 4 10 8 4 0 26 
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11 to 15 
Years 
% of 
Total 
3.8% 9.6% 7.7% 3.8% 0.0% 25.0% 
16 to 20 
Years 
Count 0 6 4 2 0 12 
% of 
Total 
0.0% 5.8% 3.8% 1.9% 0.0% 11.5% 
Above 21 
Years 
Count 0 2 1 5 1 9 
% of 
Total 
0.0% 1.9% 1.0% 4.8% 1.0% 8.7% 
Total Count 25 48 18 11 2 104 
% of 
Total 
24.0% 46.2% 17.3% 10.6% 1.9% 
100.0
% 
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
Table 56 locks in cross tabulation that offers a useful insight of experience gained in risk 
management as well as Basel Capital Regulation training undertaken by the participants. 
The above results paint a mixed picture. First of all it is noticeable that there 25 out of 83 
participants that is 30% of respondents with up to 15 years of experience as senior bankers 
have not attended any Basel training courses. Within the same experience group further 
48% respondent lurk in the category of between 1 to 3 Basel training courses. The results 
point out to the fact that participants with up to 15 years of experience as senior bankers 
have only had a maximum of three Basel training sessions. The result also shows that 
respondents with experience over 15 years, all have had exposure to Basel training. Overall 
amongst the respondents only 2 attended an impressive more than 9 training sessions and 
29 attended between 4 to 9 Basel training sessions showing that opportunities for Basel 
exposure in Pakistan arise far and between, stressing need for a regular program for the 
industry operatives in commercial banks of Pakistan to keep abreast the recent consultation 
and developments. 
 
Table 57. Senior Banker and Basel Approach 
Experience as a senior banker * Basel provides most sophisticated and advanced data analysis 
methodologies for risk management in banking Cross tabulation 
 
Basel provides most sophisticated and advanced data 
analysis methodologies for risk management in banking Total 
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Strongly 
disagree Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Experience as a 
senior banker 
0 to 5 Years Count 0 0 0 4 7 11 
% of 
Total 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.8% 6.7% 10.6% 
6 to 10 
Years 
Count 0 2 5 33 6 46 
% of 
Total 
0.0% 1.9% 4.8% 31.7% 5.8% 44.2% 
11 to 15 
Years 
Count 0 0 0 22 4 26 
% of 
Total 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 21.2% 3.8% 25.0% 
16 to 20 
Years 
Count 2 1 0 5 4 12 
% of 
Total 
1.9% 1.0% 0.0% 4.8% 3.8% 11.5% 
Above 21 
Years 
Count 0 1 2 6 0 9 
% of 
Total 
0.0% 1.0% 1.9% 5.8% 0.0% 8.7% 
Total Count 2 4 7 70 21 104 
% of 
Total 
1.9% 3.8% 6.7% 67.3% 20.2% 
100.0
% 
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 57 above displays cross tabulations of the participants’ experience and Basel 
provided data analysis methodologies for risk management in commercial banks of 
Pakistan. Overall in total only 6 participants within varied experience range disagreed with 
the assertion that Basel provides most sophisticated and advanced data analysis 
methodologies for risk management. All of the participants with experience between 0 to 
5 years and 11 to 15 years agreed or strongly agreed that Basel Capital Regulation as most 
sophisticated for risk management in commercial banks of Pakistan, however interestingly 
none of the respondent with experience over 21 years strongly agreed with that. 
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Respondents with experience as a senior banker between 16 to 20 years showed a varied 
response with a couple disagreeing strongly and 4 agreeing strongly. The results show 
valuable responses regarding Basel Capital Regulation guidelines for risk management in 
commercial banks of Pakistan and that there is always room for improvement. This also 
points out to involving as well as encouraging risk management operatives from variety of 
backgrounds and experience to take active part in ongoing Basel Capital Regulation 
consultations.  
 
 
Table 58. Credit Risk and Economic Fluctuations on Capital requirements 
Credit risk has significant impact on Bank capital requirements * Economic fluctuations significantly 
impact Bank Capital requirements Cross tabulation 
 
Economic fluctuations significantly impact Bank 
Capital requirements 
Total Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Credit risk has 
significant impact on 
Bank capital 
requirements 
Neutral Count 0 2 2 0 4 
% of 
Total 
0.0% 1.9% 1.9% 0.0% 3.8% 
Agree Count 6 5 40 11 62 
% of 
Total 
5.8% 4.8% 38.5% 10.6% 59.6% 
Strongly 
agree 
Count 7 1 20 10 38 
% of 
Total 
6.7% 1.0% 19.2% 9.6% 36.5% 
Total Count 13 8 62 21 104 
% of 
Total 
12.5% 7.7% 59.6% 20.2% 100.0% 
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
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Above table 58 presents results of cross tabulation of credit risk as a significant impactor 
versus economic activity as significantly impactor on bank capital requirements. The cross 
tabulation offers an opportunity collect views of respondents regarding impact of economic 
activity on minimum capital requirements of commercial banks of Pakistan. Credit risk not 
only impacts bank’s capital requirements but forms a crucial part of formula in calculating 
capital adequacy ratios as per Basel Capital Regulation guidelines and above results in 
table 26 clearly show that respondents practically agreed with that. Therefore there are no 
respondents with disagree or strongly disagree option when asked if credit risk significantly 
impact bank capital requirements, only 4 industry operatives chose to remain indifferent. 
An overall majority of participant totalling 81 out of 100 respondents who agreed or 
strongly agreed with credit risk impacting bank capital requirements also agreed or strongly 
agreed that economic fluctuations significantly impact bank capital requirements. Yet there 
is no clear mechanism researched significantly for incorporating economic activity in 
capital adequacy formula or policy recommendations facilitating simultaneous monitoring 
of capital requirements of bank in line with economic activity to enable improved bank 
regulation and supervision. 
 
 
Table 59. Basel compliance and Bank Size for risk management 
Full compliance with Basel is most significant requirement for effective risk management in your bank * 
Please rank most important for regulating banks - Bank size Cross tabulation 
 
Please rank most important for regulating banks - Bank 
size 
Total 
most un-
important 
un-
important neutral 
importa
nt 
most 
important 
Full compliance with 
Basel is most 
significant 
requirement for 
effective risk 
management in 
your bank 
Strongly 
disagree 
Count 0 0 0 2 0 2 
% of 
Total 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.9% 0.0% 1.9% 
Disagree Count 2 5 0 0 0 7 
% of 
Total 
1.9% 4.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 6.7% 
Neutral Count 3 1 0 0 0 4 
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% of 
Total 
2.9% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.8% 
Agree Count 22 21 5 7 8 63 
% of 
Total 
21.2% 20.2% 4.8% 6.7% 7.7% 60.6% 
Strongly 
agree 
Count 14 5 1 4 4 28 
% of 
Total 
13.5% 4.8% 1.0% 3.8% 3.8% 26.9% 
Total Count 41 32 6 13 12 104 
% of 
Total 
39.4% 30.8% 5.8% 12.5% 11.5% 
100.0
% 
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 59 displays views of respondent regarding importance of bank size as a measure for 
regulating banks with full compliance with Basel Capital Regulation as most significant 
requirement for effective risk management in commercial banks of Pakistan. The cross 
tabulation in table 27 yields interesting insights with majority population of respondents 
agreed or strongly agreed to Basel Capital compliance as an effective tool for risk 
management in commercial banks of Pakistan. It is interesting to note that an overall 73 
respondents who agreed or strongly agreed with full compliance of Basel Capital 
Regulation for effective risk management also noted bank size as unimportant or most 
unimportant for regulating banks. Interestingly all respondent who disagreed with Basel 
Capital Regulation compliance as an effective tool for bank risk management ticked bank 
size unimportant and most unimportant, all in all only 25 respondents thought bank size 
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was important or most important. The result overall confirms that respondents viewed bank 
size as irrelevant in effective risk management.  
 
 
Table 60. Liquidity and NPL on capital requirements 
Liquidity has significant impact on Bank Capital requirements * Please rank most important for regulating 
banks - NPL Cross tabulation 
 
Please rank most important for regulating banks - NPL 
Total 
most un-
important 
un-
important neutral 
importa
nt 
most 
important 
Liquidity has 
significant impact on 
Bank Capital 
requirements 
Disagree Count 2 2 1 2 0 7 
% of 
Total 
1.9% 1.9% 1.0% 1.9% 0.0% 6.7% 
Neutral Count 0 0 2 6 2 10 
% of 
Total 
0.0% 0.0% 1.9% 5.8% 1.9% 9.6% 
Agree Count 1 6 10 29 15 61 
% of 
Total 
1.0% 5.8% 9.6% 27.9% 14.4% 58.7% 
Strongly 
agree 
Count 0 1 3 19 3 26 
% of 
Total 
0.0% 1.0% 2.9% 18.3% 2.9% 25.0% 
Total Count 3 9 16 56 20 104 
% of 
Total 
2.9% 8.7% 15.4% 53.8% 19.2% 
100.0
% 
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
 
 
Table 60 above displays cross tabulations results of the responses between important risk 
management topics namely liquidity and nonperforming loans. Overall 73% respondents 
considered nonperforming loans as an important measure for bank regulations as compared 
to 84% respondents who viewed liquidity has significant impact on bank capital 
requirements in commercial banks of Pakistan. The majority of respondents who agreed or 
strongly agreed with the assertion that liquidity has significant impact on bank capital 
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requirements also ranked nonperforming loans as important or most important in regulating 
banks. Only a handful respondents who agreed with the role played by liquidity as 
significant in impacting bank capital requirements classed nonperforming loans as 
unimportant or most unimportant. The result explicates that bank regulation and 
supervisory authorities can use indicators in addition to Capital Adequacy ratio to keep 
track of the financial health of the commercial banks of Pakistan.  
 
Table 61. Capital requirements and procyclicality for regulating banks 
Please rank most important for regulating banks - Capital requirements * Please rank important bank risk - 
Procyclicality Cross tabulation 
 
Please rank important bank risk - Procyclicality 
Total 
most un-
important 
un-
important 
importan
t 
most 
important 
Please rank most 
important for 
regulating banks - 
Capital requirements 
most un-
important 
Count 
4 0 4 3 11 
% of 
Total 
3.8% 0.0% 3.8% 2.9% 10.6% 
un-important Count 
17 0 0 1 18 
% of 
Total 
16.3% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 17.3% 
neutral Count 
8 2 1 5 16 
% of 
Total 
7.7% 1.9% 1.0% 4.8% 15.4% 
important Count 
8 9 0 0 17 
% of 
Total 
7.7% 8.7% 0.0% 0.0% 16.3% 
most important Count 
32 7 2 1 42 
% of 
Total 
30.8% 6.7% 1.9% 1.0% 40.4% 
Total Count 
69 18 7 10 104 
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% of 
Total 
66.3% 17.3% 6.7% 9.6% 100.0% 
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
 
 
 
 
The above table 61 locks in interesting findings regarding views on capital requirements 
and procyclicality cross tabulations. Result of the cross tabulation show that almost all 
respondents were of the view that procyclicality as an unimportant banking risk within 
commercial banks of Pakistan. The highest proportion of respondents (64%) marked 
procyclicality as important risk to commercial banks of Pakistan were interestingly of a 
view that capital requirement is most unimportant for regulating banks. This viewpoint 
however constituted the smallest group of respondents. The highest number of participants 
stood at whopping 84% who thought procyclicality as most unimportant banking risk while 
almost confirming that capital requirements remains the most important measure for 
regulating commercial banks in Pakistan.  
The result remains in line with broader research objective of contributing to risk 
management in commercial banks as participants seemed fully aware as well agreeable to 
the international practices of bank regulations and supervision with claiming capital 
requirements as most important for regulating banks and discarding procyclicality as an 
important banking risk. 
  
Table 62. Basel implementation status and profitability on capital requirements 
To what extent Basel is implemented in your bank * Bank profitability significantly impacts Bank 
Capital requirements Cross tabulation 
 
Bank profitability significantly impacts Bank 
Capital requirements 
Total Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Count 4 0 7 7 18 
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To what extent 
Basel is 
implemented in 
your bank 
Fully Compliant 
(AIRB) 
% of 
Total 
3.8% 0.0% 6.7% 6.7% 17.3% 
To large extent Count 6 5 37 16 64 
% of 
Total 
5.8% 4.8% 35.6% 15.4% 61.5% 
Neutral Count 0 2 10 4 16 
% of 
Total 
0.0% 1.9% 9.6% 3.8% 15.4% 
Not Compliant Count 0 0 4 2 6 
% of 
Total 
0.0% 0.0% 3.8% 1.9% 5.8% 
Total Count 10 7 58 29 104 
% of 
Total 
9.6% 6.7% 55.8% 27.9% 
100.0
% 
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
 
 
The results displayed in table 62 in the series of cross tabulations regarding how 
participants viewed Basel compliance in their banks side by side with their responses on 
profitability as a significant influencer of bank capital requirements. An overall 87 out of 
104 respondents agreed with the assertion that bank profitability impacts bank capital 
requirements significantly. Analysing further commercial banks in Pakistan calculate 
credit risk, market risk and operational risk with standardized approach under Basel Capital 
Regulation with no banks achieved the status of Advanced Internal Rating Based (AIRB) 
methodologies. AIRB methodologies are developed by large internationally active banks, 
none in Pakistan. The response option ‘to large extent’ with regards to extent of Basel 
Compliance reflected the most accurate status of Basel Capital Regulations compliance in 
Pakistan. Large majority (62%) of respondent did tick the correct option indicating that 
overall industry operative are well aware of their banks take on Basel Capital Regulation 
compliance. Interestingly, 53 out of 64 participant who thought that their bank complied 
with Basel to large extent also agreed or strongly agreed with the assertion that profitability 
impacts bank capital requirement significantly and 6 remained neutral. 
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Table 63. Economic fluctuations and NPL on capital requirements 
Economic fluctuations significantly impact Bank Capital requirements * Please rank most important for 
regulating banks - NPL Cross tabulation 
 
Please rank most important for regulating banks - NPL 
Total 
most un-
important 
un-
important neutral 
importa
nt 
most 
important 
Economic 
fluctuations 
significantly impact 
Bank Capital 
requirements 
Disagree Count 0 0 3 8 2 13 
% of 
Total 
0.0% 0.0% 2.9% 7.7% 1.9% 12.5% 
Neutral Count 0 2 1 1 4 8 
% of 
Total 
0.0% 1.9% 1.0% 1.0% 3.8% 7.7% 
Agree Count 3 5 9 36 9 62 
% of 
Total 
2.9% 4.8% 8.7% 34.6% 8.7% 59.6% 
Strongly 
agree 
Count 0 2 3 11 5 21 
% of 
Total 
0.0% 1.9% 2.9% 10.6% 4.8% 20.2% 
Total Count 3 9 16 56 20 104 
% of 
Total 
2.9% 8.7% 15.4% 53.8% 19.2% 
100.0
% 
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
Table 63 shows that 34.6% of participants who agreed with assertion economic fluctuations 
significantly impact bank capital requirements also considered nonperforming loans as an 
important measure in regulating commercial banks of Pakistan followed by 8.7% viewed 
nonperforming loans as most important in regulating commercial banks of Pakistan. The 
same trend continued with a total of 15.4% of the participants who strongly agreed with 
economic factors significantly impact bank capital requirements also considered 
nonperforming loan as most important in regulating commercial banks of Pakistan.  
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Table 64. Credit risk and NPL on capital requirements  
Please rank important bank risk - Credit risk * NPL have significant effect on Bank Capital 
requirements Cross tabulation 
 
NPL have significant effect on Bank Capital 
requirements 
Total 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagre
e Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Please rank 
important bank risk - 
Credit risk 
most un-
important 
Count 0 0 0 3 0 3 
% of 
Total 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.9% 0.0% 2.9% 
un-important Count 0 0 0 0 1 1 
% of 
Total 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 1.0% 
neutral Count 2 0 0 15 0 17 
% of 
Total 
1.9% 0.0% 0.0% 14.4% 0.0% 16.3% 
important Count 0 0 2 20 7 29 
% of 
Total 
0.0% 0.0% 1.9% 19.2% 6.7% 27.9% 
most important Count 0 4 1 23 26 54 
% of 
Total 
0.0% 3.8% 1.0% 22.1% 25.0% 51.9% 
Total Count 2 4 3 61 34 104 
% of 
Total 
1.9% 3.8% 2.9% 58.7% 32.7% 
100.0
% 
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
In our series of cross tabulations, table 64 above displays interesting side by side analysis 
of when participants were prompted to give views regarding credit risk as most important 
banking risk and their status of agreement regarding significant impact of nonperforming 
loans on bank capital requirements. An overwhelming 22.1% and 25% of participants 
agreeing and strongly agreeing that nonperforming loans have significant effect on bank 
capital requirements also thought Credit risk as most important banking risk faced by 
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commercial banks of Pakistan followed by 19.2% and 6.7% participant who viewed credit 
risk as important agreed and strongly agreed respectively, with nonperforming loans 
breeding significant impact on bank capital requirements. Interestingly, 14.4% of the 
participants who remained neutral to credit risk being most important banking risk 
respectively also agreed with nonperforming loan have significant impact on capital 
requirements of commercial banks of Pakistan.  
 
Table 65. Liquidity and Market risk on capital requirements 
Please rank important bank risk - Liquidity * Market risk has significant impact on Bank Capital 
requirements Cross tabulation 
 
Market risk has significant impact on Bank Capital 
requirements 
Total Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Please rank 
important bank risk - 
Liquidity 
most un-
important 
Count 2 0 12 2 16 
% of 
Total 
1.9% 0.0% 11.5% 1.9% 15.4% 
un-important Count 2 2 19 15 38 
% of 
Total 
1.9% 1.9% 18.3% 14.4% 36.5% 
neutral Count 2 0 25 4 31 
% of 
Total 
1.9% 0.0% 24.0% 3.8% 29.8% 
important Count 2 0 3 5 10 
% of 
Total 
1.9% 0.0% 2.9% 4.8% 9.6% 
most important Count 0 0 8 1 9 
% of 
Total 
0.0% 0.0% 7.7% 1.0% 8.7% 
Total Count 8 2 67 27 104 
% of 
Total 
7.7% 1.9% 64.4% 26.0% 
100.0
% 
Source: questionnaire results of the study 
 
To sum up our series of cross tabulation analysis, table 65 above present views of 
participants regarding importance of liquidity cross tabulated with impact of market risk 
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on bank capital requirements. Interestingly a significant percentage 18.3% and 14.4% of 
respondent respectively agreed and strongly agreed with assertion that market risk has 
significant impact on capital requirements of the bank, but viewed liquidity risk as 
unimportant. A further 11% and 1.9% respectively, added to agree and strongly agree 
category that market risk causes significant fluctuations in bank capital requirements 
remained even more unimpressed marking liquidity risk as most unimportant. The result 
shows that participants who overall agreed with market risk causing fluctuations in capital 
requirements also viewed liquidity as unimportant in commercial banks of Pakistan.  
 
6.2.4 Results of Chi-Square tests 
Chi-square test applied as the study used categorical variables in order to test the validity 
of the distribution. Null hypothesis under chi-squared tests that data follow expected 
distributions. The behaviour of observed versus expected counts analysed below.  
 
Table 66. Credit risk on Bank capital requirements  
Credit risk has significant impact on Bank capital requirements 
 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Neutral 4 34.7 -30.7 
Agree 62 34.7 27.3 
Strongly agree 38 34.7 3.3 
Total 104 
  
Source: calculations from questionnaire results of the study 
Ho: Credit risk has no significant impact on Bank capital requirements 
Ha: Credit risk has significant impact on Bank capital requirements  
 
The above table 66 shows a net positive residual of 30.6 in favour of the assertion that 
credit risk impact on bank capital requirements with no opposition. 
 
Table 67. Market risk on Bank capital requirement  
Market risk has significant impact on Bank Capital requirements 
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Observed N Expected N Residual 
Disagree 8 26.0 -18.0 
Neutral 2 26.0 -24.0 
Agree 67 26.0 41.0 
Strongly agree 27 26.0 1.0 
Total 104 
  
Source: calculations from questionnaire results of the study 
Ho: Market risk has no significant impact on Bank capital requirements 
Ha: Market risk has significant impact on Bank capital requirements  
 
The net positive residual of observed remains above expected count in favour of the 
statement that market risk has significant impact on capital requirements of the commercial 
banks of Pakistan as per results displayed in table 67 above. 
 
Table 68. Operational risk on Bank capital requirement 
 
Operational risk significant impact on Bank Capital requirements 
 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Disagree 11 26.0 -15.0 
Neutral 8 26.0 -18.0 
Agree 59 26.0 33.0 
Strongly agree 26 26.0 .0 
Total 104 
  
Source: calculations from questionnaire results of the study 
Ho: Operational risk has no significant impact on Bank capital requirements 
Ha: Operational risk has significant impact on Bank capital requirements 
 
The results displayed in frequency table 68 above show net positive residual over expected 
confirming that operational risk has impact on minimum capital requirements of 
commercial banks of Pakistan.  
 
Table 69. Liquidity on Bank capital requirements 
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Liquidity has significant impact on Bank Capital requirements 
 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Disagree 7 26.0 -19.0 
Neutral 10 26.0 -16.0 
Agree 61 26.0 35.0 
Strongly agree 26 26.0 .0 
Total 104 
  
Source: calculations from questionnaire results of the study 
Ho: Liquidity has no significant impact on Bank capital requirements 
Ha: Liquidity has significant impact on Bank capital requirements 
 
The net residual of observed over expected remains in favour of the statement that liquidity 
risk has significant impact on capital requirements of the commercial banks of Pakistan as 
per results displayed in table 69. 
 
Table 70. NPL on Bank capital requirements 
 
NPL have significant effect on Bank Capital requirements 
 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Strongly disagree 2 20.8 -18.8 
Disagree 4 20.8 -16.8 
Neutral 3 20.8 -17.8 
Agree 61 20.8 40.2 
Strongly agree 34 20.8 13.2 
Total 104 
  
Source: calculations from questionnaire results of the study 
Ho: NPL have no significant impact on Bank capital requirements 
Ha: NPL have significant impact on Bank capital requirements 
 
Table 70 above locks in results for the chi square test displaying that net positive residual 
in favour of the assertion that nonperforming loans have significant impact on minimum 
capital requirements of commercial banks of Pakistan.  
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Table 71. Bank size on Bank capital requirements 
Bank size significantly impacts Bank Capital requirements 
 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Strongly disagree 3 20.8 -17.8 
Disagree 13 20.8 -7.8 
Neutral 10 20.8 -10.8 
Agree 54 20.8 33.2 
Strongly agree 24 20.8 3.2 
Total 104 
  
Source: calculations from questionnaire results of the study 
Ho: Bank size has no significant impact on Bank capital requirements 
Ha: Bank size has significant impact on Bank capital requirements 
 
Table 71 above presents the result that the net residual of observed values over expected 
values in favour of the statement that bank size effects minimum capital. 
 
Table 72. Bank profitability on Bank capital requirements 
 Bank profitability significantly impacts Bank Capital requirements 
 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Disagree 10 26.0 -16.0 
Neutral 7 26.0 -19.0 
Agree 58 26.0 32.0 
Strongly agree 29 26.0 3.0 
Total 104 
  
Source: calculations from questionnaire results of the study 
Ho: Bank profitability has no significant impact on Bank capital requirements 
Ha: Bank profitability has significant impact on Bank capital requirements 
 
The statement regarding impact of bank profitability on minimum capital requirements of 
the commercial banks of Pakistan delivered a net residual of 35 over expected value in 
favour as shown in table 72 above.  
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Table 73. Economic fluctuation on Bank capital requirements 
 Economic fluctuations significantly impact Bank Capital requirements 
 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Disagree 13 26.0 -13.0 
Neutral 8 26.0 -18.0 
Agree 62 26.0 36.0 
Strongly agree 21 26.0 -5.0 
Total 104 
  
Source: calculations from questionnaire results of the study 
Ho: Economic fluctuation have no significant impact on Bank capital requirements 
Ha: Economic fluctuations have significant impact on Bank capital requirements 
 
The results displayed in table 73 above shows a net residual value of 31.0 over the expected 
values in favor of the question that procyclicality significantly impacts the minimum 
capital requirements of the commercial banks of Pakistan.  
 
Table 74. Test Statistics 
 
 SPSS- Test Statistics 
 
Credit risk 
has 
significant 
impact on 
Bank 
capital 
requiremen
ts 
Market risk 
has 
significant 
impact on 
Bank 
Capital 
requirement 
Operational 
risk 
significant 
impact on 
Bank 
Capital 
requirement
s 
Liquidity 
has 
significant 
impact on 
Bank 
Capital 
requirement 
NPL have 
significant 
effect on 
Bank 
Capital 
requirement
s 
Bank size 
significantly 
impacts 
Bank 
Capital 
requirement
s 
Bank 
profitability 
significantly 
impacts 
Bank 
Capital 
requirement
s 
Economic 
fluctuations 
significantly 
impact 
Bank 
Capital 
requiremen
ts 
Chi-
Square 
49.000a 99.308b 63.000b 70.846b 131.865c 77.250c 63.462b 69.769b 
Df 2 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 34.7. 
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b. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 26.0. 
c. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 20.8. 
 
Above table 41 shows the expected values of the number of sample observations in each 
level of variables. The results decree that data cannot accept the null hypothesis and 
observed sample frequencies differ significantly from expected frequencies.  
 
 
6.3 Chapter Conclusion 
The results of the analysis of the questionnaires carried out used straight analysis across 
the board. In addition cross tabulations applied on restricted cases adding closing remarks 
with chi-square test results. It turns out that risk management in commercial banks of 
Pakistan is overwhelmingly approved and applied. Industry operatives of commercial 
banks in Pakistan were educated and experienced in the field of risk management in 
banking, therefore proved particularly knowledgeable of the international bank regulations 
and supervision practices on risk management compliance in commercial banks of Pakistan 
under Basel International Capital Accord. This reflects to the effective contribution of the 
Bank Regulations and Supervisory institutions of Pakistan in particular State Bank of 
Pakistan through circulars and Bank surveillance division in clarifying the objectives of 
complying with international standard of Basel Capital Adequacy regime as a serious 
business. As a result of the efforts extended by the State Bank of Pakistan the participants 
of the study seemed convinced of improvements introduced to risk management practices 
in commercial banks of Pakistan under International Basel Capital Adequacy regime. The 
participants of the study significantly evidenced their expertise and showed their awareness 
as well as approval of the current composition of capital adequacy ratios under Basel 
Capital Regulation for regulating and supervising banks. However, the results did not 
support the null hypothesis of the study that capital adequacy ratio under Basel is sufficient 
enough indicator of solvency health of commercial banks of Pakistan. The results point out 
to the fact that participants approved of factors in addition to current ingredients of credit 
risk, market risk and operational risk significantly affect directly or indirectly the minimum 
capital requirements of the commercial banks in Pakistan. These included nonperforming 
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loans, bank size, profitability and liquidity. With liquidity now incorporated in the Basel 
calculations, the participant views decree that there still remain more indicators that should 
be monitored under risk management to have even clearer picture of financial health of 
commercial banks of Pakistan for the purpose of bank regulations and supervisory. The 
results of the survey also shed light to the fact that participants carried experience in the 
risk management practices in Pakistan and applied their experience, market knowledge and 
skills in risk management decision making under the guidelines set by the regulator. The 
participants also viewed procycliacity as an important factor and approved that economic 
fluctuations also impact minimum capital requirements of the commercial banks in 
Pakistan and therefore aggravate procyclicality.  
 
 
 
Chapter 7: Secondary Data Analysis 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The study aims to examine in Pakistan in particular, the widely assumed role of 
international financial regulation and supervision on banks in improving risk management, 
profitability and thence overall reducing commercial bank sector’s contribution towards 
causing events of economic collapse (Michalapoulos, Leaven and Levine 2009; Barth et al 
2010; Chortareas et al 2012). There is plentiful evidence of varied shuffles of bank specific 
variables and economic indicators arranged in baffling sets of relationships in attempt to 
gauge the impact of banks capital behavior on the economic activity. The bulk of the 
literature, owing to extensive research activity makes notable progress in China, Gulf, 
United Kingdom, Europe and Americas214. The literature on developing economies 
                                                 
214 See Bouheni et al (2014); Messai and Jouini (2013); Klein (2013) for detailed discussion on Europe and 
Americas. Al-Khouri (2011) examined data of 43 commercial banks in the Gulf over the period 1998-2008 
applying fixed effect model. Cai and Huang (2014) for China. 
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evidence number of attempts to estimate impact of financial sector on economic activity in 
Pakistan however, research on role of commercial banks capital behavior in the economy 
for instance, continues well off pace in addressing capital adequacy shortcomings215. 
7.2 Research Data 
Data discussed as follows, directly extracted from the balance sheet, profit and loss 
statement and notes to the accounts of the sampled banks. The secondary data comprise of 
Bank Specific Variables namely Non-performing loan ratio (NPLR), Return on Asset 
(ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), Size (LGTA), Credit risk weighted assets to total assets 
(CRR), Market risk weighted assets to total assets (MRR) and Operational risk weighted 
assets to total assets (ORR); and 2 Macroeconomic variables GDP growth rates (GDPGR) 
and Industrial Production Index of Pakistan growth rates (IIPGR), hypothesized to capture 
the influence on the dependent variable Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR). Pakistan is 
compliant with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) under the organizing 
bodies of ‘The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan’ (ICAP) and ‘Securities and 
Exchange Commission of Pakistan’ (SECP)216. 
 
7.2.1 Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) 
Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR), the dependent variable extracted directly from notes to the 
accounts of the commercial banks of Pakistan. The CAR is regarded by the International 
Bank Capital Regulations and Supervision authorities as most important predictor of Banks 
                                                 
215
 In Pakistan see contributions by Ali et al (2011) by way of descriptive statistics and regression for the 
period between 2006 and 2009; Akhtar and Nishat (2002) use of DEA; Usman (2010) studied impact of 
Global financial crises on Pakistan; Alam et al (2011) attempts to study Pakistan commercial banks financial 
performance. 
216 The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan (ICAP) regulates chartered accountants in Pakistan 
and standard setting body for Islamic Financial Accounting Standards. Securities and Exchange Commission 
of Pakistan (SECP) financial regulatory body that monitors accounting standards for all entities in Pakistan. 
SECP is member of International Organization of Securities and Commissions (IOSCO), International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), International Organization of Pension Supervisors (IOPS) and 
Corporate Registers Forum (CRF).   
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ability to respond to external shock and demands regulators’ full attention in thoroughly 
scrutinizing banks’ positions. CAR indicates the level of banks financial fitness to absorb 
external shock in times of economic distress and calculated as percentage of risk weighted 
assets. In Pakistan risk weights are applied under Basel Capital guideline in line with 
research motive to establish the behavior of Basel Capital regulation in times of economic 
bother and after the global financial crises in Pakistan. Minimum capital requirements set 
at minimum of 8% and as calculated under pillar 1 of Basel Capital Accord affects directly 
the banks’ capital structure with follow up reflections on the risk weightings. Larger 
minimum capital requirements would impact in restricted operations of the banking 
sacrificing profitability and growth, whereas lower minimum capital requirements can be 
argued to allow banks to increase business investing in riskier positions (Wei 2011).  
 
7.2.2 Bank Size (LGTA) 
Total assets indicate the extent of bank operations, size and asset portfolio. Total assets are 
directly linked with the fluctuations in the capital structure of the bank therefore remain an 
important determinant of the capital ratios. On the contrary large banks enjoy good repute 
and ratings but equally subject to lower capital adequacy ratios see Jackson et al (2002); 
Gropp and Haider (2007). The study used natural logarithm of total assets as proxy of bank 
size (Kashyap and Stein 1995). 
 
Ho: Bank size has no significant impact on Capital Adequacy Ratio  
Ha: Bank size has significant impact on Capital Adequacy Ratio 
 
7.2.3 Profitability (ROE and ROA)  
Return on Equity and Return on Assets constitute most important profitability indicators. 
Profit after tax is used to calculate both ratios. There is no denying in profit directly 
influence capital base of the banks in form of retained earnings. In addition, the profit 
serves as proxy to the riskiness of banks assets impacting the risk management and Capital 
Adequacy Ratio see Buyuksalcarci and Abdioglu (2011): 
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Ho: ROA has no significant impact on Capital Adequacy Ratio 
Ha: ROA has significant impact on Capital Adequacy Ratio 
 
Ho: ROE has no significant impact on Capital Adequacy Ratio 
Ha: ROE has significant impact on Capital Adequacy Ratio 
7.2.4 Non-performing loan ratio (NPLR) 
The ratio calculated as the non-performing loans to total advances. Non-performing loan 
easily qualifies as most important indicator relating to whole of the economy (Sorge 2004). 
This can be simply explained as growing economy generally increases income levels 
suggesting better affordability of loans. For banks non-performing loans directly impact 
profitability, represent financial riskiness and influence capital adequacy ratios. NPL thus 
becomes an important bank specific predictor to impact of minimum capital requirements 
in Pakistan (Khemraj and Pasha 2009).  
 
Ho: NPLR has no significant impact on Capital Adequacy Ratio 
Ha: NPLR has significant impact on Capital Adequacy Ratio 
7.2.5 Credit risk weighted assets to Total Assets (CRR) 
Keeping at par with international risk management practices credit risk weightings are 
applied as per Basel Capital Guidelines in Pakistan. Credit risk is major determinant of 
Asset quality in banking. In fact, Basel Capital Regulation declares Credit risk as most 
important element in calculating Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR). Basel Capital Regulation 
also sets CAR as central measure of Bank’s ability to respond to economic shock. The 
study puts Basel claims to test and aims to identify if CAR incorporates the true impact of 
Credit risk in Pakistan. In addition, CRR has positive relationship with Capital Adequacy 
Ratio as increase in credit risk should theoretically mean an increase in minimum capital 
requirements. The research monitors the behavior of actual credit risk weighted assets to 
determine the credit riskiness of the total assets for each bank. The following formula 
applied to derive CRR where data is taken from notes to the accounts: 
 
CRR=Credit risk weighted assets/total assets x 100 
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Ho: CRR has no significant impact on Capital Adequacy Ratio 
Ha: CRR has significant impact on Capital Adequacy Ratio 
7.2.6 Market risk weighted assets to Total Assets (MRR) 
Market risk weightings are applied under Basel Capital Guidelines. The Market risk 
directly impacts the risk management in banking and should be reflected in their day to day 
positions. Importance of market risk is duly acknowledged by the Basel Capital Accord 
and is therefore a major determinant in calculating CAR as per Basel Capital regulations. 
Higher market risk simply equates to additional capital required to deal with the situation. 
Here too, actual market risk weighted assets was taken against total assets to determine 
market riskiness of the total assets portfolio, data from annual accounts was used in the 
following formula to derive MRR: 
 
MRR=Market risk weighted assets/total assets x 100 
 
Ho: MRR has no significant impact on Capital Adequacy Ratio 
Ha: MRR has significant impact on Capital Adequacy Ratio 
7.2.7 Operational risk weighted assets to Total Assets (ORR) 
Basel Capital Accord identifies Operational Risk and third most important factor in 
calculating CAR, at par with Credit risk and Market risk. Commercial banks in Pakistan 
apply operational risk weighting under Basel Capital Guidelines in calculating CAR. The 
ORR has positive relationship with Capital Adequacy Ratio and actual operational risk 
weighted assets data used from the annual accounts in the following formula derive ORR 
as an indicator of operational riskiness of the total assets profile: 
 
ORR=Operational risk weighted assets/total assets x 100 
 
Ho: ORR has no significant impact on Capital Adequacy Ratio 
Ha: ORR has significant impact on Capital Adequacy Ratio 
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7.2.8 Gross Domestic Product (GDPGR) 
 
In order to construct economic impact of banks capital requirements it is important to gauge 
economic activity in line with fluctuations in banks capital base, however the evidence in 
literature of a causal relationship is scarce (Martynova 2015). Gross domestic product 
(GDP) serves as the best proxy of economic activity where increased economic activity 
encourages borrowing directly affecting the size and quality of banks assets. Increased 
economic activity would mean better credit quality and lower CAR. GDP growth rates 
therefore is considered important determinant of the CAR with inverse relationship and 
included in our econometric model. 
 
Ho: GDPGR has no significant impact on Capital Adequacy Ratio 
Ha: GDPGR has significant impact on Capital Adequacy Ratio 
7.2.9 Industrial Production Index of Pakistan (IIPGR) 
Industrial production index of Pakistan is an important proxy of economic activity 
concentrating sector wise banks’ lending on manufacturing, mining, construction and 
energy distribution (Ali et al 2010). Thus IIP of Pakistan growth rates used by the study to 
establish the role of IIPGR in predicting CAR. Economic growth historically encourage 
sector wise borrowing and directly impact minimum capital requirements of the banks 
through asset quality. 
Ho: IIPGR has no significant impact on Capital Adequacy Ratio 
Ha: IIPGR has significant impact on Capital Adequacy Ratio 
7.3 Stylized facts 
Financial liberalization in Pakistan began in early 90s when private sector, knocking at the 
doors of the banking sector of Pakistan was allowed a way in. Late 90s saw privatization 
of two large state owned banks217 out of seven at the time. The decade also witnessed 
                                                 
217 Muslim Commercial Bank (MCB) and Allied Bank Limited (ABL) both banks part of the current big 6. 
Other 4 are United bank limited (UBL), National bank of Pakistan (NBP), Habib bank limited (HBL) and 
Bank Al-Falah (BAFL) 
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minimized intervention by the government in banking sector of Pakistan. Pakistan 
commercial banks grew in asset size, similar trend followed in foreign banks’ assets 
operating in Pakistan. Deposits and advances grew tremendously during the decade. 
Privatization further put in top gear through 2000’s where the banking sector remained 
largely resilient even during the crises period (Jalil and Feridun 2011). Economic growth 
of Pakistan remained strong since 1950s recession, however steep decline in GDP growth 
rates (GDPGR) witnessed as Global financial crises did penetrate Pakistan economy 
inflicting sudden decline in foreign investment. Despite rise in remittances, the GDP 
growth rates remained on a downward trend due to decline in exports as well as energy 
crises, inflation, security issues, poverty and inequality, where signs of recovery surfaced 
much quicker. Figure 4 shows that return on assets (ROA) of commercial banks of Pakistan 
remain strongly positively correlated with the GDP growth rates with almost equivalent 
negative dive. The nonperforming loans (NPLR) show strong negative correlation with 
both GDP growth rates and return on assets (ROA) from 2007 to 2009 showing a steep 
climb. Commercial banks in Pakistan operate well above Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) 
threshold of 8% set by the Basel International regulatory guidelines and their 
internationally active counterparts. Capital adequacy ratio of commercial banks in Pakistan 
witness downward trend since 2007 nevertheless still trails well above Basel Capital 
Regulations guidelines. The drop in capital can be intuitive of number of scenarios for 
example acting as a buffer to encounter liquidity issues faced due to shortage in foreign 
investment; increasing asset portfolios; or simply to align with Basel Capital guidelines of 
8%. Nevertheless, the total assets (LGTA) of banks in Pakistan shows a constant growth 
pattern. 
 
Figure 5: Banking Sector of Pakistan 
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7.4 Empirical Results 
Sample means, medians, maximums, minimums, standard deviations, skewness and 
kurtosis arranged in table 75. Data asymmetry is evident as skewness negative for GDPGR, 
IIPGR, LGTA, ROE and ROA suggesting fat tails towards the left where CAR, CRR, 
MRR, ORR and NPLR with positive skewness. Kurtosis seen deviate from 3 in majority 
of series to confirm non normality. P-values for the calculated Jarque-Bera statistic show 
that null hypothesis for normality distribution assumption for CAR, MRR, ORR, GDPGR, 
IIPGR, ROE, ROA and NPLR rejected at 1%; rejected for LGTA at 5%; and rejected for 
CRR at 10%. 
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Table 75. Descriptive Statistics (Secondary Data) 
 
 CAR CRR GDPGR IIPGR LGTA MRR NPLR ORR ROE ROA 
 Mean  17.19503  50.85653  3.596250  3.372500  18.78101  4.162764  12.38750  7.841684 -1.559196  0.201558 
 Median  14.47000  47.90000  3.770000  3.515000  18.88000  2.880000  10.13500  6.495000  7.410000  0.660000 
 Maximum  65.43000  90.87000  5.540000  9.030000  21.35000  26.46000  91.11000  80.09000  28.57000  3.980000 
 Minimum  0.560000  10.41000  0.360000 -4.180000  15.74000  0.030000  0.220000  0.400000 -270.5500 -7.080000 
 Std. Dev.  10.86166  14.20106  1.486674  3.700637  1.306938  4.567547  10.28677  9.175587  35.94958  1.888551 
 Skewness  1.898491  0.392601 -0.947349 -0.567606 -0.168658  1.886415  2.924425  6.383892 -3.944495 -1.571557 
 Kurtosis  7.088175  2.990309  3.331503  2.946775  2.201025  7.368392  19.65877  46.36950  22.95257  5.751644 
 Jarque-
Bera  258.1216  5.112942  30.83146  10.76282  6.236529  276.2543  2545.744  16692.09  3816.997  144.6955 
Probability 0.000000* 0.077578*** 0.000000*  0.004601* 0.044234** 0.000000* 0.000000* 0.000000*  0.000000* 0.000000* 
 Obs  199  199  200  200  199  199  196  196  199  199 
*, **, *** denote significance level at 1, 5 and 10% respectively 
 
For unit root testing in panel datasets Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), Im, Pesaran and Shin 
(2003), and Fisher-type (Choi 2001) test null hypothesize that all the panels contain a unit 
root. In order to overcome the issue of heterogeneity bias across cross-sections and confirm 
reliability of the parameter estimates, time series properties of data examined. Levin, Lin 
and Chu test results in column 2 of the Table 76 significantly reject the null hypothesis and 
hence all variables exhibit stationarity traits. 
  
Table 76. Stationarity tests 
 
         
Variables  Levin, 
Lin and 
Chu 
p-
value 
Im, 
Pesaran 
and Shin 
p-
value 
ADF-
Fisher 
Chi-
square 
p-
value 
PP-
Fisher 
Chi-
square 
p-
value 
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CAR -22.86 0.00 -4.83 0.00 111.2
4 
0.00 93.36 0.00 
CRR -28.45 0.00 -8.56 0.00 145.2
5 
0.00 117.3
9 
0.00 
MRR -9.79 0.00 -2.41 0.00 85.65 0.00 90.92 0.00 
ORR -72.80 0.00 -19.74 0.00 139.8
7 
0.00 134.8
9 
0.00 
NPLR -9.36 0.00 -2.55 0.00 83.86 0.00 104.5
7 
0.00 
LGTA -8.35 0.00 0.82 0.79 59.56 0.16 46.89 0.59 
ROA -18.08 0.00 -6.07 0.00 136.5
5 
0.00 136.1
4 
0.00 
ROE -10.17 0.00 -3.37 0.00 100.1
3 
0.00 110.8
6 
0.00 
GDPGR -18.06 0.00 -5.66 0.00 137.0
2 
0.00 97.28 0.00 
IIPGR -12.95 0.00 -4.99 0.00 125.7
1 
0.00 90.66 0.00 
 
7.4.1 Fixed and Random Effects  
Panel data sometimes termed as longitudinal data or cross sectional time-series, most 
importantly allows for individuality of each cross section, for example level of staff 
expertise, cultural applications or occupational practices and so forth in each commercial 
bank of Pakistan. Panel data may be analysed with ‘Fixed effects’ and ‘Random effects’ 
techniques. In order to establish impact of variables that vary over time in panel data sets, 
fixed effects technique is commonly deemed appropriate. Fixed effects modelling 
reconnoitre relationship between dependent and independent variables within each 
commercial bank, responding to assumptions that each bank in the sample has its own 
individual characteristics that may or may not influence the predictor variables. Fixed 
effects model controls for any unobservable characteristics existing within each bank that 
may or may not impact the independent and dependent variables. In other words the effect 
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of those time-invariant properties must be removed to bring to surface the net effect of the 
explanatory variables on the dependent variable. Advancing on the concept, fixed effects 
model assumes each bank is unique so that those time-invariant properties are unique to 
each bank. Fixed effects can be estimated in following forms: 
Yit = βXit + α i + uit 
Where Y, X and u represent the outcome variable, independent variables and the error term, 
i represent bank at time t, β represents the coefficients of independent variables. The fixed 
effects is αi218 that induces unobserved heterogeneity and Xit represents observed 
heterogeneity. The term uit contain the remaining omitted variables. Test for redundant 
fixed effects is applied to test for unobserved heterogeneity, if there is no unobserved 
heterogeneity the model reports pooled regression. Fixed effects Least Squares Dummy 
Variable (LSDV) facilitates enhanced understanding of the fixed effects by adding a 
dummy variable for each bank absorbing the effects unique to that bank, therefore by 
adding dummy for each bank, pure effect can be estimating by controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity. LSDV estimation model includes n-1 dummy variables. Fixed effects 
rewritten for LSDV as: 
Yit = βX/it + α1D1i + … + αnDni + uit 
Fixed effects model can capture the business cycle, unexpected variation or special events, 
therefore the period effects may be added as:  
Yit = βX/it + αi + δt + uit 
δt captures omitted variables at every time period and is constant over cross sections. 
Random effects technique takes into account that variations across the banks could be 
random and uncorrelated with the predictor variables in the model. Each bank’s error term 
is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables and therefore allows time-invariant variables 
to join in as explanatory variables. Thus, Random effects modelling serves the assumption 
that there may be reason to believe that the difference across banks have some predictor 
capabilities on the dependent variable. Random effects modelling allows for time invariant 
                                                 
218  αi (i=1…n), where n is bank specific intercepts 
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variables to be included with introduction of between entity estimator εit in the model 
below: 
Yit = βX/it + γ + εit + uit 
 
In sum, we report Fixed effects (LSDV) model tackle the issue of heterogeneity by 
allowing each bank to have its own intercept value that does not vary over time. Fixed 
effects model seems to be to appropriate, however in data sets with large number of cross 
sections in comparison with time periods Random effects appears appropriate219. Random 
effects estimation reported with generalized least squares (EGLS). Generalized Least 
Squares takes care of unobservable heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation present in panel 
datasets. 
 
7.4.2 Hausman test 
Hausman test based on chi-squared test static applied to decide between fixed effects and 
random effects models and then appropriate model reported (Wooldridge 2010). Hausman 
test tests whether the unique errors (ui) are correlated with regressors therefore null 
hypothesis under Hausman test is that unique errors (ui) are not correlated with regressors.  
In testing our panel data we start by reporting redundant fixed effects – likelihood ratio in 
table 77, we observe the value of F-statistic at 23.19 (p-value 0.000). The results suggest 
that panel data can apply either or both cross-section random and fixed effects estimation 
(Bai 2009). 
 
Table 77. Likelihood ratio 
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: EQ01    
Test cross-section fixed effects  
     
     
Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     
Cross-section F 23.196499 (24,160) 0.0000 
                                                 
219 see Kaufman (2013) 
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Cross-section Chi-square 290.904129 24 0.0000 
     
     
 
 
We report our estimations results in table 78. Equation 1 correspond to cross section fixed 
effects and equation 2 cross section random effects for comparison where the standard 
errors are reported in brackets. *, **, *** denote significance level at 1, 5 and 10% 
respectively. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 78. Regression Results 
 
 
    
 
    
Dependent variable: CAR 
   
     
  Equation 1 Equation 2 
Explanatory 
Variable FIXED EFFECTS RANDOM EFFECTS 
Constant 167.3917* (31.6648) 136.3107* (14.7041) 
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CRR -0.264053* (0.063532) -0.228854* (0.031096) 
MRR -0.079384 (0.103639) -0.039773 (0.097454) 
ORR 0.181179** (0.07284) 0.201769* (0.033246) 
NPLR -0.051907 (0.045843) -0.059094 (0.04565) 
LGTA -7.323359* (1.516714) -5.789702* (0.717929) 
GDPGR 0.074524 (0.599851) 0.120555 (0.699873) 
IIPGR 0.044211 (0.239108) 0.010784 (0.284673) 
ROE 0.052732** (0.021481) 0.056857* (0.014378) 
ROA -0.959714* (0.359391) -0.979191* (0.33912) 
     
Panel observation (unbalanced)  194  194 
R-squared 
 
0.889358 
 
0.493221 
Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.866538 
 
0.468433 
F-statistic 
 
38.97281 
 
19.8975 
Prob(F-statistic) 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
Standard errors are reported in brackets. *, **, *** denote significance level at 1, 5 and 10% respectively 
 
 
Hausman test reported in table 79 below suggests that the coefficients of the random effects 
model are the same as fixed effects. Therefore, p-value is insignificant as per the results of 
the Hausman test, therefore null hypothesis not rejected by our data and random effects 
model is preferred. 
 
Table 79. Hausman Test 
 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: EQ01    
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 16.465030 9 0.0578 
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Table 78 presents the regression results with both models and presents the general picture. 
It is evident that all variables exhibit consistency in sign and significance in their 
relationship with Capital Adequacy Ratio in both models. The table 0.4 also show that 
variables CRR, ORR, LGTA, ROE and ROA significantly impact Capital Adequacy Ratio, 
on the contrary variables MRR, NPLR, GDPGR and IIPGR have no effect on Capital 
Adequacy Ratio. Based on Hausman test, Random Effects model (Equation 2/Table 78) 
reported in more detail.  
Random effects model we observe R-square at 49% suggesting that half of the variability 
in capital adequacy ratio can be explained by the variables selected. The null hypothesis 
that all coefficients are simultaneously zero significantly rejected based on computed F-
value of 38.97 (p<0.000) of our panel estimation, therefore concluded that estimation is 
significant.   
 
7.4.3 Discussion 
The results shows that impact of CRR on CAR is highly significant at 1% and bears a 
negative sign therefore we reject our null hypothesis that credit risk has no significant 
impact on Capital Adequacy Ratio of the bank.  
The impact of MRR on CAR is not statistically significant therefore we accept our null 
hypothesis here that market risk does not have significant effect on Capital Adequacy 
Ratio.  
The impact of ORR on CAR is highly significant at 1% therefore we reject our null 
hypothesis that Operational Risk has no significant impact on Capital Adequacy Ratio. 
The impact of NPLR on CAR is not significant therefore we accept our null hypothesis 
that Non-performing loan has no significant impact on Capital Adequacy Ratio. 
The impact of LGTA on CAR is highly significant at 1% with a negative sign therefore we 
reject null hypothesis that size of the bank does not significantly impact Capital Adequacy 
Ratio. 
The impact of GDPGR on CAR is not significant there for we accept the null hypothesis 
that there is no impact of Gross domestic product growth on Capital Adequacy Ratio. 
The impact of IIPGR on CAR is not significant there for we accept the null hypothesis that 
there is no impact of Industrial Production of Pakistan growth on Capital Adequacy Ratio. 
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The impact of ROE on CAR is highly significant at 1% therefore we reject null hypothesis 
that return on equity does not have significant impact on Capital Adequacy Ratio. 
The impact of ROA on CAR is highly significant at 1% and bears a negative sign therefore 
we reject null hypothesis that return on assets have no significant impact on Capital 
Adequacy Ratio. 
 
In analysing the behaviour of credit risk, identified as the most important risk according to 
Basel Capital Regulation. The result of our estimation falls in line with expectation of the 
research and Basel Capital Regulation objectives. Negative sign and significance of the 
coefficient of CRR reflect to a negative relationship between Credit risk and Capital 
Adequacy Ratio. The estimation result here suggest that a unit increase in Capital 
Adequacy Ratio reduces Credit risk by 22% points, therefore confirming upon the Basel 
Capital regulatory objective of raising Capital in times of economic slowdown to avoid 
credit default. This seems all good and prove the point, i.e. Pakistan benefits with 
compliance with Basel Capital Regulation. However we analyse the contrary, the 
commercial banks in Pakistan have been operating with higher Capital Adequacy Ratio 
than Basel Capital Regulations recommendations, and this due to the peculiar political and 
economic environment Pakistani banks operate in. In complying with International Basel 
Capital Regulations, the concerns of home and host country are highlighted. However, the 
results corroborates with banking sector growth in Pakistan. Commercial banks in Pakistan 
decreased capital in order to aligning banks’ capital with regulatory requirement. In the 
process, commercial banks in Pakistan seemed to have managed to free up some cash 
resulting in asset growth, however with a trade-off of  raised credit risk by nearly a quarter 
of a point with each unit of Capital decreased. Raised credit risk points out to the riskiness 
of assets and associated with higher returns. This implies that in case banks need to raise 
capital would mean for each unit of capital raised, credit risk decrease by a quarter of a 
point implying lower returns and reduced profitability for the bank restricting asset growth. 
The results confirm the complexity involved in keeping the CAR in line with regulatory 
requirements without compromising credit risk quality in Pakistan and questions 
significantly, the role of International Capital Regulation in influencing the minimum 
capital requirements of the banks. Therefore, in Pakistan without evidence of 
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procyclicaltiy, the role of Basel Capital Regulation can be debated to either encourage 
banks to get involved in riskier position or discourage in restricted asset growth.  
 
Most interestingly the regression results point out that market risk does not have any impact 
on Capital Adequacy Ratio in Pakistan as MRR has no significant impact on CAR. Market 
risk is reflective of the volatility of banks trading book positions that are directly exposed 
to fluctuations in interest rate, for –ex rates, equity and commodity prices. Under Basel 
Capital Regulations market risk is tackled with VAR techniques as a measure of 
determining minimum capital requirements (Trenca 2009). Basel Capital Regulation 
identifies market risk as an important contributor in calculating minimum capital 
requirements and form part of Capital Adequacy Ratio formula. Capital Adequacy Ratio 
of commercial banks in Pakistan not reflective of Market risk can somewhat be explained 
by the fact that banks in Pakistan mainly exposed to credit risk and have restricted market 
positions. Nevertheless, this result is not consistent with our research intentions and Basel 
Capital Accord. According to our estimation output, Operational risk is significant in 
effecting Capital Adequacy Ratio with a positive sign and that however, remains in line 
with the Basel Capital Regulations claims as well as the objective of the research. The 
empirical result reveals that for each unit capital is raised, Operational risk is raised by 0.20 
of a unit. The results reveal the concerns with operational risk management remain very 
much alive in Pakistan just like the rest of the world.  
 
Our estimation shows that NPLR has no significant impact on CAR, which comes as a 
surprise. Non-performing loans directly impacts the lending activity and remain an 
important indicator of the financial health of the bank (Khemraj and Pasha 2009). Non-
performing loan portfolio form a significant part of the capital requirement. Capital 
adequacy ratio, used as the main tool to determining minimum capital requirement remains 
not reflective of the behaviour of non-performing loans in Pakistan. Our regression further 
reveals that size is statistically significant in effecting Capital Adequacy Ratio. The 
coefficient of LGTA is significant at 1% and bears a minus sign. According to our 
regression increase in 1 unit of CAR would mean 5.7 units decrease in the size of the bank. 
The finding is very significant and seems corroborative of the growth in Pakistani banking. 
Commercial banks in Pakistan largely operate with higher capital adequacy ratio and 
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remain in position to further enhance their asset size. GDP growth rates and industrial 
production growth rates included in our model to identify the procyclicality of banks’ 
capital behaviour. Our estimation shows that both GDPGR and IIPGR have no significant 
impact on capital adequacy ratio of banks. The result of our estimation suggest that there 
is no evidence of impact of economic activity or industry growth on the capital adequacy 
ratio of the commercial banks in Pakistan. The result is not consistent with the research 
objective as well as the evidence in post financial crises research of comparable countries 
(Caggiano et al 2014). Nevertheless, due to the fact that the research only takes into 
consideration data for a comparatively shorter period that is period from 2007 and 2014 
seems not enough to capture the procyclical impact of Capital Adequacy Ratio under Basel 
Capital Regulations umbrella. Our estimation reveals that both profitability indicators ROE 
and ROA have statistically significant impact on CAR, i.e. ROE with a positive sign and 
ROA with a negative sign. The result is show that Return on Equity has positive impact on 
Capital Adequacy Ratio of the commercial banks of Pakistan and fluctuates by 0.05 percent 
for each unit change in CAR. The Return on Assets on the other hand bears a negative 
relationship with 1 unit change in CAR would cause return on assets decrease by nearly 
the same proportion in the commercial banks of Pakistan. This presents with very 
interesting phenomenon that profitability shows direct (ROE +) as well as inverse (ROA -
) relationship with Capital Adequacy Ratio of the commercial banks in Pakistan. Both 
profitability ratios are as important as each other, however in Basel compliant environment 
minimum capital requirements have negative impact on ROA in commercial banks of 
Pakistan. Given the findings, commercial banks of Pakistan faced with an ambiguous 
consequence making it almost impossible task when trying to control for profitability at 
the same time as carrying out required regulatory adjustments in the capital adequacy as 
profitability and capital adequacy coefficients predicting opposite signs.  
7.5 Chapter Conclusion 
Secondary data analysis results revealed that market risk and liquidity (NPL), two of the 
major risk determinants under International Basel Capital Regulation not reflected in the 
capital adequacy ratio of the commercial banks in Pakistan. Market risk is major 
constituent of the current Basel II capital adequacy formula and liquidity currently being 
phased in through Basel III accord. Nevertheless, both aforementioned variables are 
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extremely important in gauging the risks faced by the commercial banks of Pakistan. 
Therefore, this identifies capital adequacy ratio as a weaker than expected representative 
of important banking risks faced by the commercial banks in Pakistan. In contrast, the 
results of the secondary analysis of the study show that bank size and profitability are 
statistically significant in impacting on capital adequacy ratio. Therefore we accept 
alternate hypothesis of the study and conclude that capital adequacy ratio under Basel 
Capital does not reflect important banking risks factors adequately in commercial banking 
sector of Pakistan. The results also show that the impact of procyclicality not reflected in 
capital adequacy ratio as economic indicators used for the study220 remain statistically not 
significant in predicting capital requirements of the commercial banks in Pakistan. This 
could be explained by the fact that research only managed to accumulate data for a 
comparatively short period, only 7 year from 2007 to 2014 and therefore not covering 
complete business cycle to reflect procyclicality of Capital base variations of the 
commercial banks of Pakistan under Basel Capital Regulations. In addition the result 
remain reflective of the sophistication of the GDP as a superior economic indicator 
incorporating whole of the economic activity of country and therefore diluting impact on 
capital adequacy ratio of the commercial banking sector of Pakistan. Nevertheless, despite 
all discussed the analysis also reveals that commercial banking sector of Pakistan remain 
financially healthy with higher than required Capital Adequacy Ratios by the Basel Capital 
Accords, thus creating additional capital buffer and therefore seemed adequately equipped 
to handling any form of the economic calamity.   
  
                                                 
220 Gross Domestic Product and Industrial Production Index growth rates 
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Part 3: Conclusion 
Chapter 8: Findings, conclusions and recommendations 
8.1 Introduction 
 
Banking risks generally led by credit risk, market risk, operational risk, liquidity risk, and 
procyclicality played crucial role in causing global financial concern on number of 
occasions and yet most recent past witnesses the brutality of aforementioned banking risks. 
Basel Capital Adequacy regime221, the global flag bearer of the bank regulations and 
supervision, recommended approaches for calculating, maintaining and monitoring 
minimum capital adequacy ratios (CAR) for international banks to be ready in case a 
financial event unfolds. Basel Capital Adequacy framework started with progressive 
introduction in the G-10 countries followed by countries across the globe, setting the global 
bank regulations and supervision trend. In keeping at par with the international bank 
regulatory compliance developments in the rest of the world, State Bank of Pakistan also 
initiated Basel II implementation in Pakistan. Basel Capital Accord, the revolutionary three 
pillar approach to calculating minimum capital requirements don’t come cheap. In order to 
embed Basel Capital Framework in their existing systems, banks invested heavily in 
upgradation of technology as well as training and development of human resources. 
Despite all round advancements, compliance and consultations, Basel Capital Accord in its 
form of Basel II, the most complete modern International Bank Regulations and 
Supervision at the time, fell short of its expectations. The Global Financial Crises of 2007-
8 questioned explicitly the limitations of monitoring Capital Adequacy Ratios as true 
warning sign amongst most advanced Banking institutions.  
 
The study attempted to gauge economic impact on capital requirements of commercial 
banks of Pakistan and endeavored to test that minimum capital requirements computed 
                                                 
221 Basel Capital Adequacy framework, the global flag bearer of international bank capital regulation and 
supervision was initially proposed by the G10 countries: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA 
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using Basel methodology reflects all important banking risks to guesstimate solvency of 
the financial system of Pakistan. The objective of the research remained to investigate the 
role and limitations of International Basel Capital Regulations in commercial banking 
sector of Pakistan. There is no denying the huge gap that exists between scale of 
commercial banking operations of Pakistan and developed world. Therefore research 
extends crucial insights to limitations faced by developing economy of Pakistan in 
choosing to follow the path of developed countries in fields of bank regulations and 
supervision to improve risk management in commercial banking sector.  
 
The chapter contains the summary of the epic ‘Taming Financial Capital - Role and 
limitations of Basel Capital Adequacy Regulations’ in commercial banking sector of 
Pakistan. The plot unfolded through a dual methodology regime employed by the study 
including primary approach ‘the questionnaires analysis’ and secondary approach ‘panel 
data modelling’. The approaches adopted by the study investigated the relationship of a 
striking cast of economic variables (GDP and IIP), bank specific variables (ROE, ROA, 
NPL, SIZE) with integral banking risk determinants (Credit risk, Market risk, Operational 
risk) on Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) derived under currently deployed Basel Capital 
Adequacy risk management manifesto in commercial banks of Pakistan. In addition, 
invaluable contribution extracted from the participation of the industry operatives, the 
chapter précises the major outcomes of the study, revolutions and revelations that draw 
concluding remarks of the entire research and finalized recommendations. The chapter also 
hints at the limitations of the research, highlights areas for further research and boldly 
attempts to go beyond the scope of the study.   
8.2 Summary of Findings 
The study dug into the efficacy of Bank regulations and supervision ‘Basel Capital 
Accords’ in taming financial capital by investigating ‘the Role and Limitations’ of Basel 
Capital convergence in Pakistan. The research, in addition to pioneering crucial insights 
into extent of Basel compliance in Pakistan, dared to contest claims that Capital Adequacy 
Ratios under Basel Capital Framework adequately reflects all important banking risks in 
predicting financial health of commercial banking system of Pakistan and taming the 
financial capital.  
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The research unfolded some revealing facts: 
 
 
 
 The research premier most revealed that Pakistan, a developing economy succeeded 
in incorporating Basel Capital Accord across her commercial banking sector as per 
claims of the principal regulator: State Bank of Pakistan, under standardized 
approaches of the Basel Capital Accord. Therefore despite Basel compliance in 
Pakistan, there remains much work to be done to achieve advanced internal rating 
based methodologies compliance status. Nevertheless, the commercial banks of 
Pakistan managed significant investment to integrate Basel Capital Accord into 
their systems and culture. In short, commercial banks of Pakistan found resources 
and successfully upgraded technology to facilitate advanced reporting protocols 
incorporating Basel requirements as well as staff training and development. The 
results of both primary as well as secondary data analysis credit this in abundance. 
The views of the participants significantly confirmed the Basel compliance status 
as per results shown in table 29 of the primary data analysis.  The industry 
operatives took part in the study were not only aware of Basel compliance in their 
institutions but also up to date with current developments including Basel III capital 
ratios. Not only that, participants approved of Basel Capital effectiveness in 
Pakistan as per results in tables 28 and 30 of the primary data analysis. Basel 
compliance status of commercial sector of Pakistan was also evident from the 
secondary data collected for the study as the CAR, along with other constituents 
collated for the study from the year 2007. This evidence also suggests that 
commercial banks in Pakistan comply with standardized approach and none of the 
banks have developed Internal Rating Based approaches for calculating risk. 
 
 The results of the primary research of the study showed that majority of the 
participating risk managers occupied between 6 to 15 years of experience with post 
graduate qualification and were fully conversant with the risk management 
operations of Pakistani commercial banking sector. Risk management operatives 
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with their erudite responses, welcome Basel compliance in Pakistan and a way 
towards better risk management in commercial banking sector. The primary 
research evidence that risk management is serious business for the commercial 
banks of Pakistan and all commercial banks of Pakistan operate with specialist risk 
management departments actively incorporating International Basel Capital 
Adequacy regime to Pakistan’s economic outlook. The participants of the study 
gave particular importance to bank specific risk determinants on capital 
requirements including credit risk, market risk, and operational risk in current Basel 
setup. In addition to aforementioned, the participants also considered liquidity, non-
performing loans, profitability and size of the banks impact the capital 
requirements, however currently not reflected in the capital adequacy ratio formula 
of the Basel Capital Accord  
 
 The primary results of the survey showed that participants approved of 
procyclicality however, did not think reflected in the minimum capital requirements 
of the commercial banks of Pakistan. Therefore the research failed to find evidence 
of impact of economy on minimum capital requirements of the commercial banks 
of Pakistan.  
 
 The participants of the study ranked credit risk as most important banking risk. The 
participants also ranked Capital Adequacy as the most important measure for 
regulating commercial banks of Pakistan; and finally participants ranked local bank 
regulations as most important factor in effective risk management of commercial 
banks in Pakistan. The participants also distinguished non-performing loans from 
the liquidity risk arising from the market positions and gave more importance to 
the non-performing loans showing credit risk as a prime banking risk determinant 
in Pakistan.  
 
 Overall the respondents viewed credit risk, non-performing loans and market risk 
followed by liquidity risk, profitability and operational risk are most important 
variables that effect minimum capital requirements. Economic impact and bank 
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size were the least important on the list in their opinion that impact minimum capital 
requirements of the commercial banks in Pakistan. 
 
 The regression results showed explanatory variables that captured credit risk, 
operational risk, profitability and the size of the banks significantly influenced 
capital adequacy ratio of the commercial banks of Pakistan. Credit risk and size of 
the banks showed negative significant relationship with the capital adequacy ratios 
of the commercial banks of Pakistan. The explanatory variables for market risk, 
non-performing loans, GDP growth rates and Industrial Production growth rates 
did not have significant impact on the capital adequacy ratios of the commercial 
banks of Pakistan.    
 
 The secondary research also shows that Capital Adequacy ratios of Commercial 
banks of Pakistan exceed the required Basel Capital Adequacy framework and 
therefore revealed that commercial banking sector of Pakistan222 as largely solvent. 
Capital Adequacy Ratios remains the principal statutory benchmark and considered 
most dominant measure of banks’ financial health. The financial soundness also 
backed by less vulnerable financial system of Pakistan and further supported by 
risk portfolios largely based on collateral. The evidence therefore points out to the 
fact that the financial products in Pakistan continue to be less complex as compared 
to advanced economies. Nevertheless, maintaining high capital adequacy ratios 
endorsed market confidence and evidence ability to encounter economic shock in 
commercial banking sector of Pakistan.  
 
 The primary research also stresses the importance of the role played by the Local 
Bank Regulations. The State Bank of Pakistan succeeded in putting the message 
across commercial banking industry of Pakistan that ‘Basel compliance is a serious 
regulatory duty’ as revealed by the results in table 51 of primary data. The argument 
further supported by the results of table 57 of primary data showing that participants 
                                                 
222 With the exception of Kasb bank, not managed to keep up with the required Capital Adequacy Ratios and 
continuously experienced declining trading eventually fell prey to takeover in 2014. 
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viewed risk management in commercial banks of Pakistan benefited by the Basel 
Compliance. This reflects to the effectiveness of local banking regulations in 
emerging economies setup and also shows that industry operatives in commercial 
banking sector of Pakistan seriously developed Basel Capital framework 
knowledge for compliance in their institution as per State Bank of Pakistan 
directive.  
 
 The primary results of the study support the alternate hypothesis extended by the 
research that Basel Capital Framework does not reflect all important risk 
determinants of the commercial banking sector of Pakistan in judging the health of 
the financial sector. The results in tables 32 through to table 34 reflect that 
participants approved of the Basel calculated Capital Adequacy Ratio as a major 
indicator of the financial health of the commercial banks in Pakistan. Industry 
players however, as evident in tables 35 through to 39 of the primary data analysis 
also pointed out additional factors including procyclicality, non-performing loans, 
bank size and profitability crucial in impacting the capital requirements of the 
commercial banks not covered under Basel Capital Accord explicitly and therefore 
no buffer raised to address these concerns. By allocating a capital buffer would 
serve as a cushion to economic distress and somewhat address the issue of higher 
probability of default, certainly seemed a sane option than having to inject funds 
from the taxpayers. 
 
 Secondary as well as primary data results point out credit risk remained the 
predominant risk determinant of the commercial banking sector of Pakistan and 
significantly impact minimum capital requirements of Basel compliant commercial 
banks in Pakistan. This result may further favour the notion that Pakistani banking 
structure follows a basic setup lacking sophistication in derivatives market. On the 
contrary, the study noted that commercial banks in Pakistan actively involved in 
the market activity, in progress of achieving sophistication in risk instruments thick 
and fast; thence the risk weighted assets in commercial banks on rise. This points 
out to the need for regulator to design and introduce provident reporting systems to 
capture development and complexity in derivatives market.  
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 Secondary results of the study suggest that Credit and Operational risks impact the 
minimum capital requirements of the commercial banks of Pakistan, however 
market risk, the third musketeer of Basel Capital Framework exert no explanatory 
power on the Capital Adequacy Ratio of the commercial banks of Pakistan. This 
remains an important revelation as all three credit, market and operational risk are 
major constituents of the Capital Adequacy formula devised under Basel Capital 
Accords, the forerunner regulatory framework for determining capital adequacy of 
banks across the globe. The research further revealed that in Pakistan, foreign 
exchange risk and Equity position risk remain smaller constituents of the total 
market risk weighted assets figure, the interest rate risk represents well over half of 
the market risk weighted assets composition. This indicate optimum recording of 
market risk. Keeping in mind Pakistan, a developing economy remains significantly 
reliant on foreign exchange influx both remittances and foreign aid, and therefore 
exposed to foreign exchange risk predominantly. In addition to that, Pakistan 
following liberalization of financial sector witnessing development of money 
market system which consequently is prone to plentiful market risk factors. 
Nevertheless, the secondary data analysis result suggested market risk although 
captured correctly as per evidence in the secondary data collection, not reflected in 
capital adequacy framework to mirror the full scale of market risk in Pakistan, this 
again supports the alternate hypothesis of the study that capital ratios of banks do 
not aptly reflect all important bank risks in commercial banking sector of Pakistan.  
 
 The results of the secondary data analysis reveal that capital adequacy ratio of the 
commercial banks of Pakistan failed to reflect economic activity. This could 
partially be attributed to the time period of the research that did not capture 
completed business cycle. This was further supported by the primary data analysis 
results in table 44 with majority participants view procyclicality as unimportant. 
Therefore there is no evidence that capital requirements of the commercial banks 
of Pakistan exacerbate procyclicality. The result thence supports the second 
alternate hypothesis tested by the study that change in minimum capital 
requirements do not exacerbate procyclicality in Pakistan. Nevertheless, the results 
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of primary data analysis in tables 39, 49 and 53 also show economic activity 
indirectly impacts on minimum capital requirements of the commercial banks of 
Pakistan. Therefore the results indirectly support the advocates of procyclical view 
that banks do better during the times of economic boom. 
 
 
 
8.3 Conclusion 
 
The research takes the stage right in midst of heightened focus on the limitations of 
international bank regulations and supervision following the global financial crises lit by 
the failure of big US banks. Pakistan had also turned to Basel Compliance like the rest of 
the world, to improve asset quality and adhere to more predictive capital adequacy ratios. 
The defeat of Basel II capital regulation by sheer strength of global financial crises 
questioned the role of capital adequacy ratios and their predictive strength. This in turn 
perceptibly paved the way in for continued consultation of the topic amongst varied 
industry players and thence the release of even more comprehensive regulations: Basel III, 
however still, keeping faith in capital adequacy ratios. The study motivated by the cause 
extended investigation in determining role and limitations of the international banking 
regulations and supervisory in tackling procyclicality and important banking risk issues 
through its Basel Capital compliance in commercial banks of Pakistan. The study 
investigated the determinants of capital adequacy ratios and limitations of international 
bank capital regulations in Pakistan by compiling views of 104 key risk managers of the 
commercial banks of Pakistan through structured questionnaires. The research also applied 
panel data modelling approach with tailored combination of risk determinants, bank 
specific variables and economic indicators. In addition to primary investigation, the 
research efforts in devising unique proxies to capture the riskiness of the Pakistani 
commercial banking assets and procyclicality portray originality of the study. The 
hypothesis of the study tested if the capital adequacy ratios are predictive of the financial 
health of the commercial banks of Pakistan i.e. reflected all important banking risk factors 
and captured the economic impact.  
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The empirical outcome of the study favours the viewpoint that economic factors like GDP 
growth and Industrial Production growth do not significantly impact the Capital Adequacy 
Ratio of the commercial banks of Pakistan. To add to the economic sphere, the secondary 
data analysis also reveal that market risk did not significantly impact Capital Adequacy 
Ratio of the commercial banks of Pakistan despite being major risk determinant recognized 
by the international banking regulation pundits. All in all, the results reveal that minimum 
capital requirements alone, currently relied upon by banking regulators and supervisors 
does not act as an optimum determinant to gauge the impact of economic activity on the 
commercial banks of Pakistan or capture all banking risk factors adequately favouring 
alternate hypothesis of the study.  
 
The results of the secondary data analysis further revealed that Non-performing loans 
activity in Pakistan, strongly negatively correlated to GDP did not impact the capital 
adequacy ratio of the commercial banks of Pakistan showing weak representation of 
economic activity in capital requirements of the commercial banks in Pakistan. Lending, 
the largest activity by the commercial banks in Pakistan with no exception to the rest of the 
world or historic banking patterns, seems plagued by the variation in non-performing loans 
and yet this impact is not reflected in the minimum capital requirements of the commercial 
banks of Pakistan though capital adequacy ratios. Increase in non-performing loans tend to 
espouse uncertainty in risk management practices in commercial banking sector. The 
growth in deposits of commercial banks of Pakistan depicts increased pressure faced by 
Pakistan commercial banks to increase their lending activities. Nevertheless, losses due to 
non-performing loans seriously dent the confidence of commercial banks in growing their 
business and therefore restrict lucrative profit making propositions. Drop in GDP of 
country easily responsible for rise in non-performing loans in Pakistan highlighting 
heightened depreciation in quality of assets. That in turn had sparked increased capital 
requirements of the commercial banks of Pakistan and therefore handicapping banks’ 
ability to further their business or even sustain current profitability levels.  
 
The empirical results however also show, variables that captured Credit risk and 
operational risk along with the size of bank and profitability show significant impact on 
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capital adequacy ratio in Pakistani banking sector. In particular credit risk have significant 
negative relationship with the capital adequacy ratio of the commercial banks of Pakistan. 
The negative significant relationship between credit risk and capital adequacy, contrary to 
Basel expectations implies that in commercial banking sector of Pakistan, reducing capital 
requirements down to the suggested levels of the Basel Capital Accord would result in 
increase in the credit risk. This again reveals the limitation of Basel Capital Accord in 
capturing the peculiar credit risk structure of Pakistani commercial banks signified by 
lending on collateral and henceforth partially justifies the existence of higher capital 
adequacy ratios in Pakistani commercial banking sector.  
 
In summary, the research notes from the data analysis that Pakistani commercial banks 
complied with Basel Capital Regulations in applying risk weights to their assets under 
standardized approaches and therefore heavily reliant of external credit rating agencies. 
The research further records that commercial banks of Pakistan operate with higher than 
compulsory Basel regulatory capital requirements. This demonstrates significant financial 
health and that commercial banks of Pakistan, according to their capital adequacy ratios 
calculated under Basel Capital Accord are solvent. Nevertheless, the picture could be 
imprecise as the research shows that Basel clad Capital Adequacy Ratios in Pakistan 
represent mere extract of the riskiness of the commercial banking business of Pakistan 
rather than the full saga. The results of the study support the alternate hypothesis and 
conclude that capital adequacy ratios under Basel Capital Regulation do not reflect all the 
important banking risk factors that dictate the financial fidelity of the commercial banking 
sector of Pakistan. The research thereafter concludes, capital adequacy ratio signifies a 
weak measure to capture the impact of the whole of the financial sector on the commercial 
banking segment of Pakistan. The study also, despite justifying importance of economic 
impact on banks’ capital requirements, failed to spot any evidence that procyclicality is 
reflected in capital requirement calculated under Basel Capital Accord in Pakistan. 
Therefore in Pakistan, Basel Capital Ratios alone do not act as optimum option or a reliable 
measure for the banking regulators in cautioning of any financial collapse epidemic. 
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8.4 Recommendations 
 
The research amasses following recommendations: 
 
 In view of the study commercial banks in Pakistan seems ready to move forward 
the credit risk ratings allocation of their customer base from external agencies credit 
ratings to developing own internal ratings based models. The commercial banks of 
Pakistan seem to have successfully integrated Basel Capital Accord thus far in their 
engineering. In addition, the industry operatives that are experienced and educated, 
portrayed topic authority in managing day to day risk in commercial banks of 
Pakistan while complying with Basel Capital Standardized approach. Credit risk 
remains the top priority of the commercial banks and therefore general internal 
rating based framework under the State Bank of Pakistan supervision is the way 
forward and should be initiated. However, it remains important that the internal 
rating based framework for Pakistan tailored by the Pakistani commercial banking 
industry players under the Basel Capital guidelines must be closely supervised by 
the regulatory authority. The research advocates that the newly developed internal 
ratings based framework in Pakistani commercial banking sector could be used in 
collaboration with the external credit ratings agencies and therefore substantiate the 
internal ratings based model credit ratings. This initiative would be key step for the 
commercial banks of Pakistan towards moving from standardised approach to 
internal ratings based approaches of Basel Capital Accord and seeking Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) accreditation in this regard.  
 
 Based on the findings of the research as well as recommendation in preceding 
paragraph, the study recommends that training on risk management in banking and 
Basel Capital Accords should become more frequent for staff. Regular Basel 
Capital Accord training and refresher course opportunities should be organised on 
regular intervals a through year and widely advertised amongst the bank employees 
in Pakistan as there seems limited training opportunities and resources at present. 
More training would promote better credit risk management practices and bring 
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more exposure to international capital adequacy developments in banking. In 
addition to improving knowledge of the existing risk personnel, it would prepare 
staff adequately in migrating from standardized to internal rating based approach 
in commercial banks of Pakistan.  
 
 The study also recommends regulatory authorities initiate development of stricter 
regulation of the derivatives market based on increased sophistication and financial 
liberalization on rise in Pakistan. Prudential regulatory framework for securitization 
in particular, should be developed by the State Bank of Pakistan. Market risk 
although captured in the market risk weighted assets under Basel Capital Accord, 
not reflected in the capital adequacy ratios of the commercial banks of Pakistan. 
State Bank of Pakistan should take active consideration of this fact and devise 
alternative measures to keep check on the market positions of the commercial banks 
of Pakistan to forecast liquidity issues arising from market movements. Based on 
sensitivity of commercial banks of Pakistan to market movements, Pakistani 
regulatory authorities should assign if necessary, a capital charge reflecting 
riskiness of market positions through capital adequacy ratio based on the 
sophistication and systemic importance of individual commercial banking 
institutions rather than a standardized industry framework. This would overall 
determine systemic importance of the big industry players and keep the scale of 
their risk taking under observation effectively.  
 
 Procyclicality remains clear and present economic occurrence based on the primary 
results analysis of the study. Furthermore, the Basel Capital regulatory framework 
of the commercial banks of Pakistan failed to significantly reflect that in their risk 
monitoring through capital adequacy ratios. Therefore as a precautionary setup 
Commercial banks of Pakistan should allocate a capital charge for procyclicality. 
For the purpose of effective regulations and transparency the capital charge for 
procyclicaliy should be reflected through capital adequacy ratio. This will act as 
necessary warning signs and cushion against contagion. The State Bank of Pakistan 
should endeavour to supervise the capital ratios more closely to ensure that 
additional regulatory capital buffer for procyclicality installed.  
 257 
 
 
 Non-performing loans show no significant impact on the capital requirements 
therefore behaviour of non-performing loans cannot be predicted through capital 
adequacy ratios of the commercial banks of Pakistan. The study views that in 
making loans the commercial banks of Pakistan in addition to monitoring Capital 
adequacy ratios for credit risk management, should conduct rigorous scrutiny of 
variables effecting economic activity in order to dilute impact of non-performing 
loans on liquidity as well as profitability of the commercial banking sector of 
Pakistan. As a starting point, in extending loan profile commercial banks of 
Pakistan should pay extra attention to the real economic implications on their loan 
portfolios as dip in economic growth usually brings the non-performing loan 
culprits to light. In addition, Pakistani commercial banking sector should duly 
incorporate global economic impact on cash flows of international partners of 
domestic export businesses. Local firms of Pakistan involved in international trade 
heavily rely on cash flows from the foreign partners to continue operations and 
prone to varied liquidity concerns arising from export/import demand fluctuations. 
In addition, close consideration should be given in passing on the interest rate 
detriment to the loan customers given the reality that loan defaults could be frequent 
when real interest rates increased. The State Bank of Pakistan should also develop 
regulatory framework incorporating prudential economic indicators when assessing 
the creditworthiness of commercial banking sector of Pakistan. 
 
 The study also recommends that commercial banks of Pakistan should also 
incorporate analysis of Risk Adjusted Return on Capital (RORAC) in order to 
involve performance evaluation in their broader risk management landscape. This 
would in turn, further improve risk management practices in commercial banking 
sector of Pakistan in a performance driven culture. In addition, liquidity should be 
given consideration as priority and the commercial banks of Pakistan should 
develop culture to balance the business mix optimally. Commercial banks of 
Pakistan must consider economic viability to effectively introduce low risks low 
profit businesses to borrowers with convincing cash flows position rather than 
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continuing with excessive risk taking for higher profit margin with speculative 
businesses with increased liquidity risk.  
 
 
 
8.5 Limitations of the study 
The study remains limited to Pakistani commercial banking sector and the results represent 
implications to Pakistani commercial banking sector and economic outlook. The secondary 
data was collected from a total of 25 commercial bank of Pakistan as well as primary 
research also carried out in commercial banking sector of Pakistan with 104 structured 
questionnaires administered to the risk management personnel of the commercial banks of 
Pakistan. The secondary data captures time period from 2007 to 2014 on yearly bases. The 
study considered the time frame based on availability of data including the research 
variables and symmetry. Also commercial banking sector of Pakistan had not fully 
complied with Basel Capital Accord prior to 2007 in Pakistan therefore limited or no data 
available before 2007 for operational risk of the commercial banks of Pakistan. In addition, 
only yearly frequency could be captured due economic indicators including GDP growth 
rate released yearly rather than quarterly.  
8.6 Future Research 
The participants of the study also included 104 senior risk operatives of commercial 
banking sector of Pakistan, more participation could bring better representation of the risk 
management practices in Pakistan under Basel Capital rule, it would be a great idea to 
incorporate questions regarding risk adjusted rate of return (RAROC). The study could be 
replicated amongst comparing economies or further raise the scale of the research to 
regions including emerging economies, Europe and or Americas. In addition, unlike 
Pakistan quarterly data capability amongst a number of countries and regions would 
facilitate same mix of risk proxies and variables on quarterly basis and greatly allow even 
more in-depth analysis of risk management practices and highlight the role and limitations 
of Basel Capital regulations.   
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Appendix 1: BCBS Groups 
 
Accord Implementation Group (AIG): 
The Accord Implementation Group (AIG) tasked to promote consistency in implementation of the Basel II Framework. AIG 
provides a forum for discussing members' approaches to implementing Basel II and share best practices amongst regulator 
counterparts. Currently the AIG operates further two subgroups that share information and discuss specific issues related 
to Basel II implementation:   
 The Validation Subgroup (AIGV) deals with issues related to the validation ratings and parameters system that 
serve as inputs into the internal ratings-based approaches to credit risk.  
 The Operational Risk Subgroup (AIGOR) addresses issues related to implementation of AMA for operational risk 
within banks.  
The Policy Development Group (PDG): 
The Policy Development Group (PDG) formerly Capital Task Force works for BCBS by identifying and monitoring emerging 
supervisory issues and responds by proposing and developing policies that not only address detected issues but also help 
promote a banking system with adequately equipped with capital according to its exposure to risk and maintain supervisory 
standards. PDG operates following subgroups: 
 The Risk Management and Modelling Group (RMMG) maintains updated contact with the industry on the latest 
advances in risk measurement and management. Its focus remains on assessment of the range of industry risk 
management practices and develop supervisory guidance to promote and share best risk management practices. 
 The Research Task Force (RTF) serves as a forum for research academics and economists from member 
institutions to exchange information and engage in research projects on supervisory and financial stability issues. 
 The Definition of Capital Subgroup explores emerging trends in eligible capital instruments in member jurisdictions 
and also through the course of implementation of Basel II, facilitate monitoring of capital requirements to ensure 
that banks in their jurisdiction maintain required capital base throughout the economic cycle. 
 A Basel II Capital Monitoring Group aims to share national experiences in monitoring capital requirements. 
 The Trading Book Group (TBG) highlights issues relating to the application of Basel II to the exposures arising 
from trading activities e.g. development of principles towards the treatment of event risk in the trading book. 
 The Cross-border Bank Resolution Group (CBRG) addresses issues concerning national policies, legal 
frameworks and other cross-border operations. 
The Accounting Task Force (ATF)  
The Accounting Task Force (ATF) works towards development of prudential reporting guidance and international accounting 
& auditing standards.  
ATF operates following subgroups:  
 The Conceptual Framework Issues Subgroup monitors and responds to the conceptual accounting framework 
project of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board in 
the United States. 
 The Financial Instruments Practices Subgroup assesses implementation of international accounting standards 
for the financial instruments, and explores any links between accounting practices and prudential supervision. 
 The Audit Subgroup works towards encouragement of publishing reliable financial information by responding to 
international audit standards-setting proposals, other issuances of the International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board and the International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants, and audit quality issues. 
The International Liaison Group (ILG)  
International Liaison Group (ILG) formerly Core Principles Liaison Group is responsible for providing a forum in order to 
engage Committee with supervisors around the world on a broader range of issues. That include Senior representatives 
from eight BCBS member countries (France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom and the 
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United States), 16 non- BCBS supervisory authorities (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Hong 
Kong, India, Korea, Mexico, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, and the West African Monetary Union), 
the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Financial Stability Institute, the Association 
of Supervisors of Banks of the Americas and the Islamic Financial Services Board.  
ILG operates following subgroups: 
 The ILG working group on Capital (ILGC) works in collaboration with the AIG. They take responsibility for Basel 
II implementation issues and regularly hold joint group discussions.  
 The Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Expert Group (AML/CFT-EG) responsible 
for monitoring AML/CFT issues that affect banking supervision. 
 
Source: www.bis.org  
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Appendix 2: U.S. and International Transition to Basel II 
Capital Accord 
 
 
 
  Source: GAO (2007) 
   Note: Dates shown for both the international and U.S. parallel run and transition periods are for the advanced risk  
   Measurement approaches. *Donates estimated date 
  
 293 
 
Appendix 3: List of U.S. Core Banks 
 
 
1.  Bank of America    
2. JP Morgan Chase 
3. Citibank 
4. Wachovia 
5. Wells Fargo 
6. Washington Mutual  
7. HSBC a 
8. State Street a 
9. Bank  of New York a 
10. Northern Trust a 
11. Deutsche Bank a 
 
a Include 10% Foreign assets Trigger  
 
defined as large List of 11 Core Banks in US, Core banks 
internationally active banks with foreign exposure in excess of $10 billion and/or total 
assets greater than $250 billion. 
 
Source: GAO-07-253, p23 
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Appendix 4: Change in Minimum Required Capital 
 
Source: Bank for International Settlements www.bis.org  
          
  
QIS-4 Result: Change in Minimum Required 
Capital    
Portfolio 
% change 
in 
portfolio 
MRC 
% point 
Contrib. 
to MRC 
Change 
Median% 
change 
in Port. 
MRC 
Weighted 
Median % 
change in 
Port. 
MRC 
Share 
of 
Basel I 
MRC 
Share 
of 
Basel 
II MRC  
Wholesale 
Credit (24.6%) (10.9%) (24.5%) (21.6%) 44.30% 38.20%  
   Corporate, 
Bank, 
Sovereign (21.9%) (7.4%) (29.7%) (13.5%) 33.90% 30.30%  
   Small 
Business (26.6%) (1.2%) (27.1%) (24.8%) 4.6% 3.9%  
   High Volatility 
CRE (33.4%) (0.6%) (23.2%) (42.4%) 1.8% 1.3%  
   Income 
Producing RE (41.4%) (1.7%) (52.5%) (52.4%) 4.0% 2.7%  
Retail Credit (25.6%) (7.8%) (49.85) (28.7%) 30.6% 26.0%  
   Home Equity 
(HELOC) (74.3%) (4.6%) (78.6%) (76.8%) 6.1% 1.8%  
   Residential 
Mortgage (61.4%) (6.8%) (72.7%) (64.4%) 11.1% 4.9%  
   Credit 
Card(QRE) 66.00% 4.00% 62.80% 72.2% 6.1% 11.6%  
   Other 
Consumer (6.5%) (0.4%) (35.2%) (18.3%) 6.0% 6.4%  
   Retail 
Business 
Exposures (5.8%) (0.1%) (29.2%) 11.6% 1.2% 1.3%  
Equity 6.60% 0.10% (24.4%) 9.6% 1.3% 1.6%  
Other Assets (11.7%) (1.2%) (3.2%) (11.6%) 10.0% 10.1%  
Securitization (17.9%) 1.40% (39.7%) (45.8%) 8.1% 7.6%  
Operational 
Risk   9.20%     0.0% 10.5%  
Trading Book 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%   5.2% 5.9%  
               
Change in 
MRC (12.5%) (12.5%) (23.8%) (17.1%) 100.0% 100.0%  
Change in 
Effective MRC (15.5%)   (26.3%) (21.7%)      
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Appendix 5: BCBS average by Portfolio in percent 
 
 
    BCBS average by portfolio in percent   
Portfolio   Group 1     Group 2   
  size 
Change in 
MRC Contribution size 
Change in 
MRC Contribution 
Wholesale; of 
which: 32.2 7.9 2.5 21.8 -4.1 -0.9 
_ Corporate 26.9 3.2 0.9 16.1 -6.5 -1.0 
_ Bank 4.9 30.0 1.5 5.1 4.3 0.2 
_Sovereign 0.4 55.5* 0.2 0.5 -14.8 -0.1 
SME corporate 8.6 -2.5 -0.2 16.4 -0.5 -0.1 
Specialized lending 4.6 -5.5 -0.3 1.5 7.2 0.1 
Retail; of which: 26.5 -26.9 -7.1 36.0 -25.0 -9.0 
_ Mortgage 22.3 -28.3 -6.3 22.1 -28.2 -6.2 
_Revolving 0.6 -20.5 -0.1 1.2 -22.3 -0.3 
_ Others 3.7 -19.7 -0.7 12.8 -19.8 -2.5 
SME retail 1.8 -23.4 -0.4 5.8 -20.0 -1.3 
Equity 3.2 5.3 0.2 3.2 -0.9 0.0 
Purchase 
Receivables 0.3 -6.2 0.0 0.3 -3.4 0.0 
Other assets 3.3 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.0 0.0 
Securitization 3.0 7.4 0.2 1.7 30.6 0.5 
Counterparty risk 1.2 35.1 0.4 0.1 42.4 0.1 
Specific risk 1.3 5.4 0.1 0.3 1.7 0.0 
Market Risk 1.6 0.6 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 
Related entities 4.7 16.7 0.8 1.7 41.2 0.7 
Other deductions 3.5 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.6 0.0 
Partial use**, others 3.9 -1.1 0.0 4.2 1.3 0.1 
Operational risk     5.6     8.3 
Total 100.0   1.7 100.0   -1.3 
* The large percentage change in capital for the sovereign portfolio arises because a significant part of the sovereign exposures 
are allocated a 0% risk weight under the current accord. Applying any risk weight under the new approach gives an infinite 
percentage increase in capital requirement for those banks with only such exposures, even if in absolute terms the change in 
capital requirements is small. 
** This row includes standardized approach capital requirements for exposure subject to partial use under the IRB approaches 
for banks also providing data for at least one IRB approach. 
 
Source: Bank for International Settlements www.bis.org 
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Appendix 6: Overall results: Standardized approach average by 
portfolio in percent. 
      
Portfolio   Group 1     Group 2   
  size 
Change in 
MRC Contribution size 
Change in 
MRC Contribution 
Wholesale; of which: 22.1 7.7 1.7 40.8 40.2 16.4 
_ Corporate 20.1 2.1 0.4 34.8 -0.5 -0.2 
_ Bank 1.9 64.2 1.2 5.1 45.5 2.3 
_Sovereign* 0.1 80.5 0.1 0.9 1643.2 14.3 
SME corporate 9.9 0.5 0.0 6.5 -1.2 -0.1 
Specialized lending 1.7 -2.5 0.0 0.2 19.6 0.1 
Retail; of which: 17.1 -24.1 -4.1 21.7 -14.9 -3.2 
_ Mortgage 14.1 -28.9 -4.1 3.6 -3.3 -0.1 
_Revolving 1.3 -3.1 0.0 2.3 -24.5 -0.6 
_ Others 1.7 -1.0 0.0 15.7 -16.3 -2.5 
SME retail 0.0 72.8 0.0 3.7 -21.8 -0.8 
Equity 0.1 -1.5 0.0 2.2 -1.1 0.0 
Purchase 
Receivables 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 9.4 0.1 
Other assets 2.0 0.0 0.0 8.1 0.0 0.0 
Securitization 0.3 102.4 0.3 0.8 -18.2 -0.1 
Counterparty risk 1.3 66.8 0.9 0 1739.2 0.6 
Specific risk 0.9 12.4 0.1 1.6 306.1 5.0 
Market Risk 1.8 0.0 0.0 6.3 22.1 1.4 
Related entities 7.5 0.0 0.0 5.2 124.1 6.4 
Other deductions 32.5 0.0 0.0 2.6 -24.9 -0.6 
Partial use**, others 2.7 -19.7 -0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Operational risk     3.5     13.0 
Total 100.0   1.8 100.0   38.2 
* The large percentage change in capital for the sovereign portfolio arises because a significant part of the sovereign exposures are 
allocated a 0% risk weight under the current accord. Applying any risk weight under the new approaches gives an infinite percentage 
increase in capital requirement for those banks with only such  exposures even if in absolute terms the change in capital requirements 
is small. 
** This row includes standardized approach capital requirements for exposure subject to partial use under the IRB approaches for banks 
also providing data for at least one IRB approach. 
Source: Bank for International Settlements www.bis.org 
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Appendix 7: Roadmap of Basel Capital convergence Pakistan 
 
 Activity/Action 
 
Description 
 
Date of 
Completion 
1 
 
Finalization of 
Implementation Plan 
 
Preparation and finalization of the Roadmap 
after consultation with the stakeholders for 
Implementation of Basel II. 
 
31.03.2005 
 
2 
 
Communicating the 
implementation 
plan to Banks 
Plan to Banks After the approval of this road 
map, the plan to implement Basel II in 
Pakistan will be communicated to the banks. 
The communication will include; 
Timeframe for the adoption of Basel II. 
Minimum requirements for the adoption of 
various approaches for credit and operational 
risk. 
This communication will enable banks to 
devise their internal plans and would gear up 
their efforts. 
31.03.2005 
 
3 
 
Designation of 
coordinator at each 
bank 
 
To serve as a focal point for coordinating 
activities internally and communicating with 
SBP. 
The coordinator could be CFO or Head of 
RM or Head of Credit. 
31.05.2005 
 
4 
 
Banks to submit their 
individual plans 
containing specific 
approach 
(Standardized or IRB) 
they intend to adopt 
and their internal plans 
with respect to such 
implementation. 
 
However the banks intending to adopt 
advance approaches will be subject to SBP’s 
validation/approval. 
30.06.2005 
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5 
 
Approval of 
individual plans by 
SBP.  
Finalization of specific approach to be 
adopted by each bank. 
30.09.2005 
 
6 
 
Preparing eligibility 
criteria and rules 
for recognition of 
ECAIs 
The eligibility criteria will be used for short 
listing of rating agencies 
 
30.06.2005 
 
7 
 
Recognition of ECAIs 
and mapping of the 
ratings with the 
appropriate risk 
weight. 
Inviting applications from the interested 
Ratings agencies. 
 
Assigning the risk weight for their particular 
ratings. 
30.09.2005 
8 
 
Capacity Building at 
SBP.  
Organizing various learning sessions. 2005-2008 
(on-going) 
9 
 
Capacity building in 
banks  
PBA to take lead. 2005-2008 
10 
 
Preparation and 
issuance of 
instructions/Circular 
Issuing detailed instructions to banks for 
Implementation of Basel II. 
 
31.12.2005 
 
11 Parallel run of Basel II 
.Banks to continue 
meeting the existing 
MCR. 
Simultaneously to calculate capital adequacy 
on the basis of Basel II 
 
01.07.2006 
to 
31.12.2007 
 
PILLAR 2 SUPERVISORY REVIEW PROCESS 
12 Prompt Corrective 
Measures by SBP  
Deciding on the range of actions and 
standardizing them for different scenarios in 
case a bank is not meeting in whole or in part 
different aspects of capital adequacy as 
emerged during the supervisory review 
process. 
31.12.2005 
 
PILLAR 3 MARKET DISCIPLINE 
13 Reviewing existing 
disclosure 
Compare the existing disclosure 
requirements with those required under Basel 
30.09.2005 
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Requirement for 
banks with respect 
to Basel II and 
assessing the gaps. 
II and identify what additional discloser 
would be required by banks 
 
14 Preparing / drafting 
new formats for 
disclosure by banks 
in order to meet 
the minimum 
disclosure 
requirements 
Under Basel II. 
To be prescribed along with proposed 
circular to be issued by SBP for 
implementation of Basel II. 
 
31.12.2005 
 
     
                                                                                                                                        
Source: State Bank of Pakistan www.sbp.org.pk 
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Appendix 8: Group-wise composition of Banks of Pakistan 
 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan www.sbp.org.pk 
 
  
2008 2009 Sep-10 
A. Public sector com. banks (4) A. Public sector com. banks (4) A. Public sector com. banks (4) 
National Bank of Pakistan National Bank of Pakistan National Bank of Pakistan 
First Women Bank Ltd First Women Bank Ltd First Women Bank Ltd 
The Bank of Khaiber The Bank of Khaiber The Bank of Khaiber 
The Bank of Punjab The Bank of Punjab The Bank of Punjab 
      
B. Local Private Banks(25) B. Local Private Banks(25) B. Local Private Banks(25) 
Askari Bank Ltd. Askari Bank Ltd. Askari Bank Ltd. 
Bank Alfalah Ltd. Bank Alfalah Ltd. Bank Alfalah Ltd. 
Bank Al Habib Ltd. Bank Al Habib Ltd. Bank Al Habib Ltd. 
Mybank Ltd. Mybank Ltd. Mybank Ltd. 
Faysal Bank Ltd. Faysal Bank Ltd. Faysal Bank Ltd. 
Habib Metropolitan Bank Ltd. Habib Metropolitan Bank Ltd. Habib Metropolitan Bank Ltd. 
KASB Bank Ltd. KASB Bank Ltd. KASB Bank Ltd. 
The Royal Bank of Scotland Ltd. The Royal Bank of Scotland Ltd. The Royal Bank of Scotland Ltd. 
Saudi Pak Commercial Bank Ltd. Saudi Pak Commercial Bank Ltd. Saudi Pak Commercial Bank Ltd. 
Sonari Bank Ltd. Sonari Bank Ltd. Sonari Bank Ltd. 
Standerd Chartered Bank(Pakistan) Ltd. Standerd Chartered Bank(Pakistan) Ltd. Standerd Chartered Bank(Pakistan) Ltd. 
MCB Bank Ltd. MCB Bank Ltd. MCB Bank Ltd. 
Allied Bank Ltd. Allied Bank Ltd. Allied Bank Ltd. 
United Bank Ltd. United Bank Ltd. United Bank Ltd. 
Meezan Bank Ltd. Meezan Bank Ltd. Meezan Bank Ltd. 
NIB Bank Ltd NIB Bank Ltd NIB Bank Ltd 
SAMBA Bank Ltd. SAMBA Bank Ltd. SAMBA Bank Ltd. 
Habib Bank Ltd Habib Bank Ltd Habib Bank Ltd 
Atlas Bank Ltd Atlas Bank Ltd Atlas Bank Ltd 
Arif Habib Bank Ltd Arif Habib Bank Ltd Arif Habib Bank Ltd 
Dubai Islamic  Bank  Pakistan Ltd Dubai Islamic  Bank  Pakistan Ltd Dubai Islamic  Bank  Pakistan Ltd 
 Bank Islami Pakistan  Ltd  Bank Islami Pakistan  Ltd  Bank Islami Pakistan  Ltd 
JS Bank Ltd JS Bank Ltd JS Bank Ltd 
Emirates Global Islamic Bank Ltd Emirates Global Islamic Bank Ltd Emirates Global Islamic Bank Ltd 
Dawood Islamic Bank Ltd Dawood Islamic Bank Ltd Dawood Islamic Bank Ltd 
      
      
C. Foreign Banks (7)  C. Foreign Banks (7)  C. Foreign Banks (7)  
Albaraka Islamic Bank B.S.C. Albaraka Islamic Bank B.S.C. Albaraka Islamic Bank B.S.C. 
Bank of Tokyo -Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd. Bank of Tokyo -Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd. Bank of Tokyo -Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd. 
Deutsche Bank AG. Deutsche Bank AG. Deutsche Bank AG. 
Citibank N.A. Citibank N.A. Citibank N.A. 
Oman International Bank S.A.O.G. Oman International Bank S.A.O.G. Oman International Bank S.A.O.G. 
Barclys Bank PLC. Barclys Bank PLC. Barclys Bank PLC. 
HSBC Bank Middle East Ltd. HSBC Bank Middle East Ltd. HSBC Bank Middle East Ltd. 
      
D. Specialized Banks (4) D. Specialized Banks (4) D. Specialized Banks (4) 
Zarai Taraquiti bank Ltd. Zarai Taraquiti bank Ltd. Zarai Taraquiti bank Ltd. 
Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan 
Punjab Provincial Co-operative Bank Ltd. Punjab Provincial Co-operative Bank Ltd. Punjab Provincial Co-operative Bank Ltd. 
SME Bank Ltd. SME Bank Ltd. SME Bank Ltd. 
      
All commercial Banks (36) All commercial Banks (36) All commercial Banks (36) 
Include A+B+C Include A+B+C Include A+B+C 
      
All Banks (40) All Banks (40) All Banks (40) 
Include A+B+C+D Include A+B+C+D Include A+B+C+D 
* Descheduling of Albaraka Islamic Bank Pakistan Operations and merge into Emirates Global Islamic Bank Ltd with effect from October 29, 2010. 
 301 
 
Appendix 9: Stress Tests of Banks of Pakistan  
September 30, 2010    
    
  
Number of 
Banks  
  
      with CAR   
    < 0% 0% - 10% 
> 
10% 
Pre- Shock 3 3 34 
Post – Shock     
Credit Shocks       
C-1 
15% of performing loans moving to substandard, 15% of substandard to doubtful, 
25% of doubtful to loss. 
4 7 20 
C-2 
Tightening of loan classification i.e. NPLs under substandard category 
downgraded to doubtful and all doubtful NPLs downgraded to loss category. 
4 4 32 
C-3 25% of loans to the textile sector directly downgraded to doubtful category. 4 5 31 
C-4 
25% of consumer loans (auto loans, personal loans &consumer durable only ) 
classified into doubtful category. 
3 3 34 
C-5 
Deterioration in performing loans of the SME sector (50%) and Agri sector (50%) 
directly downgraded to loss category of NPLs. 
5 8 27 
C-6 Critical Infection Ratio (The ratio of NPLs to loans where capital wipes out). 3 37 0 
Interest Rate Shocks      
IR-1 An increase in interest rate by 300 basis points. 3 5 32 
IR-2 
Shift coupled with flattening of the yield curve by increasing 500, 300 and 200 
basis points in the three maturities respectively.  
3 4 33 
Exchange Rate Shocks     
ER-1 Depreciation of Pak Rupee by 25% against all currencies. 3 6 31 
ER-2 Appreciation of Pak Rupee by 5% against all currencies. 3 3 34 
Equity Price Shocks     
EQ-1 Fall in the equity prices by 30%. 3 4 33 
EQ-2 Fall in the equity prices by 50%. 4 4 32 
Combined Credit & Market Shocks     
COMB-1 
Interest rates increase(3%), deterioration of loans to the textile sector(25%) 
directly downgradedto doubtful category, and fall in equity prices by 30%. 
4 7 29 
COMB-2 
deterioration in loans portfolio (performing to substandard: 15% substandard to 
doubtful: 15% doubt to loss: 20%), fall in the equity prices (50%). 
4 7 29 
     
Number of 
Banks 
  
Liquidity Shock   
Becoming 
Illiquid 
  
      after shock for   
    3Days 4Days 5Days 
L-1 
Withdrawal of customer deposits by 2%, 5%,10%, 10%, and 10% for five 
consecutive days respectively. 
0 3 4 
 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan www.sbp.org.pk 
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Appendix 10: Secondary Data Analysis 
 
 
 CAR CRR GDPGR IIPGR LGTA MRR NPLR ORR ROE ROA 
CAR  1.000000           
CRR -0.325907*  1.000000         
GDPGR  0.056018  0.118070  1.000000        
IIPGR  0.062262  0.130529  0.963131*  1.000000       
LGTA -0.460541* -0.108291 -0.017514 -0.016659  1.000000      
MRR  0.078297 -0.033401 -0.033134 -0.022710  0.023835  1.000000     
NPLR 
-
0.149174**  0.118507 -0.209862* -0.227881* -0.066579  0.164299**  1.000000    
ORR  0.310825*  0.099675  0.173996**  0.204694* -0.083891  0.056876 
-
0.166908**  1.000000   
ROE  0.211641* 
-
0.304882*  0.140440  0.131588  0.269757*  0.043842 -0.484342*  0.114902  1.000000  
ROA -0.021179 
-
0.233170* 0.161150**  0.144926** 0.477169*  0.114001 -0.565564*  0.103309 0.783404* 1.000000 
 
  
 
 
 
 
         
 
 CAR CRR GDPGR IIPGR LGTA MRR NPLR ORR ROE ROA 
 Mean  17.19503  50.85653  3.596250  3.372500  18.78101  4.162764  12.38750  7.841684 -1.559196  0.201558 
 Median  14.47000  47.90000  3.770000  3.515000  18.88000  2.880000  10.13500  6.495000  7.410000  0.660000 
 Maximum  65.43000  90.87000  5.540000  9.030000  21.35000  26.46000  91.11000  80.09000  28.57000  3.980000 
 Minimum  0.560000  10.41000  0.360000 -4.180000  15.74000  0.030000  0.220000  0.400000 -270.5500 -7.080000 
 Std. Dev.  10.86166  14.20106  1.486674  3.700637  1.306938  4.567547  10.28677  9.175587  35.94958  1.888551 
 Skewness  1.898491  0.392601 -0.947349 -0.567606 -0.168658  1.886415  2.924425  6.383892 -3.944495 -1.571557 
 Kurtosis  7.088175  2.990309  3.331503  2.946775  2.201025  7.368392  19.65877  46.36950  22.95257  5.751644 
 Jarque-Bera  258.1216  5.112942  30.83146  10.76282  6.236529  276.2543  2545.744  16692.09  3816.997  144.6955 
Probability  0.000000  0.077578  0.000000  0.004601  0.044234  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 Obs  199  199  200  200  199  199  196  196  199  199 
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Apply redundant fixed effects – likelihood ratio  
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: EQ01    
Test cross-section fixed effects  
     
     
Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     
Cross-section F 23.196499 (24,160) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 290.904129 24 0.0000 
     
     
 
 
 
FIXED EFFECTS 
 
Dependent Variable: CAR   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 11/18/15   Time: 11:52   
Sample: 2007 2014   
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 25   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 194  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 167.3917 31.66480 5.286365 0.0000 
CRR -0.264053 0.063532 -4.156235 0.0001 
MRR -0.079384 0.103639 -0.765962 0.4448 
ORR 0.181179 0.072840 2.487358 0.0139 
NPLR -0.051907 0.045843 -1.132256 0.2592 
LNTA -7.323359 1.516714 -4.828438 0.0000 
GDPGR 0.074524 0.599851 0.124237 0.9013 
IIPGR 0.044211 0.239108 0.184898 0.8535 
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ROE 0.052732 0.021481 2.454794 0.0152 
ROA -0.959714 0.359391 -2.670387 0.0084 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.889358    Mean dependent var 16.73711 
Adjusted R-squared 0.866538    S.D. dependent var 10.22208 
S.E. of regression 3.734377    Akaike info criterion 5.630870 
Sum squared resid 2231.291    Schwarz criterion 6.203588 
Log likelihood -512.1944    Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.862780 
F-statistic 38.97281    Durbin-Watson stat 1.267990 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
 
RANDOM EFFECTS 
 
Dependent Variable: CAR   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects) 
Date: 11/18/15   Time: 11:55   
Sample: 2007 2014   
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 25   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 194  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 136.3107 14.70410 9.270250 0.0000 
CRR -0.228854 0.031096 -7.359523 0.0000 
MRR -0.039773 0.097454 -0.408118 0.6837 
ORR 0.201769 0.033246 6.068888 0.0000 
NPLR -0.059094 0.045650 -1.294504 0.1971 
LNTA -5.789702 0.717929 -8.064450 0.0000 
GDPGR 0.120555 0.699873 0.172253 0.8634 
IIPGR 0.010784 0.284673 0.037881 0.9698 
ROE 0.056857 0.014378 3.954368 0.0001 
ROA -0.979191 0.339120 -2.887446 0.0043 
     
      Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
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Cross-section random 6.609223 0.7580 
Idiosyncratic random 3.734377 0.2420 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.493221    Mean dependent var 3.325764 
Adjusted R-squared 0.468433    S.D. dependent var 5.229466 
S.E. of regression 3.808652    Sum squared resid 2669.073 
F-statistic 19.89750    Durbin-Watson stat 1.092704 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.395782    Mean dependent var 16.73711 
Sum squared resid 12185.10    Durbin-Watson stat 0.239350 
     
     
 
HAUSMAN TEST 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: EQ01    
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 16.465030 9 0.0578 
     
     
 
 
 
 
Unit root tests 
 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  CAR    
Date: 04/27/16   Time: 14:49  
Sample: 2007 2014   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
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Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -22.8651  0.0000  25  165 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -4.83906  0.0000  25  165 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  111.243  0.0000  25  165 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  93.3620  0.0002  25  174 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
     
     
     
     
 
 
 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  CRR    
Date: 04/27/16   Time: 14:49  
Sample: 2007 2014   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -28.4583  0.0000  25  164 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -8.56475  0.0000  25  164 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  145.254  0.0000  25  164 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  117.392  0.0000  25  174 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
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        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
 
 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  GDPGR   
Date: 04/27/16   Time: 14:50  
Sample: 2007 2014   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 1 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
Balanced observations for each test   
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -18.0635  0.0000  25  150 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -5.66361  0.0000  25  150 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  137.022  0.0000  25  150 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  97.2884  0.0001  25  175 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
     
     
 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  IIPGR   
Date: 04/27/16   Time: 14:50  
Sample: 2007 2014   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 1 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
Balanced observations for each test   
     
        Cross-  
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Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -12.9557  0.0000  25  150 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -4.99597  0.0000  25  150 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  125.710  0.0000  25  150 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  90.6652  0.0004  25  175 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  LGTA   
Date: 04/27/16   Time: 14:51  
Sample: 2007 2014   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -8.35444  0.0000  25  164 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   0.82540  0.7954  25  164 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  59.5647  0.1667  25  164 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  46.8979  0.5986  25  174 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
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Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  MRR    
Date: 04/27/16   Time: 14:51  
Sample: 2007 2014   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -9.79475  0.0000  25  168 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -2.41035  0.0080  25  168 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  85.6511  0.0013  25  168 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  90.9259  0.0004  25  174 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
 
 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  NPLR   
Date: 04/27/16   Time: 14:52  
Sample: 2007 2014   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -9.36251  0.0000  25  162 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -2.55941  0.0052  25  162 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  83.8628  0.0019  25  162 
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PP - Fisher Chi-square  104.576  0.0000  25  171 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
 
 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  ORR    
Date: 04/27/16   Time: 15:17  
Sample: 2007 2014   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -72.8096  0.0000  25  160 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -19.7481  0.0000  25  160 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  139.873  0.0000  25  160 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  134.894  0.0000  25  171 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  ROA    
Date: 04/27/16   Time: 14:52  
Sample: 2007 2014   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
 311 
 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -18.0855  0.0000  25  166 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -6.07683  0.0000  25  166 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  136.556  0.0000  25  166 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  136.143  0.0000  25  174 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
     
     
 
 
 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  ROE    
Date: 04/27/16   Time: 14:52  
Sample: 2007 2014   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -10.1769  0.0000  25  165 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -3.37312  0.0004  25  165 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  100.130  0.0000  25  165 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  110.869  0.0000  25  174 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
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Appendix 11: Questionnaire 
 
The Principal Investigator 
Shazaib Butt 
B.S. 414 
Royal Docks Business School 
University of East London 
Docklands Campus 
University Way 
London 
E16 2 RD 
Phone: 020 82237798 
Email: s.butt@uel.ac.uk;  
shahzeb@hotmail.com  
 
Institution 
University of East London 
 
University Research Ethics Committee 
If you have any queries regarding the conduct of the program in which you are being asked 
to participate, please contact:  
 
Merlin Harries,  
Quality Assurance and Enhancement (QAE) 
External and Strategic Development Service (ESDS)  
University of East London,  
Docklands Campus,  
London E16 2RD  
Telephone: 020 8223 2009 
Email: m.harries@uel.ac.uk 
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Consent to Participate in this Research Study 
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the information that you need to consider 
in deciding whether to participate in this study. 
 
Research Project Title 
Role and limitations of Basel II in Pakistani Banking Sector 
 
Outline of Research 
In the wake of frequent global financial crises caused by banking risks e.g. credit risk, 
market risk, operational risk, liquidity risk, risk of procyclicality etc. This research would 
attempt to contribute to mitigating such banking risks within Basel II compliant Banks in 
Pakistan.  
Basel II is international capital regulation framework proposed by G-10 countries to 
promote effective risk management in banking in order to avoid risks in banking. Basel II 
recommended approaches for calculating and maintaining minimum capital adequacy 
ratios (CAR) for international banks. Basel II has been progressively introduced in the G-
10 countries and the rest of the world. In keeping at par with the international regulatory 
compliance developments, State Bank of Pakistan initiated Basel II implementation in 
Pakistan in 2004.  
 
Project Objectives 
The objectives of the study are: 
 Explore role and limitations of Basel II on capital adequacy of commercial 
banks in Pakistan. 
 To establish whether impact of procyclicality on capital requirements can be 
measured 
 Attempt to develop CAR formula incorporating impact of procyclicality on 
capital requirements of commercial banks in Pakistan. 
 
 
Expected research contribution 
In Basel II compliant banks Credit, Market and Operational risks are calculated using given 
models and incorporated in Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) of the institution.  The 
conceptual framework of the study assumes that within the Basel II framework, risks (i.e. 
Credit, Market and Operational Risk) under Pillar 1 of the Basel II capital accord exert a 
collective impact on CAR of banks and exacerbate procyclicality. The impact of 
procyclicality then feeds back into these risks and further intensifies them for the bank 
prolonging given economic crises recovery period. Procyclicality of the capital 
requirements alone is more significant in dictating financial instability than mere individual 
sum of the three risks added together. Thus, the study attempts to measure that impact of 
procyclicality on capital requirements resulting from complex interaction of the Credit risk, 
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Market risk and Operational risk. The study furthermore, attempts to incorporate impact of 
procyclicality in Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) in Pakistani Banking.  
 
Contribution required by the participants: 
Please contribute to the study by completing the enclosed questionnaire and return it using 
the self-addressed envelope provided. The researcher sincerely appreciates your kind 
participation. Your contribution is considered an invaluable input towards achieving the 
objectives of the research and answering the research question. Thank you very much for 
cooperating.  
 
General information for the participants: 
There have been no risks or hazards identified in relation to this study. It is unlikely for the 
participants to experience any after affects, discomfort or distress.  
 
Confidentiality of the Data 
The study would strictly comply with Data Protection Act, 1998.  
Personal data will be stored securely using provided secured network and lockers provided 
by University of East London. Personal data shall not be transferred or shared. Personal 
data will be securely disposed of once the final analysis is achieved. The information 
provided would remain anonymous and strictly confidential. The analysis would be 
presented only in aggregate form when published.  
 
Location 
Royal Docks Business School 
University of East London 
University Way 
London 
United Kingdom 
E16 2RD 
 
Disclaimer 
You are not obliged to take part in this study, and are free to withdraw at any time during 
filling out the questionnaire. Should you choose to withdraw from the programme, 
discontinue filling out the questionnaire. Should you choose to withdraw from the 
participation, you may do so without any disadvantage to yourself and without any 
obligation to give a reason. 
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Questionnaire 
 
Name of the bank                                  
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 
Section A: Demographic Profiling 
Questions 1-4 relate to demographic profiling. Please tick (√) the appropriate box. 
 
1. Age range        
20 - 25             □     
26 - 30             □    
31 - 35             □   
36 - 40             □      
41 and above □ 
 
2. Qualification (relevant)       
Diploma            □     
Bachelor’s Degree   □    
Master’s Degree             □   
MPhil    □      
PhD    □      
Others (Please specify) ____________________ 
 
3. Years of experience as senior Pakistani banker      
0 - 5              □        
6 - 10              □      
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11 - 15   □       
15 - 20   □         
Above 21 years □  
 
4. Number of Basel Capital Accord Risk Management training courses attended          
1 - 3             □     
4 - 6             □    
7 - 9             □   
9 or more         □      
None  □ 
 
Section B: Basel Capital Regulation Compliance 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), established in 1974 by the G-10 
industrial countries released Basel II Capital Framework (Basel II) in year 2004. Basel II 
and then Basel III remain comprehensive upgrade versions of its predecessor Basel I 
Capital Framework. Basel Capital Regulation recommended approaches for calculating 
and maintaining minimum capital adequacy ratios (CAR) for banks. 
 
Questions 5-7 in this section relate to understanding the extent of Basel II compliance in 
your bank. Please choose one response only by ticking (√) the appropriate box. 
 
5. Implementing Basel Capital Regulation is a matter of ‘regulatory compliance only’ 
for your bank 
Strongly disagree                         □       
Disagree               □       
Neither disagree nor agree  □        
Agree                            □      
Strongly agree               □ 
 
6. Full compliance with Basel Capital Regulation is the most significant requirement 
for effective risk management in your bank 
Strongly disagree                         □       
Disagree               □       
Neither disagree nor agree  □        
Agree                            □      
Strongly agree               □ 
 
7. To what extent Basel Capital Regulation is implemented in your bank 
Fully compliant (AIRB Approaches)     □       
To large extent (i.e. calculate credit, market and operational risks) □       
To some extent (i.e. calculate credit risk only)    □        
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Not compliant                           □      
Don’t know        □ 
 
 
Section C: Active Risk Management under Basel Capital Regulation (ARM) 
Questions (1 – 11) in this part relate to the ‘Active risk management under modern 
methodologies’ as understood and practiced by personnel on daily basis in your Bank. 
Please tick (√) the most appropriate box or boxes (as instructed at the end of each question). 
 
 
8. Basel Capital Regulation provides most sophisticated and advanced data analysis 
methodologies for risk management in banking (Please choose one response)  
 
Strongly disagree                         □       
Disagree               □       
Neither disagree nor agree  □        
Agree                            □      
Strongly agree    □ 
 
9. Risk management models developed by Basel Capital Regulation for Credit, 
Market and Operational risks are very complex (Please choose one response) 
 
Strongly disagree                         □       
Disagree               □       
Neither disagree nor agree  □        
Agree                            □      
Strongly agree               □ 
 
10. Credit risk has significant impact on Bank’s Capital requirements 
 
Strongly disagree                         □       
Disagree               □       
Neither disagree nor agree  □        
Agree                            □      
Strongly agree               □ 
 
11. Market risk has significant impact on Bank’s Capital requirements 
 
Strongly disagree                         □       
Disagree               □       
Neither disagree nor agree  □        
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Agree                            □      
Strongly agree               □ 
 
 
12. Operational risk has significant impact on Bank’s Capital requirements 
 
Strongly disagree                         □       
Disagree               □       
Neither disagree nor agree  □        
Agree                            □      
Strongly agree               □ 
 
13. Liquidity has significant impact on Bank’s Capital requirements 
 
Strongly disagree                         □       
Disagree               □       
Neither disagree nor agree  □        
Agree                            □      
Strongly agree               □ 
 
14. Non-Performing Loans have significant effect on Bank’s Capital Requirements.  
 
Strongly disagree                         □       
Disagree               □       
Neither disagree nor agree  □        
Agree                            □      
Strongly agree               □ 
 
15. Bank’s size significantly impacts Bank’s Capital requirements  
 
Strongly disagree                         □       
Disagree               □       
Neither disagree nor agree  □        
Agree                            □      
Strongly agree               □ 
 
16. Bank’s profitability significantly impacts Bank’s Capital requirements 
 
Strongly disagree                         □       
Disagree               □       
Neither disagree nor agree  □        
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Agree                            □      
Strongly agree               □ 
 
 
 
17. Economic fluctuations significantly impacts Bank’s Capital requirements 
 
Strongly disagree                         □       
Disagree               □       
Neither disagree nor agree  □        
Agree                            □      
Strongly agree               □ 
 
 
18. Which of the following are most important banking risks. 
Please rank on a scale of 1 to 5 (where 1 = most UNIMPORTANT; through to 5 = most 
IMPORTANT) 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Credit Risk      
Market Risk      
Operational Risk      
Liquidity      
Procyclicality      
 
  
19. Which of the following is most important for regulating banks.  
Please rank on a scale of 1 to 5 (where 1 = most UNIMPORTANT; through to 5 = most 
IMPORTANT) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Capital requirements      
Non-performing loans      
Bank Profitability      
Bank size      
Sensitivity to economic activity       
 
 
20. Which of the following factors significantly impact effective risk management in 
banks?  
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Please rank on a scale of 1 to 5 (where 1 = most UNIMPORTANT; through to 5 = most 
IMPORTANT) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
International Bank Regulation      
Local Bank Regulation      
Globalization      
Economic factors      
Political factors      
 
 
-----End of questionnaire. 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION 
 
 
If there is anything else that you would like to tell us about this survey or 
any other comments you wish to make that you think may help us 
understand the risk management practices of banks and issues arising 
thereof, please do so in the space provided below. 
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